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Cover Photograph by Joseph D. Isaacson
With this issue, we introduce THINKING: The Journal of Philosophy for Children.

One more periodical? Perhaps. But THINKING is needed. Ever since philosophy for children ventured out of its shelter in the university and found itself at home in the elementary school as the basic thinking skills program, there has been a need for some more efficient way of sharing the news about this new educational development.

THINKING seeks to act as a clearinghouse of information, an arena for controversy, and a forum for philosophical and educational articles dealing with philosophy for children and related topics.

So that readers can judge for themselves whether or not what goes on in the elementary school classroom is genuinely philosophical and educational, THINKING will publish transcripts of classroom dialogue.

THINKING will present reports of educational experiments which are seeking to ascertain whether philosophy can make a demonstrable and measurable impact upon children's academic performance.

For those who are curious to know more about the historical ancestry of philosophy for children - just where in traditional literature it was foreshadowed - THINKING will reprint selections from relevant writers of earlier periods as well as more recent articles which may not be familiar to our readers.

Since philosophy entails independent, critical and imaginative reflection - or, more simply, "thinking for oneself" - there may be some juridical aspects to introducing such thinking into the schools. THINKING will attempt to throw light on this problem by publishing articles by philosophers of law on children's intellectual rights.

Some teachers report that philosophy in the classroom is nothing new. THINKING will invite discussion to make explicit what specifically makes a classroom discussion philosophical and how teachers can encourage children to think and converse philosophically among themselves.

For those interested in funding innovative philosophy programs in their local school districts, THINKING will contain up-to-date announcements about developing grant possibilities. It will also print bulletins regarding domestic and overseas developments in philosophy for children, with reports from Europe, the Middle East, Asia, South and Central America — wherever the program is being taught.

THINKING will also invite contributions from other scholarly areas — such as psychology and the social sciences — which bear on the development of a common front for reflective education. Likewise, there will be articles from classroom teachers themselves, reporting on their experience.

Each volume of THINKING will contain articles from still other areas — on moral education, on the teaching of logic, on the availability and nature of teacher-training, and on countless topics that are relevant to this emerging educational field.

It will be our policy to report what we see happening in the thinking skills area; it is not our wish to provide favored treatment to reports about IAPC curricula. There is a definite need for a broad spectrum of philosophical materials, and perhaps we can encourage the development of a variety of such curricula for children by inviting relevant contributions to the pages of THINKING.

These are some of the ways, we believe, that THINKING can make a contribution of sorts to the emergence of a more reflective community.
Many of Arnold Lobel's stories, both in this collection and elsewhere, make wry comments on language, on life and on human nature. One of my all-time favorites is a story in this collection called "Cookies" (pp. 30-41). It goes this way.

Frog and Toad begin eating cookies Toad has baked. They eat and eat, until Frog finally says (with his mouth full of cookies), "I think we should stop eating. We will soon be sick."

Toad agrees, but wants to eat one last cookie; they do. Then they eat one very last cookie. Frog says that what they need is will power. To Toad's question, "What is will power?" Frog answers, "Will power is trying hard not to do something that you really want to do."

Frog puts the remaining cookies in a box and announces that they will eat no more. "But we can open the Box," says Toad. "That's true," admits Frog. So Frog ties a string around the box. "But we can cut the string," Toad points out. "That's true," admits Frog. Frog gets a ladder and puts the box on a high shelf. "But we can climb the ladder," Toad points out. Finally, in desperation, Frog goes outside and gives the remaining cookies to the birds. "Now we have no more cookies to eat," says Toad sadly. "Not even one."

"Yes," says Frog, "but we have lots and lots of will power.

The notion of the will, and the associated notion of will power, are philosophically both vexed and vexing. Some of the vexations have to do with the idea of determinism and whether determinism is compatible with free will. But others have to do with the idea of weakness of will, incontinence (akrasia) — lack of will power.

Frog says that will power is "trying hard not to do something you really want to do." There is something very puzzling about the idea of trying not to do what you really want to do. If you really try not to do it, it will be because you want not to do it. What Frog (and we) describe as a lack of will power begins to look like a case of conflicting desires. Toad wants to stop; but also (and even more strongly) he wants to continue to eat cookies.

At this point it is easy to think of Toad as a collection of desires, including the desire to stop eating cookies (not very strong just now) and the desire to continue (very strong). Suppose Toad continues to eat cookies. Who is to blame? The desire to stop — for being too weak? Or the desire to continue — for being too strong? Or is it silly to blame a desire for being too strong, or too weak?

When St. Paul says, "Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me... (Romans 7:20)" he seems to be identifying himself with his good desires and disowning the others as alien and subversive (sin). But isn’t the person, St. Paul, as much the ego, or id, as the superego?

Arnold Lobel's gentle and loving mockery of Frog and Toad invites us to reflect on the phenomenon of weakness of will and to join philosophers from Aristotle (see Bk. VII of his Nicomachean Ethics) to the present in trying to understand it. The phenomenon is as familiar as it is difficult to be clear about.
The chairs in the classrooms of the Hardie School in Beverly, Massachusetts, are not sized for visitors of my height and displacement. They fit the likes of Barry Madore, who was more composed than I thought he should have been when he sat across from me at the schoolroom table my knees did not fit under. Barry Madore is a ten-year-old in the fifth grade at Hardie and he had agreed to tell me what he felt was happening in his philosophy course, which is listed in his principal's office as the Elementary Enrichment class. As he spoke, Barry leaned back in his chair to deepen my envy of his ease, while I studied him from a cramped perch close to the floor and beat back the urge to ask if he knew that Aristotle was the first to propose that learning is pain.

Aristotle, as I was relieved to learn, is not yet a big formative presence in Barry's philosophy studies. That afternoon in Beverly, the cynosure of his mind's eye was still Harry Stottlemeier, a fictional contemporary who is the protagonist of Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery. In the book what Harry does is... he thinks. He cerebrates, syllogizes, inducts and deduces better than anybody on his turf, which is an elementary school where a nicely turned major and minor premise leading to a rigorous conclusion would get more notice than a record-breaking toss with a Frisbee.

The Most Interesting Thing

The children's story is a classroom philosophy text for fifth and sixth graders and it was written by Matthew Lipman, an RF grantee and head of the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children at Montclair State College in New Jersey. Wherever Lipman gets his program started, Harry Stottlemeier becomes as familiar a character to the ten-to-twelve-year-old set as Tom Sawyer was to their grandparents.

When we talked that morning late last fall, Barry told me his class had read to page fifty of the book but that he had read on to page seventy-five. I, however, cunning with years, had read to the end, or another twenty pages. I had not come all the way around wintry Boston on Route 128 to get tripped up in any textual analysis showdowns with adversaries half my height and a fifth my age. Since we had no prefatory pipes to light up, or sheries to sip, Barry and I got right to our subject.

I opened my marked-up copy of Lipman's text to page sixteen where I had jabbed a few exclamation points into the margin. The sentences beside them were the opening paragraph of a composition assignment on "The Most Interesting Thing in the World", which Stottlemeier had written for his history and geography class.

To me, the most interesting thing in the whole world is thinking. I know that lots of other things are also very important and wonderful, like electricity and magnetism and gravitation. But although we understand them, they can't understand us. So thinking must be very special.

Barry agreed that it was. "What I like best is thinking about how to think," he told me. "And I like a lot of the thoughts I get from reading this book." I wanted to know what some of his recent thoughts were, and Barry told me one.

Backwards and Forwards

"Right now, I'm thinking about how the universe got here," he said, and then shared with me a few penseées on the possible causes for its arrival. While he talked, he kept checking to be sure I was keeping up with him.

"But I don't just think back all the time now. Sometimes I think about why things keep going forward." I told him that was one of the puzzlements that drove me to thinking at times too, usually at night, but that I did not always turn up any answers I thought valuable. Barry allowed that he had had the same experience. "Sometimes when I am thinking hard about something I get frustrated," he said. "You know," he continued, "things can be real even if you can't see them. For example, you can't see thoughts but they are real."
We went on that way for a while longer, battling the old
dialectic back and forth, exchanging Socratic roles, ham­
mering together a few syllogisms, some with holes in them.
All minnows are fish/All sharks are fish/And therefore, all
minnows are sharks; that was one I tried on him. By then I
felt it was time to return him to the other fifth graders and
I had my last question ready.

"Who was Aristotle?" I asked him.

"He was a Greek philosopher, but I haven't heard much
about him."

That left me with two more last questions. "How many syl­
lables are there in Harry Stottlemeier's last name?" Barry
thought with his eyes closed and then told me there
were four.

"Take away the last two and what would your friend
Harry's name be?" Barry closed his eyes again, thought
contentedly, and then snapped them open wide. "Now I
see," he said delightedly. "Stottle. Harry Stottle. That's
Aristotle. That's who he is." We shook hands and ex­
changed assurances that we would meet again.

All Fish Are Tuna?

Barry's philosophy teacher is James Watras, a lean and
soft-voiced Vermonter who turns up once a week at Hardie
for its Elementary Enrichment class. I met Watras in the
library across the street where he was showing a band of
earnest youngsters how to use the card catalog. It was
Watras who had booked my twenty minutes with Barry: were there any more like him in the school district, I
wondered? To convince me that there were, Watras had
three more ten-year-olds, John Higgins, Kevin Wesley, and
Joanna Murphy, waiting at the Brown School a few miles
away. All of them, quite obviously, had spent a lot of time
thinking about thinking, and talking to one another about
thought. I felt excluded from their deliberations while they
fell into noisy disputes about the difference between sen­tences beginning with "no" and sentences beginning with
"all." What they called "no" sentences, such as "No lions
are eagles," are true, they explained to me, even when they
are reversed into "No eagles are lions." But "all" sentences,
such as "All tuna are fish," are not true when they are re­
versed into "All fish are tuna." It was Kevin Wesley who
wanted to be sure I followed their reasoning on this. "All
fish aren't tuna," he confided, "because there are trout and
there are sharks and lots of other fish besides." I agreed.
Who would do less?

ON ENCOURAGING LOGICAL CHILDREN TO BE CREATIVE

In terms of pedagogy, I feel that the clearest educational
challenge exists in the case of the children who are relative­
ly able to analyze implications but relatively unable to
generate conceptual possibilities. There is little doubt that,
as educational environments become richer and teachers
become equipped with a wider variety of technical aids,
general improvements can take place in the level of analytic
skills possessed by children who are initially poor at
analysis of implications. The gradual rise in scores on
intellective-ability tests that we have witnessed over recent
years testifies to this kind of pedagogical effect. It is an ef­
fect, however, that amounts to cultivating "more of the
same," since we have found that sensitivity to what is cor­
correct and incorrect in terms of given rule systems already
constitutes the very core of what qualifies in our society as
educability and as educational achievement. The educa­
tional message that gets communicated to those children
who are capable of analyzing implications but poor at pro­
ducing conceptual possibilities, on the other hand,
represents in my estimation a serious deception. These
children are informed that as far as the society is con­
cerned, they are doing fine educationally. Yet, they cannot
adopt the kind of tolerance toward error that may lie at the
root of much significant innovation in mathematics, science,
and the arts. The challenge for education, then, is to do
something different for these children—something that may
have the effect of freeing them from an inflexibly maintained
attitude of avoidance toward error. It would seem that they
need to learn that circumstances exist under which it is an
acceptable practice to withhold one's judgment about cor­
rectness or incorrectness — to live with the chance of mak­
ing a mistake.

—from Michael A. Wallach, "Creativity and the Expression of
Possibilities," in Creativity and Learning (Boston: Houghton
I can’t decide,” pondered John, a freckle-faced red head whose eleven year old face confirmed his uncertainty. “In some ways I can see how thoughts are real: I mean, you can see them. You can get them when you want them. Sometimes you can even feel them. They can even cause other things to happen. But in other ways they still don’t seem real to me. Like, you can’t touch them, and no one else can see them.”

“Well, how do you vote?” his neighbor impatiently asked. “You said you can’t touch them,” an anti-realist lobbied. “I just don’t know,” John continued. “I can’t make up my mind.”

“Maybe there isn’t a right answer?” Chris chimed in, seemingly questioning her own previous pro-realist vote. “That’s not necessarily true,” Marcie quickly responded, looking directly at Chris. (John’s face showed the ping-pong match still going on in his mind.) “It’s just like Plato’s Cave. Just because we don’t know the answer, that doesn’t mean there isn’t one.”

At that the bell rang and the students left for recess. On the playground Marcie and Chris quickly bounced a ball back and forth to one another. John ran up a wooden ramp and leaped off clutching as high as he could onto a stack of old tires.

No, this scene is not a new chapter from Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery. The discussion was a real (used in a literal sense) incident involving gifted fifth- and sixth-graders in the Elementary Enrichment Center (E.E.C., a one-day-per-week pull-out program) in Beverly, Massachusetts. Admittedly the precipitant in this particular discussion was Chapter Four from Harry, but long before discovering Harry these children had made their own discoveries. One characteristic which all children have in common is that they, like Harry, are naturally philosophical.

Questions of ethics come up naturally in class. “Shouldn’t we do something for children who don’t have any toys?” Steven asks after hearing a talk by a woman from the Salvation Army. Kim puts up signs in her father’s store in support of the bottle bill (“Because people shouldn’t litter,” she tells me later), and then cries when it is defeated. Marcie goes up to a particularly obnoxious visiting student and asks if she would like to share a snack, not, as she informs me after the girl has left, because she likes the girl, but because she didn’t want her to feel lonely.

We give children the skills to make sense of the physical world, but their world is more.
"My thoughts are like a lion in a cage ... at night ... the lions growl and keep me awake."

"But wait a minute!" It is John again, bursting in after much thought. "How would you know there was anything on the tape if someone didn't hear it?"

Again the bell rings.

When a parent sees me at the supermarket she comments, "All I've heard the past two days is trees falling in the forest."

I hope she has heard. Not the trees, but the young philosopher at work.

"My thoughts are like a woodpecker pecking away at my mind," Mary writes. Unknown to her, Cary expresses a similar impression: "My thoughts are like a lion in a cage. During the day people look at them, and at night they don't, but the lions growl and keep me awake."

The lions are the philosophical questions that all children have. Our problem, as teachers, is what to do with such questions.

One responsibility which we all have as teachers of the gifted (either in a homogenous, heterogenous, or one-to-one setting) is to allow them the opportunity to get together with their intellectual peers and discuss questions of philosophy. It is through this bouncing off of ideas, through this understanding that others share similar concerns, that students will grow most fully.

But simply discussing is not sufficient. As teachers of philosophy in the schools, we also have the responsibility to become better trained in philosophy — especially in the elements of philosophical reasoning. To the extent we simply nod and say, "That's good," when students share their questions, or end a discussion with "You know, sometimes I have the same questions," we do our students a disservice. We do them the injustice of thinking that philosophy is just the asking of questions, instead of also providing them with the tools and motivations to make their own inquiries.

"Thinking can be one of the most enjoyable things in the world," says Michael. "When I learn it is like adding a new volume to my huge encyclopedia in my brain."

"I like to learn because I am very curious," writes Dana. "I like knowing things. Learning helps me understand too. I also think about why we die. And I always get different answers when I think about this. But most of the time I think about why we live. Why do we live?"

The questions are real. Dana, Michael, Marcie, John and the others really want to know. Learning helps them understand their world. But the world for many a gifted child is the world of the mind, the world of thinking: Thinking about the square root of two, the speed of a space ship, the causes of the depression, but also thinking about why we live, why we act, what is good, who is God, thinking about thinking.

We give children the skills to make sense of the physical world, but their world is more: it is also the logical, the ethical, the aesthetic, the metaphysical. We must give children the tools to make sense of those other worlds which are equally pressing for them. We must give them the tools of philosophy.
Of the Education of Children

— Michel de Montaigne, Essays

Since philosophy is that which instructs us to live, and that infancy has there its lessons as well as other ages, why is it not communicated to children betimes? "The clay is moist and soft: now, now make haste, and form the pitcher on the rapid wheel."

They begin to teach us to live when we have almost done living. A hundred students have got the pox before they have come to read Aristotle’s lecture on temperance. Cicero said that though he should live two men’s ages, he should never find leisure to study the lyric poets; and I find these sophisters yet more deplorably unprofitable. The boy we would breed has a great deal less time to spare; he owes but the first fifteen or sixteen years of his life to education; the remainder is due to action. Let us, therefore, employ that short time in necessary instruction. Away with the thorny subtleties of dialectics; they are abuses, things by which our lives can never be amended. Take the plain philosophical discourses, learn how rightly to choose, and then rightly to apply them; they are more easy to be understood than one of Boccaccio’s novels; a child from nurse is much more capable of them than of learning to read or to write. Philosophy has discourses proper for childhood as well as for the decrepit age of men.

I am of Plutarch’s mind that Aristotle did not so much trouble his great disciple with the knack of forming syllogisms or with the elements of geometry as with infusing into him good precepts concerning valor, prowess, magnanimity, temperance, and the contempt of fear; and with this ammunition sent him, whilst yet a boy, with no more than thirty thousand foot, four thousand horse, and but forty-two thousand crowns to subjugate the empire of the whole earth. For the other arts and sciences, he says, Alexander highly indeed commended their excellence and charm and had them in very great honour and esteem, but not ravished with them to that degree as to be tempted to affect the practice of them in his own person. "Young men and old men derive hence a certain end to the mind, and stores for miserable grey hairs."

Epicurus, in the beginning of his letter to Meniceus, says, "That neither the youngest should refuse to philosophize nor the oldest grow weary of it." Who does otherwise seems tacitly to imply that either the time of living happily is not yet come or that it is already past. And yet, for all that, I would not have this pupil of ours imprisoned and made a slave to his book; nor would I have him given up to the morosity and melancholic humour of a sour, ill-natured pedant; I would not have his spirit cowed and subdued by applying him to the rack and tormenting him, as some do, fourteen or fifteen hours a day and so make a packhorse of him. Neither should I think it good when, by reason of a solitary and melancholic complexion, he is discovered to be overmuch addicted to his book, to nourish that humour in him; for that renders him unfit for civil conversation, and diverts him from better

"Since philosophy is that which instructs us to live . . . , why is it not communicated to children betimes?"
employments. And how many have I seen in my time totally brutified by an immoderate thirst after knowledge? Carneades was so besotted with it that he would not find time so much as to comb his head or to pare his nails. Neither would I have his generous manners spoiled and corrupted by the incivility and barbarism of those of another. The French wisdom was anciently turned into proverb: "Early, but of no continuance," And, in truth, we yet see that nothing can be more ingenious and pleasing than the children of France; but they ordinarily deceive the hope an expectation that have been conceived of them; and grown up to be men, have nothing extraordinary or worth taking notice of: I have heard men of good understanding say, these colleges of ours to which we send our young people (and of which we have but too many) make them such animals as they are. But to our little monsieur, a closet, a garden, the table, his bed, solitude and company, morning and evening, all hours shall be the same, and all places to him a study; for philosophy, who, as the formatrix of judgment and manners, shall be his principal lesson, has that privilege to have a hand in everything. The orator Isocrates, being at a feast entreated to speak of his art, all the company were satisfied with and commended his answer: "It is not now a time," he said, "to do what I can do; and that which it is now time to do, I cannot do." For to make orations and rhetorical disputes in a company met together to laugh and make good cheer had been very unseasonable and improper, and as much might have been said of all the other sciences. But as to what concerns philosophy, that part of it at least that treats of man and of his offices and duties, it has been the common opinion of all wise men that, out of respect to the sweetness of her conversation, she is ever to be admitted in all sports and entertainments. And Plato, having invited her to his feast, we see after how gentle and obliging a manner, accommodated both to time and place, she entertained the company, though in a discourse of the highest and most important nature, "It profits poor and rich alike, but, neglected, equally hurts old and young." By this method of instruction, my young pupil will be much more and better employed than his fellows of the college are. But as the steps we take in walking to and fro in a gallery, though three times as many, do not tire a man so much as those we employ in a formal journey, so our lesson, as it were accidentally occurring without any set obligation of time or place and falling naturally into every action, will insensibly insinuate itself. By which means our very exercises and recreations, running, wrestling, music, dancing, hunting, riding, and fencing, will prove to be a good part of our study. I would have his outward fashion and mien and the disposition of his limbs formed at the same time with his mind. 'Tis not a soul, 'tis not a body that we are training up, but a man, and we ought not to divide him. And, as Plato says, we are not to fashion one without the other, but make them draw together like two horses harnessed to a coach. By which saying of his, does he not seem to allow more time for, and to take more care of, exercises for the body, and to hold that the mind, in a good proportion, does her business at the same time too?
As is well known, Supreme Court decisions over the past decade have significantly expanded the scope of constitutional protection available to public school students. Children today enjoy the protections of the first amendment in school by virtue of the Court's decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District and of the due process clause when school administrators seek to discipline them, by virtue of the decision in Goss v. Lopez. These cases inevitably provoke the question: "How far will — and should — this development go?" Or to put the matter somewhat more theoretically: To what extent does the ideal of constitutional equality properly extend to schoolchildren and entitle them the same range of protections enjoyed by adults?

At the risk of oversimplification, one can today identify at least two characteristically different responses to this question. One builds upon the historic attitude that schoolchildren, both because they are young and because they are in school, are self-evidently "different" and unentitled to such rights.

Those attuned to this view will regret the Supreme Court's expansion of students' rights and they will be unsympathetic to any further such expansions. They will, to one degree or another, find themselves in sympathy with traditional thought about the power of school officials over their young charges as embodied in the doctrine of in loco parentis.

The essence of this doctrine may be captured without extended or technical inquiry. Readers who matriculated before the mid-1960's need only recall their own implicit assumptions as public school pupils to remember how unthinkable it would have been to claim that they possessed rights and that school administrators were bound to respect those rights. "Unthinkable" here is no figure of speech. The notion of "rights" was so contrary to prevailing assumptions about the natural order of things as never to require conscious rejection.

The second approach — one which I regard as far preferable — is sympathetic to the extension of constitutional protections to students in the myriad contexts in which they daily confront state power as exercised by school authorities, including the right to free speech, the right to due process of law at the hands of school authorities, the right to be safeguarded from cruel and unusual punishment in the school setting, the right to immunity from unreasonable searches or seizures on school premises, and the privilege against self-incrimination in disciplinary proceedings.

This latter view does not depend on any conception that children are merely adults whose growth has through some hormonal quirk been physically stunted, such as the children portrayed in the paintings of Brueghel. Rather, it depends on the belief that for all their differences, their development as informed, self-
confident, critical participants in a democratic society necessitates much the same respect for their right to share in the core values of the Bill of Rights as is displayed toward adults.

This contrast in perspective can be largely explained in terms of the conflicting assumptions concerning children, education and the relationship between the two, which underlie the contending viewpoints. One school of thought tends toward the view that where children are involved, educational values and constitutional values are in implacable conflict; the other inclines toward the view that the very ends of education demand respect for the rights of those being educated.

It is these conflicting attitudes about children and education, particularly as manifested in some court decisions, that I wish to explore in this paper.

To better understand the *in loco parentis* ideology, or at least one variant of it, it is useful to start with the little-known case of *Wooster v. Sunderland*. That case, decided some 60 years ago, is notable for capturing so neatly one variant of it, with the court described it with such unselfconscious candor, the "subordination" by students to "constituted authority," as practical training of a high order. Adult life, after all, often required the unquestioning, even amiable acceptance of things as they were, however irrational they might have appeared. (I encountered this attitude a number of years ago during a parent-student discussion in a Los Angeles junior high school concerning the validity of the hair-length regulations then in force. One parent conceded he could find no justification for a rule regulating the hair length of male students only. He concluded however that not all things in society were rational. Therefore the rule should be retained so that students would learn to accept such irrational rules.)

What contributes to children's academic outlook?

Three things impress us more and more: one, the early importance of parents in the academic socialization process; two, the variety of implications marking policies have for children's expectations and school performance; and three, the complexity of the world when viewed from the child's eyes.


Wooster was brought before the board to "explain his motive." For the benefit of those insensitive to nuance, he explained that his rhetoric was "intended as a slam" at the board. The board concurred and demanded an apology. None was forthcoming and Wooster was expelled. The trial court affirmed the board action and Wooster appealed.

The appeals court found in favor of the school board saying:

[The whole tenor of the address was well calculated to . . . engender . . . in the minds of the students a feeling of disrespect for the defendants, and a secret if not an open hostility to their control of the student body and management of school affairs. Such being the natural tenor and tendency of the plaintiff's address, his conduct in making the same cannot be classed as anything but a species of insubordination to constituted authority, which required correction . . . in order that the discipline of the school might be maintained. . . .

It occurred to no one — school authorities, the court, or even to Wooster himself — that his speech should enjoy constitutional protection; his appeal was therefore cast in narrowly technical terms. The predominant attitudes toward education and the young made it incongruous, even bizarre, to suppose that Wooster might possess "rights" enforceable against school officials, even assuming such speech would have enjoyed protection in the society at large. The prevailing view of education saw its central purpose as the transmission of those facts and skills students would someday need to play a useful role in society; the cultivation of critical, independent thought was not a proper schoolhouse activity.

Given the conception of education as a one-way conduit from teacher to pupil — as product rather than process — it was logical to view student criticism of authority as sand in the machinery of education, undermining discipline and distracting students from the main task of absorbing knowledge.

Moreover, the dominant view of life and education regarded unquestioning obedience to official dictates, or as the *Wooster* court described it with such unselfconscious candor, the "subordination" by students to "constituted authority," as practical training of a high order. Adult life, after all, often required the unquestioning, even amiable acceptance of things as they were, however irrational they might have appeared. (I encountered this attitude a number of years ago during a parent-student discussion in a Los Angeles junior high school concerning the validity of the hair-length regulations then in force. One parent conceded he could find no justification for a rule regulating the hair length of male students only. He concluded however that not all things in society were rational. Therefore the rule should be retained so that students would learn to accept such irrational rules.)

Quite apart from such functional justifications, restrictions on student speech were warranted simply because "disrespect" and "insubordination" were immoral. Their suppression required no further justification.

Given the prevailing sentiments it is not surprising that the school authorities did not consider less repressive responses to Wooster's criticisms. They might, for example, have simply laughed off the incident because Wooster's
WHAT CLAIMS CAN CHILDREN MAKE?

The justification of children's rights under Rawls's theory has one major emphasis: children have a right to make just claims, and adults must be responsive to these claims. This conception of the just society, if widely accepted, would lead to a change in attitude on the part of adults. In according rights to children, the theory makes adults more accountable to children. They can no longer assume it is only at their pleasure that children are permitted to make claims and exercise freedoms. Adopting this new conception of children's rights would in itself be an important reform.


comments had not seriously interfered with school life. Or they might have engaged him in dialogue about his complaints, because the issues he raised were more important than the perhaps intemperate way in which he raised them. Or they might have welcomed his forthright criticism of the then-prevailing conceptions of relationships between young people and "constituted authority."

Now one might be tempted to treat this case as a historic relic, interesting to one with an antiquarian bent but of no contemporary practical significance. To be sure, few courts would decide the case the same way today. But the attitudes underpinning that decision have yet to be interred. One suspects that the nerve fibers of many a school administrator and judge, too, would flutter sympathetically to the law-and-order rhythms of the Wooster decision.

It is instructive also that even some judges who are deeply committed to constitutional rights in general are prepared to read students out of the ambit of their protection because of a view they hold about the "special nature" of school children. Justice Hugo Black exemplified this view. His fierce dedication, as a member of the Supreme Court, to the first amendment in general needs no testimonial for those with a passing knowledge of his record. Yet in Tinker, he opposed the extension of first amendment rights to students in a bilious dissent, saying that schoolchildren have "not yet reached the point of experience and wisdom which [enable] them to teach all of their elders . . . taxpayers send children to school . . . to learn, not teach." Furthermore, to acknowledge that schoolchildren have a right of speech would be to subject "all the public schools in the country to the whims and caprices of their loudest-mouthed, but maybe not their brightest, students."

With this background as a frame of reference, one can appreciate the change of view represented by several of the Supreme Court decisions of the last decade, to which we now turn.

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. This case, decided in 1969, marked a major judicial reassessment of the Wooster attitude toward minors, schools, and freedom of speech. Students had worn black armbands to school in symbolic protest against the war in Vietnam. School officials promptly banned the conduct and suspended those who disobeyed the ban. The case compelled the Supreme Court to confront squarely the issue whether speech on school premises was entitled to first amendment protection. It concluded that students did not leave their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate, saying:

"In our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk . . . and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom — this kind of openness — that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.

One striking facet of the case is how extraordinarily modest were the rights claimed by the students. The student expression could not plausibly be viewed as "incendiary," "disrespectful," or "insubordinate." The wearing of armbands "caused discussion outside of the classrooms, but no interference with work and no disorder." The fact that it took a landmark Supreme Court decision to establish even the modest rights at issue underscores the historic absence of student rights.

Goss v. Lopez. This case arose out of a period of widespread student unrest during which several schools in Columbus, Ohio, were affected by racial confrontation, demonstrations and problems of various sorts. Over 75 students were suspended for their involvement in disruptive demonstrations. Although the circumstances surrounding the suspensions varied, they shared one common feature: No hearing was provided in which the students could contest their suspensions.

Some of the students challenged the law that allowed their suspension by school authorities for up to 10 days without notice or hearing. The lower court found that these procedures violated the students' rights to due process of law, reasoning that suspension for even 10 days or less was unconstitutional where no hearing was provided. On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed by a vote of five to four. The threshold issue was the very applicability of the due process clause to school disciplinary procedures. The Court found that it did apply, that public school students were not somehow outside the amendment's guarantees.

What then were the requirements of due process? The Court laid down a number of what it characterized as "rudimentary" requirements. These requirements reduced themselves to "some kind of notice" and "some kind of hearing." As will be seen, the Court's characterization of its requirements involved no false modesty: rudimentary they were indeed. For to illustrate its meaning, the Court gave apparent en-
the proposition that children are incompetent requires substantial modification in order to approximate the real world.”

1. Incompetence and paternalism.

The notion that children are incompetent is one of the pillars of the classic *in loco parentis* view of the public schools. This view rests on a syllogism of beguiling simplicity: Only those who possess certain capabilities are entitled to share in generally held rights; schoolchildren lack some of those capabilities. The conclusion is that children may be denied rights take for granted by adults.

The argument, however, is neither as simple nor as compelling as it first appears; both premises of the syllogism must be qualified. First, the proposition that children are incompetent requires substantial modification in order to approximate the real world. Although history clearly teaches that children are “different,” it has spoken over time with a remarkable cacophony of voices as to who are “children.” Indeed, that dependent state between childhood and adulthood called adolescence is an invention of modern industrialized society. Even given a culture that takes extended adolescence for granted, its proper duration is subject to reasonable dispute and to revision.

More fundamentally, the major premise of the syllogism — the notion that entitlement to share in generally held constitutional rights depends on certain capabilities or competence — is flawed. Competency is, to be sure, at times relevant and even decisive for the determination of rights; but at other times it is not. Competency is relevant to those rights principally aimed at maximizing the free choice of persons, as opposed to those principally intended to safeguard the individual against governmental abuse. Rights of the first category ought to be limited to those who have the capacity of avoiding serious harm to themselves or others as they go about exercising their choices. Thus, we have the strongest case for denying rights to children...
on the ground of their incapacity when the injury we are concerned with is great, when the likelihood of its occurrence is high, when the opportunity for the child’s learning process or for adult intervention to moderate the danger once the child has acted is low, and when the injury, if it occurs, is irreversible. Driving cars and using guns are examples: A momentary indiscretion may unleash terrible consequences that can neither be checked nor undone. The child’s immaturity certainly argues against free choice. But with respect to other rights, “competency” is not the appropriate test. I have in mind those rights aimed not so much at maximizing free choice but at civilizing the processes and instruments of state compulsion.

Due process of law and the right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment are archtypical examples. They do not deny the legitimacy of governmental interference with a citizen’s free choice. Rather, they regulate the terms of that interference. Procedural due process does not immunize persons against deprivations of life, liberty or property; it simply insists on a degree of fairness and humanity. Similarly, the eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment does not prevent punishment; it regulates the ways in which government visits unpleasantness upon people. At that degree, the capacity of children has nothing to do with their right to be treated fairly, decently and humanely by their government. They are entitled to such treatment not because they are competent but because they are persons.

One might reason, however, that other constitutional rights do hinge on possession of adult competency. The right of free speech might be offered as a prime example. One of its central functions, after all, is to facilitate free choice by that portion of the population regarded as competent to exercise choice. But that argument, too, breaks down. For in our society the right to speak is far broader than the right to act on that speech. And the fact that choices may be foreclosed to children until they reach a certain age hardly precludes their right to think, speak, debate, and dissent about those choices.

Furthermore, important choices are inescapable even for the young. How, for example, should children think about their peers of other races and sexes? How should they adjust to the competitive values that permeate our society? How should they evaluate the network of ideas and values they are exposed to in school? How should they think about authority — its legitimacy and its limits? How should they go about selecting their future education and careers? Schools are, or should be, a training ground for informed, intelligent resolution of such issues, whether the decisions are to be made now or in the future. Students, therefore, should be permitted access to ideas and arguments that stir the society at large, even if they are permitted only limited participation in decisionmaking. This educational process cannot be deferred until the child reaches age 18.

2. The “unity of interest” between school authorities and students.

The paternalism argument rests not only on assumptions of student incompetence but on a companion view that school authorities can and do protect student interests. Why then do they need legal protections? Justice Powell, speaking for the Goss minority, described the relation between the interests of students and officials as “unalike the divergent and even sharp conflict of interests usually present where due process rights are asserted.” In the school context, he found those interests “essentially congruent.” Accordingly, the adversary stance that makes sense in the world outside of the schoolroom makes none at all within that benign setting, where “the experience, good faith, and dedication” of the school staff safeguard student interests.

“Students . . . should be permitted access to ideas and arguments that stir the society at large, even if they are permitted only limited participation in decision-making.”
“The requirements of fair treatment at the hands of government, of humane punishment, of privacy, or of free speech are protected not because they are earned, but because they preserve essential aspects of human dignity and are necessary limitations upon government in a democratic society.”

The Goss majority, in upholding the students’ claim to due process rights, presented one response to this view. Even assuming the coincidence of interest postulated by the minority, officials may make mistakes. No one, said the Court, believes that the school “disciplinary process [is] a totally accurate, unerring process, never mistaken and never unfair.” The majority here stands on firm ground.

But the dissent’s easy equation of the interests of students and school officials also contains a more fundamental flaw: The “unity of interest” is partial at best. School teachers, principals, school superintendents, and school boards have a variety of interests — personal, bureaucratic and political — that may clash with those of the child. The interest of school officials in job advancement, political approval, county funds, peer recognition, ego gratification, or a work atmosphere free of student “disrespect” is not necessarily the child’s best interest.

This divergence of interest is aggravated, or course, when the disciplinary issues arise out of political controversy, and students find themselves challenging, criticizing and thereby offending the very school authorities who sit in judgment upon them. It strains credulity to suppose that students in such a context would perceive the disciplinarian’s stance as “disinterested” or would see the interests of the two as “congruent.” Why should they?

3. The young have not earned certain rights.

Arguably, certain rights are denied the young not only because they lack rational capacity, but also because the rights have not been earned. For example, this justification might be offered as part of the reason for denying the young the right to vote. Because they have not shouldered adult responsibilities such as self-support, paying taxes and fighting in wars, minors have not earned the right to vote. Denial of the right is the quid pro quo for their privileged status as children. Moreover, because they are relieved of adult burdens, there is no unfairness in denying children a voice in the allocation of such burdens. This position is the converse of the no-taxation-without-representation argument.

But the young are no immune from countless legal requirements, including the duties to pay taxes and to obey the laws. Furthermore, the right to vote is conferred upon numerous adults whose claim to entitlement may be no stronger than that of many minors — for example, those who do not support themselves, earn enough to pay taxes or fight in wars. Finally, the arguments are fatally similar to the long-discredited conception of the right to vote as a privilege of the propertied class.

More important, whatever validity these arguments are said to have with respect to the right to vote, they cannot apply to the protections of the Bill of Rights. The requirements of fair treatment at the hands of government, of humane punishment, of privacy, or of free speech are protected not because they are earned, but because they preserve essential aspects of human dignity and are necessary limitations upon government in a democratic society.

4. Obedience as educational imperative.

One view of the relationship between children and adult authority considers a high degree of deference by children indispensable to their proper moral and practical growth. Thus, the Goss minority postulates an incompatibility between due process and a student’s understanding of “the necessity of rules and obedience thereto.”

But the students in Goss claimed no immunity from the “rules.” They merely sought an opportunity to challenge an administrator’s decision that the rules had been violated and that they, the students, had violated them. To deny them a hearing on this point may or may not produce a desirable lesson in obedience, but surely the lesson cannot be characterized as one of obedience to administrative fiat.

The minority, nonetheless, felt that this nonreciprocal approach to rule compliance contributed to the moral development of the child:

In an age when the home and church play a diminishing role in shaping the character and value judgments of the young, a heavier responsibility falls upon the schools. When an immature student merits censure for his conduct, he is rendered a disservice if appropriate sanctions are not applied or if procedures for their application are so formalized as to invite a challenge to the teacher’s authority...
But what is to happen when, as in Goss, the student doubts that "censure" is merited? The minority, with startling simplicity, eliminated the issue, in the quotation above, by assuming the very question to be proved: that censure was merited. The dissenters hoped thereby to teach the young the meaning of "the social compact of respect for the rights of others." But these methods teach only that those wielding governmental powers are not to be challenged and that "respect for the rights of others" is a mildly disguised code phrase for a unidirectional "respect" for adult authority no matter how arbitrary it may be.

The history of official behavior, especially as revealed in recent years, offers precious little that would make one want to teach this version of the "social compact." Surely, a better lesson would be to teach precisely the reverse: that even the young and powerless enjoy rights, and that legal constraints bind the governors as well as the governed. From this perspective; one might regard a student’s desire to rebel against "arbitrary" authority as an impulse that society should prize.

An alternative argument for the virtues of unquestioning obedience to authority might be couched in practical rather than moral terms. Students need to learn this lesson as part of their socialization to adult life. To learn to accept authority, sometimes even irrational authority, is to prepare for the real world. But if this accurately describes the real world, educators might well seek to encourage reflection about that world, the nature of the social organization that produces it, its implications, and possible alternatives to it, rather than merely to promote the practical advantages of accommodation. To the degree that public education promotes "realistic accommodation" of this sort, it contributes to the reality just described and abandons more noble ideals of public education: the development of a citizenry capable of understanding, questioning and evaluating society and one that confronts authority in a self-confident, thoughtful and critical way.

5. Student rights as incompatible with school disciplinary requirements.

Uncomplaining obedience may commend itself not as an ideal but rather as a concession to the harsh realities of the school world in which teachers are increasingly beset by disrespect, disobedience and violence. In this view, for example, due process has no place in the "real" world if educators are to survive, much less to educate. Calling the students’ attention to "rights" is then like waving a red flag to persons who above all else need more discipline, not more license.

Now one must concede that school officials may confront disciplinary emergencies requiring temporary restrictions of rights. But excessive deference to officials on this score is itself dangerous. However sincere, officials may tend to see "exigencies" when the disinterested observer will detect only an inappropriate response to admittedly difficult problems.

Moreover, the presumed benefits of an authoritarian school regime may not be worth their price. In an effective educational setting "most of the objectionable behavior of students — their idiosyncratic tendencies, their expressions of opinion on many subjects, the disturbances and distractions caused by their actions, their statements, and even their appearance — is actually grist for the educational mill." A system predicated on hostility to student rights runs the risk not only of forfeiting this educational opportunity but of exacerbating the very difficulties it is seeking to cure. Such a system both undermines the moral claims of authority and diverts attention form the genuine evils that frequently underlie school disciplinary problems: racial segregation, staffing deficiencies, overcrowded classrooms, inadequate physical plant, defects of school policy, and the hopelessness bred by lack of opportunity. Schools adopting this route are likely to end up with the worst of both worlds: the authoritarian environment without the hoped-for peace.

“In an effective educational setting ‘most of the objectionable behavior of students — their idiosyncratic tendencies, their expressions of opinion on many subjects, the disturbances and distractions caused by their actions, their statements, and even their appearance — is actually grist for the educational mill’.”
Peaceful or not, the educational prospects of schools run on the model of an authoritarian regime are dubious. Such schools are primarily custodial institutions whose principal assignment is to keep the young off the streets, out of trouble and off the labor market. The resulting atmosphere is likely to prove incompatible with either learning or teaching.

Nothing said thus far is intended to dispute the fact that schools, like most other institutions, need certain conventions of behavior on the part of their participants in order to accomplish their mission. Conventional education presupposes the orderly consideration of subject matter under the guidance of a knowledgeable instructor. This view of education dictates that a classroom not be treated as an unstructured public forum in which all persons are free to say or do what they will, when they will, on whatever subject strikes them. The crucial point, however, is that neither age nor special theories about educating the young are essential underpinnings for such rules of decorum and order. The need would exist more or less equally in a university or an institution of adult education, though all the participants were over 18. Nor is this even a unique truth about schools. Similar needs exist for courts, hospitals, libraries, business offices, and theaters — in short, for most institutions. Emphasis on age and educational goals adds little that is legitimately relevant to the argument for maintaining institutional order. The danger is that such talk will provide a psychologically potent bit of rhetoric for justifying a host of extraordinary restrictions because of a presumed but unwarranted view that children and the needs of schools are “different.” So far as routine institutional requirements are concerned, a college or university would furnish a presumptively appropriate model for drawing the proper balance between constitutional rights and institutional needs, unencumbered by reflexive assumptions that either age or educational objectives defeat constitutional claims. The argument I advance for students’ constitutional rights, then, is quite compatible with a recognition of the need for routine institutional order.

6. Student complaints as educational diversion.

a. The “floodgates” theory. If rights are granted to students, it is said, school officials will be compelled to spend much of their time commuting to and from the local courthouse responding to the complaints of their litigious charges. Administrators regularly make decisions of serious consequence to students — in grading, in imposing curricular requirements, in “tracking” them, and the like — to which “due process” claims as plausibly might attach as in the case of the short-term suspension. Did the Court’s decision, the dissenting Justices asked, imply that all these heretofore professional decisions were now to be transformed into decisions for judges? The minority feared that unless Goss could be rigidly contained, courts would displace school officials as the authority in the educational community.

One response to this concern is that compelling authorities to justify their use of power in terms of applicable legal standards may not be so bad after all. Education still would...

Education, coercion and children’s rights

Concerning the extension of the law of equal freedom to children, we must therefore say, that equity commands it, and that expediency recommends it. We find the rights of children to be deducible from the same axiom and by the same argument as the rights of adults; whilst denial of them involves us in perplexities out of which there seems to be no escape. The association between filial subservience and barbarism — the evident kinship of filial subservience to social and martial slavery — and the fact that filial subservience declines with the advance of civilization, suggest that such subservience is bad. The viciousness of a coercive treatment of children is further proved by its utter failure to accomplish the chief end of moral education — the culture of the sympathies; by its tendency to excite feelings of antagonism and hate; and by the check which it necessarily puts upon the development of the all-important faculty of self-control. Whilst, on the other hand, a non-coercive treatment being favourable to, and almost necessities, constant appeals to the higher feelings, must, by exercising those feelings, improve the character; and must, at the same time, accustom the child to that condition of freedom in which its after-life is to be passed. It turns out, too, that the very need for a moral training of children is but temporary and that, consequently, a true theory of the filial relationship must not presuppose like the command-and obedience theory that such a need is permanent. Lastly, we find reason to attribute whatever of incompatibility there may be between these conclusions and our daily experience, not to any error in them, but to the necessary incongruity between the perfect law and an imperfect humanity.


“To what extent does the ideal of constitutional equality properly extend to schoolchildren and entitle them the same range of protections enjoyed by adults?”
were sensitive to the constitutional issues involved, but partly in the setting of the judicial system. By
occur, but partly in the setting of the judicial system. By

Moreover, the predicted volume of complaints itself may be exaggerated. For a number of reasons students
and administrators alike might receive a powerful lesson in the rule of law.

do not appear to have rushed to court to take advantage of the due process system that dawned on the American
university more than a decade ago. Many college students who face school discipline are perfectly happy to be treated
paternalistically. When they are charged with traditional offenses, such as plagiarism, cheating on an examination, or
shoplifting from the university bookstore, what they want is sympathy, understanding and a second chance rather than
"rights," due process and litigation. The exceptions have come mainly from students disciplined for politically re-
lated activity, but even these students have infrequently sought judicial review.

Rather than fearing a tidal wave of litigation, the opposite should be feared: Students acculturated to the Goss dis-
senters’ "social compact" may be so conditioned to a "realistic" assessment of bureaucratic power that they will give in to it too readily.

In sum, although no one doubts that the activity of teaching requires school authorities to exercise broad discretion-
ary powers, particularly in the area of nondisciplinary issues, this discretion should not preclude challenges to the fairness of the mechanism or the rationality of the decisions.\footnote{See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).}

b. The harm of "constitutionalizing" teacher-student relationships. In opposing due process rights for students, Justice Powell hinted at greater dangers than merely increased litigiousness. He described the normal teacher-pupil relationship as "rarely adversarial," suggesting that the "constitutionalization" of that relationship not only will fail to secure due process to the student but will irreparably damage the relationship as well. Under this theory, the very adversary atmosphere generated by speaking of "rights" is objectionable: Students need to focus not on their "rights" but on what the teacher has to teach. A related argument begins with the observation that students need structure and limits. Otherwise anarchy reigns, and anarchy is incompatible with education.

But rules can be defined with sufficient precision so that neither students nor teachers are enveloped by an asphyxiat-
ing cloud of doubt. Even very young children can and should learn the importance of both rights and obligations. A genu-
ine commitment to both will, of course, produce occasional tensions. But educators should surely avoid the parody of education that results when they seek to exercise the unavoidable tensions between rights and obligations by insisting on the obligations and denying the rights.

Conclusion

Constitutional rights express fundamental postulates about the respect due to human beings and about indispensable

limitations on government in a democratic society. These commitments should furnish the basis for thinking about the rights of minors even as they do the rights of adults. If the case can be made for circumscribing particular rights of the young because they are young, or because educational needs require it, let the case be made and not simply proclaimed or assumed. The tradition that permits the automatic, uncritical reliance on student or youth status as a trump card to justify the denial of rights richly deserves to be abandoned.

It is, moreover, misguided to see constitutional values as fundamentally at war with educational values. The capacity and willingness of the young to think independently, to question and to challenge constituted authorities and established ways, are not superfluous luxuries. The development of such talents ought to be central objectives of educational policy.

"It is . . . misguided to see constitutional values as fundamentally at war with educational values."

Footnotes

This article largely based on articles published elsewhere with extensive citations to legal authorities: After Goss v. Lopez: Student Status as Suspect Classification?, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 627 (1977); Regulation of Underground Newspapers on Public School Campuses in California, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 141 (1974). 1.393 U.S. 503 (1969). 2. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). This case and Tinker are each discussed below. 3. Though this is a view thus far rejected by the Supreme Court. Consult Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977). 4. 27 Cal. App. 51, 148 P.999 (1st Dist. 1915). 5. Emphasis added. 6. Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social Context, 39 Law & Contemp. Prob. 38, 61-63 (1975). 7. Ladd, Allegedly Disruptive Student Behavior and the Legal Authority of School Officials, 19 J. Pub. L. 209, 236 (1970). 8. In Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978), the Supreme Court declined to decide whether a medical school student dismissed on academic, rather than disciplinary, grounds was entitled to due process protections. The court held, however, that assuming the student was so entitled, the procedures employed had satisfied due process requirements because they permitted her the informal opportunity to discuss the matter with the administration and to make her side of the issue known, even though she was not granted a formal hearing by the medical school.
Education and Government

The Validation Process

In 1965, Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which provided funds for developing, implementing, evaluating and disseminating educational innovations. The idea was to encourage local school districts to develop new educational practices, and to devise means of exporting such practices to other districts. Successful approaches would then come to be taken as model solutions which would be made available to other districts through state and national dissemination efforts.

In 1974 the ESEA was amended so as to consolidate support for new and innovative programs under "Title IVC." In the past decade, thousands of educational innovations have been developed and field-tested. Many of those who have conceived and nurtured such programs have turned to Title IVC for assistance. Winnowing out the more promising candidates for support has been a concern of both the national Office of Education and the National Institute for Education. A bewildering array of federal and state panels, boards and agencies, not always free from overlapping jurisdiction, has been charged with overseeing the long, slow haul which a newly conceived educational program must endure on its way toward state and national validation.

Suppose some teachers in a school have come up with a new approach in some educational area. They may need time and money, however, to develop a curriculum, and so their school (the application must come from a local school district) applies on their behalf to the Title IVC agency in their state. If their application is successful, they will get a year's support, perhaps renewable a second and third year, if they can satisfy a careful annual assessment by a team of examiners.

But the development of a new program will not receive further support unless it can show that it is both statistically and educationally significant, and that it is economical and efficient enough for other districts to be able to adopt it. Usually this means that an experiment has to be devised which will generate convincing data as to the value of the program. Upon completion of this phase of development, the teachers would request state validation of their program. Different states evaluate programs differently: in New Jersey, the process is accomplished by a visit from a team of three out-of-state evaluators — usually from colleges of education, although they might also be principals or superintendents of schools, or educational psychologists specializing in statistical assessment. After two days of examination of the program, the team gives its verdict for or against state validation.

Obtaining state validation means that the program becomes one of a select number of programs which are recommended by the State Department of Education to each school district in the state. It also means that there will likely be Title IVC monies in that state for teacher-training, so that districts do not have to reach into their own limited staff development funds to train their teachers in the new program.

Programs that are validated on the state level can subsequently apply for national validation. The route again may vary, but it seems generally to involve going through the Joint Dissemination Review Panel of NIE for formal approval, and subsequently applying to the Office of Education’s National Diffusion Network for funding.

The funds allocated by Title IVC for teacher-training must be employed for just that purpose; they cannot be used either for training teacher-trainers, or for teaching children. And for no program are they likely to last very long. After a year or two of dissemination, programs are expected to find other sources of support. By that time, if the program has demonstrated that it is genuinely of academic merit and can be economically delivered to consumer districts, it is presumed that other local, state, federal or private funding will be discovered to take up the slack.
Philosophy for students with learning disabilities

Research has determined that cognitive and communicative deficits and delays are prevalent among learning disabled (LD) students (Wiig and Semel, 1976). Since normal intelligence is assumed with this etiological classification, the educator may assume that potential exists for development of both cognitive and communication skills in these students.

For the purposes of this paper, the term “cognition” will be operationally defined as the intellectual activities of the mind, including thinking, knowing, perceiving, remembering, abstracting and generalizing. The term “communication” refers to giving and receiving information; transference of a message.

As the speech-language clinician at the Devereux Day School (Scottsdale, Arizona), a grade K-12 educational facility for LD and emotionally handicapped (EH) students, the interaction of communicative and cognitive deficits has become increasingly apparent. Upper grade students (ages 10-17) in my caseload have not learned to think critically (or decide whether a conclusion follows necessarily from the premises offered in support of it) or process information at higher cognitive levels (Bloom, 1956), such as application, analysis and synthesis. In addition, they do not know how to organize their thoughts prior to expression or support opinions and positions with facts. In short, they do not have control of the cognitive uses of language (to describe, explain, instruct, inquire, analyze, compare and contrast, evaluate) (Bereiter and Engelmann, 1966). Communicative effectiveness is severely reduced by the near absence of what Loban (1961) refers to as “the correlates of language proficiency.” These factors include fluency (ability to find vocabulary readily to express oneself), effectiveness and control (ability to order a message purposely and convey it in conventional and varied grammatical patterns) and coherence (ability to subordinate related ideas).

The purpose of this paper is four-fold: to consider natural-cultural versus accelerated cognitive development; to relate research findings from a study of LD and EH adolescents exposed to the Lipman and Sharp (1974) philosophy program which was developed through The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children; to describe certain modifications of the program which made it more relevant to the skill needs of this special population; and to offer selected suggestions to other professionals similarly interested in using the Lipman and Sharp program with LD and EH adolescents.
BACKGROUND

Clinically, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether a student is “LD” or “EH.” By the time children have spent three to four frustrating years in school, and due to the fact that they do not learn through traditional methods, they can become quite angry and aggressive in their attempts to vent feelings of failure and frustration. In many ways, the old “chicken or the egg” controversy is kindled when analyzing the etiology of LD and EH student behaviors.

Educationally, LD and EH students spend much of the school day working on “splinter skills” in the areas of math and reading. The goal of special programs for these students is to re-integrate them into the regular classroom, and the achievement tests which grant re-entry tend to focus on such skills as knowledge of math facts, phonics, vocabulary and comprehension. Improving general cognitive and communication skills, therefore, tends not be within the parameters of the classroom teacher’s goals, due to time limitations. These skills, however, are of immense practical use and therefore might fall into the domain of those ancillary teachers who focus on “adjustment” as contrasted to “academics.”

One of the initial questions an educator asks when embarking upon an instructional project is, “Where do I begin?” We know through observation and investigation that children make steady refinements with age in both their cognitive and communication skills. In the area of cognitive development, Jean Piaget has become a primary reference for many educators as they determine the sequence of program content which would stimulate progressively more complex cognitive operations (Gorman, 1972).

According to Piaget, by approximately eleven years of age, a child begins to have the ability to reason from an hypothesis to all its conclusions, which involves thinking about thoughts or theories rather than concrete realities (Pulaski, 1971). The most important general property of this most advanced stage of cognition, Formal Operations, concerns the “actual” versus the “possible.” It is the ability to deal with the possible, rather than with just the actual, that is uniquely found in true formal operational thought and which separates it from the preceding stage, Concrete Operations.

When considering program guidelines for students in the age range of 11 to 17, it is necessary to maintain a perspective on this transition from Concrete to Formal Operations. How much do we let natural-cultural cognitive growth determine or contain an instructional acceleration of potential or readiness for growth? If potential is not capitalized upon at a prime moment, it is possible that growth may be stunted and full potential never realized. This is particularly true of Formal Operations, in which thinking about thoughts might not ever naturally occur within a student’s cultural experience.
Piaget is considered the leading figure in the study of a child's knowledge of logic, though not his capacity to learn logic. A study by Ennis (1965), Critical Thinking Readiness in Grades 1-12, was directed toward how children between ages nine to eighteen (with a mean IQ of 114) responded to instruction in class and conditional logic. He found that while younger students did not benefit from the fifteen days of instruction given to them in the course of his study, students from age 11-12 onward were responsive to instruction in class logic and made significant strides. By 17-18 years of age, there was considerable mastery of the basic principles of class logic as the result of existing natural-cultural influences and that the advance through instruction was minimal when compared to the strides evidenced in the 11 to 16 age group. Conditional logic was a different story. It was not until ages 16-17 that students were ready to make great strides through the instructions provided. Ennis noted that students in the primary grades showed major advances in mastery of the principles of ordinal logic, also a type of deductive reasoning: ages six through nine were particularly responsive to training. While ordinal logic can be mastered during Concrete Operations, it would appear that capacity for the mastery of class logic through instruction might occur at the transitional point into Formal Operations and then conditional logic (referred to by Piaget as "propositional logic") would more completely define this last stage of cognitive growth.

The following are examples of ordinal, class and conditional logic:

1. Ordinal— She is taller than Jim. Jim is taller than Joan. Is she taller that Joan?
2. Class— All cars in the garage are Mr. Smith's. All Mr. Smith's cars are Fords. Are all of the cars in the garage Fords?
3. Conditional— If the bicycle in the garage is Bob's, then it's red. The bicycle in the garage is not red. Is the bike in the garage Bob's?

One might ask of any program devised to promote development in logic, "Are these stages in deductive reasoning sequenced correctly?" Obviously, of immense importance is a child's development of critical thinking capacities. To build judiciously upon current potential and at the same time consider the next stage of refinement is to make successive approximations to the goal. Since deductive logic, or the concern with whether a statement follows necessarily from one or more other statements, is central to critical thinking, perhaps ordinal logic could be used in readiness exercises to prime the intellect for consideration of logical relationships. The fact that these relationships can be graphically displayed provides support from Concrete Operational thought. Class logic could then be utilized as the tool through which thinking about relationships (as contrasted to seeing ordinal relationships) would provide the base for the concept of critical thinking. Again, as a transition from seeing relationships to thinking

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Student Comments:

Piaget would have us believe that thinking about thinking typically does not appear until about age 11. But, at least when there is something practically to be gained from such thinking, it may make its entrance much sooner. I offer the following real-life episode as evidence.

At age 6 our daughter, Susan, found it difficult to sit still at the dinner table. On one occasion I found myself reprimanding her several times for leaving the table, not eating, and so on. Each reprimand was punctuated with an, "...and I mean it!" As my irritation was approaching rage, Susan calmly said, "Unfortunately..." and paused to let out a hearty laugh. "Unfortunately...?" I asked incredulously. "Unfortunately," she continued "we're not playing 'I mean it' today." As my rage melted into laughter, she explained how this clever ploy had occurred to her. She said that she had seen a Peanuts comic strip in which Snoopy was brooding over his tennis game, saying, "I should have done this" and "I should have done that." Then he concluded, "Unfortunately, we weren't playing 'should have'." Needless to say, I can hardly wait until Susan joins forces with Harry and his friends!

—Michael S. Pritchard, Dept. of Philosophy, Western Michigan University.
about relationships, perhaps-class logic should be intro-
duced with a graphic display of intersecting circles instead
of a heavy emphasis on the "language of logic" (Ennis, 1965)

Just as children profit from instruction in logic by making
more dramatic gains that they would have through natural-
cultural development alone, educators profit from "pro-
grams" which provide instructional guidelines for teach-

ing logic. For example, in searching for ways to meet
the intellectual growth needs of very capable Upper School
students at Devereux Day School, materials from The
Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children
came to my attention. Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyan (1977)
describe how principles of logical thinking and discussion
skills can be developed through student interaction with
a "philosophical novel." They contend that the "readiness
period" of which Ennis (1965) speaks, should be capitalized
upon. Students (of approximately age 10 onwards) follow
the novel's characters through a series of thoughts and
experiences which reveal that one must not rely totally
upon one's perceptions, experiences or prejudices, but
must call upon the principles of logic in order to draw
responsible conclusions. These critical thinking skills are
developed within the context of peer-discussions. The
discussions foster practice in organizing one's ideas prior
to expression, following the line of a discussion so that
relevant comments can be presented and learning to re-
spect differing points of view. The goals of this program
were synonymous with those I had formulated after con-
sidering the present gaps in the educational programming
of some of the EH and LD students in the school.

It was decided to offer a "philosophy seminar" composed
of the most intellectually capable students. The philo-
osophical novel, Harry Stottlemeler's Discovery, would
be read and discussed, relying heavily upon the accompany-
ing manual to provide necessary guidelines, for the teacher-
clinician had interest but no academic training in philosophy.

THE STUDY

Subjects

Teachers in the Upper School (ages 10-17) were requested
in the fall of 1977 to refer their "best thinkers" to partic-
ipate in a "philosophy seminar," meeting for 30-minute
sessions three days per week. Five boys ranging in age
from 11 to 16 (mean of 12.9) joined the seminar. It was
treated as the equivalent of a gifted program in the school.

In order to collect data on the validity of the Lipman and
Sharp program (1974) and determine whether or not there
should be continued allocation of the speech-language
clinician's time for a philosophy seminar, a control group
was formulated. This group consisted of referred students
whose schedules conflicted with the Tuesday, Wednesday,
Thursday seminar sequence. The three boys ranged in age
from 13.6 to 14.4 (mean of 13.7).

Within the entire population of five experimental cases
and three controls, the mean WISC IQ was 96. The mean IQ
for the experimental group was 93 and for the control
group, 102.

Procedure

Prior to entry into the experimental or control group, each
boy was administered the following tests to acquire data
on baseline performance:

1. Inference Subtest, Level II California Test of Mental
   Maturity (CTMM) (Sullivan, Clark and Tiegs, 1961)
2. Inference Subtest, Level III, CTMMT
3. Auditory Association Subtest, Illinois Test of Psycho-
   linguistic Abilities (ITPA) (McCarthy and Kirk, 1968)
4. Visual Association Subtest, ITPA

Although the Inference Subtests were designed to be speed
tests, the time limitations were not enforced in this study.
Instead, they were used as achievement tests and scored
in terms of the number correct out of the total test items.
This tactic was chosen to partial out reading skill from the
ability to make logical inferences; the emphasis was not on
reading speed, but critical thinking capacities. Two levels
of the Inference Subtest were used because it was difficult
to determine an exact grade level for these LD/EH students,
so it seemed desirable to have a reliability check on the de-
gree of their critical thinking skills.

The association subtests from the ITPA require the stu-
dent to relate two concepts or sets of concepts. The ques-
tion was asked, "Would gains in logical thinking be ev-
denced in performance on this type of associational thinking?

The five boys in the experimental group attended approxi-
mately 50 30-minute sessions between October 1977 to
May 1978. Harry Stottlemeler's Discovery (Lipman and
Sharp, 1974) was read and discussed. Generally, teaching
suggestions in the accompanying manual were followed.
There were some additions and modifications necessary
to meet some special needs of this LD/EH group, and
these are discussed in a later section of this paper.
The novel was read aloud. In the beginning, the boys took turns, but because only two of the five were relatively facile readers, they suggested that the clinician do the reading and they would follow along in their books. The impetus for this suggestion was probably two-fold: 1) they did not want to belabor the content of the story because they found it unexciting (it was written with a 10-year old in mind), and they wanted to spend the bulk of the seminar time discussing concepts emanating from the story, and 2) they had very little tolerance for the difficulty their peers experienced in oral reading. Since the focus of the seminar was on the development of thinking and discussion skills and not the development of reading skills, their suggestion was implemented. They were always reminded, "Be sure to let me know if you would like to read at any time." Because the discussion was such a dominant part of the 30-minute sessions, usually no more than 2-to-3-pages per day were covered.

Results

In May 1978 all subjects were re-tested with the initial test battery. A t-test was done on each of the four pre-tests and results indicted that the populations in October 1977 were not significantly different; they could therefore be considered equivalent. The levels of significance were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Level II (Inferences)</th>
<th>Level III (Inferences)</th>
<th>Auditory Association</th>
<th>Visual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auditory Association</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.82</td>
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At the time of post-testing in May, however, the populations were no longer equivalent. The differences between performance of the two groups on post-testing, determined by a t-test, were significant at the following levels:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Level II (Inferences)</th>
<th>Level III (Inferences)</th>
<th>Auditory Association</th>
<th>Visual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auditory Association</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.10</td>
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Looking at the groups separately, each showed significant improvements. Pre-/post-test improvement for the treatment group on all four tests was significant beyond the .05 level. Pre-/post-test improvement from controls (explained by testing effect) was beyond the .05 level except for auditory association (.33). Both groups improved, but the experimentals improved significantly more.

Specific differences in performance were analyzed in terms of the mean percentage of increase between pre-and post-testing in each of the two groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean % Increase Between Pre-Post-Tests</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control Group</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inferences CTMMT-II 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aud Assoc. ITPA 1%</td>
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<td>III</td>
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</table>

By employing a t-test, it was possible to determine that participation in the group not only affected the absolute performance but that the improvement pre-/post-testing was different to the following levels of significance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Level II (Inferences)</th>
<th>Level III (Inferences)</th>
<th>Auditory Association</th>
<th>Visual Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

Although the control group had advantages of age and IQ, the experimental group made greater gains in critical thinking skills between October 1977 and May 1978. An intervening condition was the experimental group participation in a philosophy seminar, utilizing materials from The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children.

Statistical manipulation of the study data showed that the differences between the experimental and control groups at post-testing could not be attributed to chance; critical thinking skills were apparently improved through participation in the philosophy seminar. Certain clinical observations would coincide with this empirical evidence. Two examples will be offered.

Early in 1978, a classmate of one of the participants visited the seminar. We were reviewing principles of class logic and the following problem was posed:

Miss Brown is a kindergarten teacher. Miss Brown teaches crafts at a senior citizens facility. Therefore,
1. kindergarten teachers work well with older people
2. people who teach crafts to senior citizens make good kindergarten teachers
3. a kindergarten teacher also teaches crafts at a senior citizens facility

"... they had learned a compensatory skill which enabled them to engage in productive problem-solving as contrasted to guessing."
The visitor responded, "It's number one." One of the boys regularly attending the seminar said, "No, I don't think so. Now, I would have said that a while back, but now I think it's number three. We don't have any facts about a lot of people, only Miss Brown, so it's one teacher. We don't know how good she is at teaching crafts, so we can't say that she works well with senior citizens. It's number three — a teacher teaches crafts."

Secondly, during post-testing there was an obvious difference in the degree of comfort and assurance in completing the Inferences Subtests, between the experimental and the controls. Comments from the control group included, "Oh, no not these. They don't make sense; These are hard; I can't figure these out — Oh well, so what!"

The experimental group, on the other hand, commented on how easy the items were in May as contrasted to October. "Boy, I remember when I took this a long time ago. I don't think I knew any of them then."

Error analysis of experimental post-test responses on the Inference Subtests showed the greatest growth in ordinal logic. Of the total of 18 errors from the entire experimental group on both Levels II and III, 15 were due to confusion of value judgments (or opinion) and fact in class logic problems. They had learned to compensate at a concrete level through drawing diagrams which showed the spatial and temporal relationships stated in the ordinal logic problems, and could make appropriate inferences. While they could not always manipulate the problem components at an abstract thought level, they had learned a compensatory skill which enabled them to engage in productive problem-solving as contrasted to guessing. The difference between their performance on ordinal and class logic problems might indicate a present ability to deal with logical operations closer to the Concrete Operational stage of thought than to the Formal Operational stage. Ability to manipulate factual details easily at an abstract level (or without visual aids) appears to be emerging, judging by the mean percentage increase of correct responses on both Inference subtests.

For both groups, there was a greater increase in the ability to make visual associations than auditory associations. There could possibly be a language factor operating here. While expressive vocabulary plays a significant role in the auditory association tasks, the visual association tasks are receptive. Both present conceptual tasks to be completed, but the auditory task requires that the subject retrieve a vocabulary word. It was observed during auditory association testing that while a student might be "on the right track" conceptually, he would be unable to retrieve the precise word(s) needed to score within normative limits. Because most of the subjects scored near the top of both association tests on the pre-test, there was not enough room for variance to assess fully the impact of the philosophy seminar on these associational skills. Clinically, it appeared that the greatest contribution of the seminar experience to any of these "cognitive calisthenics" was the interest developed in analysis of what would be the most appropriate answer, rather than offering unsystematic guesses.

Regarding growth in communication skills during the course of the seminar, a pragmatic model developed by Halliday (1973) as well as Loban's proficiency model (1961) could be used as reference points. Halliday addresses his model to the various functions that language serves (instrumental, regulatory, interactional, personal, heuristic, imaginative and representational). Clinical observation indicated observable growth in the interactional, personal, heuristic and representational functions. The seminar provided a setting in which ideas and viewpoints were shared; in the beginning, these were emotional properties. To attack one's ideas or viewpoints was to attack the person. Frequent comments such as, "Hey, you big dummy, I've been around a lot longer than you and I know," were not uncommon during the early discussions. As the boys gained greater insight into differing views, supported by inductive or deductive reasoning, views were treated more objectively. This is not to say there were not occasional acid remarks exchanged, but the tone of the seminar showed that as the students developed better habits of...

"...the greatest contribution of the seminar experience to any of these 'cognitive calisthenics' was the interest developed in analysis of what would be the most appropriate answer, rather than offering unsystematic guesses."
thinking (more carefully and critically), they reached out for hard facts or evidence upon which to base their judgments of peer remarks rather than succumbing to emotional attacks on the person.

Of the factors leading to proficiency in language (Loban, 1961), the most apparent advance was in the ability to express a point of view or describe an event more coherently and effectively. Factors such as grammar and vocabulary did not show obvious improvement. Although no correction of agrammatical patterns was injected into the goals of seminar sessions, vocabulary development was attempted during the discussion of difference in "kind" and "degree." We took the word "anger" as our base and found a series of words that expressed degrees of anger (annoyed, exasperated, furious, provoked, incensed) and rank ordered them. We discussed various experiences which might produce anger in these differing degrees and the boys used the carrier phrase, "When (a certain event occurred) I was (the word that showed the appropriate degree of anger)." We used several other words and their "synonyms" in a similar fashion to show the importance of precision in word choice for accurate communication of feelings to occur.

...although the control group had advantages of age and IQ, the experimental group made greater gains in critical thinking skills ...

PROGRAM ADDITIONS AND MODIFICATIONS TO MEET NEEDS OF EH AND LD STUDENTS

There were five basic additions and/or modifications of the philosophy program as it was presented in the manual accompanying Harry Stottlemeler's Discovery: the method of presentation; the insertion of frequent reviews of the leading ideas; a total emphasis on the application of the principles of logic; occasional editing of the story; and "branching" to include additional activities for remedial and enrichment purposes.

Method of Presentation

Instead of the students silently reading parts of the novel, discussing the leading ideas and then doing enrichment activities, the novel was read aloud and the discussion and activities were inserted at the appropriate times. These boys needed the variety that this format provided to maintain interest. Because the clinician was drawing from leading ideas and activities at the same time, the copy of the novel printed in the manual was of little use. It was more efficient to use a copy of the student novel and make notes in the margin.

A Second Look at "Childish Behavior"

There is a sense in which small children are recent immigrants in our midst. They have trouble both in understanding and in using the language, and they often make errors. So many people (you can notice this in the supermarkets, especially with two- and three-year-old children) talk to their children and get angry at them because the children don't seem to mind, and anyone standing around can tell that the children just haven't understood what mother said, because the mother's vocabulary happened to be beyond them and the mother's intention was not clear to them. But mother feels, "Well, I said it, didn't I? What's wrong with the child that he doesn't understand. It's English, isn't it?" But, as I say, the child is a recent immigrant in our midst and there are things that the child doesn't understand.

There are curious instances. Once, when our little girl was three years old, she found the bath too hot and she said, "Make it warmer." It took me a moment to figure out that she meant, "Bring the water more nearly to the condition we call warm." It makes perfectly good sense if you look at it that way. Confronted with unusual formulations such as these which children constantly make, it seems to me that many of us react with incredible lack of imagination. Sometimes children are laughed at for making silly statements when it only requires looking at them — at their way of abstracting and their way of formulating their abstractions — to see that they are not silly at all...

"...they reached out for hard facts or evidence upon which to base their judgments of peer remarks rather than succumbing to emotional attacks on the person."

Review of Leading Ideas
Review of the major points covered in the previous seminar session always initiated each session. Research by many learning disabilities authorities, including Hallahan and Kauffman (1976) indicates that memory deficits within this population necessitate repetition of content. Not only the specifics of the preceding session were included in the review, but also pertinent vocabulary (such as reasoning, reversibility, inference, analogy) and basic concepts (such as inductive and deductive reasoning principles) were periodically included. In addition, following every three or four chapters, approximately two sessions were devoted to reviewing the leading ideas that had just been presented. The clinician goal was mastery of the concept of critical thinking rather than "finishing the book." The emphasis, then, was on quality rather than quantity.

Emphasis on the Practical Application of Logic
Whenever possible, the target of discussion was focused on the application of the principles of inductive and deductive reasoning. At times the suggestions in the manual "activities" section sufficed, but at other times we relied on personal experiences, spontaneous occurrences or the mass media. Several examples follow.

During a discussion on inductive reasoning, opinions on rock music groups surfaced. One segment of the seminar asserted that "Kiss" was the best group and another segment supported "Led Zeppelin." The interaction began with name-calling, "Only little kids like 'Kiss'." The clinician suggested that we were operating at an emotional rather than an analytical level. In addition, keeping in mind the development of the interactive and personal functions of language (Halliday, 1973), it was suggested that it was important to express personal views but these needed to be supported with evidence or information and then transmitted in an objective manner. How could we gather some data on the music of each group? The boys suggested that tapes of both groups be brought into the seminar and that each group be critiqued and discussed. The rules for such an interchange were to include: 1) allowing an individual to state his position and the supportive facts, without interruption and 2) in refutation, there would be no name-calling, but a statement that detailed why the individual disagreed.

When discussing generalizations, one of the sentences in the activities section to be analyzed was "I can tell a bad guy from his looks." Several boys asserted this was not an over-generalization because they were always able to "read a guy's looks." That evening I clipped several photos from the newspaper and magazines and mounted them on 5x7 cards. At the next seminar the boys were asked to rate each person, on the basis of his looks, whether he was "good" or "bad." We had a good laugh when the exercise was completed, because among those rated as "bad" were the Arizona Attorney General and Zbigniew Brezezinski, Advisor for National Security Affairs to President Carter. The exercise left them less confident that they were really able "to tell a book by its cover."

The media was used in several ways as a source for exercises in critical thinking. Three examples follow.

1. We spent time analyzing the "hidden persuaders" in commercials and advertisements and found very little logical persuasion; they were primarily emotional appeals to indulgence.
2. "Letters to the Editor" in the local newspaper provided multiple examples of premises that had little, if any, relationship to the conclusion formulated. The clinician reduced the "letter" to a syllogism in which two premises and the choice of three conclusions were presented to the students. They were first asked to choose the appropriate conclusion (based on the premises), to the letter. On other occasions, they created the syllogism from the letter.
3. Political cartoons were analyzed for their representational value in commenting on current events.
With all of the exercises described above, the clinician was operating on the assumption that most of these boys would not be going to college; school had been nothing but a negative experience for them and they were anxious to terminate it. It was unlikely, then, that they would be exposed to another educational experience in which the concentrated focus was the development of critical thinking skills. This seminar should provide as many opportunities as possible to practice critiquing persuasive arguments offered by the media or their peers and to express these critiques in an organized, objective fashion.

Editing

Sometimes sections from the novel were edited because the story did not move fast enough for these adolescents; it had been written with the 10-year-old in mind. For example, Chapter Six was just summarized by the clinician and the various interpretations of "mind" were discussed through suggestions offered in the "activities" section. Another example was in Chapter Eight, in which the first three pages enumerate the styles of thinking of students in Harry’s class. The boys were not ready to focus on "thinking about thought." The content was tedious and did not seem that important to them; it was too abstract. There were many other areas of the philosophy program that did maintain their interest and which had more practical usage. They did enjoy discussing animal versus human intelligence in Chapter Seven because they were able to draw upon some experiences of their own and contrast two living beings. Cognitively, they appeared to show the most readiness for a transition into Formal Operations; the clinician chose to emphasize those parts of the novel that were congruent with their current level of cognitive development and to "plant seeds" for some more sophisticated thinking about thoughts on a purely abstract level. The program was edited to meet these goals.

Branching

Branching is a behavioral process in which the teacher adds exercises to an established program, or the program itself provides the exercises. Branching is done to provide remedial or enrichment experiences. An example of remedial branching would be exercises added to provide practice on reversibility or syllogisms. Since one of the major problems this group experienced was confusion of fact and opinion, it was essential they become aware of when they were including value judgments in conclusions that were not integral in the premises.

There are many examples of enrichment branching in the "activities" section of the manual. An example of clinician-devised branching would be the time we spent contrasting structural analogies (introduced in Chapter Five) and conceptual analogies (such as those appearing in the Visual Association Subtest of the ITPA). The word "analogy" was new to each of the boys. We began with the Chapter Five discussion of structural analogies, which included making inkblots to be interpreted and observing cloud shapes (both of which were recommended in the manual). We had intended to be surprised, but our astonishment exceeded our expectations. — Jane Austen

Next, we contrasted form to conceptual analogies by looking at some clinician-devised problems similar to those in the Visual Association Subtest. They found that both types of analogies took analysis, but the conceptual associations were more complex because they had to engage in convergent thinking, selecting one of four available "conclusions." The task was not unlike the "if-then" conditional logic problems. As the Ennis (1965) research has shown, this appears to be the most difficult of three types of deductive logic he studied (ordinal, class and conditional) with regard to student (ages 9-18) readiness for instruction. With structural analogies, they were able to engage in divergent thinking, in which they could devise an infinite number of analogies. Branching, then, involved taking one of the "leading ideas" in Chapter Five and using it as the impetus for a related, but more complex task.
"...if students cannot read well, they assume they are not very smart. It is important to keep reminding them how smart they are."

SUGGESTIONS FOR EDUCATORS INTERESTED IN USING INSTITUTE PROGRAMS WITH LD/EH ADOLESCENTS

The critical thinking and discussion skill development focused upon in the program accompanying Harry Stottlemeler's Discovery is quite comprehensive. The suggestions that will be enumerated in this section evolved from the research findings and clinical experience of working with five adolescent LD/EH boys.

Suggestions Pertaining to Seminar Organization

1. Keep the seminar group small (4-6 students). The LD/EH population tends to be sensitive to unstructured activities and they become easily over-stimulated.

2. Establish a few basic rules that keep the setting relaxed, but provide some regulatory guidelines.
   a. when someone is speaking, try not to interrupt; if you do interrupt, the speaker has the right to say, "I'm not finished yet."
   b. no name-calling; construct a statement which specifies how you disagree with the person.
   c. you may sit on a chair or on the floor, but no lying down.
   d. you may bring a soft drink, but no food.

3. Establish baseline behavior through testing.
   a. devise a teacher-constructed test, focusing on the leading ideas delineated in the manual, as a mastery test.
   b. use the Inference Subtests from appropriate levels of the CTMMT as achievement tests, with no time limit and score in terms of percentage correct.
   c. consider the Cornell Deduction Tests (Ennis, 1965).

4. Read the novel aloud, keeping in mind that LD students show difficulty processing language auditorily, but need practice in developing the skill.
   a. maintain a slower than average speaking rate.
   b. have students follow along in their books.

5. Provide variety in each session by including some reading, some discussion of the leading ideas and some opportunities for practical application of the leading ideas.

6. Let the seminar function as a “gifted program.” Because these students have had so many educational failures, they think they are “dumb.” Our educational system has done a superb job of equating reading ability with intelligence: if students cannot read well, they assume they are not very smart. It is important to keep reminding them how smart they are.

7. Focus on quality of understanding rather than quantity of material covered. If only half of the book is completed during the year, continue with the remainder the following year. Begin with a fairly extensive review of the leading ideas covered in the first half, which would benefit new members to the group and provide reinforcement for older group members.
SUGGESTIONS PERTAINING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL THINKING

1. Consider the characteristics of “the critical thinker.” Ennis (1965) has provided the following guidelines which can be used as educational objectives when constructing IEP’s: “A critical thinker is characterized by proficiency in judging whether
   a. a statement follows from the premises
   b. something is an assumption
   c. an observation statement is reliable
   d. a simple generalization is warranted
   e. a hypothesis is warranted
   f. a theory is warranted
   g. an argument depends on an ambiguity
   h. a statement is overvague or overspecific
   i. an alleged authority is reliable.”

2. Begin with some ordinal logic exercises to prime the intellect in preparation for various relationships expressed in verbal problems.

3. Visual stimuli should be used whenever possible, to reinforce auditory input. The auditory channel is the weaker for LD students (Kirk and Kirk, 1971). For example, make a “placard card file” (to be used as giant “flash cards”) of items you plan on reviewing periodically because of their importance to the concept of critical thinking.
   a. synonyms for quantifiers
   b. reversible versus non-reversible sentences
   c. syllogisms in which the premises and a choice of conclusions are stated

4. Make concepts as concrete as possible. Research (Wiig and Semel, 1976) and clinical observation indicates that LD students have excessive difficulty relying only upon the word content (either as a listener or reader) for conceptual processing. Whenever abstractions can be made explicit through concrete means, this course should be adopted. In other words, these students need to learn compensatory skills which will allow their intellect to be more realistically judged.
   a. they should learn to diagram ordinal logic relationships; for example, in a problem such as, “Tom runs faster than Jim; Jack runs slower that Jim. Who is the slowest?” they would note an initial to represent the position of each person, as the problem was being processed
      T
      Ji
      Ja
      such a strategy would help them visualize the correct answers rather than succumbing to guessing because their processing and memory capacities did not provide necessary support.
   b. class logic relationships should be introduced through the use of intersecting circles instead of placing emphasis on the “language of logic,” which spends considerable time discussing subject and predicate roles
   c. contrast word logic problems to symbol problems because this is a difficult transition for this population; for example
      John is as tall as Joe.          Joe is as tall as Jack.
      A is equal to b.                B is equal to C.
      Therefore, John is as tall as Jack.
      A is equal to C.

5. Spend extra time on those program segments that will directly contribute to their ability to be more responsible citizens by learning to:
   a. watch for overgeneralization (through misuse of the quantifiers “all” or “no,” reversing sentences that are non-reversible, etc.)
   b. avoid jumping to conclusions until sufficient data are gathered
   c. follow the line of reasoning in an argument by reducing it to a syllogism, to make sure fact and opinion are not being confused
   d. support opinions with facts and expect factually supported opinions from others; do not allow a person’s charisma to substitute for his knowledge.

Each of us thinks his own thoughts; our concepts we share with our fellow-men.
—Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding
SUGGESTIONS PERTAINING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISCUSSION SKILLS

1. The guidelines in the manual are excellent for leading a discussion and providing “active listening” (Gordon, 1975) cues which help the speaker to know if he has communicated an idea the way he had intended. With the LD/EH students, the leader’s role frequently needs to be taken a step farther. When there are disruptive behaviors and inflammatory comments detracting from the session, it is necessary to send some “I messages,” described by Gordon in Parent (and Teacher) Effectiveness Training (1975). For example, “When I hear someone call another person ‘a big baby’ it really annoys me because name-calling is a put down.” Sending “I messages” simply tells a student how some unacceptable behavior is making the teacher feel; it is a statement of fact that leaves the solution negotiable. For students particularly prone to resistance, an “I message” is less likely to provoke them, is a more mature and less authoritarian interaction in which honesty and openness are fostered and it does not underestimate a student’s willingness to be considerate of other people’s feelings and take responsibility for modifying his own behavior. As the teacher-clinician uses this method of interaction with students, it becomes a model for student-student interaction. After the students have had a chance to internalize this alternate method of commenting on someone’s actions or statements the clinician can give them opportunities to improve their personal and interactional functions (Halliday, 1973) of language. When a comment is rudely or abruptly stated, the clinician can say, “Is there perhaps another way you might have expressed your opinion?”

2. Avoid being concerned with grammatical constructions. A student who is in the midst of sharing an idea has every right to be annoyed if interrupted with “brought, not brung.” It is discouraging to have someone concentrate on how you are saying something rather than on what you are saying.

3. In addition to the emphasis on the organization of messages, consider providing multiple opportunities to develop language functions. The philosophy program format lends itself especially well to the following functions described by Halliday (1973):
   a. interactional - getting along with others (“me and you”)
   b. personal - expression of self-identity (“here I come”)
   c. heuristic - learning and exploring reality (“tell me why”)
   d. representational - communication of content (“I’ve got something to tell you”)

“...a student who is in the midst of sharing an idea has every right to be annoyed if interrupted with ‘brought, not brung.’ It is discouraging to have someone concentrate on how you are saying something, rather than on what you are saying.”
CONCLUSION

Learning to become a responsible citizen is a crucial element of the educational process. Because learning disabled students have academic skill deficits, their programming is frequently monopolized by the remediation of splinter skills. Adaptive skills such as communication and reasoning abilities are overlooked. The research study reported here as well as the Ennis (1965) study have shown that students are responsive to instruction in the principles of logic. Instructional advantage should be taken of cognitive readiness states, especially for Formal Operations. As educators it is too precarious an assumption that students will realize their potential through purely natural-cultural forces; there simply is not that much opportunity to develop critical thinking skills informally.

Considering Ennis' study finding that ages 6-9 were particularly responsive to instruction in ordinal logical and the students between 11-16 particularly profited from instruction in classical logic, it would appear that his study population and this one were not equivalent. It is possible that the mean IQ difference (114 for the Ennis study as contrasted to 93 in this study) had a significant effect on the readiness level of each group, or the research indicating delays in abstract thinking among LD students (of varying IQ's) could explain the difference. It was obvious, however, that this population (with a mean age of 12.9) was more responsive to instruction in ordinal logic, judging by the consistency in correct answers on ordinal problems, than to class logic. They were also more interested in discussing topics which they could anchor in the real world than to philosophize about the nature of man and the universe.

A "program" should be used as a base for individualized instruction; it should not be followed as a cookbook. The greatest value of Harry Stottlemeler's Discovery and the other materials developed by the Institute is that they provide a starting point for the development of critical thinking and discussion skills. Basic principles of logic and their practical application are spelled out for the educator who has recognized a need for instruction in these areas but does not know where to begin.

A program such as the Institute's is clay in the hands of the educator who can sculpt it to meet individual needs. Analyze the "leading ideas" and the "activities" to see if they are appropriate for the current cognitive readiness stage of the students and/or will make the best use of instructional time. Having accepted the present level of cognitive growth, strengthen it before attempting to emphasize more taxing cognitive exercises. Successively approximate an understanding of the world of "the possible," by providing transitional exercises which utilize the world of "the actual" in a supportive role.

The author's research study was developed to test the validity of the Lipman and Sharp (1974) program and to assess whether clinician time should continue to be allotted to guiding the program. The data indicate the program is valid, and the degree of improvement in critical thinking skills merits the continuation of the philosophy seminar for Upper School students who are referred by their teachers as the "best thinkers" in the classroom.

REFERENCES


Our present-day knowledge of the child's mind is comparable to a fifteenth-century map of the world — a mixture of truth and error. . . . Vast areas remain to be explored. There are scattered islands of solid dependable fact, uncoordinated with unknown comments.

Arnold L. Gesell
Funding Opportunities

National Endowment for the Humanities

Elementary and Secondary Education Grants

The Elementary and Secondary Education Program seeks to strengthen the humanities in the nation’s schools by encouraging the development and testing of imaginative approaches to the humanities through support of demonstration projects which improve teaching and learning at elementary and secondary levels. Projects often focus on specific disciplines yet seek broad impact, thereby showing promise of serving as models for, or of influencing in specific ways, programs in many institutions. (NEH does not support projects which are concerned primarily with teaching theory or technique per se, or with educational research, school system management, or child development — these areas are supported by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. In considering where to submit an application, applicants should bear in mind that DHEW is the principal source of federal support for elementary and secondary education.)

The Division particularly seeks applications for:

• projects which relate recent scholarship in the humanities to in-service teacher training and the design of new curricula;
• projects involving collaboration between schools and other educational and cultural institutions, such as museums and libraries, colleges and universities, and graduate schools of education;
• projects that have the endorsement of large administrative units such as a school system or state education department;
• projects to improve teachers’ and students’ knowledge of English literature, foreign languages and literatures, and history, especially social history;
• projects emphasizing expository writing within the context of humanities curricula.

In recent years, successful projects have tended to combine the training of teachers in new approaches to their disciplines with the development of new or improved curricula. Such projects have been of varying size and scope, single-discipline or interdisciplinary in nature, and have focused on traditional as well as relatively new areas of study in the schools. A particularly effective design brings together school and university faculty for a period of intensive summer work, after which the school teachers — working under the continuing supervision of the project staff — introduce into their classrooms the new materials and approaches developed during the summer.

Any school, school system, state education department, consortium of schools (including private schools), or other educational institution or organization in the United States is eligible to apply for project support. Institutions other than schools, school systems, state education departments, colleges, universities, junior colleges, and schools of education are eligible to apply for support, but their applications are unlikely to be competitive unless their proposed relationship to the formal curriculum of elementary and secondary schools is well defined.

The Elementary and Secondary Education Program supports three types of activities: extended teacher institutes; regional development projects; and general projects.

Application Deadline: April 1, 1979, for program beginning October, 1979. For further information, contact the Assistant Director for Elementary and Secondary Education, or a member of the program staff, in the Division of Education Programs.

The National Endowment for the Humanities is located at 806 Fifteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506. The Division of Education Programs is located on the fifth floor.
Bilingual Philosophy in Milwaukee

by A. Gray Thompson and Adrian DuPuis

"Do you know that some of my seventh graders have great difficulty in reading English or Spanish on the third-grade level, but these same learners are working with and do understand such logical concepts as conversion and standardization of propositions, reversibility of some relationships, logical contradiction . . . ?" This is the kind of statement has made by Jack Pendergast and Joe Krzyzanowski, teachers at the bilingual Bruce-Guadalupe Community School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. This school, in the heart of Milwaukee's Spanish-speaking community, began working in a philosophy project for elementary, bilingual learners sponsored by Marquette University in March, 1977. The project is an outgrowth of the authors' participation in IAPC workshops.
league's suggestion that perhaps the use of philosophy for children ought to be reserved for the gifted learner.

Jack and Joe were very aware that new ideas and approaches in curriculum matters frequently do nothing but continue the frustration-failure cycle for bilingual learners because such materials assume previous learnings or because the materials themselves are perceived by some students as symbols of failure. Another concern was that the school already was “into” individually guided educational approaches to such an extent that whole-group opportunities were minimal, with the exception of art, music, physical education, and values education. A third concern involves a prevailing attitude that bilingual learners (as well as other learners) are always in need of some kind of compensatory experience in order to “bring the learners up” to that magical level at which appropriate teaching-learning can take place.

These Bruce-Guadalupe educators shared with us the belief that their elementary school is not alone in facing the challenge of providing rewarding experiences for learners who have not been successful in reading, math, or language arts. Their school staff, like scores of others, attempts to rekindle the desire to know in the learner, believing that when such a desire is stimulated, the learner may well rediscover a need to know. Revitalizing this desire frequently is compromised severely when the learner is confronted with situations, materials, tasks, and methods which coincide with those elements recalled from the past from which little meaning was derived or failure was experienced. Obviously, a new dimension needed to be brought to the learning situation. These teachers could no longer be approached with the age-old curriculum “innovation” syndrome in which they had to swing away from something or swing back to something else. What was necessary was to engage in something which not only would appeal to the imagination of the teacher, as many publishers do, but also appeal to the imagination of the learners. Philip Phenix puts this concept into perspective applicable to this situation:

Good teaching is imaginative in quality, and the effective teacher chooses materials that kindle the imagination of the learner... No matter how high the quality of curriculum materials may be, if the student has no interest in them, he will not readily make them his own... Hence, the materials of instruction should be selected in the light of students' real interests.

Jack's and Joe's long experience at Bruce-Guadalupe convinced them that their learners did not suffer from any cognitive deficiency but rather from simple communicative breakdown. And the first major barrier between the Community School and the authors began to be dismantled when Jack asked, “What reading level is Harry?” The response was, “Whatever level you want to make it. The orthography represents ideas in Harry which are of intrinsic interest to upper-elementary boys and girls, and that's what's crucial.” Students read Harry because of the ideas. The interest level rather than the reading and level appears to be paramount.

Jack and Joe took copies of Harry and the teacher's manual and agreed to give these materials a critical examination.

At our second meeting, the enthusiasm of the two teachers equalled that of the project directors for the following reasons:

1. The materials were authentic. Jack and Joe could identify with Senor Benitez, el maestro. His classroom was their classroom. Ari Hoteles, y Lisa, y Tito, y Toni were merely extensions of the class roster of Rooms 201 and 202 at the Bruce-Guadalupe School. Lastly, Jack and Joe were sure their boys and girls would be interested in exploring Ari's concern:

- Todos las calabozos son vegetales... pero no era cierto al revés.
- ¿Son todos los vegetales calabozos? ¡Claro que no!

2. Harry presented an imaginative vehicle to support the teaching of reading and language arts as well as enabling the teachers to drop the time assigned to values education because of Harry's emphasis on logic and right-thinking in ethical matters. The teachers did not have to worry about “where to put it.”

3. Working with Harry did not assume prior mastery of certain knowledge. For example, learners cannot perform tasks in long division if they cannot subtract or multiply. Harry lends itself to whole-class activity as well as to small groups and individually-guided opportunities since it is not based on prerequisite learning.

4. Although Jack and Joe realized that compensatory education usually means little more than the alleviation of symptoms, they felt intellectually and emotionally comfortable with the notion that philosophy for children as presented in Harry needed nothing more than the boys and girls with whom they were already working.
IN-SERVICE

Once the teachers decided to become involved with Harry, they requested that the project directors meet on a regular basis with them to plan cooperatively approaches to making philosophy a part of their curriculum. Since Jack and Joe had a background in philosophy, the in-service needs were limited. Also, they had read IAPC's Philosophy in the Classroom which provided the rationale for the program. We decided to meet regularly to explore Harry and the teacher’s manual. Microlessons were taught. One of us explored the purposes of Harry from the philosophical view and the other assisted in matters dealing with teaching methodology. This formal attention to in-service resulted in the following decisions:

1. Harry Stottlemeler’s Discovery would be the vehicle to teach philosophy for the twenty-two seventh graders at the Bruce-Guadalupe Community School.

2. The novel would be available for all learners in Spanish and in English. Spanish audio-tapes of Harry would be prepared.

3. The class sessions would be held on Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday from 10:15 to 11:00 a.m.

4. Red and Al (project directors) would meet with Jack, Joe, and the class each Tuesday and Thursday.

5. A pre-test program would be completed even though the school staff has serious questions about “outsiders” administering standardized tests at this school. For our initial purposes, the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Form A), the Detroit Test of Learning Aptitude (Scals. 15, Social Adjustment B), and the Dos Amigos Verbal Language Scales were selected.

6. The teaching would take place in whole-class settings, large groups, and small groups with Joe and Jack in the leadership roles.

Instruction began late in April and was interrupted by the vacation calendar early in June. Most of the class sessions began with large-group teaching which was followed by small-group activities led by Jack, Joe, Red, and Al. The large-group sessions were generally guided by Jack or Joe with Red and Al each being responsible for at least one large-group instruction session. Two chapters of Harry were completed during these sessions which included a broad spectrum of exercises and activities from the teacher’s manual.

In addition to the support offered by Bruce-Guadalupe Community School, and the financial assistance of Marquette University, the Midwest Materials Development Center (located in Milwaukee) provided much needed professional support by editing the Spanish version of Harry. Also, the Milwaukee Public Schools gave contingent approval to participating in the project in selected bilingual schools for future implementation of the program.

“...new ideas and approaches in curriculum matters frequently do nothing but continue the frustration-failure cycle for bilingual learners because such materials assume previous learnings or because the materials themselves are perceived by some students as symbols of failure.”
Curriculum Implications

After a short time of working with the philosophy program, Jack and Joe verbalized a greater awareness of, and sensitivity to, the interdisciplinary nature of teaching/learning. The content and process inherent in such a program are the integrating substances out of which quality curricula can and should be developed.

More specifically, classifying observations in science projects were approached positively with the students stating the relationships between classifying in science and classifying in philosophy. Students were further aware that they had been involved with the process of classification in mathematics — “classifying is classifying,” regardless of the content area being studied.

In a history class exploring concepts related to culture and social change, it was the students who asked about the relationships of these concepts to their philosophical explorations with differences of degree vs. differences of kind. These ideas were related to their previous discussions about man having a culture and the lack of a culture among other animals. Existence of transfer of learning between social studies and philosophy is clearly demonstrated in this situation.

Jack told us that math classes on days on which philosophy is taught are more intense and meaningful. Comprehension of math has been deepened, and the children relate math to the real world of contexts as they have done in their philosophy class. The precision of the language engendered in the philosophical discussions transfers directly into the precise language required for successful work in math.

Both Jack and Joe suggested that the children's past verbal flippancy has given way to thoughtful verbalizing on important topics and issues. This change in student attitudes toward language also enhances the study of reading and literature. As part of the class's philosophical discussions and dialogue about the nature of the mind, a poet was invited to speak to the class. Perceptions of the mind from a poet's point of view have affected language experiences for their learners. Students who have never clipped poems from magazines, and newspapers, do so now. Day-dreaming and reflection are continuously emerging as useful tools for creative ideas rather than being considered a waste of time.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEARNER

Implications for individual learners are as numerous as the myriad of thoughts these learners can potentially foster. Students who might normally be labelled “non-academic” seem to have become more intellectually assertive. They are learning in an active manner.

Surprising contributions are made by bilingual learners who are without the “usual” background. One such student, while involved in dialogue relating to the concept of exclusion vs. inclusion, insisted to an “academically bright” learner that two diagrams would be necessary to exemplify the concepts rather than only one.

The recognized “fast learner” has found previously unrecognized peers with whom to conduct dialogue. Tasks that “bright” children previously saw themselves as singled out to do are now seen by them as tasks to be undertaken with others as contributors. Also, the “others” see themselves as doing now what the “bright” ones alone did so well. It seems as though the experience with philosophy has enabled class members to cut through various differing abilities (football vs. thinking), and they sense that each can do as well as the others with philosophy. Previously overlooked peers are now gaining respect because “they are saying something important.”

The “space wanderer” or “free spirit” now is okay because the students identify such human functions as being related to creativity and imagination. These are viewed as important activities in their philosophical experiences.

CONCLUSIONS

While we have no statistical data at this time, some conclusions can be drawn from our observations and direct involvement in the project.

1. Bilingual and monolingual learners see themselves as being successful in doing what philosophers do.
2. Students are learning more about reading and speaking in another student's language as well as in their own.
3. When dialogue proceeds in English, Spanish-speaking learners are less involved, but when the teaching-learning switches into Spanish, non-verbal as well as verbal participation is evident.
4. The value of thinking as a vehicle for discovery — making connections between thinking and dialogue to the everyday world — was evident in student reactions to the learning materials.

_An agent can understand fully only what he has himself made._
— Giambattista Vico
5. Seeing differences in opinions, values, and reactions of peers for what they are and realizing that differences may exist even when one applies the tools of logic, such as conversion, standardization, reversability and contradiction.

6. Among the things classroom teachers perceive are: a higher level of peer sensitivity and toleration for ambiguities; students moving away from the need for quick “right” answers, particularly from teachers; students listening more carefully to determine what others really are saying; students working in both Spanish and English with better than expected success; “bright” and “slow” learner labels becoming non-existent; philosophy for children becoming that much-sought-after focus around which other subject areas such as reading, comprehension, vocabulary, mathematics (set theory), language arts, music, and drama can be organized; passive learners becoming active; communication between students and students and teachers increasing; and students realizing that their thoughts and contributions to discussion have worth.

The project espouses no “philosophy of life” but provides learners with an opportunity to gain practice with the philosopher’s tools — logical inquiry and analysis. In addition, the students examine basic issues or themes which are of lasting human concern. Inquiry and analysis about these concerns, exercised in a responsible manner and using the tools of logic and dialogue, might enhance the decision-making process for children as they are learning, experiencing, doubting, growing, and maturing in their daily living.

7. The curriculum utilized in the program is seen as a more effective and affective way of approaching values than those value clarification programs which have always played a key part in the Bruce-Guadalupe experience. This realization has been due, in great measure, to the teacher’s manual. It is an indispensable aid to planning and teaching and a veritably limitless resource for creative ideas, activities and exercises, all of which emphasize the interdisciplinary opportunity in philosophical experiences.

Thinking and learning with materials in Spanish and English have brought higher levels of respectability to performance in both languages. It does not matter which language. The language, Spanish or English, becomes the facilitator for thinking — this is the essence of bilingual education for the teachers at Bruce-Guadalupe. Philosophy for children has enriched this aspect of the program by offering another tool for the teaching/learning of “thinking.”

The teachers see Harry as central to the total curriculum— a unifying thread which exemplifies several primary aims of the school. “If someone asked, ‘What is Bruce-Guadalupe Community School all about?’ I’d bring him into this philosophy class.”


This figure presents data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (1972). It shows that if our criterion of literacy were that people be able to read reference material, then some 8 percent of the young adults (25 year olds) in the nation would be “illiterate”. However, if critical reading is our goal, then some 50 percent of young adults would be called “illiterate”. These data show that student achievement in reading, as a problem area, changes considerably depending on our criterion of literacy.
Bulletins from the field . . .

• In Hawaii, a sizeable teacher-training operation in philosophy for children is operating with Title IVC funding. In charge of the program are Prof. Barry Curtis, Department of Philosophy, University of Hawaii, and Prof. Nobuko Fukuda, of the School of Education, University of Hawaii.

• Thanks to a three-year grant from the Minnesota Council on Quality Education, Profs. Peter French and Howard Wettstein of the Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota at Morris, together with Prof. Bruce Burnes of the School of Education, are conducting a philosophy for children program in five rural communities in western Minnesota.

• The IAPC curriculum for grades 5-8 has been validated by the New Jersey Department of Education, following a two-day site visit by a three-member out-of-state team of evaluators.

• The teacher-training affiliate of the IAPC — The Center for the Teaching of Reasoning — has been established with the assistance of Title IVC funding. During the 1978-79 academic year, CTR is training 110 teachers, most of whom will be receiving 12 graduate credits for the year's work.

• The Lexington (Mass.) Public Schools are continuing a broad program in teacher-training in philosophy for children. Children in grades 5-8 are being taught concurrently.

• As a result of a 1977 grant of $100,000 from NEH, three members of the Queens College School of Education (Jack Zevin, William Proefreidt, and James Higgins) and two members of the Queens Department of Philosophy (Peter Manicas and Ralph Sleeper), some 75 New York teachers participated last year in a pre-college philosophy workshop. As a result, a number of teachers in Brooklyn and Queens have begun implementing programs in grades 5-8.

• Approximately 25 Chicago teachers of the gifted, each from a different school, participated in the Spring of 1978 in a training workshop conducted by Dr. George Dalin, of the Department of Research and Evaluation, Chicago Board of Education. Virtually all of those trained are continuing to use the program in their classes.

• The November/December (1978) issue of The Social Studies is devoted to pre-college philosophy, dealing with traditionally high school philosophy, critical thinking, and P4C.
The Return to "Moral Education"
Should Dick and Jane Tackle the Categorical Imperative?

by Henry C. Johnson, Jr.

Relying upon the schools to make up for their private negligence is another of those things which are as American as apple pie. For two centuries, as participants in the world's largest scale continuous reform movement, Americans have given pedagogical answers to every sort of individual and corporate crisis. Whether the need be dietary deficiency, economic mobility, or low-cost therapy, the task is assigned to the American Public school, the world's most elaborate and comprehensive humanitarian agency. It was predictable, given the "revelations" of Watergate, corporate bribery and chicanery, and the dramatic increase in cruelty and violence invading even the schools themselves, that Americans would rapidly insist that their schools reassume their illegitimately forsaken responsibility for "moral education."

The question, however, is whether the schools (meaning teachers, administrators, and students) are ready for any such enterprise. They are, as usual receptive — indeed, shufflingly eager to please. But, as with any pedagogical change, except even more crucially in this case, competence is not merely a matter of technique and good will. We have just spent more than a decade watching the "new" science and math wreck upon the shoals of an instructional incompetence, made inescapable by our practical persuasion that pedagogical adequacy is exclusively a methodological problem, to be solved by issuing teachers new instructions without a concomitant change in presuppositions and concepts. Yet, if the outcome of that has been sloppiness in the "basics," now being remedied by a return to the old drill, the results of an ill-defined and inadequately grounded campaign for moral education or development can easily be far more dangerous. The responsible moral formation of human beings is not reducible to a program or a classroom technique, cheerfully (if expensively) furnished by a beneficent Edubiz or (failing that) a district committee set up to complete the task of curricular reform on six in-service days."

Before tuning their instruments for still another bandwagon performance, those with a stake in the outcome need to consider what "moral education" really is, why it has become a problem, what it can and cannot do, what some of its peculiar dangers are, and what any significant progress in the nurturing of moral competence will really require. These necessarily limited remarks are consequently addressed not just to specialists but to conscientious teachers and administrators, puzzled members of boards of education, parents, citizens, and, yes, even students themselves. They are not answers but an invitation to look further and deeper. They are written in advocacy of genuine moral education. The necessity of making that distinction, however, signals both the controversy and the dangers which mark the movement. Whether such a distinction will be made is part of the danger. Whether such a distinction can be made is part of the controversy. I also think the school does now have, and always has had, a peculiar responsibility in respect to moral education. Indeed, it is its principal and legislative purpose. The contemporary school is not "adding" anything to its already excessive burden but re-assuming a responsibility of which it illegitimately divested itself.

The Nature of Genuine Moral Education

What Is moral education? Answering that vital and difficult question requires some crucial distinctions which are not mere quibbles over words. The program labels currently in use form a baffling array: "moral education," "moral development," "affective education," "value education," "values clarification" are some of them. A thorough account of each would require an extensive analysis, but one difference among them is of the utmost importance both in theory and practice. That is the difference between those which approach the process almost exclusively psychologically and those which approach it philosoph-
The psychological approach appears most frequently under such titles as "values clarification," "affective education," or sometimes — and ambiguously — "humanistic" education. Often based on a crudely simplified and restricted notion of what "psychology tells us," it looks at human "behavior" largely from a so-called "affective" or emotional perspective. The moral-educational process, on this view, comprises an attempt to help the student get "clear" about what he "really wants," or how he "really feels" about things. Students are then "guided" to "accept" their "feelings," and those of others, to establish their personal "priorities," to look at "consequences," and so on.

The approach which we can call broadly "philosophical," on the other hand, looks at the choices human beings make as problems that are to be examined in primarily rational rather than emotional terms. Furthermore, it examines these choices in genuinely moral terms, i.e., as questions about what we ought to do rather than merely what we want to do or are likely to do. Indeed, as virtually any philosopher, and most educators, since Plato would insist, we are not dealing with "values" or "moral" education at all until we think in terms of an "ought" that applies to our choices, whether they be questions of individual conduct or social policy. On this approach, then, moral education means helping students to understand what genuine moral problems are (as questions of principle, not merely of preference), to identify them in their own and others' experience, to analyze them competently, and to look at the unique way in which we have developed, justified, and acted on moral principles as guides to responsible human action.

It seems to me clear that the schools have, in recent times, taken the psychological approach to the virtual exclusion of the philosophical. They have done so because we have committed ourselves, with little further thought, to some crucial and inter-related assumptions at the popular and practical level. First of all, we have assumed at the popular level that how one "should" behave is merely a matter of personal opinion, differing little if at all from one's other tastes and preferences. It is assumed that one's desires and appetites are really supreme, whatever the appearances. As a consequence, so-called "ethical" considerations really comprise attempts to rationalize tendencies to behave that are just there and cannot really be altered. Rather than fight against them, one should accept them, "learn to live with them," for the achievement of true peace and happiness.

As a further consequence, "educators" have assumed that one doesn't help people change for the better — as an educator surely tries to do — by appealing to their "minds" or "consciences" but to their self-interest. One changes them by making the desired behavior appear advantageous to them rather than either good or obligatory. A curious result then follows: neither moral education nor education itself makes any sense. Having come to view students as "organisms" which "respond" rather than as "persons" who "choose" and "act," the very notion of responsible, voluntary self-development, essentially focused in terms of an improvement in the value structures through which we govern ourselves, becomes absurd. In the place of "teaching" we are left with little or nothing but a crude process of manipulation from the outside — a process of "rewarding" or "conditioning" which need not (indeed cannot) involve genuinely reflective activity on the part of the student.

If, as I think is the case, on this view any notion of responsible self-development, any notion of education at all, simply seems to have disappeared, the assumptions which have led us to such a curious position need to be questioned. If we are to have not only moral education but any education at all, their roots need to be carefully explored.

The Logic of Moral Education

It is the teacher's task, in morals as in mathematics, to help the children to learn the language so that they can do the sums; his job is not to teach them answers but to raise questions, and at the same time to initiate them into the logic, which is an inherent property of the language, in accordance with whose rules those questions have to be discussed. So the question arises crucially: 'What are the logical properties of the moral words, and what restrictions do they place on what we can or cannot consistently say?' I hope that we philosophers, when we discuss moral education, will not allow ourselves, in the pursuit of relevance, to be diverted from this, the most relevant question of all.

Why Has Moral Education Become a Problem?

The sources of this all-important distinction between the psychological and philosophical approaches are very deep and help to explain why there has been a continuing controversy about the axiological or value dimensions of American education and schooling. I do not mean to suggest for a moment that the school has no legitimate function in respect to the development of the student's emotional well-being, still less that there is no legitimate role for psychological analysis. Education, as a concept of ideal development, however, is in itself inescapably bound to principles and judgments of value. What goes on in an education can ultimately only be grounded in someone's judgment of what is good and fitting for the individual and society. No amount of empirical evidence or reasoning can ever leave us other than in a position of confronting that question. Furthermore, both education and schooling have customarily involved a conscious attempt to develop the student's individual conduct as well.

A number of events, perhaps beginning in the 19th Century, conspired to call the relatively straightforward logic of the educational process into question. Only a few can be cited, and then only briefly. In part they were broad and cultural: a growing commitment to positivistic philosophy and scientific thought, often crudely defined and applied at the popular level, tended to push into the realm of the "meaningless" any "knowledge" not based on sense-data or experiment. In such a pseudo-scientific ethos, moral rules and principles, not proper inhabitants of the realm of "fact," had necessarily to be relegated to the limbo of attitude and private opinion. Under the onslaught of an often over-blown Darwinism, the whole notion of human freedom and voluntary action, presuppositions without which meaningful moral arguments can hardly be constructed, also became increasingly suspect. Particularly as appropriated by the nascent social and behavioral sciences, essentially deterministic doctrines, when converted to explanations of "human" action, left man with only an "outside." His behavior was, as educational psychologist Edward Lee Thorndike argued, safely and productively understood only when viewed "objectively," just as one would (necessarily, of course) view the behavior of an amoeba or a fish or one's cat. Finally, finding that cultures differed, and that the content of particular moral rules was not always and everywhere the same, the slippery conclusion was drawn that because there were many, none could be authoritative. A crude relativism thus gained virtually universal popular acceptance.

The schools, as social institutions, followed suit. Faced with a growingly plural culture, turn-of-the-century educators tried to replace it, when it couldn't be eradicated, with an equally debilitating ideological nihilism: any opinions, or none, would have to be accepted as equally valid. The new "educationists," struggling for a place in the academic sun, grabbed at the then infant social and behavioral sciences for support. A crude "scientific" method borrowed from their immature parent disciplines (and maintained with paralyzing rigor long after change... and can we say that children lack principles?

He told me that facts gave birth to, and were the absolute ground of principles; to which I said, that unless he had a principle of selection, he would not have taken notice of those facts upon which he grounded his principle. You must have a lantern in your hand to give light, otherwise all the materials in the world are useless, for you cannot find them; and if you could, you could not arrange them.

"But then," said Mr.—, "that principle of selection came from facts!" — "To be sure!" I replied; "but there must have been again an antecedent light to see those antecedent facts. The relapse may be carried in imagination backwards for ever, — but go back as far as you may, you cannot come to a man without a previous aim or principle."

Coleridge, Table Talk, Sept. 21, 1830.
ETHICAL DIALOGUE AT AN EARLY AGE

Exclusive altruism is absurd. On this point too I once got instruction from the mouths of babes and sucklings. The children of a friend of mine, children of six and four, had just gone to bed. Their mother overheard them talking when they should have been asleep. Wondering what they might need, she stepped into the entry and listened. They were discussing what they were here in the world for. That is about the size of problems commonly found in infant minds. The little girl suggested that we are probably in the world to help others. "Why, no indeed, Mabel," said her big brother, "for then what would others be here for?"


and growth had marked those disciplines themselves) shaped everything — pedagogical theory, research, and educational content — in spite of repeated warnings by broader and more perceptive educational thinkers such as William James and John Dewey. Eventually joined to the movement for "social efficiency" and "human engineering" and a frequently coercive liberal mythology, this methodological dogmatism held silent sway. Freedom and democracy became little more than a provision for value skepticism. School administrators often pleaded for a hygienic neutrality in the schools, in the midst of social and moral conflict, oblivious of the moral foundations of their own agenda. Teachers worked for professional protection of their "personal" privacy, as a defense against the moral responsibilities societies have always, and necessarily, expected from teachers. The assumptions of an impoverished learning theory were facilely extended to generate the notion that it was only what teachers did, not what they were inside the classroom or out, that mattered. To achieve professional status meant becoming a learning technician, not an exemplar of human virtue.

Such a brief analysis is, of course, entirely inadequate, though I think not incorrect. The point is that, in this process the curriculum and the schools' regimen became essentially psychologized: "drives" replaced "reasons" and "motives" as complete explanations of why people do what they do. Environmental inevitability and physiological necessity emptied notions such as "will" and "responsibility" of any real meaning and thereby deprived education of its unique content and discourse. Heroic figures and exemplary actions — admittedly often puerile and ridiculous in some of their 19th Century textbook manifestations — became an embarrassment. What the younger Huxley was later to call the "nothing but" school of evolutionary thought prevailed — it was fashionable to see man as "nothing but" an animal. Children were encouraged to look to their continuity with "Nature" and to "accept" their feelings and instincts, rather than see themselves and form their identity against distinctively human and social modes of conduct, on the argument that the former would "liberate" them while the latter would stifle their creativity. An army of counselors was created to assuage their wounds and aid in the process of their "adjustment," an "adjustment" which assumed that "education" was effected not by the conflict of thought and principle but by quiet absorption into a "natural" learning "environment" and, paradoxically, a mechanistically defined social system which was itself at least in part a fiction of the liberal-progressive imagination.

Consequently, in so far as the schools have, in recent decades, dealt with "values" at all, they have tended to take refuge either in a shallow relativism or in a "social morality" essentially defined by some statistically normative acceptability. Neither, of course, has succeeded in achieving the schools' purposes. Our shallow relativism has produced neither openness nor liberality but a state of affairs crudely contradictory and chaotic. Nor is there any social consensus upon which the schools can rely. It is, in fact, precisely because people do differ in how they judge and act that a critical, rational, and ethical examination of alternatives is required. Unfortunately, however, the schools now provide little if any guidance for this task.
What School Programs Can and Cannot Do
Distressed by what they regard as our signal failure to maintain, let alone improve, the nation’s moral health by what were once promising new approaches, many people clearly hope that we can again use the schools to make people good. Unfortunately — or, perhaps, fortunately — moral education programs cannot promise that. The schools cannot guarantee that anyone will be good as a direct and immediate consequence of teaching and learning. To revert to lessons taught at least as far back as Socrates, we must realize that while we may be able to teach those who are willing how to go about finding out something about virtue, we cannot teach anyone to be virtuous, particularly in the American public school. In a genuinely pluralistic society we cannot impose the teachings of particular moral systems. Nor, even if we could legitimately do so, would that produce moral actions on the part of those whom we had so “taught.” That is true partly because people do not necessarily act on the basis of right beliefs even when they hold them. It is also true because any such imposition of behavior would in itself contradict the notion of moral growth and integrity, resting as they do on voluntary, rational conduct.

That is not to say that we can as a people recognize and apply no moral principles whatever in our common institutions, nor is it to suggest that there is nothing for the school to do in this case. There are, among others, two ways in which the school’s moral task is obviously warranted and inescapable. The maintenance of a genuinely free society is itself embedded in a prior moral commitment. Such a society, in contrast to both anarchy and autocracy, requires, as Horace Mann put it nearly a century and a half ago, a “voluntary obedience” to the “laws of reason and duty.” The school, as an instrumentality in the achievement of a free society, has every right to bend its efforts toward achieving that goal. No school can, however, guarantee the successful accomplishment of such an objective, because it rests upon the individual’s willingness to be bound by it. Yet the school can surely require that its students confront the moral issues implicit in human choices, both individual and social, take account of the potential consequences of their individual and corporate acts, and learn how to weigh them in ethical terms.

Secondly, the educational enterprise not only includes value content but as a process rests upon ethical criteria for its very intelligibility. Truth-telling and honesty are implicit in the very notion of self-development, for example. Furthermore, education and schooling are not solitary phenomena. The school as an intrinsically social organization may adopt only prudential and bureaucratic rules for its self-ordering, but the observance of even these antiseptic conventions rests upon a moral commitment to be bound by the legitimate claims of others. Consequently, the school has a right not only to teach the positive ethical principles and rules which are the presuppositions of its very existence but to insist upon their observance by all who choose to be members. The only alternative to this is the abandonment not only of free institutions but of society and community itself.

“...the educational enterprise not only includes value content but as a process rests upon ethical criteria for its intelligibility. Truth-telling and honesty are implicit in the very notion of self-development...”
The schools, in short, both can and should make moral choice possible, by providing the student with the opportunity to learn what it means to make reasoned judgments respecting moral issues, to understand at least the major moral traditions in his culture — indeed, any he chooses responsibly to examine — and to reckon with those figures whom we have legitimately regarded as images of heroic conduct. Undergoing such an educational experience will not, as I have said, produce good conduct. But genuinely moral action cannot be achieved apart from the conscious, critical development of such knowledge and skill. It is unnecessary to accept all of Kant's moral theory to agree with him that, in some sense, moral action is never merely doing what is right but doing what is right because one has learned how to grasp its rightness as a demand upon oneself.

There is a third consideration at once more technical and more controversial. I should like to outline briefly a provisional definition of what I take to be a crucial element in the school's province of responsibility for moral development. It is the systematic expansion of the person's "moral universe." My concern for this aspect of things arose directly from working with both students and teachers. I discovered that individuals tend very frequently to develop their moral rules and principles only in a highly restricted area. For example, one teacher evidenced a highly developed moral rationale in relation to his wife, but no one else counted. Such reasoning might resemble, on Kohlberg's approach, both the very low level of "interpersonal concordance" and the very highest level as well. Yet, the treatment he believed ought to be accorded his spouse was, on the one hand, not the crude prudentialism characteristic of the lower stages. On the other hand, the higher principles invoked had logical universalization but only very limited application.

Now it seems to me that one practical task for which the school is particularly fitted is, if I may put it this way, the expansion of the moral universe or field of application, not just the logical expansion of principles and rules to logically universal status. Clearly, the school has some role in respect to the content of moral rules and principles, though perhaps more as vehicle than source. The school, likewise, as Kohlberg and his disciples advocate, has a role in respect to the form of reasoning, in building and applying moral rules and principles. The extension of the moral universe may — I am not sure — constitute a third sort of role not usefully subsumed, at least for pedagogical purposes, under the others.

Although it is impossible to complete it here, looking at this issue seems to me to bring together three important contributions in the literature: First, Piaget's intriguing parallel between cognitive and moral adequacy, as embodied in the notion of "decentering." For Piaget both successful cognitive and moral relations require the systematic dissolution of an egocentric universe, with the upshot that justice is the moral analogue of truth in the epistemological domain. Secondly, there is Dewey's compatible notion of education and schooling as the deliberate cognitive extension of the environment. For Dewey, in Democracy and Education for example, intelligent and "educated" persons are those who have developed a sense of environment, not only physical but social, not only immediate but "historical," if you will, in which they come to see themselves as parts-in-relation-to-wholes. Finally, William James insists that a central element in living morally is to recognize an unlimited universe of sentient beings who, all and each, have legitimate claims upon us.

Now, if we take it as a potentially useful definition of the school's task that students are to develop to their maximum ability their sense of "environment," of things and persons in various modes of relation, clearly empirical knowledge is required. So also is progressively more adequate conceptual development. If the school is, further, to take as its responsibility persuading individual students that they also live in a moral environment, uniquely moral conceptualization will have to be developed, in conjunction with their more general cognitive development. However, if we are to aim at their becoming moral, more than just conceptualizing such a larger "world" is entailed, I should think. This is a larger world which cannot be reduced to an abstraction. To avoid that, one's moral imagination must be developed as well, a process which cannot be reduced either exclusively to the cognitive nor to the emotional but demands the integration of both. It is this all important aspect, in which one grasps an environment of persons in their singularity, who have real and not merely titular claims, that the arts, and particularly literature (including drama and poetry) play an absolutely irreplaceable role. That role is to make the singular present, without reducing it to an abstraction.

Theaetetus: Yes, Socrates, I stand in amazement when I reflect on the questions that men ask. By the gods, I do! I want to know more and more about such questions, and there are times when I almost become dizzy just thinking about them.

Socrates: Ah, yes, my dear Theaetetus, when Theodorus called you a philosopher he described you well. That feeling of wonder is the touchstone of the philosopher, and all philosophy has its origins in wonder. Whoever reminded us that Iris (a messenger of the gods) is the offspring of Thaumas (wonder) wasn't a bad genealogist.

Plato, Theaetetus
Although the schools are instruments of a particular society and culture, all depends upon what sort of society and culture they serve. It was Dewey's point, of course, that the presuppositions of a free, democratic society differed essentially and not merely accidentally from those of an authoritarian society, whether autocratic or anarchic. The principle of life of a democracy, Dewey in effect argued, is actively comprehensive rather than passively intensive, looking forward and outside itself. Hence it consciously aims at the construction of an environment larger than itself, more extensive than its immediate local or national interests. If there is any sense to that, the task of schools and teachers is to see to the expansion of knowledge and conceptualizing necessary for a comprehensive environment, but also one which is paralleled by a commensurate ability to see that environment morally and not merely selfishly or prudentially.

Finally, given a notion shared by all three, namely that the development of all uniquely human potential is for the purpose of human action, and that action, as opposed to mere response, is always and everywhere moral, since it involves the deliberate choice of means-ends, it is in a genuine sense the moral element which unifies any curriculum. More controversially, I should also want at least to try to argue that it is for this reason that both the artistic and the social studies are the mutually interactive core of the school's developmental regimen, 'round which all else is instrumental. It also suggests why the school's acts and purposes cannot be psychologized without being destroyed in self-contradiction.

What Is Required for a Moral Education Program?

The implications of what we have been discussing require first of all that any adequate program of moral education pay some rigorous attention to the process of learning how to make moral judgments in itself. No one is spontaneously wise about values, though everyone may be about his inclinations — indeed, no one else can be. Moral competence is no more "caught" than the ability to do quadratic equations or play the oboe. While both musical and mathematical virtuosity may, like highly ethical action, rise from springs the school can seldom divine let alone bring into existence, each rests upon skills that can be taught and practiced. But it seems to me that, unless we are willing to settle for a rather narrow competence, something more than a study of the process by itself will be required. A satisfactory program of moral development will demand the restoration of a long-lost ethical dimension wherever it is appropriate in the entire curriculum. Although we may use "true to life" examples in the course of attempting to develop the skills necessary for moral competence as such, it is equally important to look at the moral issues which arise in virtually every study in the student's curriculum. This will mean learning once again to look at literature and drama, for example, as more than a discussion of social and psychological dynamics, as more than the anatomy of feeling. It will involve seeing history as more than the interplay of impersonal forces and ideological patterns. It will mean seeing science not as a colorless technique but as a form of human activity which has consequences requiring ethical judgment quite as much as any other.

The achievement of such a pervasive reordering of our perspectives on the curriculum, not to mention the addition of conscious philosophical skill development, will obviously require in turn a considerably broadened competence on the part of teachers and administrators as well. This is not just desirable. It is absolutely necessary. Here again, recent educational experience should be instructive. As I have already suggested, most analysts would agree that the important new programs in the sciences pioneered in the last ten to fifteen years have been severely hampered, and indeed have often failed abysmally in practice, because they presupposed not merely new materials but "new" teachers for their success. And these teachers were rarely forthcoming. The situation in the case of moral education programs is even more serious, because there is in most cases little or no competence at all in respect to guiding moral development, through no necessary fault of the teachers. Colleges of education have not provided even rudimentary acquaintance with this matter until very recently — and even then, only here and there. Nor will the instructions of the pedagogical merchandisers, nor usually organized "orientation programs" or "in-service" days. The only possibility of an adequate moral education rests upon rigorous study of the field itself, and rigorous restudy of much of the teachers area of specialization as well, in order to achieve a genuine integration of the two.

At this point the politics of education becomes a vital concern. It is unfortunate that the teachers' organizations and many state departments, together with colleges of education, are locked in a struggle over the control of teacher preparation and certification. The crux of the matter is the proposal to move teacher preparation and certification, as well as much continuing professional education, off the campus. There is something to be said for the location of an important part of the teacher's practical training at the site in which it is practiced, and little to be said on behalf of unresponsive professional colleges. It is, however, also difficult to believe that the fundamental kind of preparation required by responsible programs in moral education can be handled by practitioner experts, if only because there are few, if any, at least at this point.

Finally any genuine program in moral education will require at least one additional element, an element all too easily overlooked and quite possibly the most difficult of all to obtain. The principal practical question is perhaps one of consensus. The moral education "movement" is already experiencing some significant opposition along with its
"...a variety of moral exemplars, principles, and arguments must be actively examined by the student, rather than impose upon him a single, preferred moral system."

enthusiastic acceptance. Essentially this opposition tends to take two forms: a sharply expressed concern over what specific moral content will be taught and a reluctance to see the school as an instrument of moral development rather than the family or the church. These issues are also much too large to be dealt with satisfactorily in a limited space. However, a word or two may be useful. These concerns are real and probably very difficult to dislodge, even though I do not think they are well-founded. Clearly, both family and church have legitimate reasons as well as generally accepted authority for engaging in their own programs of value-formation. But, it does not follow that this fact pre-empts the school’s authority or renders its efforts nugatory. Family, church, and school do not do the same thing, nor do they do what they do for the same reasons or purposes. Some application may make this clearer. Although other bases and contexts for moral formation may be provided, as we have already noted, the community as a whole has reasons and obligations of its own to foster a broadly social moral character. An adequate morality from the community perspective is necessarily connected at least in part with some of the functions an individual customarily learns how to exercise in school. One must learn how to look, along with others (whose moral orientation may differ), at questions of social policy as moral and ethical issues — issues that may, but need not, arise in a personal, family, or religious context. One must learn to look at one’s vocational role, the institutions one must deal with and oneself responsibly shape, and the other contents of the society and culture which one shares, as problems in value, not merely as matters of fact. Indeed, unless the community sees to it that these moral connections are made, the outcome may be an exclusively private and therefore, from the community’s perspective, an entirely inadequate morality.

It is implicit in most if not all the responsible current approaches to moral development that a variety of moral exemplars, principles, and arguments must be actively examined by the student, rather than impose upon him a single, preferred moral system. It is in dealing with conflicting moral claims and considerations that the student is provided with an opportunity to grow in his ability to reason about moral issues. This will understandably disturb many groups and persons. But it need not, provided that the process of analysis is maintained with real rigor and openness. Furthermore, given the incredible amount of intercommunication in the world of today, it is doubtful that any significant degree of isolation from “unsatisfactory” moral concepts and claims could be achieved, even if it were desirable. Indeed, it is the fact that there are claims and counter-claims which makes developing the student’s critical moral competence all the more necessary at this juncture. Finally, it is frequently suggested by the inadequately informed that there are widely disparate moral principles floating about. But, upon more adequate examination, there is probably a much greater moral consensus than division. There are, of course, certain issues, many quite serious, in which there is considerable and severe conflict, if only because of a rethinking of these issues in the light of changed situations. But at least a large proportion of the morally bizarre is little more than posturing, and its inadequacy would be easily exposed by anyone who possessed even an elementary competence at moral analysis.

There is also another kind of consensus that will have to be achieved, I believe, if really adequate programs of moral education are to be made to work. As anyone familiar with recent writing on the “movement” knows, the philosophers tend to be suspicious of “moral educators” with insufficient preparation or procedural rigor. Mutual distrust characterizes the relations of both with the psychologists, who rightly point out that even given the necessity of clearly distinguishing descriptive social and behavioral scientific approaches from genuine value concepts and issues, there are significant psychological questions involved in human moral action. Much of this distrust and confusion arises, however, from long dissociation and evasion in working with the problems of this realm of human inquiry. Much also stems from the excessive territoriality which has grown up in the American academy, a characteristic which has rendered it frequently unfit to tackle serious problems in many realms. Some constructive peace treaty, without a stifling of serious cross-disciplinary debate, will have to be voluntarily signed, or risk a destruction born of our specialisms. It is difficult to believe that the lot of either philosophers, psychologists, or educators would be advanced by such a catastrophe, let alone the public good.

I have been trying to suggest, then, that the recovery of serious and responsible “moral education,” is both an intrinsic, i.e. dangerous enterprise and one of supreme importance. It is perhaps potentially the most significant educational movement in our generation, not only because of its own importance but because of its potential effect upon the whole educational enterprise. Whether it will work, or turn into yet another pedagogical bandwagon, depends absolutely on our ability to recognize the true article from those which are bogus — those which will only further expand the already excessively private and psychological preoccupation of the schools, or those which will lead to the uncritical imposition of some particular form of the moral development we ostensibly seek. The avoidance of these dangers will entail not only a great deal of careful thought on the part of all involved, from teachers to parents and to students, but an enormous amount of homework. In this case, there simply are no crib-sheets and no cram courses. As the ancients knew: corruptio optimi pessima: The worst things we do as human beings usually stem not from the pursuit of evil as such but from a corruption of our highest goals.
What is a Discussion?

by Justus Buchler

What the traits of a discussion are and what the traits of a good discussion appear to be two different questions. I do not feel heroic enough to attempt an exhaustive answer to either, although perhaps in dealing with the first, which it is my inclination to do, some conclusions may emerge about the second.

It may be true, as the Greeks have told us, that men by nature desire to know. I have never encountered a student who did not desire to know. Unfortunately, the real problem is whether students desire to learn, and whether, among those who do, there is any sense of what actual inquiry or discovery entails. The first major job of a teacher, and maybe in the last analysis the only one, is to implant the spirit and experience of inquiry — or, better, of query, if I may import a term I have used elsewhere to designate probing in the widest possible sense, that is, probing which can be directed toward making or acting no less than toward stating. Whatever else a comparison of one teaching method with another aims at, it should consider which method is the best means of accomplishing this job. And in any such comparison the realities of the school situation within the cultural situation merit attention at the very outset. The school is an institution which receives young persons from society at large. We need not fool ourselves; the contrast between the values to which the student has been subjected and the demands of the school is enormous, and it cannot be obliterated by the vague notion that the school is a microcosm of society. The school, though a body social, is not primarily a mirror of a culture, and if it ever were, it would cease to have any function.

The student is one among a vast cultural majority who have about as much understanding of what a school is and of what its ideal values are as of the other side of the moon. A current writer speaks of an unprecedented “hunger for learning,” an “adulation of learning” in our time — a pitiable identification of the passion for quiz programs or the testimony of registration figures with the love of ideas. It is no mystery why parents who themselves have gone to school are so often scarcely less ignorant of the sense of learning than anybody else. They passed through school in their day with a cultural armor that would have resisted even the most self-conscious instruction or the most ardously wrought curriculum of the present. Developments since the first World War have, by and large, made the situation a more hopeful one. But circumstances contrive to perpetuate the moral isolation of the school.

At its worst, schooling means a decade of baby-sitting, and, for the most part, it means training in the right answers. It is a commonplace that students can go through years of a good school curriculum without experiencing an iota of intellectual excitement. F.J.E. Woodbridge warned us, more than a half-century ago, to minimize the emphasis on education as “a preparation for life.” It is better, he said, to think of it as “a discipline in present excellence.”

The first consideration, then, that imposes itself when we try to clarify ourselves about the meaning of the discussion procedure is the role of this procedure in fostering intellectual awareness and in dissipating the machine-like conception of query. Since it concerns the student as person and not simply as registrant in good standing, it cannot
possibly be limited to the first classroom hours. Ideational sensibility does not arrive in the form of sudden illumination, and students already endowed need to be sustained and fed. Now in the formal presentation (the "lecture"), as we ordinarily understand it, a product is established. In the discussion, a product is established. Quantitatively speaking, "more" can be transmitted by presentation or exposition than can be established by discussion. But more can be assimilated of what is established than of what is transmitted. In both cases, a subject matter engages the action and attention of a certain number of people. In the lecture the wheels have been greased, the mechanism operates, and the product is inherited, God willing. In the discussion the product is necessarily earned, through halting personal labor. By the standards of social efficiency, one method appears to be rational and fluid; the other, primitive, wasteful, circuitous. But this is the crux of the matter. Ideational awareness in students requires precisely the perception on their part that there is no analogy whatever between entrepreneurial productivity and the productivity of query.

The relative merits of the lecture and the discussion depend in part on the conditions of their fulfillment: most obviously, on who is lecturing and who is being lectured to, on who is guiding the discussion and who is present in the discussion. But, plainly, there are properties intrinsic to each procedure considered as a situation. I have refrained from employing a common pair of terms, to the effect that lecturing entails "passivity" and discussion "activity" on the part of the student. Postponing for a while the question whether this account is just, it should be clear that there is no virtue at all in mere activity and that it is often wise to be passive. Everyone knows that unmitigated activity is a disease of the times contagious to the school. What is important in any procedure is the type of activity, the circumstances of passivity, involved. It is therefore in the total character and purpose of a method of teaching that its significance is to be found. If the discussion method is superior to the lecture method, this is not because of its degree of activity but because the establishment of a product of query by students is more fundamental to the deepening of their powers than their acceptance of such a product, and because the assimilation of ideas is more important than the compilation of ideas. I am aware that some champions of discussion might favor "manipulation of ideas" instead of assimilation, and, in general, I should agree to the equal suitability of the term; but, having presupposed its meaning in the notion of "establishing" a product, I prefer here to lay stress on the distinctive effect of discussion and to return later to the question of "activity" in general.

The term "discussion", occurring in a variety of contexts, carries a variety of associations. Notwithstanding their own practice, a great many teachers as well as students still labor under the idea that the lecture is the normal mode of academic communication and that the discussion is the anomalous mode, introduced not primarily to subserve query but primarily to promote "democracy" or to generate fraternal feeling. It is important, therefore, in determining what classroom discussion is, to determine what it is not. First of all, it is simply not true that "discussion is discussion" regardless of its conditions. Classroom discussion is a continuing enterprise, with a content that is sequential, and above all, cumulative. The members of a social club, who discuss what their luncheon speaker has told them about traffic deaths, religion, or an African safari, bring to the meeting no moral commitment toward query. They come with no substantive preparation. Unlike students, they have no responsibility for the framing of ideas. They are present to be entertained, to evoke interest in the world about them, to be "stimulated" a little, to be "civic-minded." They are inherently distrustful of the abstract, of the effort to generalize, of "big words." The club discussion is a discrete occasion of comradeship. The classroom discussion is a persisting community of query.

There are many people who are inclined to belittle sharp distinctions between the different circumstances of discussion. Even those who do have a strong sense of the uniqueness of the classroom often belie it in practice. For example, the typical observer of another school's curriculum, having received permission to visit classes, goes to one hour of discussion in the social studies course, perhaps another hour of discussion in the mathematics course, and departs. I have often insisted upon greater hospitality than a visitor is prepared to receive, not merely because casual observation is absurdly unrepresentative, but because false perspective can give the air of travesty to an hour of labor. The individual discussion is part of a course; it presupposes products earlier achieved, evolving interests, and future obligations. It is not a one-act play giving way to another on the morrow. The specific techniques and procedures can vary greatly from day to day. To the one-hour observer (the largest species) a discussion can seem excessively narrow in scope, excessively broad in scope, or well-nigh unintelligible.

**CONVERSATION AS AN UNREHEARSED INTELLECTUAL ADVENTURE.**

As civilized human beings, we are the inheritors, neither of an inquiry about ourselves and the world, nor of an accumulating body of information, but of a conversation begun in the primeval forest and extended and made more articulate in the course of centuries. It is a conversation which goes on both in public and within each of ourselves. Of course there is argument and inquiry and information, but wherever these are profitable they are recognized as passages in this conversation... Conversation is not an enterprise designed to yield an extrinsic profit, a contest where the winner gets a prize, nor is it an activity of exegesis; it is an unrehearsed intellectual adventure.... Education, properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill and partnership of this conversation in which we learn to recognize the voices, to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and in which we acquire the intellectual and moral habits appropriate to conversation.

THE TEACHER AS A THINKING MODEL

“What and how much do children know about what a teacher thinks? It is inevitable that children will know something about how a teacher thinks, how much depending on the teacher. I have never heard anyone argue that a teacher is not a model for children of how one should think and act. It is not a matter of should a teacher be a model but rather that he is a model.... The point I wish to emphasize is that it appears that children know relatively little about how a teacher thinks about the classroom, that is, what he takes into account, the alternatives he thinks about, the things that puzzle him about children and about learning, what he does when he is not sure of what he should do, how he feels when he does something wrong — there is quite a bit that goes on in a teacher’s head that is never made public to children.... There is a good deal of anecdotal evidence strongly indicating that the more a teacher can make his own thinking public and subject for discussion — in the same way one expects of children — the more interesting and stimulating does the classroom become for students.... If my experience with school children — in fact, with all levels of students, from elementary through graduate school — is any guide, that large part of a teacher’s “thinking about thinking”, which is never made public, is precisely what the children are interested in and excited by on those rare occasions when it becomes public.”


The contentions embodied in a and b can be dealt with implicitly by various considerations. In referring to discussion as community of query and as committed to the establishment of a product, I do not mean to romanticize the process or to overestimate the extent of its accomplishments. The classroom never will be the scene of grandiose research or of systematic thought. As anyone who has spent any time in it knows, the talk is not consistently inspiring and can sometimes be dispiriting. Yet it can engender values truer to the spirit of free speculation than any other instance of community, within or without the academic world. The ingenuousness, the insight, the mad spontaneity of children discussing fairness or friendship or personal identity is like nothing else in the realm of discourse. It may not be the peak of invention, but it is very much the beginning of query. Given sufficiently challenging fare, accorded a status of reasonable equality within the confines of the classroom, students have begun the revolution of awareness. To establish a product is in itself a very modest process. It implies, of course, not the exhaustion of a subject but progress in the ascertainment of complexities. The classroom discussion is as different from the “bull session” as it is from the club luncheon, the T.V. panel, or the town meeting. Profitable and necessary as the informal gabfest may be, it is no ideal for the classroom, where economy and the sense of reflective order are the partners of exuberance.

No doubt there are as many conceptions of the actual conduct of discussion as there are practitioners of the method. I gather, both from direct observation and from the testimony of colleagues at various institutions, that practice ranges all the way from the rigorous specification of classroom norms to utter chaos. In between are to be found meetings like those of the Society of Friends, lectures to small groups in small rooms, and hour-long interrogation of students in alphabetical order. I am myself a little suspicious of strict canons for the “art of teaching” or of legislation as to what is or is not authentic discussion. On the other hand, since certain aims and values in a school are of greater importance than others, it seems to me that such aims and values are what any discussion ought to subserve. The view that no aims whatever can be specified as guides and that the values of learning are unpredictable or fortuitous may not be exactly nihilistic, but it questions the very existence of organization in learning. If, then, the actualization of the student’s powers for query and the widening of his or her imagination are the values at which academic learning aims — naturally there are other values intellectual and moral of the total school experience — these are the guideposts for the conduct of discussion. One can scarcely take exception to any particular discussion technique if it does promote these values. Whether all current techniques do, in fact, promote them and whether the views on which these techniques are based have been carefully weighed, I rather doubt.

Consider, for instance, the view that a discussion should be characterized by the widest possible participation of students. Some years ago a visitor from the West Coast attended a class of mine. At the end of the hour he came
up and congratulated me on the number of students who had taken part, specifying the percentage to the first decimal place. When I told him that the day before only four or five students had carried the burden, his response was that not every hour could be a "good" one. And when I expressed the feeling that the earlier hour had been the better discussion, with greater benefit to the group, he smiled as though I had uttered a paradox. He had not paid much attention to the lines of argument and could not appraise the substance of anyone's contribution, but had occupied himself with computations about the number of times students spoke, the number of times they signified willingness to speak, the number of times they looked out of the window, and the number of doddlers among them. I do not know how many exponents of the discussion method find such criteria significant. I do know that several of my colleagues express a sense of defeat when only a small number of students speak during a discussion hour.

Among other questions, we are back to that of "activity" and "passivity." All things considered, wide participation is an index of vitality in the discussion, and participation itself is a symptom of intellectual energy in the participant. Yet if the ends of discussion are to be kept in view, the quality of the talk is more important than its quantity, and it is in the teacher's discretion whether at a given time it is of greater value to students to ruminative on the argument or to help build it. Neither pedagogical maxims nor an unseen hand can replace the variable, but ever responsive, judgment of the teacher. I suppose it would be generally acknowledged that the dialogues of Plato are pretty good "discussions." Yet the merit of these discussions does not depend on the number of participants, and in most of them one speaker dominates. The quantitative emphasis goes hand in hand with what might be called a therapeutic conception of discussion. It is sometimes contended that, since a school exists primarily to help students, it is good for them to "blow off steam" and good for them to acquire the responsibilities of communal participation. To this there are two main answers. First, a school does indeed exist to help students; but some conceptions of help are in effect the very reverse. None is of greater disservice to students than that which prescribes indiscriminately for their welfare, lumping together the functions of the dormitory, the advisory interview, the front office, and the classroom. It is good for students to blow off steam, even in the classroom — but occasionally, not principally. In the classroom there are other values which take precedence. The desirable degree of participation in discussion varies with the particular subject, the extent and nature of the background reading, the ability of students to discern what is going on, the psychological readiness of students, and a host of other factors. Since participating can mean raising questions as well as expressing viewpoints, a large number of participants is a fact which, taken by itself, signifies nothing.

Second, so far as the individual student is concerned, not the group, "participation" in the discussion does not necessarily take the form of oral activity. Every class exhibits wide differences in the emotional makeup of its members, and the shy, reticent, or modest student may profit greatly from discussion by others, even as the witnesses did in the Socratic conversations. Neither direct coercion nor coercive expectation is a technique becoming to teachers who wish to identify with the minds and needs of their students. The student who participates through reflective activity alone is not shirking the collaborative obligation of the group as the chronic absentee is. Such students are, as it were, creative auditors in the community of query. The problem of self-confidence is one that they must solve for themselves and the teacher can help by lifting from them the tension that comes with external pressure. The "responsibilities of communal participation" must not, therefore, be construed as a yoke; they can be fulfilled in more than one way. It is a positive good, not a necessary evil, that a class should be diversified. Numerically speaking, a discussion group can be too small. And it does not make sense to value diversity without respecting the human differences it implies.

A key distinction between the expository and discussion situations emerges at this point. It is possible for the student's intellectual activity to be as great in a lecture as in a discussion. Between the auditor of a formal presentation and the silent member of the discussion group there is no basic difference — so far as energy and movement of thought is concerned. Moreover, the skilled expositor can anticipate typical stumbling blocks in student understanding and deal with them by judicious restatement. Nevertheless, there is one thing that the formal presentation cannot do. It cannot reproduce the conditions of actual query. The silent student in the discussion, fully as much as the vocal one, witnesses and experiences the manipulation of subject matter from its initial circumstances. He or she observes pitfalls as they occur in student probing and not merely as they are formulated in the more finished perspective of a formal exposition. Such students experi-
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What Philosophy Does

“A philosopher’s genius lies not in his giving one new
answer to one old question, but in his transforming all the
questions. He gives mankind a different air to breathe. But
the differences that he makes are as hard to describe as the
differences made by growing up. The adolescent cannot
realise what these changes will be like; the adult cannot recollect what they had been like.”


enience the natural history of query sometimes with their guts as well as with their intellects. The expositor can re-enact problematic experience dramatically; but in discussion the student is party to the original. Perhaps the most important consideration of all is that in the discussion the teacher has the opportunity to do all that the formal expositor does, and with more direct awareness of student needs. Teachers, too, can dramatize ideas, introduce factual information, prepare the ground, and clear the ground. But they can do these things in their urgency as well as by design, in the same way that they can answer questions as well as anticipate them. Thus in the discussion, not only is a product established collaboratively; it is experienced in its life-cycle as well as in its consummation.

It may be clear now wherein lies the error also of another group of teachers who stoutly insist that discussion should be wholly a student affair, with a minimum of contribution by the instructor. As the typical expositor places too much emphasis on the product and too little on the process, they place too much on the process and too little on the product. They contend that it is not the business of children’s discussion to reach conclusions; that for students the experience of learning is far more important than the concoction of half-baked results. This school of thought, though not identical with that which wishes to widen participation at all costs, overlaps with it. It certainly must be conceded that half-baked results, if mistaken for what they are not, can be worse than no results at all. And I think it must be conceded also that, if a choice had to be made, the process of learning might merit more emphasis than the product. But the products of classroom discussion do not have to be half-baked in order to be results, and a choice between the product and the process does not have to be made in a discussion. Two simple confusions are imbedded in the approach of this school. One is between a product of query and a conclusion of query; the other is between a definitive conclusion and a functional or provisional conclusion.

We have agreed that students cannot aim at authoritative termini. Where we can speak of a conclusion at all, it may be developed only after many hours, and then with qualifications befitting the circumstances. But, regardless of this, a product is inevitably established in any given hour of discussion. For the product need not take the form of an assertive conclusion. It may be an enumeration of possible views, or a fuller definition of a problem, or a growth of appreciative awareness. It may be more of an envisioning or of an exhibiting than of an affirming. The product is the concrete achievement of the hour — this is the language of students themselves. Students may have no right to demand final answers, but they certainly have a right to expect some sense of intellectual motion or some feeling of discernment.

Those who would remove the teacher as much as possible from overt participation cannot evade either the nonsense or the pathos of the consequences. Strictly, “as much as possible” means the total disappearance of the teacher and the replacement of the class by the bull session. Should the teacher be a patrolman keeping physical order? Or a purely formal logician, interrupting to detect inconsistency in argument? Or a parliamentary chairman, democratically distributing opportunities to speak? Or a mere representative of the school, symbolizing the sponsor of the discussion? Or a silent judge, meditating future rewards and penalties to the performers? Or an enigmatic contriver of puzzles, throwing out “hints”? Or “one of the boys,” making himself as stupid as possible in order to spur them on? No doubt it is possible for a teacher so to dominate the proceedings as to terrorize or stultify students into total non-participation. But I am assuming throughout that when we speak of the “lecturer” and the “leader of discussion,” we mean individuals representative of the respective methods and sufficient in reasonableness to permit comparison of these methods. By “discussion” we cannot possibly mean “tyrannical lecture.”

How can teachers be the midwives of ideas if they merely look on at the dubious birth of such ideas? To legislate that they deliberately suppress their possible contributions to the discussion is to suppose them less than human or less than teachers — or less than responsible. If they are concerned with promoting awareness and not just encouraging speeches, they can no more refrain from contributing themselves than from permitting the best of their students to contribute. Rigid prescriptions of just how much teachers should talk at one stretch or what the intervals should be between their comments convert the discussion from an instance of learning into an exercise or a rite. Withdrawing them from the group is like withdrawing the books from the library or tearing out the odd-numbered pages in order to improve the guessing power of the students. Of course, teachers may often contribute injudiciously. But “contributing” and “contributing injudiciously” are no more synonymous than “teacher” and “unskilled teacher.” It is possible for teachers to utilize their cognitive authority without flaunting it or to be periodically authoritative without ever being authoritarian. The fact of the matter is that they have to be not only positive contributors but exemplars of discussion. And if they are not, then to that extent the formal expository method is the superior method.

Having mentioned one great student of education, Woodbridge, it would hardly do to overlook his colleague Dewey, who, by some strange quirk of history, is often invoked to support, and is supposed even to have developed, the conception of the quiescent teacher. As Dewey puts it, on the contrary:
There is no spontaneous germination in the mental life. If [the student] does not get the suggestion from the teacher, he gets it from somebody or something... The implication that the teacher is the one and only person who has no "individuality" or "freedom" to "express" would be funny if it were not so sad in its outworkings. And his contribution, given the conditions stated, will presumably do more to getting something started which will really secure and express the development of strictly individual capacities than will suggestions springing from uncontrolled haphazard sources. The point is also worth dwelling upon that the method of leaving the response entirely to pupils, the teacher supplying, in the language of the day, only the "stimuli", misconceives the nature of thinking.  

A notorious pitfall of the discussion method is the danger that a thin line often separates discussion from pure rhetoric. But this is a controllable circumstance. Innumerable threats are always present, such as unco-operative or rebellious student personalities, and the temptations of self-aggrandizement. None of these is an objection to the practice of discussion. The thin line is no thinner than that between listening to a lecture and sleeping at a lecture. A more serious pitfall, I think, lurks in the now widely held view that as much attention should be given in discussion to "form" as to "content," to the use of language as to the development of ideas; that, indeed, the improvement of expression and the articulation of ideas are one and inseparable. I am by no means a dissenter from the ideal which underlies this contention. A standard which holds for the teacher should hold for the student. One of the indisputable virtues of the discussion method is the experience it provides of the travail of formulation and of the test whether opinions which seem intuitively sound can bear the light of day.  

Nevertheless, I am wary of any emphasis on the correlative status of language and ideas which does not realize its qualifying conditions. Some ideas, of our students no less than of our colleagues, resist conventional formulation, and we are too prone to insist on what turns out to be an oversimplification or an abortive version. By sanctifying the requirement of overt expression or of coherency, we can as easily smother a deep idea as expose a vapid one, and get to prize rapidity of response rather than thoroughness. It seems to me that excessively conventional thinking in the classroom is a much greater danger than slovenly expression. The latter is in no sense to be condened as an end, but sometimes it may have to be tolerated as one stage in a means. One of the maladies endemic to this generation of scholars is an impatience with "unclear" speculation. The cries of "metaphysical" and "obscure" fly thick and fast, as though any sincere thinker were ever deliberately obscure or as though all metaphysics necessarily treated of the fantasies that positivists have in mind. It is common knowledge that many of the best students, whose written performances can be impressively coherent, have trouble in oral discussion. As often as not, this is the consequence of their being confronted at one and the same time with many more ramifications of an idea than are average students. Students who are hesitant to volunteer in discussion are frequently grappling with more than they can readily formulate. When to encourage them to share their wealth and when to let them work through their ideas is a perennial problem. I am disposed habitually to trust their judgment more than my own. Generally speaking, if we would curb the glib student enthralled by the sound of his or her own voice, we might well be patient with the student who refuses to be glib and who is unable to be clear. With those teachers who construe "expression" primarily in terms of diction or grammatical niceties and who would interrupt a discussion to expose lapses, I have no sympathy whatever. Where a problem of this kind exists, it cannot be dealt with ad hoc. The best basis of satisfactory speech habits in the student is the continuing example set by the books he reads and by the teacher in action.  

Continuous discussion, then, appears to be the superior mode of learning, when it is intensified by an imaginative teacher and supported by a powerful reading program. Sustained discussion has, if you will, an openness that the lecture cannot have, and a persistent promise as an avenue of discovery for the student and as an instrument of perception for the teacher. Like all values, discussion is a value for persons. The most immediate aspects of a value do not, of course, always coincide with its most fundamental aspects. For the teacher, discussion is one of the great reminders of fallibility. And, like all values for the student, it is not separable from other values which condition and environ it. It can barely survive in effective form without good concomitant reading or without the co-operativeness of the teacher outside the classroom. The fact that it needs to be distinguished sharply from other school functions does not mean that it lacks connection with them. The community of discussion and other forms of academic community contain the same persons, who need to know one another as inquirers no less than as companions and contemporaries. At its lowest ebb, discussion is simply one more cultural ceremony; at its best, it is a force in the total constitution of the student. Too often this force is dissipated by the pressures and currents of the student's later life. Still it is imperative, academically, to do costly labor for small social fruits and to remember that even the student who has forgotten almost everything may now and then, from an influence remote to him, perceive the moral power of query.

Notes

"...a discussion... is a force in the total constitution of the student."
Even with all the recent developments in science and science education, far too many elementary school children fail to develop any appreciation for "doing science." To have an appreciation for the doing of science suggests something more than a tendency to be intrigued by clever experiments, awed by recent scientific mechanical procedures pertinent to a particular discipline. To have an appreciation for the doing of science is to recognize that the scientist does not content himself with the discovery of new phenomena but that he strives to explain the nature of phenomena to others who are familiar with the discipline in its present stage of development. In this respect, scientific explanation is a public activity. If Newton had watched an apple fall to the ground and did no more than think to himself that there must be an attraction between the two objects, we would not remember Newton today as a scientist. Newton is recognized as a scientist because he gave a comprehensive and well argued explanation which characterized the nature of a class of phenomena.

Just as the scientist is fundamentally concerned with the formulation of clear and perspicuous arguments, so too the philosopher's activities are almost wholly predicated upon his ability to develop and understand well-formed arguments. That careful argument plays such a central role in philosophical deliberation is evidenced by the fact that philosophers of early Greece self-consciously named the study of argument, logic. Today the study of logic remains a distinctive object of philosophic study. The scientist looks to logic as a tool to be used in developing his explanations about the physical world. The philosopher not only uses logic as a tool but in addition regards logic as a legitimate area of study in its own right. Consequently, the philosopher and the scientist have much in common to the extent that the success each might hope to achieve is largely dependent upon facility of each with logical operations.
Any advance in the study of logic by either the scientist or the philosopher may be of great consequence to the other. Since logic is a traditional object of study for the philosopher and not simply prized only for its instrumental value, one might expect more advances in logic to originate among philosophers than among scientists. Indeed, historically this has been the case.

A significant development in logic in modern times, and of significant interest to the scientist, has centered around the study of semantics. Philosophers such as Rudolf Carnap and Alfred Tarski recognized that the meaning of an expression depends both on its structure and the meaning of the terms. Other philosophers such as Charles Morris and Ludwig Wittgenstein showed that much of the meaning of a statement depends too on the context in which it is uttered. Thus, for example, if a scientist wants to make clear his conclusion regarding a particular phenomenon, he must be skilled in recognizing how it is one uses language in a precise and unambiguous fashion. Learning to give clear and precise explanations in science is a skill that can be greatly enhanced by initiating children in philosophical activities.

To illustrate this social aspect of the scientific enterprise, students at the Laboratory School are asked to consider what makes a scientist a scientist. Students are asked to consider further how it is that a scientist differs from a mathematician, a philosopher or even a laborer. For example, on one occasion students were asked to consider what makes the conclusions of a laborer regarding a particular artifact any different from those proffered by an archeologist. The childrens' response was that the archeologist's conclusions are based on facts or evidence. However, when the children considered that the laborer may have been the very person who actually discovered the artifact and subsequent to doing so formulated a conclusion regarding its origin, their next inclination is to wonder whether or not there really is any difference between the arguments of a scientist and the empirically based musings of the ordinary man. Surely, the children conclude, there must be some difference between an ordinary man's observations of an old vase and his subsequent conclusion that the vase was used by Caesar and the same conclusion drawn by a professionally trained scientist.

In the course of further discussion, the children recognized that the additional information to which a scientist has access cannot be the deciding factor, since the laborer may be well read and privy to a great deal of information himself. The children reasoned that information with which each is familiar must be related to the topic at hand if the information is to be relevant to the hypothesis under consideration. Still this did not seem enough. One imaginative child pointed out that a person may know a great deal about something he does not consider relevant to the question at hand. Finally, the responsible scientist takes great care to order the evidence in such a way that his justification of the hypothesis can be readily seen by his colleagues to be the most reasonable explanation imaginable. In short, the children learned that scientists...
are identified not by their credentials or even solely by the object of their studies, but rather by their ability to make sense of a phenomenon to their respective colleagues. Having determined the fundamental role of logical explanation in the doing of science, children at the Laboratory School are subsequently asked to consider various aspects of giving a clear and perspicacious explanation. On numerous occasions children are asked to consider features of a clear explanation, such as its logical consistency, semantic clarity, comprehensiveness and so on. Only when children understand something about what counts as an adequate explanation in the sciences can they be described as having some genuine appreciation for science.

Thus, to illustrate the essential role of semantic clarity in scientific explanation it is often helpful to ask children to analyze the meaning of a term used commonly by the children themselves as well as by practicing scientists. One such term that is particularly amenable to this sort of analysis is the term "time." Ten and eleven year-old children have been using the word time for nearly half their lives and typically regard themselves as familiar with its meaning. Yet, when asked to define the term, they find that this very common expression, which they have been using for years, has a meaning which at first blush seems extraordinarily obscure. Although time is used like many other nouns, it does not seem at all clear to the children that time names anything. Even though the children have grown accustomed to queries such as "What time is it?", "What time will we arrive?", and so on, many have never thought to ask — or have never been exposed to — adults who are willing to entertain such queries as "Does time exist?", "What is time?", and "What am I really asking when I ask 'What time is it?'"

After considering any number of substances and processes as the object possibly named by the word "time," the children, finding each candidate deficient in some respect, come to consider the alternative that time is the name of an idea. The children/investigators then consider that if time does in fact refer to an idea, they must try to determine what sort of an idea it is. Certainly time does not refer to a fanciful entity in the same way that the word "unicorn" does. Hard-nosed empirical scientists use the term in their descriptions of events in the physical world, and ordinary people use the notion to plan their activities for the day. By setting forth hypotheses regarding the use of the term "time" and considering the objections to such hypotheses by their peers, the children eventually reach a rather startling conclusion. The conclusion is not startling in the sense of its unconventionality, though indeed a hundred years ago that certainly would have been the case, but rather because of its degree of sophistication. In each of several classes, the majority of the children respectively concluded that, "Time is an idea that marks off a place within a succession of events." The degree of sophistication demonstrated by this definition is evident when one considers not only how the definition accounts for our daily use of the term "time," but how it accommodates physicists' use of the term "space-time" as well. Those who did not agree with this definition were usually content to assert more modestly that they still suspected there was such a thing as time although they were unable to demonstrate its existence. In light of how the philosophy for children classes have so far progressed, I have little doubt that the dissenters will one day resurrect the issue of the meaning of the term "time" and perhaps base their own newly formed case on some such notion as duration, simultaneity or the idea of one event succeeding another regardless of there being any human observer.

What will come of such further discussions I can hardly predict, for genuine philosophical discussion as well as responsible scientific research establishes its own direction. This is not to suggest that whatever happens in an elementary school philosophy class is purely a matter of chance; it is not. The teacher, particularly in the early stages, must play a very active role in demonstrating to children how a rigorous philosophical discussion proceeds. However, as the children acquire the requisite skills, the teacher's role diminishes to that of participant in an activity where the ideas, claims, queries and arguments of each participant stands on all four with those of every other participant. Philosophical activity requires that each argument be judged on its own merits and not on the social role or polemical abilities of its originator. Genuine philosophical discussions proceed unrestricted by teacher prejudice, though restrained by a respect on the part of the participants for well-reasoned arguments which are clearly and carefully articulated.

Philosophy for children programs promise not only to develop in children more mature and reflective skills for making sense of their world, but as the above discussions illustrate, philosophical activities allow children to discover something about the fundamental characteristics of an enterprise such as the doing of science. It has been our experience at the Laboratory School that as children become more familiar, through philosophical analysis, with the fundamental personality of a discipline such as science, the more amenable they become to learning the necessary mechanics for further study in that discipline. Although the effects of these early studies warrant further empirical investigation, our experience with philosophy for children encourages us to recommend strongly a more generalized use of philosophical techniques in the elementary school curriculum, particularly in the area of elementary school science education.

2 A video tape titled "Philosophy In Mathematics and Science Education" showing fifth graders discussing the meaning of the term time is available for examination through the Academic Support Center, University of Missouri-Columbia. The tape is also available through the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, Montclair State College, Upper Montclair, New Jersey.
3 For a discussion of how philosophy can be used to introduce children to such fundamental notions in science as induction and the difference between an analogy and a model see Paul A. Wagner and Christopher J. Lucas, "Philosophic Inquiry and the Logic of Elementary School Science Education," Science Education, Vol. 61, No. 4, Fall, 1977, pp. 549-558.
Children Discuss Degrees and Kinds of Difference

In the summer of 1975, it was decided to hold a small demonstration class in philosophy for children, as part of a teacher-training workshop at Montclair State College. The teacher was Mrs. Gerry Dawson McClendon (then as now a teacher at the Morton Street School in Newark), who had participated in a previous training workshop. One group of students was bused in every morning from the New Ark school in Newark, a privately-operated, alternative school. These students were in the 14-15 year-old range. The other group was drawn from the Montclair-Clifton area, and consisted of 11 and 12-year-olds.

After two weeks or so of being on display, the children began to verbalize their discontent with the arrangement, so the class was moved into a separate classroom and was videotaped. This unedited videotape transcript (prepared and annotated by Miriam Minkowitz) is a verbatim record of the twelfth and final class session. The teacher is guiding the discussion by following the questions in two discussion plans contained in the instructional manual for the course.

Although the wealth of visual cues is lacking in this written version of the classroom discussion, there is much that is instructive in it as well. The logic of conversation and the etiquette of dialogue can often be scrutinized more meticulously in this fashion than can be done where one is present in the classroom. Especially worthy of study are the patterns of group reasoning, in particular on those occasions where the children build on each other's contributions, thereby penetrating as deeply into the issues (of considerable difficulty even for skilled philosophers) as might a smaller number of older individuals. Equally noteworthy is the readiness of the participants to establish a youthful community of inquiry, and to display the characteristic features of a truly reflective education.

| Gerry  | —All right — when Mr. Portos was discussing with the girls about the minds and the differences between animals and men . . . he mentioned two types of differences. (Works on board) One was the difference of degree, and what, Renata? . . . and one was the difference of . . .
| Renata | — . . . Kind.
| Gerry  | — . . . and kind.
| Gerry  | —How did he explain those differences? What's the difference between a difference of degree and a difference of kind? What did he use to show the girls what he meant? Because they didn't understand. What did he use?
| Kirk   | —Height and weight.
| Gerry  | —As an example of what?
| Kirk   | —Difference of degree.
|        | —Height and weight. What do the rest of you think about that? What type of difference is that? Height and weight?
| Jeanne | —Difference of degree.
| Mitchell | —Well like if one girl weighs 59 lbs. and someone else . . . weighs . . . uh . . . 29 lbs. . . . in between there is . . . uh . . . degree.
| Gerry  | —A difference of degree but you used two what?
| Mitchell | —Two people.
| Gerry  | —Two people and their what?
| Mitchell | —Their height. I mean their weight.
| Gerry  | —Two people and their weight. As a difference of degree?
| Renata | —That's a difference of kind.
| Gerry  | —Why is that a difference of kind?
Could a child’s question be answered this way?
The simple “I don’t know” deserves respect but it shouldn’t cut off dialogue. The teacher can shift the question so that the student can respond, and thus, through a series of such questions, demonstrate that students do know things they don’t think they know. Enthusiasm for all responses, not just for the right answers, is both a courtesy and an incentive. Never deliberately ignore a question or demean the questioner.

Recent experience of mine seems to violate this principle though actually it supports the point. I was challenged in a question-and-answer session to support my claim that characteristics of good and bad teaching could be identified. “Can you give even one example of bad teaching?” this faculty member asked. I thought a moment, then said abruptly, “That seems to me to be a trivial question,” and turned to another question from across the room. I went on for some moments, keeping the first questioner in the corner of my eye to make sure that he wasn’t stalking out of the room. Then I turned back to him, apologized for my rudeness, and said, “That’s your example.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gerry</th>
<th>All right. O.K. How about... uh... dark red compared with light red?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>(many voices) Difference of degree!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Absolutely sure?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>O.K. How about... uh... freezing temperature compared to boiling temperature?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>Difference of degree!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Damp compared to wet?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>Difference of degree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>We’re unanimous. Uh... I think I’ll put this one on the board. (Stands up and goes to blackboard).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wait</td>
<td>I don’t know (unintelligible)...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>(laughs) This is called an acute angle (says this while drawing it on board.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>Obtuse...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Took me a long time... (unintelligible) ... and this is an obtuse angle. What would the difference between these two be?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wait</td>
<td>Difference of kind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>(Many voices) Difference of degree! Degree!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Who said a difference of kind? Walt?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wait</td>
<td>(Walter shows hands).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>And everybody else thinks it’s a difference of degree. What do you think about that?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wait</td>
<td>Difference of kind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Why do you say it’s a difference of kind?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wait</td>
<td>Because they aren’t shaped the same...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>They aren’t shaped the same way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen</td>
<td>Yeah, but they’re both angles, though.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Tell him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen</td>
<td>(repeats) They’re both angles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Do you understand what she’s saying? They’re shaped differently but they’re both angles. Let’s take... um... (draws on board - chalk makes a scratchy sound)... excuse me... What would you say about these two figures? This is a triangle and this is a...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>Rectangle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Rectangle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>(Simultaneously) Difference of kind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>(Simultaneously) Difference of degree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>I hear “kind” and “degree”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wait</td>
<td>Kind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renata</td>
<td>Difference of degree because they’re both shapes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>They’re both shapes... What?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamela</td>
<td>They’re both shapes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>They’re both shapes so that means they’re a difference of degree. Those of you who said they’re a difference of kind — why would you say they’re a difference of kind?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COMMENT:** By asking this question Gerry is (1) opening up alternate possibilities; (2) allowing the children to come to discover that context is significant in making this judgment. As one of the children on the tape later remarks, it really depends on the reasons that you are looking at. That is, if you look at it from one point of view something may seem a difference of degree; however, if you look at the same thing with something else, i.e., some other standard, in mind, it may then appear to be a difference in kind.) See* below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mitchell</th>
<th>Because when they’re triangles...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donna</td>
<td>(Unintelligible)... they’re different shapes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Huh?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melanie</td>
<td>They’re different shapes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeanne</td>
<td>They’re very different.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renata</td>
<td>But they’re both shapes... and them were different angles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitchell</td>
<td>But the two girls are both girls, only they’re different.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renata</td>
<td>So it’s a difference of degree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melanie</td>
<td>It could still be a difference of kind... You could put either one anyway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melanie</td>
<td>Because you could find different reasons for each one.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>All right. Well, why is this a difference of kind?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melanie</td>
<td>Because they’re both different shapes. Just like those are different angles. So we use this reason for saying...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Well, then, are you saying that this could also be a difference of... uh... kind, too?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melanie</td>
<td>It could... if it has smaller reasons. So it could be just simply smaller reasons for it... and then you could always go to the big reasons of (unintelligible) the different shapes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COMMENT:** By using the terms “smaller” and “bigger” Melanie seems to be calling for an appreciation for differences in degrees of generality. I.e., “Smaller” reasons would apply to things that are more specific, whereas “larger” reasons may apply to things considered more generally.

| Gerry | All right. Well, let’s take the alligators and the apples. O.K.? Now, these are different angles, but if they’re both angles, they’re different angles. What would you say about the alligators and the apples? |
| Melanie | One is an animal and one is a fruit. |
| Daniel | One is an animal and one is a fruit. |
| Gerry | One’s an animal and one’s a fruit. We said that that was a difference of kind. Because they were totally different. |
| Karen | But if there was nine alligators and nine zebras, then it would be a difference of degree. |
| Gerry | Why would it be a difference of degree if it was nine alligators? |
| Child | They’re both animals. |
| Gerry | Because they’re both animals. But they’re both totally different animals! |

**COMMENT:** Gerry here introduces a criterion for judging something to be a “difference of kind” “Total” difference.

<p>| Child | But there’s still nine... |
| Daniel | One’s a reptile and one’s a mammal... |
| Rod | Right. Right. |
| Gerry | One’s a reptile and one’s a mammal... |
| Renata | They still animals. |
| Rod | Difference of degree. |
| Gerry | You say it’s a difference of degree. You say it’s a difference of kind. So you can’t... |
| Renata | I said degree. |
| Gerry | Oh... you say it’s a difference of degree. |
| Karen | Which one? |
| Gerry | An... uh... zebra and an alligator. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karen</td>
<td>Yeah. Difference of degree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Even though they're both totally different animals?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen</td>
<td>Yeah. They're still animals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Are those totally different angles?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>(many) Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boy?</td>
<td>Yes, but they're still angles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Are they totally different?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John or Walt</td>
<td>Not totally different because both of them has a point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renata</td>
<td>Yeah. They different.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COMMENT:** Here Gerry shows that a criterion for distinguishing a difference of degree is the capacity for one thing to "become" the other.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>What could I do to a zebra and an alligator so that I could get them together?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John or Walt</td>
<td>Make them fight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>But would one ever come close to being the other?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>(many) No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel</td>
<td>Well, we could get them both the same colors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>But would that still make them come close to each other in things?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel</td>
<td>No— It won't make them closer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>But does the zebra ever become the alligator or the alligator ever become the zebra?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>(all) No! No!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renata</td>
<td>Just like in the book when they say something about Jill and you know... it's a difference of degree as far as they go, and one of them can't turn into the other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>No, but we weren't talking about girls, were we? What were we talking about?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renata</td>
<td>Their weights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Their weights. Could one girl keep eating and eating and eating and become the same... the girl who weighs less, could she become the same weight as another girl by eating or putting on weight?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>Yeah... Ummmm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Or could one of the girls become the same weight by dieting... and losing weight?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>(several) Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>Could their weights become the same?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>But they couldn't...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>But they wouldn't become the same, no. So we're not talking about the two girls. We're talking about their heights or their weights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renata</td>
<td>Okay, so you use two people for the difference of degree.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COMMENT:** Daniel is asking for the standard to be stipulated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gerry</td>
<td>That's a very good question. What are we measuring when we say the alligator and the zebra? Who brought up the alligator and the zebra? Well for that matter, what were we measuring when we said... uh... nine apples with nine... oh... nine alligators? (giggles from the class)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamela</td>
<td>Things.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gerry — Yeah — we were comparing the ... the ... the ... things applies with the things alligators. You know, fruits 'n alligators.

Daniel — You can't. 'Cause there's so many properties of each of them.

Renata — That's a difference of kind, though.

Daniel — Yeah, but if you were talking about ... what ... the water content in a ... a ... um ... alligator you'll get difference of degree. If you compare the form of an alligator and the form of an apple you get only a difference of kind.

Gerry — Ummhmm.

Daniel — An apple can never grow to look like an alligator.

Gerry — All right ... but in this one we were ... I guess you were comparing, you know, that they are, their physical properties ... to apples and alligators. Form. You know. But what about Kathy and I? (unintelligible)

Child — Difference in degree.

Gerry — Jeanne and I? (aside) That's what you get for always sitting there (unintelligible) Jeanne and I. What about Jeanne and I?

Child — Difference of degree.

Gerry — Difference of degree.

Melanie — Because ... um ... she could get ... like, everything about her could (unintelligible) not everything out - parts of her could become to look like you, and then ... um ... well then she could (unintelligible) ... then it would be a difference of degree. Because she could become to look like you. She'll grow up to be a woman, and she'll ... she has brown eyes now...

Gerry — Umm ... her eye's already same...

Melanie — Umm ... She may grow up to be the same height as you. Maybe taller.

Gerry — Ummhmm.

Melanie — But she will sometime be ... (unintelligible)

Gerry — Still with all of those differences between ... between our heights and the difference between our ages and the difference between our weights, the difference between all of those are all differences of degree?

Child — Degree.

Gerry — Does that make the thing that's Jeanne and the thing that's me — is that difference ... if all of the things about us is a difference of degree does that make us ... the difference between us, a difference of degree?

Children — Yeah, sure.

Gerry — OK. You're absolutely sure about that? Well. Let's go on to some others ... how about dead things and living things?

Kirk — A difference of kind.

Gerry — Why do you say a difference of kind?

Daniel & Kirk — (together) Well, one's alive and one's dead.

Kirk — They're not functioning no more.

COMMENT: Kirk is introducing a standard by which he is judging whether something is living or not living - the standard of function.

Gerry — Ummhmm...

Kirk — Being considered... not functioning...

Daniel — I think it's degree.
Mitchell

You know, let’s all see this rabbit right now. (giggles from the class) I can really see it. There’s a rabbit there! Let’s make this rabbit that’s right here and it’s hopping around. (Unintelligible remark from a child)... No, it’s white. (giggles from class). It’s hopping around... all right, it’s my rabbit, OK? And it’s hopping around and all of a sudden, it dies. (giggles from class). I think that the dead rabbit is so totally different from the living rabbit...

Walt
—He was alive.

Gerry
—Well, it’s absolute.

Mitchell
—Well, you didn’t have the dead rabbit to start with...

Child
—You’re right. I had a living rabbit.

Mitchell
—but that’s (unintelligible) two rabbits.

Child
—It’s gonna jump around so you’re gonna...

Gerry
—No, no. The same rabbit died.

Mitchell
—Don’t you have to have a live rabbit and a dead rabbit... a dead rabbit that... (unintelligible)

Kirk
—Put it this way— Go around the room... go around the class. Let’s have a vote, what you think it is.

Child
—Aww, that ain’t...

Gerry
—(laughing) -- How many of you want to have a vote?

Child
—Oh, I don’t want to have a vote. (Other children raise their hands.)

Gerry
—All right, Eugene? Difference of degree or difference of kind?

Eugene
—Degree.

Gerry
—Degree. One degree.

Rod
—Degree.

Gerry
—Two degrees.

Daniel
—Degree.

Gerry
—Three degrees.

Mitchell
—Degree.

Gerry
—Four degrees.

Kirk
—Kind.

Gerry
—Four degrees and one kind.

Pamela
—Five degrees.

Gerry
—Five degrees and one kind.

Jeanne
—I don’t know... uh...

Gerry
—Five degrees and one kind, and one I don’t know.

Jeanne
—Right (giggles).

Gerry
—I’m getting confused. Five, one and one.

Child
—(unintelligible)... write it on the board.

Gerry
—Five degrees, two kind (points to herself), and one I don’t know.

Renata
—Degree.

Gerry
—Six degrees, two kind, and one I don’t know.

Karen
—Degree.

Gerry
—Seven degrees.

Alana
—Degree.

Gerry
—Eight degrees.

Walt
—Degree.

Gerry
—Nine degrees.

John
—Um... um... degree.

Gerry
—Ten degrees.

Melanie
—I’m not gonna say anything.

Donna
—I don’t know, Melanie. I’m not gonna say anything...

Walt
—Ten degrees, two of a kind... I mean...

Child
—And three I don’t know.

Gerry
—Two of a kind... two kind, and three I don’t
... started with the beginning of all life and apes. Right. Right. Right. Apes. Animals. All life. One-celled. Ape. Animals. Ape. ... started with the beginning of all life and everything... Right.
Daniel — Right, right. — Yeah, but why can't apes still have people?

Children — (giggles).

Gerry — That's a good question. I don't know.

Daniel — Because the problem is that way back then apes and man were one thing. And... uh... and... uh... one thing looked different from apes and different from men.

Gerry — Ummhum.

Daniel — Some... some...

Renata — So, way, back, it's the same thing.

Daniel — Some had to live there and became us, and some lived in other places and didn't...

Gerry — And just stayed on...

Daniel — ... and developed into different... then the differences...

Gerry — Two different what?

Child — ... wasn't as much.

Gerry — Oh! Different. Uhhuh. so what are they?

Daniel — So... so different... I don't know!

Child — (unintelligible)

Daniel — Some ancient, ancient kind of ape. Not the kind of ape they have today.

Mitchell — Then real human beings... them too are... what? They (unintelligible) have apes that stay apes and many apes that stay people.

Children — (giggles).

Gerry — What he's saying...

Mitchell — What distinguishes the apes that are apes... that stay apes...

Daniel — We developed into different areas.

Gerry — Shh.

Child — (unintelligible)

Mitchell — ... and the apes that stay people?

Daniel — What's...

Renata — I still ain't him.

Gerry — You mean why did... why did the apes... some...

Mitchell — Certain apes be apes and certain apes became people.

Child — Oh!

Gerry — That's a good' question. Anybody know the answer?

Child — I might have been the apes...

Gerry — I'm sure... I... I guess that would be a good question for... uh... research, you know, as to why certain apes just stayed apes, and certain apes became people.

Daniel — I saw... I saw the film on it. It was... uh... what... what... what... what...

Rod — How come you the only one who see the show?

Daniel — I saw the show. Uhh... un... I forget what it was, in it was a show and it showed how man had evolved... evolved.

Gerry — (inmmhum)

Daniel — And I... in the end, you know. some people died.

Child — Oh?

Daniel — If the plane crash...

Child — Ohh.

Child — That way.

Child — What way?

Daniel — If the actors, all the actors crash up.

Gerry — ... think that's sad.

Daniel — That's at the end. But... anyway, they... they... um... like there was one animal— and some of the animals, like, were... were... lived in the jungle, and some, and some of the animals were given real plain (unintelligible) and they were expanding and the ones that went out in the fields experimented more, and the other ones in the trees just sort of lopped around and became... (unintelligible) and after these guys they explored, they came back and they could easily overtake the smaller ones. Because they had adventured. And once they had dominated them they got bigger and they didn't die. (unintelligible) just because of what they did. They went out in the fields and they used... they needed to invent more than the ones... who were living in the trees loafering around eating oranges.

Rod — Oh jeez!

Gerry — Okay! All right, well... well... we were talking about the difference of... uh... uh... kind and differences of degree. Oh, well, we're still talking about differences, right?

Kirk — Right.

Gerry — Ummhm. I'd like to get into differences. Would you say that all of you are different?

Renata — No.

Children — No. The same.

Gerry — You're all the same?

Renata — We're difference of degree... 'cause we're all people.

Gerry — Uhhuh. Well, then, if we're all people... and... and... you think that we're all the same, I guess you mean... just in the fact that we're all people. But as individuals, are we different?

Children — Uhh... Yes.

Melanie — Because we think different.

Gerry — All right. Well, that's what I want to get into now. That our differences... what is it that makes you, you? I guess in the same way...

Child — Our mind.

Gerry — ... we're talking about differences...

Child — Our mind.

Child — Our mind.

Gerry — Uhh...

Child — Between who and who?

Gerry — You! What makes you you? Not whether... you know... just thinking about you now, what makes you you? Uhh... your face, your clothes, your name, your mind, your thoughts...

Daniel or Mitchell — Your mind and thoughts...

Gerry — Your mind and your thoughts?

Walt — Right, right.

Gerry — Not the others? Your name, your face, your clothes?

Child — Yes, yeah!

Child — All of them.

Child — Your mind.

Daniel — There could be two people just alike. Different minds would be completely different people.

Gerry — (inmmhum).

Child — If you had different clothes.

Gerry — If you had different clothes. Could you have the same clothes?

Child — mmm.

Child — Yeah.

Mitchell — I knew this family that had twins, and they looked
| Gerry | -Uhhuh. Well, before they were five, and they were wearing the same clothes, not only did they wear the same clothes, what else did they have that was the same? |
| Mitchell | -Well... they... looked exactly alike. |
| Gerry | -They looked alike... |
| Mitchell | -And they had... kinds similar names. |
| Gerry | -Uhhuh. But were they different? |
| Mitchell | -Uhhuh. |
| Renata | -Mmmhm. |
| Child | -(unintelligible)... difference of degree. |
| Renata | -...one was Craig and one was Bob. |
| Gerry | -Well, what was it that made them different? |
| Children | -Their names. |
| Gerry | -Just their names? |
| Children | -No! |
| Gerry | -Well, suppose my name... have you ever come across somebody else who was... who was named Renata? |
| Renata | -Yeah, but... |
| Gerry | -Was she you? |
| Renata | -No, but we had different minds and everything. |
| Daniel | -Did she think... |
| Gerry | -Uhhuh, so... |
| Walt | -They had different ways. |
| Daniel | -What happens if... they have different minds, and have the same name? Are they the same thing? |
| Mitchell | -But it's a difference. |
| Kirk | -Nope. Difference of kind. |
| Renata | -Well... well that's just one of the differences, that one name was Craig and one name was Bob. |
| Daniel | -Well... if they have both the same minds and one was named Craig, and one was named... |
| Renata | -But how dumb! Two people don't have the same mind. |
| Daniel | -Yeah, but you said before, that if... uh... the name makes you different from everybody else. |
| Walt | -But your ways doesn't. |
| Renata | -I didn't say exactly different! It made them different. |
| Gerry | -Yeah, but which one was... |
| Renata | -Their two names made them different. |
| Gerry | -Is this your... Is your name you? |
| Renata | -Yes! Not really. Part of me. |
| Gerry | -Uhhuh. Is that what makes you you? If I change your name, or if you went to court and you changed your name, and you said you didn't want... |
| Renata | -I'd still be me! |
| Gerry | -Would you say... what would you... then... that... what would it be then that would make you you? If you could change your name? |
| Renata | -Your mind, I guess. |
| Gerry | -Your mind? |
| Children | -Yeah... |
| Gerry | -Somebody said "personality," what do you mean by "personality"? |
| Pamela | -It's the way you act and the way you do things. |
| Gerry | -Is that the same... when you used... when you said, your ways? |
| Walt | -Yeah. |
| Gerry | -Or a part of it. |

**Walt** —Yes.

**Gerry** —Okay. Umm, I'd like to ask you some questions. If for some reason you couldn't use your arm... would you still be you?

**Children** —Yeah, yeah, sure.

**Gerry** —Why?

**Children** —Because... it is...

**Child** —Because your arm...

**Melanie** —When I was (unintelligible) of your arm or your finger or something (unintelligible) hurts a lot like a splinter or something — you don't stop thinking the same way. And sometimes it makes you feel sorry for yourself because you can't do some things, but you never really... uhm... think differently.

**Karen** —But you might have to use different ways.

**Melanie** —If I came in here today, and I had a broken arm, I probably would still say the same thing.

**Gerry** —Uhhuh. What were you saying, Karen?

**Karen** —Like if you lost your right arm, and you were right-handed, even though you'd have to learn with your left hand, you're still you. Even though you'd change your ways.

**Gerry** —Okay. If for some reason, you couldn't use your mind, would you still be you?

**Child** —Yes.

**Daniel** —You'd be dead.

**Children** —(giggles)

**Gerry** —If you couldn't use your mind, you'd be dead?

**Daniel** —You wouldn't be able to do anything. Nothing. You couldn't breathe...

**COMMENT:** *Daniel is equating the "brain" with the "mind".

**Child** —You're talking about your brain!

**Daniel** —Your mind is the same thing.*

**Child** —... everything you do.

**Daniel** —(Unintelligible conversation and laughter.)

**Children** —... If you can't think... (unintelligible)... haven't enough to breathe.

**Mitchell** —Did you ever have a dream where you didn't... um... did you ever have a night where you didn't dream?

**Children** —Uhhuh. Yes. Uhhuh. No.

**Mitchell** —Well, I did. Am I dead? (giggles from class)

**COMMENT:** Notice how the children have taken over the discussion, and how they, themselves, are posing the questions, arguing, presenting examples, etc.

**Gerry** —Well, I guess when they say that they... if you couldn't use your mind... uh... if you couldn't think, or if you couldn't use your own imagination, or your own wishing, or your... your own ideas — would you still be you? If you couldn't have these thoughts, and you couldn't do these things... your thoughts, or your ways, as you say.

**Daniel** —No.

**Gerry** —Why wouldn't it be you?

**Daniel** —No, because... You couldn't distinguish yourself from anybody else. You'd just... you'd just sit there, you'd be just like the other guy.
Jeanne

Transcript of Video Tape

Gerry

Walt

Child

Gerry

Pamela

Gerry

Children

Gerry

Gerry

Children

Gerry

Walt

Mitchell

Daniel

John or Walt - Brains.

Child - ... you couldn't... um... do anything.

Gerry - But wh...?

Daniel - You couldn't use your mind at all.

Child - You'd be dumb.

Walt - Could you have... uh... any kind of... um... ideas... you know... I mean... out of your brain?

Gerry - Do you have any ideas?

COMMENT: Did Gerry accurately restate Walt's question, or was he asking a different question?

Walt - Uh...

Gerry - Not right off hand. You could get that information...

Walt - I went to the doctor the other day, he told me my brain weighed eight pounds.

Gerry - Your brain?

Walt - Eight ounces.

Gerry - Eight ounces.

Walt - Seven and a half.

Children - (giggles)

Gerry - Um... are you the same person you were yesterday?

Children - Yes. No. Yup.

Gerry - All of you?

Children - Yup. No.

Gerry - Why did you say "no"?

Mitchell - Well, like if you learned something, or... uh... if you had a new experience or something, that would change you a little.

Gerry - It would change you a little, but it would make you... it would still... are you still you?

Children - Yes!

Mitchell - It would still be you, only not the way you were.

Gerry - Not the way you were.

Mitchell - But you!

Gerry - But you.

Mitchell - Yes. (laughter)

Renata - You still be you, though.

Gerry - But would you be the same person?

Karen - Yeah.

Gerry - You'd still be the same person if you had a new experience or learned something new?

Karen - Well, yeah.

Child - Uhhuh.

Daniel - You couldn't use your mind at all.

Gerry - But wh...?

Child - ... you couldn't... um... do anything.

John or Walt - Brains.

Daniel - You still couldn't breathe.

Gerry - Yeah, well...

Daniel - Because your mind tells you what to do.

Everything.

John or Walt - Just like you're brain-washed.

Daniel - Just like... your thoughts... imagination... tells you what you're seeing, what to do, because of what you see. If you see... If you're driving and you see a car coming right at you, your mind tells you to swerve.

Gerry - Mmmhhmm.

John - Swerve?

Daniel - So. Your mind tells you to breathe, too. If you can't... if you can't breathe, you can't eat.

Child - You can't eat if you don't know you're hungry!

Gerry - But are you still you?

Daniel - No.

Gerry - Okay. Well, assuming that you can use your mind and you can do all of those things, are you the same person that you were yesterday?

Child - Yes. Oh. Sure.

Gerry - Everybody but Daniel, right? Daniel's different.

Are you the same person you were yesterday?

Daniel - Yes.

Gerry - Now you are the exact same person?

Rod - Nope.

Gerry - Why do you say "no"?

Rod - Well, I'm taller.

Gerry - Does that make you... ah... different?

Rod - No. Outside, but not inside.

Child - Mmmhhmm.

Gerry - Rod, when you say the inside, what do you mean by the inside?

Rod - Personality's still the same.

Gerry - Ummhhmm... (long pause)... Are you the same person you were ten years ago?

Child - No.

Child - No. (giggles)

Gerry - You're the same person you were yesterday, and you're the same person you were last year, but you're not the same person you were ten years ago?

Karen - Yes.

Child - She didn't say...

Walt - No!

Child - No.

Gerry - Why do you say "no," Walt?

Walt - Because you don't react the same.

Gerry - Why do you say that?

Child - Because ten years ago, you could've been a little (unintelligible) boy.

Gerry - Yeah.

Walt - Now you're still... (laughs)...

Gerry - All right, so... so that those two are different things?

Walt - Right.

Gerry - All right. You said that you were, that you descend...

Renata - I'm still Renata, I'm stay me my whole life.

Gerry - Are you the same Renata that you were ten years ago?

Renata - Uhmhum. Yup... except for, as far as my mind goes 'n everything, but I'm still Renata.

Gerry - Uhh... well... yes, you're still Renata, but if your mind is... has changed, 'n everything like that, that you said... are you the same person?

Renata - Yeah. I'm still Renata. I'm still the same as she.

Gerry - You're still the same... you're still the same name...

Renata - But it's still me!

Gerry - Uhhuh.

Renata - I was me ten years ago.

Gerry - Yes. You were you ten years ago. But are you the same you now that you were ten years ago?

Renata - Oh... (unintelligible)

Gerry - What made you change?

Renata - Because... I'm not... I'm smarter than I was ten years ago.
Gerry —Ummhmmm, Anything else?
Renata —I"m developing...
Jeanne —You"re not two years old anymore.
Renata —... more than I was ten years ago.
Gerry —Uhhuh, Anything else?
Child —(unintelligible)
Gerry —What about the rest of you?
Jeanne —I"m not two years old anymore. (giggles)
Gerry —Uh... does that make you different? Uh, the fact that you were two years old ten years ago, and twelve now? How does that make you different?
Jeanne —We didn"t know as much. We were just... (laughs)
Child —(unintelligible)
Gerry —Shh. Shh. John. ... Go on, I"m sorry.
Children —(laughter)
Gerry —Well, why are you different now than ten years ago? Besides your age. I"m talking about... (unintelligible)... because you didn"t know that once?
Jeanne —(unintelligible)... like, as many experiences and things like that.
Gerry —(Uhhuh. laughter) Anyone else?
Daniel —Yeah, you could say more... Daniel?
Gerry —Daniel?
Daniel —And Mitchell said... it"s the same (unintelligible) wouldn"t make much difference... cause... like you can learn here and there little things, but after ten years all those would add up some... you know,... you... most of what you know about is either you gained more knowledge or you"ve gotten a different opinion because you know more about it.
Gerry —Ummhmmm.
Daniel —Like sometimes you say... no, no, no, it... I agree with this, and then you gain more knowledge about the subject and ten years later... that time you know you"re definitely uh... yeah, that"s right. You know because you realize then you probably will... let"s say it"s a big political decision (unintelligible)... run America bankrupt (unintelligible)... now you realize what you"re gonna do. You say... oh, no.
Gerry —All right. So you"re different. You"re different...
Daniel —You"ve changed...
Gerry —You"ve changed your opinions. When you"ve changed your opinions that makes... makes you a different person?
Daniel —No! Different... In what way? The way your personality...
Mitchell —Well...
Child —Or...
Gerry —I... that"s what I"m asking you!
Mitchell —Well... well if... well if when you add up a whole bunch of knowledge, that makes you different than you were, and then you"ll be able to (unintelligible)... I mean, does it matter whether you add up a lot or a little?
Gerry —I think what David is saying is that if you get a little bit of knowledge... David was saying that if you get a lot of knowledge, it changes... it changes the way you look at things, sometimes. Does it always change the way you look at things?
Children —No.
Gerry —But sometimes it could change the way you look at things. Mitchell was saying, if you get... what's the difference between a little bit of knowledge and a lot of knowledge? Can"t you change from just a little bit of knowledge? That you could learn... that you can gain maybe in one day? Could you change...
Daniel —No.
Gerry —... your opinion in one day? Daniel doesn"t think it"s possible.
Daniel —Only... on one subject, yeah. But not (unintelligible). You can"t change yourself almost completely.
Gerry —Okay. When you"re very old will you still be the same person that you are now?
Child —No.
Child —You"d be the same person, but uh...
Alana —You just have more wrinkles.
Gerry —You have more what?
Alana —Wrinkles. When you"re old, you don"t look the same like you did before.
Gerry —Uhhuh.
Walt —When you walking down the street... hunchback...
Gerry —Does that make you a different person, because you look different?
Child —It doesn"t.
John —It doesn"t really make you different.
Renata —It makes your looks different.
Gerry —It makes your looks different.
John —Right.
Gerry —Yes, but what about the person that you are? Does that make you...
Child —No.
Walt —You still have the same... you still have the same mind.
Renata —You"re still... ahh (unintelligible)
John —But you know yourself (unintelligible)! You"re still the shape that you give. You know you look a bit different but if you take care of yourself, it"s possible you could pass for young.
Gerry —Yeah. But would you still be the same person?
Children —Umhum, yes.
Renata —You"d still be John Carroll!
Gerry —Would he still be the same John Carroll? Well, you"ll probably be... you might... most of us stay the same name, like, all our lives, right? But does that mean you stay the same person just because your name stays the same?
Renata —Umhm.
Gerry —Always? You never change...?
Renata —You just don"t know as much as you did when you were younger but you still the same person.
Gerry —Ummmm.
Renata —You can"t change... or, I can"t change t"her.
Gerry —No. Absolutely. But are you the same Renata?
Walt —Right.
Renata —I"m... I"m... yeah, I"m...
Gerry —The same Renata?
Renata —Not...
Gerry —... and all your life?
Walt —As you get older, as you get bigger and bigger, you could get a little... As you get bigger and bigger you are getting old.
Gerry —Ummhm.
Walt —Right.
Gerry —Ummm.
Transcript of Video Tape

Walt: —So...
Gerry: —But when we... when we were talking before, you were talking about your ways, and your personality, and your minds, and your thoughts!...

Renata: —That don’t change you.
Gerry: —Do your ways and your personalities and your minds... well, well, what is you? (simultaneously)
Renata: —A person. It don’t change a person. You might change the knowledge of a person, but it don’t change the person itself.

Gerry: —Uhmm...
John: —You never can.
Gerry: —Well, what do you think of as the person? Before you told me that it was your mind, your thoughts. Can your thoughts change? Can your personality change?

Renata: —Yeah. That can’t change.
Gerry: —But they... you don’t change?
Renata: —(simultaneously) You don’t change much.

Child: —Yeah. I’m still the same person that...
Gerry: —Okay. All right.
Child: —It’s ten o’clock.
Gerry: —Uhmm... I... you know. I... I want to put this away for now, Okay?
Child: —It’s ten o’clock.
Gerry: —No. I told you. It’s not ten o’clock. I’ve got to... I
Walt: —It’s ten o’clock.
Gerry: —Yeah, ·cause some of the things that we’ve been thinking about... about what you’ve done for the last three weeks... and how you think it’s affected you, and how you feel about it, whether you liked it, whether you liked it, whether you didn’t like it...

Child: —(unintelligible)
Gerry: —Yeah. Your experience of being here for the last three weeks... and how you think it’s affected you, and how you feel about it, coming here in the morning?
Renata: —It was nice to me.
Gerry: —What about it was nice to you?
Renata: —The group sessions.
Gerry: —What did you like? You liked talking like this?
Renata: —Yes.
Gerry: —Anybody else? How did you feel about it? Do you think that this did anything for you?
Renata: —Yeah, ‘cause some of the things that we’ve been talking about... it’s not that I didn’t know, but I didn’t have... uh... definite answers.
Gerry: —Uhmm. Now you do have some definite answers?
Renata: —(simultaneously) Now I got...
Gerry: —Okay. What about the rest of you? What do you feel that this has done for — coming here in the morning?

Walt: —Did a lot.
Gerry: —What?
Walt: —Uh... uh... made me think better. Usually I like to play around...
Gerry: —Huh?
Walt: —I like to play.
Gerry: —Yes?
Walt: —Well, it made me think. Now I like better to think.
Gerry: —You’re gonna stop playing?
Child: —I don know (giggles)
Gerry: —What about the rest of you?
Daniel: —(unintelligible)... bored all day.
Rod: —You learn how to say things better... uhmm...
Gerry: —Uhhum. Anyone else?

Walt: —Is this your last day here?
Gerry: —Yes.
Walt: —No wonder you’re asking such questions!

Children: —(laughter)
Gerry: —Do you... do you think the fact that I’m asking these questions... is just because on the last day, I guess it is, because this is my last day here...
Walt: —I know what you’re trying to find out. You want us to find out how much we learned.
Gerry: —How much you think you’ve learned.
Walt: —I think I learned... everybody think he learned...
Gerry: —To let you know, right?
Walt: —The last day...
Gerry: —Yes.
Walt: —I learned a lot.
Gerry: —You learned a lot. All right, Donna said she learned a lot...
Donna: —Me too. I thought it was fun.
Gerry: —You thought it was fun? I’m glad. Anybody else?
Child: —(unintelligible)
Gerry: —Yes?
Mitchell: —I hate to see you go.
Daniel: —(simultaneously) It was boring.
Child: —Call us sometimes.
Gerry: —I’m gonna cry. (laughter) Uh... I was thinking... no, I was thinking (unintelligible). I’m sorry... go on.
Mitchell: —Sometimes it get a little boring.
Gerry: —Uhhuh. What about it makes it boring?
Mitchell: —Well, like sometimes... like something dragged out a little too long.
Gerry: —Uhhuh.
Pamela: —There were arguments.
Gerry: —Were our arguments boring to you?
Pamela: —No.
Gerry: —Oh. For you they were boring.
Pamela: —No. Only like some of the subjects I was bored with.
Gerry: —Hmmm. You didn’t like the arguments?
Pamela: —Yeah, I did.
Gerry: —Oh.
Daniel: —I love the arguments. I could argue all day long.
Gerry: —You could argue all day long? Well, well, I want to ask you another question now.

Walt: —(unintelligible) say you... um... sad because you were leaving today.
Gerry: —Uhh. I am too... in a way, and in a way I’m not. ‘Cause I need a rest. (laughter)
Child: —(unintelligible)
Renata: —I need one.
Gerry: —Yeah!
Renata: —I’m tired, like...
John or Walt: —Well, we don’t have to come back to uh... we don’t have to come back no more.
Gerry: —Exactly.
John or Walt: —We don’t have to come back until Monday, right?
Gerry: —Yeah. Umm. I wanna ask you one more question, okay? What d’ya think... suppose... this group, all of us, we met everyday like this for a year?

Children: —(Uhh... Ahhh... Ugh... (laughter)
Gerry: —What would you think about that?
Walt: —It would be nice. It would be nice. I think it would be nice... um... we could do... uh...
Pamela: —I think if we... if we started...
—Uh... wait...

Pamela —... later.

Children (laughter)

Gerry —If we could start a little bit later? Okay. That would be all right.

Walt —I would like it not so... not 9 o'clock.

Gerry —Well, what do you think... how do you think that you would change if we had... if we did this for a year? How do you think it would affect you? What would happen?

Walt —We would change... a lot.

Children (speaking, all at once)

Gerry —Let's take... can I... one at a time? 'Cause I can't hear. You're all doing the same things...

Walt —... change a lot.

Gerry —How would it change...?

Walt —It helps you learn a lot.

John or Walt —Cause you know if we was meeting for a year, right?

Gerry —Uhmhum.

John —Then maybe, you know, probably wouldn't have no discussions, we'd be doing some work. 'N that's (unintelligible)...

Walt —Are you gonna let us watch before you leave?

Gerry —Are you... do you think that this is not work?

Walt —Discussion is all the time we spend really.

John —No, uh, you know it's doing good.

Gerry —If we stay here...

John —... because some people didn't know some things, you know, like you know... (unintelligible) isler

Gerry —Mmmm... Renata?

Renata —It's the (unintelligible) of our lives. For some of the people. Some people that don't notice things, or the things that we might do.

Gerry —Uhhuh.

Renata —I know everybody don't know everything.

Gerry —Yeah.

Renata —And then once we do that then (unintelligible) everybody react just like we will.

Gerry —What would it... what would it do... You're talking about knowledge. What do you think would happen between you?

Renata —Well it would build up my knowledge.

Gerry —But I mean, say between you and Karen, or you and Donna?

Child —That's another thing... that's another thing...

Child —We got to know each other better. I made a lot of friends.

Gerry —Do you think... do you think that's a good thing that they got to know each other better?

Children —Yeah. (Uhhmm)

Gerry —Why?

Child —Because you know a lot.

Renata —Because you don't have to be all suspicious about another...

Gerry —Uhhuh. Donna and Melanie, what were you saying?

Melanie —When you know people better, it's easier for you to get along better with other people that you didn't know...

Gerry —Uhhuh. Donna?

Donna —Well, it's better (unintelligible)

Gerry —Uhhuh.

Child —(unintelligible)
Forthcoming in THINKING . . .

✓ Professor Kenneth Aman and Sister Anna Marie Hartman will relate their experiences training teachers in philosophy for children in El Salvador. In a subsequent article, they will tell what it was like conducting two workshops during the summer of 1978 in Chile.

✓ Reports from professor-teacher teams who have begun working together to introduce philosophy into local classrooms. Louis Katzner (Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green University, and Frances Brent (Conneaut Elementary School, Bowling Green, Ohio) will recount their adventures in Ohio. Henry Frankel (Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri), and Nelda Gosnell (Loretto School, Kansas City, Missouri), will give an account of how it happened in Kansas City.

✓ An exchange of views on the educational presuppositions of philosophy for children, with John Wilson of Oxford University responding to a statement by Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp.

✓ THINKING will take a fresh look at some of the older views of education which need to be re-examined in the light of philosophy for children. Relevant articles or selections will be reprinted from such authors as Henry Sidgwick, George Herbert Mead, Leonard Nelson, Floyd Dell, George Santayana, Herbert Spencer, Leo Tolstoy, Hilda Taba and Lawrence Metcalf.

✓ Books relevant to children’s thinking will be reviewed in subsequent issues.

✓ Peter Yang (of Fu-Jen University) will comment on the philosophy for children movement in Taiwan, and Pierre Belaval (University of Lille) will take note of similar stirrings in France.

✓ Dr. Virginia Shipman, of Educational Testing Service, will report on a year-long experiment in philosophy for children in New Jersey, and Ray Karras will describe an experiment in Lexington, Massachusetts.