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Cover photograph by Joseph D. Isaacson.
Albert is a turtle, who complains that he has a toothache. Albert's father is quite unsympathetic. "That's impossible," he says; "it is impossible for anyone in our family to have a toothache."

Though Albert's father does point to his own toothless mouth (does he also point to its toothlessness?) to establish the impossibility of a turtle's having a toothache, he never actually says to Albert, "To have a toothache you need to have a tooth and turtles don't have teeth."

Wouldn't it have been much better to tell Albert that he can't have a toothache because he doesn't have any teeth? Perhaps Albert can have a tailache; but he doesn't have the right equipment for having a toothache.

It isn't even enough just to have a tooth (for example, under one's pillow). One can't have an ache in x unless x is a part of one's very own body. Indeed for y to be able to have an ache in x at a particular time, t, x must be an integral part of y's body at t.

But is that last claim really satisfactory? Descartes was impressed by the fact that amputees sometimes report having aches and pains in their amputated limbs (the phenomenon of the "phantom limb"). Suppose that, while I am unconscious, my last remaining tooth is extracted and, when I wake up, I report having an awful toothache. Is it false that I then have a toothache, since I then have no tooth? And what do I have instead? A jawache? But suppose it doesn't feel like a jawache? (I've had those, too). "It's just in your head," someone might say. Perhaps so. But it's not a headache. (Nor, of course, is it a brainache!).

Albert's grandmother is the only character in the story who is sympathetic to Albert. To her he explains that his "toothache" is on his left toe. Albert's explanation makes it hard to avoid the conclusion that he simply doesn't know what a toothache is.

How does one learn what a toothache is? By having one? And how does one first know it is a toothache one has?

Doesn't it go this way? I come to learn that I have various anatomical parts, including teeth. Once I know a little about my own anatomy I immediately know where I hurt without having to learn how to tell. Then, so long as I know I have a tooth, I am in position to recognize that an ache or pain I have is in my tooth.

But there are complications. Suppose the dentist says there is nothing wrong with my tooth? Can the dentist tell me I don't have a toothache?

Perhaps what the dentist will say (it's what a dentist said to someone I know) is that, my tooth being sound, what I have is a simulated toothache. Is this something Albert could have had?

Then there is the ache in the phantom tooth. And if one can have an ache in a tooth one no longer has, why not in a tooth one never had?
KNOWING BETTER

Ann Diller

Teachers, parents and other adults who work with children commonly talk as if even fairly young children have some moral knowledge. They often act as if such children could, on occasion, be legitimately held morally responsible for their actions, as when they assert to a young child: "You know better than that!" or, somewhat less absolutely, "You ought to know better." In other situations the same adult will excuse the child as "not knowing any better."

We thus tend to distinguish between at least two types of moral situations for children: (1) situations where we think a child can or does 'know better' and (2) situations where we believe a child cannot or does not know any better. If such a distinction holds, then it should have some interesting implications for moral education. But first we need to consider the distinction itself. In Section I we will examine our use of 'knowing better' with young children.

In Section II we will discuss four prerequisites for knowing better. Section III explores an approach to moral education designed to help children acquire these four prerequisites. Our approach is to help children find "Live Moral Alternatives" for themselves. Efforts to do moral education are rarely free from ethical dangers; in Section IV we discuss ways in which the use of Live Moral Alternatives can avoid some prevalent dangers in contemporary moral education.

I. Situations

In order to examine the distinction between 'knowing better' and 'not knowing any better,' let's consider its use with young children where the distinction is perhaps the most clearcut. Can a young child 'know better' in some situations and not in others, as our usage seems to presuppose?

Most of us seem willing to grant that very young children frequently do not know any better. When a curious toddler crawls off with a visitor's purse we do not accuse the child of stealing. When a pre-schooler misleads us with his fanciful tales, we do not accuse him of lying. When he sells his brother's prize model ship to the bottom of the pond, or polishes the antique furniture with cold cream, or feeds the family's dinner to the stray dog, we may get upset, but we are generally willing to grant (after we calm down) that the child didn't know any better.

In fact there are so many instances in which young children truly don't know any better that we may well ask whether parents and teachers are mistaken when they think otherwise. Certainly people can be mistaken in this way, as in the case Selma Fraiberg cites, in connection with "...one of the practical problems which may emerge in the first three months of life... The infant cries fitfully for hours... If his mother holds him he may subside for a while, but soon the howling begins again. He is not ill. He does not have colic." The desperate and sleepless parents may resort to what Fraiberg refers to as an "old theory" namely that the infant "is spoiled and he just wants attention. He is using crying as a weapon against his parents, as a means of getting his own way."

As Fraiberg points out, this "old theory" is untenable partly because it is based on a number of false premises, such as the notion "that an under-three-month-old infant has the mental equipment to carry out a plot against his parents, that he takes pleasure in disturbing their sleep, in exercising his tyranny over them." To assume that the infant could know any better is clearly mistaken. Even worse is the tendency in the "old theory" to accuse or blame the infant.

But in contrast to a three-month-old, what about a three-year-old? Let us look at two actual examples. These should sound not unfamiliar to anyone who has had occasion to work closely with young children or to observe them at play.

(a) The day-care teacher of a little boy, who had recently begun to talk, reported that he was hitting other children and that her efforts to forestall it by reprimands and mild punishment had been unsuccessful. The mother decided to "reason with" the boy. "Why are you hitting other children?" she asked him. Barely able to talk, he asserted, "E. (his brother) hits. Daddy hits. You hit." "You are right," said his mother. "From now on, if anyone hits, they will be reminded not to and we will all try very hard not to. If we do that, will you also try not to hit?" "Yes," he promised. His teacher reported that he was as good as his word; there was indeed no more hitting.

(b) Two four-year-olds were engaged in an increasingly acrimonious dispute over the possession of a large set of magic markers. A nearby adult pointed out that since there were 16 markers it would be fair if each child counted out 8...
of them. Fascinated, the children not only forgot their quarrel, but even their drawings and devoted the next half hour to a very full and effective discussion generating and agreeing upon many further rules (e.g., if there are two of the same color, we each get one; if there is only one color, the person gets it whose favorite color it is; if both children like that color, or if neither does, they take turns using it).

Similar observations and anecdotes from teachers and parents of pre-school and grade-school children indicate a few limited but recurrent moral concerns. For example, most young children seem to be concerned with fairness. Even before they can comprehend counting, division, or the conservation of matter as objective operations, many children have a surprisingly accurate and highly motivated sense of "equality of portions" when they are to have something desirable distributed among themselves.

"...many children have a surprisingly accurate and highly motivated sense of 'equality of portions' when they are to have something desirable distributed among themselves.

II. Four Prerequisites

So far we have decided that it does make sense to expect children to know better in some situations and not in others. And we are now in search of what makes the difference between the two. But first let's try to be clear on just what we are looking for. As teachers, parents, and educators, we are not looking for cases where children invariably know better or always act as they should (not even adults do that!). What we want are situations where it is plausible for children to know better, where children sometimes act as they should.

If we look at situations in our own culture where even a small child is sometimes presumed to know better, such as certain forms of sharing, especially "taking turns," and not hurting other children, we usually find that four conditions are met:

1. The child is sufficiently familiar with similar cases to recognize this situation as one of a certain sort and to distinguish the relevant moral factors. This generally includes understanding the key terms; for example, the child knows what 'taking turns' means in practice.

2. The child is able to control his or her own actions in this situation; and it is within the child's powers to act in a morally acceptable way under the circumstances.

3. The child is able to recognize that the morally relevant consequences are connected with the child's own action, often because they are immediately and directly observable. For example, in hitting another person, one can observe both the physical impact and the reaction of the victim.

4. It is also highly likely, although not necessary, that the child has had some direct personal experience with the morally relevant consequences. The child may have already suffered or benefited from them, or observed first-hand their effect on someone else.

Without these four conditions, we cannot, and should not, expect a child to know better. But these four conditions are only minimal because it does not follow that someone will automatically or definitely 'know better' just because these conditions are met. I shall, therefore, call them the four prerequisites for knowing better. Just as being able to count accurately from one to twenty is a prerequisite for understanding the process of adding either one, these four prerequisites make possible but do not guarantee a child's 'knowing better.' Let's consider each one separately.

1. Recognizing the Situation and Understanding What Counts

Before a child is expected to know that s/he should take turns in a given situation, the child needs to know what it means to "take turns," and what sorts of circumstances call for this action. This is not easy. The child must learn what "taking turns" looks like, how it
works, and when people should do it.

Some of the first cues for recognizing the right circumstances probably come when a child enters a situation in which the appropriate actions are already being taken, as when children are already lined up for the sliding board, or a teacher is allotting turns one by one to a classroom group, or a parent is requiring and guiding the sequential use of a popular toy. Over time then the child can begin to develop a rudimentary sense of the relevant moral factors, namely that more than one child wants to do or to use the same thing at the same time, that this is not possible, and that the children have more or less equal claims.

Young children cannot, of course, verbalize their understanding of the relevant moral factors, but they can learn to act on them with a fair degree of accuracy. For example, most children come to distinguish between the obligation to share common property, such as playground equipment, and the element of altruistic choice involved in deciding to share one’s own toys with a friend or playmate. And many children are capable of righteous indignation when another child does not or will not wait their turn, but “butts in line” or “hogs the ball.”

2. Within the Powers of the Child

When an indignant parent or teacher says to a child: “You know better than that!” the adult is not referring merely, or even primarily, to the child’s verbal facility for handling cognitive knowledge (e.g., the child’s ability to recite Kant’s different formulations of the Categorical Imperative). The expectation is rather that the child ought to have acted in a certain way; that ought implies can; and that the appropriate action was within the child’s capability. An adult may, of course, be mistaken about a particular child’s capacity for dealing with a given situation (as we noted above in Fraiberg’s case of the infant). But the point is that the expectation is based on a presumption that the child can do the right thing, that the child is able to do so. This ability is an essential prerequisite for “knowing better than that!” We need, therefore, to keep asking ourselves over again for each child in each situation whether an appropriate moral action is within the present powers of the child.

In asking whether a moral action is “within the powers of the child” we are, I think, asking a number of different questions. One question is whether the child has the physical capacity for doing what is expected. A different question is whether the child has the requisite skill or “know how” for doing what needs to be done. I may have the physical capacity to be a strong swimmer, but still not have learned how to swim, so that it would not be within my present powers to rescue a drowning man by swimming out to him. So also children have the capacity for doing numerous things which they have not yet learned how to do.

Or it may not be so much the skill that is lacking as it is information or other knowledge. In the case of the magic markers, the two four-year-olds needed to know what would be a fair division of their common pool of markers — once they had that information they could use their skill in counting out eight markers each.

Another difficult, but nonetheless important, aspect of one’s powers is that mysterious something called “will-power.” Because one bothersome characteristic of moral imperatives is that they sometimes run counter to what would be easiest to do or what we would like to do right this minute, some minimal development of will-power seems to be required. How to get this will-power and how to sustain it for the right causes pose interesting but far from simple questions.

Achieving strength of will may depend partly on our ability to keep our attention focused on the right thing long enough. If this is so, then the development of a capacity for sustained concentration, or for a concentration span of some minimal duration, may itself be a prerequisite for will-power. I am convinced that one thing able teachers do is to help students focus their attention in a productive way on those factors which are most important for the students’ own level of learning.

3. Seeing the Moral Connections

Two separate questions can be asked here. First, is it clear to the child that there are morally relevant consequences which are connected with his or her own action? Second, is it possible for the child to trace or to comprehend the causal sequence involved? The first question is crucial from a moral point of view, while the second question reveals the importance of education. When young children meet both these requirements, it usually means that we have a sequence with relatively few steps, where the consequences are immediately and directly observable, rather than remote or indirect.

As the child gets older, the sequences can get longer and the consequences can become more remote. To understand that the use of aerosol spray cans endanger the ozone layer which in turn endangers life on our planet is a connection that even many adults have trouble seeing; or they, at least, have trouble taking the moral consequences seriously.

It is often difficult to separate moral indifference from mere ignorance. A high school chemistry teacher told me that he found it had been common practice in his high school for students to dump dangerous chemicals down the lab drains, even though the drains went into the regular town system and eventually back into the water supply network. And even in recent years, most students who study chemistry learn chemical composition and properties without any more than a passing reference to the dangers and toxic effects caused by misuse, or by any use, of these same compounds. Thus, the chemistry student who casually dumps his most recent experiment down the drain may do so out of disregard for others or out of ignorance of the facts (e.g., where the drain goes or what the dangers are). In such cases, teaching the relevant facts and information may well be the best, if not the only, way to call attention to the moral connections.

Certainly in the long run, education which reveals interrelationships and causal connections is necessary if students are to be enabled to meet the ethical demands of others or even to exercise fully and ably their own rights. But in the short run we may have to insist on giving due recognition to moral connections, to help children see these even before they are capable of grasping all the
intricacies of a causal sequence.

The minimal requirement, the key to seeing a moral connection, is to recognize or be persuaded that certain actions do, indeed, have an effect for good or for ill. Being so persuaded need not mean that one truly understands the causal connections or sequence, any more than many car drivers understand why it is that turning the ignition key starts their car engines. Drivers do, however, recognize that there is a relevant connection and they act accordingly. Similarly, in order to "know better" morally we do not have to wait for complete causal understanding. Let me give an example from my own experience.

I'm working in my bedroom on a winter's afternoon. My two-year-old son David, who has been busy with his blocks on the floor, gets up and goes over to our waterbed where he starts to play with the thermostat dial. He turns the knob back and forth and watches the red light go on and off. I notice what he's doing and say, "No, no David, please don't play with that." No response. I stop working. Then slowly, carefully, and a bit dramatically, I explain: "David, if you do that it turns off the heater, and it makes Mommy and Daddy's bed all cold — Brrr, FREEZY COLD!" David listens. He is a New Hampshire child who knows that "freezy cold" is like what happens to your hands when you lose your mittens in the snow. He stops changing the dial, allows me to reset it, and gradually goes back to his blocks.

In this episode with David we would answer our two initial questions differently. In answering the second question, we have to consider all the causal connections between setting the thermostat dial and controlling the temperature of the waterbed, which were surely beyond David's grasp at his age. In answering the first question, we look at the way in which the temperature of the waterbed affects the people who sleep in it, and the related fact that David's changing the dial made his parents uncomfortably cold. This connection was not totally beyond his comprehension, even though he may have found it quite puzzling. He could at least recognize that it was "not a good thing" to make us "Brrr — Freezy Cold." (If you think I am exaggerating, try, some winter's night, to sleep on an unheated waterbed in an unheated bedroom; granted, however, that this is not a "serious" moral consequence. For more on 'moral' see Section III.)

4. Personal Experiences and Having Moral Reasons

Even people who can comprehend causal connections and morally undesirable consequences may still have trouble taking a moral danger seriously if it is beyond the range of their personal experience. When we considered cases in which it was plausible to expect young children to "know better," we noted that usually such situations are ones where the children do have some personal experiences which could provide the basis for a sympathetic understanding of the human consequences. David's encounters with "freezy cold" snow provided just such a basis. But a more fundamental question here is whether or not the child has any basis at all, experiential or otherwise, for sympathizing with others, for imagining themselves in another's position, for understanding why one action might be better for the persons involved (or "right") while another act might be worse (or "wrong").

Another way of putting our question is to ask whether the children themselves might "have any moral reasons" for acting one way rather than another, any reasons for caring about what happens to others, any reasons for doing the "right thing." 'Having moral reasons' is, of course, a very complicated business that has worried numerous philosophers — and undoubtedly children do not have moral reasons in full the same sense which Immanuel Kant, Henry Sidgwick, John Stuart Mill or John Rawls have them. Nevertheless, I think we need to beware of making 'having moral reasons' so complicated that we begin to believe that young children cannot have them at all. For example, not hurting someone is a valid moral reason at almost any age. And being hurt and hurting someone are experiences which most children have had, experiences for which they can often meet all four of our prerequisites. It is not surprising, therefore, that a brief and frequent effective moral command-plus-explanation is: "Don't do that, it hurts!" "It hurts" is one moral reason which most children can understand, and one which many children can also accept as their own.

III. Live Moral Alternatives

If moral education consists partly of helping children to get to 'know better' in an ever widening range of circumstances, and if we are correct in our assessment of what some of the prerequisites for knowing better are, then one task for moral education would seem to be that of helping children to acquire these four prerequisites. Each one suggests educational tasks or undertakings which are appropriate to it. For example, our first prerequisite can be furthered by accurate language learning, as we noted when we discussed "taking turns." It may also be furthered by our giving brief moral explanations to children, by pointing out why we call certain actions "right" and others "wrong," by calling their attention to the relevant moral factors.

Of all the possible implications for teaching and for moral education, I want to discuss one in particular which I consider central. This task is of key importance for meeting our second prerequisite, but it incorporates and relies on the other three as well. This central task is that of helping children to acquire Live Moral Alternatives.

Since we are concerned here with moral education, we shall speak of the 'child' as the agent in question. But Live Moral Alternatives are by no means limited to children. The concept applies to adults as well. If you substitute 'agent' (or 'person') for 'child,' you can see that Live Moral Alternatives are important at any age.

A Live Moral Alternative is, first of all, a course of action which is within the child's powers, which the child has the skill, knowledge, and ability to carry out. Thus it is "live" in the sense that the child can actually do it.

But it is also "live" in the sense of our fourth prerequisite, namely that the child also has some reason for choosing this course of action, that the child has some predisposition for actually considering the alternative as a live option. Be-
ing live in this sense does not mean that the child will find the reason so conclusive or compelling that s/he will necessarily act accordingly, but it does mean that s/he will seriously entertain the possibility of so acting, that it accords with one of the child’s own possible choices. Thus the alternative is “live” both in the sense that the child can do it and in the sense that the child has some reason for doing it.

In determining what counts as a moral alternative, we again need to note some different senses of the term.5 In the first and most stringent sense, a ‘moral’ alternative is one which does not injure others and does not harm the innocent. Some of our most common moral prescriptions, such as “Don’t Kill,” prohibit just such actions. In fact, this first sense of ‘moral’ largely a matter of telling us what not to do rather than what to do. It places certain moral constraints on our behavior and then says, in effect, “you can do anything you want, so long as you avoid these morally wrong actions.” It sounds simple, but of course it isn’t simple at all. Much of Ethics and Moral Philosophy are efforts to work out the details, the implications and complexities of our most basic moral constraints. Many conventional moral maxims are simplified ways of indicating which actions are so universally injurious that we can say they are almost always wrong.

One can argue that this stringent constraints sense of ‘moral’ is the core of morality or even the only sense which ought to count as truly moral. One argument, for example, is that to “avoid causing evil” is the only moral requirement which applies to all of us “all of the time, with regard to everyone equally” (Gert, 73). But most of us, and especially many persons concerned to do moral education, use ‘moral’ in additional ways which go beyond this moral constraints sense.

Before we leave this first sense of ‘moral’ we should note that it does provide us with an important distinction, especially for our education and supervision of children. For this first sense of moral, this requirement to avoid causing evil, is the one which provides the strongest and clearest justification for intervention when questions of moral protection and enforcement arise. We do see ourselves as morally justified, indeed, obligated, to intervene in order to stop a child in our care from causing serious harm or injury. Such a strong justification for intervention is not generally found in any other sense of ‘moral.’

But the obligation to intervene in order to protect others from serious harm also illustrates another sense of ‘moral,’ namely that of preventing evil when we are in a position to do so. Thus, a moral alternative may not only avoid causing evil, it may also, upon occasion, be a course of action which helps to prevent evil.

But we still have not considered what is, perhaps, the most common further sense of ‘moral.’6 In general, to act morally means not only to refrain from certain actions because they are ‘wrong’ but also to do other actions because these are ‘right.’ Some of these ‘right’ actions are those which are also for the good of both ourselves and others, actions which are in the common interest, which may even aim for “the good of everyone alike” (Baier, 2007). On this view a moral alternative would not only avoid causing evil, it would also be an alternative which was likely to promote some good. Here again we have conventional moral rules and principles which identify those positive actions which are most likely to promote good, as well as prevent evil. For example, we expect people to be fair, to respect each other, to uphold justice, to provide for mutual aid, to fulfill obligations, and to keep their promises.

In sum, we have said that a live moral alternative must first try to meet the moral constraints requirements, for this is our most serious and stringent sense for ‘moral.’ But in our searches for moral alternatives we often consider the extent to which different courses of action may also further the good of ourselves and others, as well as prevent evil. In some circumstances the best we can do is to find an alternative which does the least amount of harm; but ideally a moral alternative would both avoid evil and also promote good.

A Live Moral Alternative is an alternative in the sense that it is one among two or more possible courses of action open to the child. Moral agency generally presupposes some degree of choice, some sense in which it is possible for the person to have acted, chosen, or decided differently—or at least that other people in the same circumstances do indeed decide and act differently. Thus we are not talking about those instances where there is no conceivable way in which the child could have done otherwise, even if the child had had more information, more skill, more knowledge, etc.

Now it may be that in a given situation, as a matter of fact, a particular child does lack the necessary skills or information and therefore has very little real choice; but in such cases we can say that if the child had been taught or helped then s/he could have acted differently. Thus, in this sense, a child may have a temporarily non-live alternative which education could bring alive. As educators we often know of alternatives which a child could take if the child knew of them.

Thus we can speak of someone “having an alternative” in two different senses—one is that of its already being

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“Thus the alternative is ‘live’ both in the sense that the child can do it and in the sense that the child has some reason for doing it.”
“live” for that person. We can also talk about an alternative for another person in the sense that if they knew about it and knew how to do it then it could be live, they could then choose it or consider it. For example, I may have arrived in a new city; and in trying to get from one section to another suppose that my alternatives are to go on foot, by private car, by taxi, bicycle, motorcycle or bus, or some combination thereof; but I may not know that there are also, as in Puerto Rico, the “Publicos” which are a cross between a taxi and a bus. Thus, one sense the Publico is an alternative for me, it may even be the best way for me to reach my destination. But the

Consider a fairly common problem for schoolchildren — the playground bully. Most children tend to get stuck on three alternatives — fight, flight, or “tattletale.” All three are frequently (not always) unsatisfactory. What most children need then are some more options, other courses of action besides these three. Perhaps they could acquire some skills in co-opting troublemakers. Or they might discover ways of bringing peer group pressure to bear or using group defense measures. They might even find acceptable ways to initiate changes in the relevant institutional structures, such as the playground activities and supervision.

Publico is not a “live” alternative for me until I find out about it and learn how to go about using it.

Morally acceptable courses of action for some children are rather like Publicos in Puerto Rico for a newcomer, they are available but the child does not know it. Children often need help in discovering what is available to them. Sometimes a person simply needs to be told about an alternative course of action. But children frequently need someone to show them how it is done. And most of us can use what we aptly call “moral support.”

Older children, and many adults, want to talk about their options as they perceive them, to get help in assessing the practicability of certain actions: Can I do it? What is likely to happen? And most children need some guidance in tracing the moral consequences, the probable effects on all the persons involved, including themselves.

Our point here is not to decide in the abstract which moral alternative is best for a given situation; in some situations there may be many good ones while in other cases there may be none under the existing circumstances. Our point is rather that the child does need to find some Live Moral Alternative. And in order to do so the child may need help. Imaginative teachers can probably think of many more ways than I can to help their own students acquire such alternatives. They might do role-playing or simulations in which children act out different ways of handling the situation and get some sense of the different perspectives involved. They might read stories or see a film in which the children do deal successfully with bullies in morally acceptable fashion. Or the students might have a brainstorming session to come up with as many Live Moral Alternatives as they can. Whatever the method, it should be combined with a realistic discussion of both the practical and the moral merits of different suggestions. And it is crucial that the children’s own particular perceptions, reasons, and powers be taken into account in the final assessment if the children are to find what are truly their own Live Moral Alternatives.

At other times the children may know very well what to do but need help in accomplishing it, in organizing and carrying through on what they want to do. This may require sustained group effort with varying degrees of adult guidance. We don’t only need to help children discover or find their own moral reasons for doing the right thing — in fact, very often children already have good moral reasons. We also need to find ways of helping children to give sufficient attention to their own moral reasons so that they can muster or sustain the necessary “will-power” to carry through on their own convictions. Doing something with someone else is, of course, one of the ways we achieve our more difficult commitments — moral and otherwise. The prevalent, and often successful, use of common group tasks, of “teams” and co-operative ventures reflects this general truth.

IV. Dangers

In helping children to acquire Live Moral Alternatives, we need to avoid the dangers of both “moralism” and ethical relativism. The danger of a moralistic approach is not only that it often identifies all of morality with a single ideology or one particular set of social conventions, but also that the moralist tends to exclude any alternative course of action which differs from his own restricted, predetermined ways of proceeding, regardless of whether or not the procedures and consequences are ethically desirable. The moralist thus excludes what are Live Moral Alternatives for others merely because they are not live for him, failing to distinguish his own way of being moral from all possible ways of acting morally.

A relativistic approach does allow for our differences in what is “live” to us, but it capitulates on the ethical requirement. The relativist fails to distinguish between what are admittedly different live options all of which are still morally
acceptable and those options which are not only different but are also unethical as well. He seems unable or unwilling to admit that some live options are not merely different from others but may also be wrong from almost any informed moral viewpoint.

Certain ways of teaching “values clarification” can lend themselves to a form of ethical relativism. This happens when little or no distinction is made between: (a) those “values” that are a matter of taste or personal preference such as a preference for baseball over tennis and (b) those “values” which reflect primary human goods or basic moral rights and wrongs. If no one makes this distinction, then students are left with the impression that all these “values” are on a par, and that all “values” are equally justifiable or unjustifiable.

Although stage theories of moral development are considerably more sophisticated and adequate than most varieties of “moralism,” some educational uses of moral stage theory do have dangers not unlike those of moralism. For instance, if in an educational setting one presents a moral dilemma with two and only two alternative courses of action, and also refuses to consider other options which might conceivably come closer to being both live and moral, then we have another version of “you have to do it my way.” Such an approach implies, furthermore, that moral alternatives must come in a binary choice form, either this or that and nothing else, as if people really were stuck with choosing between two and only two courses of action, however horrible they both may be.

In contrast to such unwarranted limitations, a Live Moral Alternative approach would encourage us to look further for other options, to try to find some more alternatives which might come closer to being both live and moral for the persons involved. Here is where knowledge and skills as well as philosophic study come in handy. For our knowledge and skills increase the range of what is “within our powers” thus making more alternatives “live” for us. And philosophic study should enable us to see more alternatives, to discover their ethical implications, and to assess their moral merits.

Another danger in the educational use of moral stage theory lies in the propensity for classifying or categorizing students. Placing a student in a “lower” stage than oneself can easily lead to underestimating the student’s moral capacities. If, instead of struggling to fit students into classifications, we considered who could come up with truly live moral alternatives for a given situation, we might even discover that sometimes children find better Live Moral Alternatives than we do ourselves, even though we are, of course, at a much “higher” stage. I’ll confess that this has happened to me a number of times with my students and even with my own children.

My pedagogical point is then that we should both help and allow children to find their own Live Moral Alternatives. Children, and adults as well, need courses of action which fit their perceptions, their powers, and their own reasons for acting. But we should also insist that these choices be morally acceptable.

Summary

We have said that we can distinguish between those situations in which children “don’t know any better” and those in which they do “know better.” And we found that even young children are capable of “knowing better” in certain circumstances where they can meet our Four Prerequisites. So we took one task of moral education to be that of helping children to meet these prerequisites in the situations where it is plausible and reasonable for them to do so. One way of doing this is to help children acquire Live Moral Alternatives — morally acceptable courses of action, that are within the powers of the child and make some appeal to the child’s own reasons for acting. It does not follow that the child will always choose to act in this “right” way or shall succeed in doing so; but we should hope rather that at least sometimes the child may so choose and that under the right conditions may even succeed.

Footnotes and References

1. This article is taken from a larger study on which I am presently working. In it, I distinguish a number of different forms which moral education takes, and I address the question of who should undertake particular forms of moral education. The question of who has the right or the responsibility to do moral education is an important issue which I bypass in this article.


3. These anecdotes, (a) and (b), are taken from observations and records made by Dr. Nancy C. Glock of Carmichael, California. Nancy Glock helped me substantially with an earlier draft of Section I. I also want to thank Dr. Jane Roland Martin and Dr. Beebe Nelson (both of U. Mass., Boston) for their helpful comments on successive drafts of this paper.

4. This fourth condition is stated in a preliminary way here, and it needs refinement in order to count as necessary. See Section II, 4, for the refinements.

5. My discussion of “moral” borrows freely from traditional and contemporary Western moral philosophy, without adhering strictly to any single position. Some relevant twentieth century references are:

6. Since a certain number of people still seem to see “sex” and “morals” as synonymous (cf. Webster’s dictionary definition number B.b.), I should probably emphasize that “sex” is not central to the meanings we are discussing here, even though some people will, no doubt, derive conclusions about sex from any line of practical reasoning.
Rights and Responsibilities of Young People

Liberation movements are many and varied. Among those that have inherited the style, ideology and political activism of the black civil rights movement of the Sixties are women’s rights, gay rights, senior citizens’ rights and the anti-abortion right-to-life movements. The successes of these movements combined with startling statistics on child abuse have led to the rapid growth of a children’s rights movement, which has been attacked by some philosophers who have pointed out difficulties in applying the concept of rights to children. It is my aim in this paper to show that children do have rights, even if not all the rights adults can claim, and that the grounds of at least some children’s rights are different from the grounds of similar rights of adults. These differences of rights will be shown to be related to different degrees of responsibility.

A different kind of attack on the children’s rights movement comes from conservatives appalled by increasing juvenile crime, who demand a return to authoritarian education and child rearing and yet also clamor for stiffer criminal penalties for adolescent offenders. Their position is blatantly inconsistent. Degree of liberty goes together with degree of responsibility. If a fourteen year old must automatically obey adults, it is manifestly unfair to hold him or her criminally responsible to the same degree as an adult who is under no one’s thumb. It might seem that the liberal position on children’s rights is equally inconsistent in proposing increased liberty of the youth together with less severe punishment for juvenile offenses, but I intend to show that there is no contradiction in the liberal position, that, in fact, it is eminently reasonable. My resolution of the apparent paradox will depend on clarification of the concepts of rights, liberty and moral responsibility, and of their interrelations in the ethics of child and adolescent rearing.

Rights

Talk about rights in the context of liberation movements usually involves appeal to ‘natural,’ ‘human,’ or ‘absolute’ rights. Joseph Margolis has observed, in "Reflections on the Right to Health Care," that ‘the emptiness of familiar, so-called human rights may be seen at a stroke once it is remembered that, even though inalienable, such rights as that of life and liberty are thought to be necessarily violated by capital punishment... In theory, no one can forfeit his human rights; he can only forfeit his positive or legal or political rights, that is, the actual particular rights accorded or protected in a particular society.” Margolis argues that in talking about rights such as the right to health care it is better to talk about general rights, that is, rights that are like natural or human rights in that they ‘depend on the admission of certain prudential interests such as life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, dignity of person, security of person,” but which, like positive rights, “are formulated in such a way as to favor enforcing or promulgating certain rights and positive obligations.” To classify children’s rights as natural or absolute is too nebulous and too removed from historical and cultural contexts, while to classify them as positive rights would make them too dependent on local attitudes. The category of general rights reflects most accurately what the UN Bill of Rights for children is aiming at. The Bill is not meant as positive law, but countries with too harsh an attitude toward children would hopefully be pressured into according them more liberty. For example, the Bill states that “The child shall not be admitted to employment before an appropriate minimum age; he shall in no case be caused or permitted to engage in any occupation or employment which would prejudice his health or education, or interfere with his physical, mental or moral development.” The principle is admittedly vague; it does not, for example, rule out parental use of children for work at home, no matter how arduous. But it is a helpful tool in pressuring nations to look carefully at harmful child labor practices. For example, Colombia may possibly be persuaded to put a stop to the practice of sending five year old children to work in salt mines.

Rights, whether natural, general or positive, are of two kinds: claim rights and liberty rights, to use Hohfeld’s nomenclature. Generally speaking, a liberty right is freedom to do something,
while a claim right is the obligation of another to provide one with some good or service. There is an intimate relation between claim rights and liberty rights. If each person has a moral obligation to protect the liberty rights of all, then each of us has a claim right against each other and the state to protect our liberty rights.

Children’s rights

The most direct claim children have in our society is their claim on their parents to satisfy their basic needs. Their legal claims (positive rights) are narrower than their moral claims (general rights). The latter could include a claim to kind treatment, whereas the former would at most include a claim to treatment that is not cruel. More positive features of child rearing cannot be required by law, if only because we are uncertain how to ensure them.

If the rights of children to care and protection by their biological parents were natural rather than general rights, then communal societies in which the care of children is the responsibility of others would violate such alleged 'natural' rights. However, in societies like our own where child care has been traditionally the obligation of natural parents, all parents who do not surrender their children for adoption implicitly take on themselves the primary responsibility for child care. This freely assumed obligation provides the child with a corresponding claim right to be cared for.

Although, in our tradition, parents bear most of the responsibility for raising children, when this becomes unduly difficult, relatives and friends, state institutions and even the whole world take on some responsibility in varying degrees. Our religious and moral traditions require that each of us as a member of the human race has some modicum of responsibility to help children in need, no matter how remote they may be from our narrow sphere of personal acquaintance.

Children are persons, and all persons have a right to liberty, so children have that right. But liberty rights are defensible. Rights like freedom of the press and fair trial may limit each other. Rights may be forfeited by criminal actions. It has been argued that the liberty rights of children must be severely limited by their dependence and need for protection. Yet we do not to the same degree limit the liberty rights of the physically handicapped even when they are even more dependent on others than are many children. We do however severely limit the liberty rights of the mentally deranged. Irrationality is the most important ground for limiting liberty rights, and may be the only justifiable ground for limiting the liberty rights of children (other than the general ground, which applies to everyone, of conflict with other rights).

But the lack of rationality and the dependency of children are not always independent of each other. The tendency of two-year-olds to run into the road manifests a lack of rationality which justifies severely limiting their freedom of movement. The dependency on parents which is due to this lack of rationality supports a claim right of the child on the parent for adequate protection from its irrational impulses. Thus claim rights and liberty rights of children vary inversely. When the adolescent acquires the right to cross the street alone, he or she no longer has a claim on the parents to protective escort across the street.

Parents’ rights

In recent years there has been a renewed emphasis on the rights of parents. Champions of parental rights maintain that parents have rights both to and over their children against meddling outsiders including the state. Ferdinand Shoeman, in a recent paper, has argued that the essentially intimate and private relationship between parent and child justifies the right of the parent to keep the child even where most observers would judge the child to be better off with others. This is a complex issue, involving a cluster of rights, duties, needs and counter-needs. Anna Freud observed that child abuse tends to le self-perpetuating — abused children tend when they grow up to become child abusers — and this is an additional reason for society to intervene in such cases, to defend itself as well as the rights of children.

Moreover, it is not at all obvious that intimacy between child and parent must always be respected; after all, incest is an intimate relationship. Nor is it clear that intimacy excludes liberty rights; the most intimate lovers retain some rights against each other. Not all is fair in love or war.

It is a well known fact that the best institutions for children are unable to provide the special warmth that children need. For this reason alone, apart from parental rights, it is best to keep the child in the family wherever possible. But it does not follow that the family’s privacy may not be violated. Physicians are required to report evidence of child abuse; schools and even neighbors are encouraged to do so. Some recent programs have been fairly successful in keeping abused children within their families by means of close scrutiny and effective counselling. Thus privacy and fostering good family relationships are not always interdependent.

There is only one way to make sense of the notion of parents’ rights visavis children, and it is a very limited sense: because it is usually unbearably cruel to take a child away from a parent, society ought not to do this without a compelling reason. The loving parent therefore has a corresponding liberty right against society to be allowed to keep and raise his or her child. It is outrageous when a sanctimonious judge orders a child to be taken from a mother who is a prostitute but loves and wants her child and whose care for the child is adequate.

Insofar as parents have a duty to satisfy the basic needs of their children they must have a corresponding right not to be interfered with in carrying out that duty, either by outsiders, or by their own children. Moreover, parents have the same rights as all persons to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Clearly these rights of parents and those of children may come into conflict, but such conflict of rights is not unique to the parent-child relationship. A child’s right to a secular education may come into conflict with a parent’s right to practice a religion that requires the son to study only scripture and the daughter to devote herself to producing sons. Should society defend the right of the parent or that of the child? Such conflicts require the wisdom of Solomon, to
Children have a right to be vaccinated parents have a duty to see to it that they thing that is both a right and a duty. Good citizenship. Education is the cen­
exercise of adult liberty rights and public interest and thus a corres­
schools are not adequate modes of edu­
right to demand standardized testing in all schools to en­
some psychological theories are, they both endorse a non­punitive approach to learning. Behaviorism holds that positive rein­
ent that children should learn to handle freedom through a kind of rehearsal of freedom. One cannot expect young peo­ple who have been kept in line by fear of punishment suddenly to be able to act as responsible moral agents when they reach their twenty-first birthday. Since the reason for limiting children’s liberty in the first place was their lack of ra­
not be held fully responsible for the decisions they make. Ordinarily freedom and responsibility go hand in hand. But in the case of young people the need for a rehearsal of liberty rights entails that they be given more freedom than their corresponding degree of responsibility seems to warrant.

This is the paradox of liberal child rearing that I promised earlier to resolve. The resolution is as follows: Preparation for the full and responsible exercise of adult rights requires con­siderable practice or rehearsal, just as much as preparation for any complex creative and skillful activity, such as dramatic performance, ballet dancing or neurosurgery. In all these cases, we face the dilemma that it is dangerous for the parvenu to perform such activities, yet he or she must do so in order to learn from experience. We generally meet this dilemma by grasping the first horn with a padded glove; that is, we allow the student to perform at some risk, but we limit the risk by close surveillance and by only gradually raising the level of risk involved. Nevertheless, the fact is that the learner must be allowed to take some risks beyond what he or she has already proved himself or herself able to handle if the learner is to make significant progress. If this is true of particular ac­tivities, how much more true of what Plato called “the art of living”? Conse­quently, children and adolescents must be granted more freedom than their burden of responsibility taken by itself would justify.

Liberty and Learning

Two theories of learning have been competing recently for control of educa­tion: Behaviorism and development­alism. Different as these psychological
tories that it is dangerous for the

NOTE

The Child and The Future

To bring up a child means carrying one's soul in one's hand, setting one's feet on a narrow path; it means never placing ourselves in danger of meeting the cold look on the part of the child that tells us without words that he finds us insufficient and unreliable. It means the humble realisation of the truth that the ways of injuring the child are infinite, while the ways of being useful to him are few. How seldom does the educator remember that the child, even at four or five years of age, is making experiments with adults, seeing through them, with marvellous shrewdness making his own valuations and reacting sensitively to each impression. The slightest mistrust, the smallest unkindness, the least act of injustice or contemptuous ridicule, leave wounds that last for life in the finely strung soul of the child. While on the other side unexpected friendliness, kind advances, just indignation, make quite as deep an impression on those senses which people term as soft as wax but treat as if they were made of cowhide...

The query of a humourist, why he should do anything for posterity since posterity had done nothing for him, set me to thinking in my early youth in the most serious way. I felt that posterity had done much for its forefathers. It had given them an infinite horizon for the future beyond the bounds of their daily effort. We must in the child see the new fate of the human race; we must carefully treat the fine threads in the child's soul because these are the threads that one day will form the woof of world events. We must realise that every pebble by which one breaks into the glassy depths of the child's soul will extend its influence through centuries and centur-ies in ever widening circles. Through our fathers, without our will and without choice, we are given a destiny which controls the deepest foundation of our own being. Through our posterity, which we ourselves create, we can in a certain measure, as free beings, determine the future destiny of the human race.

—Ellen Key, The Century of the Child

Education as the Development of Thinking and Judgment

If a young man has trained his muscles and physical endurance by gymnastics and walking, he will later be fitted for every physical work. This is also analogous to the training of the mind and the exercising of the mental and manual skill. Thus the wit was not wrong who defined education this way: "Education is that which remains, if one has forgotten everything he learned in school." For this reason I am not at all anxious to take sides in the struggle between the followers of the classical philologic-historical education and the education more devoted to natural science.

On the other hand, I want to oppose the idea that the school has to teach directly that special knowledge and those accomplishments which one has to use later directly in life. The demands of life are much too manifold to let such a specialized training in school appear possible. Apart from that, it seems to me, moreover, objectionable to treat the individual like a dead tool. The school should always have as its aim that the young man leave it as a harmonious personality, not as a specialist. This in my opinion is true in a certain sense even for technical schools, whose students will devote themselves to a quite definite profession. The development of general ability for independent thinking and judgment should always be placed foremost, not the acquisition of special knowledge. If a person masters the fundamentals of his subject and has learned to think and work independently, he will surely find his way and besides will better be able to adapt himself to progress and change than the person whose training principally consists in the acquiring of detailed knowledge.

—Albert Einstein, Out of My Later Years (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950)
Learning and Education

The terms "education" and "learning" are troublesome…. Arithmetic, for example, may be studied in order to further the advancement of him who studies it. I call that education. It may also be studied to further its own advancement. I call that learning. Obviously these two ends are not mutually exclusive, but they imply a difference in emphasis which is far-reaching and significant…. To approach a given subject or inquiry with the question, "What advantage is to come from it," and to approach the same subject or inquiry with the question, "Whither does it lead," are clearly different even if the first leads to an answer to the second or the second to an answer to the first.


Education as Learning from Oneself

If one who hears me has personally perceived these things and become aware of them, he does not learn them from my words, but recognizes them from the images that are stored away within himself. If, however, he has had no sense knowledge of them, he clearly believes rather than learns by means of the words.

Now, when there is question of those things which we perceive by the mind — that is, by means of the intellect and by reason — we obviously express in speech the things which we behold immediately in that interior light of truth which effects enlightenment and happiness in the so-called inner man. And at the same time if the one who hears me likewise sees those things with an inner and undivided eye, he knows the matter of which I speak by his own contemplation, not by means of my words. Hence, I do not teach even such a one, although I speak what is true and he sees what is true. For he is taught not by my words, but by the realities themselves made manifest to him by God revealing them to his inner self. Thus, if he were asked, he could also give answers regarding these things. What could be more absurd than to think that he is taught by my speech, when even before I spoke he could explain those same things, if he were asked about them?

As for the fact that, as often happens, one denies something when he is asked about it, but is brought around by further questions to affirm it, this happens by reason of the weakness of his vision, not permitting him to consult that light regarding the matter as a whole. He is prompted to consider the problem part by part as questions are put regarding those same parts that constitute the whole, which originally he was not able to see in its entirety. If in this case he is led on by the words of the questioner, still it is not that the words teach him, but they represent questions put to him in such a way as to correspond to his capacity for learning from his own inner self. 

* * * *

Teachers do not claim, do they, that their own thoughts are perceived and grasped by the pupils, but rather the branches of learning that they think they transmit by speaking? For who would be so absurdly curious as to send his child to school to learn what the teacher thinks? But when they have explained, by means of words, all those subjects which they profess to teach, and even the science of virtue and of wisdom, then those who are called pupils consider within themselves whether what has been said is true. This they do by gazing attentively at that interior truth, so far as they are able. Then it is that they learn; and when within themselves they find that what has been said is true, they give praise, not realizing that they are praising not so much teachers as person taught — provided that the teachers also know what they are saying. But people deceive themselves in calling persons "teachers" who are not such at all, merely because generally there is no interval between the time of speaking and the time of knowing. And because they are quick to learn internally following the prompting of the one who speaks, they think they have learned externally from the one who was only a prompter.

—St. Augustine, from The Teacher, Chapters 12 and 14.

A Letter to Michael's Schoolmaster

DEAR SIR,

My son is now between nine and ten and should begin Greek at once and be taught by the Berlitz method that he may read as soon as possible that most exciting of all stories, the Odyssey, from that landing in Ithaca to the end. Grammar should come when the need comes. As he grows older he will read to me the great lyric poets and I will talk to him about Plato. Do not teach him one word of Latin. The Roman people were the classic decadence, their literature form without matter. They destroyed Milton, the French seventeenth and our own eighteenth century, and our schoolmasters even to-day read Greek with Latin eyes. Greece, could we but approach it with eyes as young as its own, might renew our youth. Teach him mathematics as thoroughly as his capacity permits. I know that Bertrand Russell must, seeing that he is such a featherhead, be wrong about everything, but as I have no mathematics I cannot prove it. I do not want my son to be as helpless. Do not teach him one word of geography. He has lived on the Alps, crossed a number of rivers and when he is fifteen I shall urge him to climb the Sugar Loaf. Do not teach him a word of history. I shall take him to Shakespeare's history plays, if a commercialized theater permit, and give him all the historical novels of Dumas, and if he cannot pick up the rest he is a fool. Don't teach him one word of science, he can get all he wants in the newspapers and in any case it is no job for a gentleman. If you teach him Greek and mathematics and do not let him forget the French and German that he already knows you will do for him all that one man can do for another. If he wants to learn Irish after he is well founded in Greek, let him — it will clear his eyes of the Latin miasma. If you will not do what I say, whether the curriculum or your own will restrain, and my son comes from school a smatterer like his father, may your soul lie chained on the Red Sea bottom.

—from William Butler Yeats, Explanations
Poetry as the Model
Embodiment of Knowledge

It is not in a gluing together of bits of knowledge that a child reaches understanding. School is a waste, a harmful waste under such a system — except to the alert and resourceful child, who circumvents the harm by use of his own mind. That virtue of deception, of double-crossing the teacher from within, is the only thing that saves the child's mind at all. He knows he must "get" the work to pass, but he knows deeper still, that it is the bunk, and that he only needs to get enough to pass. By this method he rescues his intelligence, fortunately for him and for us all....

Surely it cannot be escaped that the true solution of the difficulties does not lie with synthesis but with a reawakening of the classical method of analysis — a light, a bolt even, through the chaotic murk of information, the discovery of an end to learning — something toward which the child from any direction may strive. It is this that must be sought.

Data should be present in activities which, in particular, have newly organized their material, such as, let us say, in poetry. How better than in poetry, that solves the child's mind at all. He knows he must "get" the work to pass, but he knows deeper still, that it is the bunk, and that he only needs to get enough to pass. By this method he rescues his intelligence, fortunately for him and for us all....

The Function of Criteria in Education

We see only one way to avoid the seeming dilemma of guiding pupil thinking without indoctrination: conscious adoption of criteria upon which judgments shall be based. This is a very simple device, yet an effectual one. A criterion (note the singular form) is defined by the American College Dictionary as "a standard of judgment or of criticism; an established rule or principle for testing anything." Whenever a class has before it a matter that calls for judgment on its part, the teacher should make sure that the judgmental basis is clear.

How does employment of consciously recognized criteria enable a teacher to criticize and guide student thinking, yet avoid indoctrination, and in so doing achieve democratic guidance? Simply by subjecting whatever ideas or proposals a teacher presents to the same bases for acceptance or rejection as any student's ideas or proposals. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, equality of obligation to abide by adopted decisions. This means, of course, that a pupil can "guide" a teacher as well as the teacher guide a pupil. But what more should a teacher want or expect? If what is right rather than who is right is the objective, is not truth or rectitude to be recognized wherever it is found? To find what kind of conclusions any given set of criteria logically requires or implies sheds convincing light on the desirability (or undesirability) of the criteria themselves.

*It should be noted that a criterion is not a rule for behavior, such as a law establishing a speed limit. It is a basis for judgment; in the case of a law on speeding, the law serves as a basis for judging what is legal and what is illegal speed and thus can be used as a criterion; but the law as such is a rule for behavior, not a criterion for judgment.

Philosophy for Children in Mexico

Al Thompson & Adrian DuPuis

When Al Thompson became involved with philosophy for children at the first national conference at Rutgers University in 1976, he had no notion that some three years later he would find himself a senior Fulbright Scholar to Mexico and that he and Adrian DuPuis would be initiating a philosophy for children project in that country.

Thompson arrived at Universidad Anahuac in late December 1978 to work in the area of curriculum and administration. Shortly thereafter he met and became friendly with Lic. Francisco Huerta, professor of philosophy, and with Lic. Jaime Moya, a professor of psychology at the University.

Even though there existed a keen initial interest in philosophy for children among the faculty, several months passed before the beginnings of planning began. This rather lengthy hiatus might be attributed to the fact that Latin Americans are becoming more hesitant about accepting educational panaceas from north of Rio Bravo.

In time, however, several conferences were held with Lic. Huerta and Moya after they had read the Spanish translations of *Harry and Lisa* (which had been prepared for the bilingual philosophy for children project at the Bruce-Guadalupe School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin). Huerta’s enthusiasm for a project grew in proportion to the chapters he completed. Moya, too, identified many possible connections between his classes in psychology and the development of a philosophy for children project.

An exploratory meeting was held in which the principals of several private schools met with the Director of the School of Education, Dr. Carlos Bravo, to determine the level of interest in a philosophy for children project. Some of the advantages identified by the faculty were:

- the need to improve the general curriculum with an organized approach to “thinking”
- the need to relate the process of thinking to all of the content areas especially reading, literature, and mathematics
- the need to develop a total school curriculum with *thinking* as the unifying thread from the primary grades through preparatoria. (Many of the private schools in Mexico are organized according to a 6-3-3 plan. Six years of primary, three secondary, and three preparatory.)

One school, Margarita de Escocia, contacted Moya and asked if a presentation could be made to the faculty. This was done in June and the faculty agreed that a program should be initiated in August or September of 1979. In early August, plans were begun to develop an orientation program for philosophy for children. Representatives from ten different *colegios* were invited to the orientation with the understanding that we would begin the first phase of the project at Margarita de Escocia.

Adrian DuPuis was notified of the plans and he agreed to participate in the orientation of philosophy for children in Mexico.

It was planned that the teacher-administrator orientation program would span a two day period of at least three hours each day. During the first session Dr. Carlos Bravo, Director of the School of Education, discussed the role of the proposed project as a cooperative venture among interested *colegios*, Anahuac University and Marquette University. After taking the group through the mechanics of the project, Dr. Bravo introduced Adrian DuPuis, who presented the philosophical ingredients of the project:
1. the elements of traditional logic which are covered in *Harry and Lisa*,
2. the major philosophical issues regarding human nature, the origin and nature of the universe and other metaphysical questions,
3. the nature and origin of knowledge and truth,
4. the nature and origin of moral, social and aesthetic values (emphasized in *Lisa*).

Most of these topics were not new to the teachers and administrators attending the sessions, since most of them had a broad background in philosophy. However, their main concern was how to treat such topics in pre-college level classes, since most of the participants had learned their philosophy in university ‘lecture’ settings. In fact some of the participants questioned whether children could handle philosophical concepts at all. Many of these fears were allayed when the teachers noted that the philosophical concepts and the skills involved in logic were introduced in real life settings at the children’s age level and were treated in non-technical language.

Also, the teachers recognized that they could not use the traditional didactic teaching methods which they were using in their other classes. It became apparent that the ‘lecture’ method which the teachers often use to present concepts to students would negate the basic purpose of the philosophy for children program. Therefore a considerable time was spent discussing alternate ways of treating the program’s logical and philosophical content. The importance of student-teacher and student-student dialogue was stressed as a way of getting students to give reasons for their views on an issue, and to become aware of their own assumptions. Further this dialogical approach could encourage students to seek the logical implications of their views on various issues.

Another concern which engendered much discussion among the participants was the students’ expectation that every discussion must yield a “right answer.” In all their other subjects, whether it be math, social studies, science, or religion, both teachers and students looked for “the answer.” With the possible exception of the formal logic content, such correlating of questions and answers are not possible in many of the issues raised in *Harry & Lisa* as well as in many other issues which might arise from spontaneous student interest. The participants recognized the magnitude of this pedagogical problem but agreed that it could be resolved.

Yet another concern of the teachers involved grading. Again, in all other subjects, students received a grade based mainly on the mastery of content. In the philosophy for children program, such “objective measures” are not readily available. After much discussion, the teachers were convinced that other evaluative criteria could be used, such as “logical thinking,” giving reasons for one’s views on an issue, openness to new ideas, and open discussion of issues.

A number of other questions arose which generated some heat among the participants. Of particular interest was the contention that the philosophy for children program is meant only for gifted students. One teacher commented that some critics feel that the philosophy for children program should not be used with the “masses”—it would be dangerous to foster such independent thought among them. Our experience with the bilingual philosophy for children program in Milwaukee (See Thinking Vol. I, #1, 1978) enabled us to show the “doubting Thomases” that other children can benefit from the program.

In summary, most of the participants seemed to be convinced that it was possible to teach philosophy to younger children, but that it would require a major change in the teaching-learning process—a change they felt they could make.

After Adrian Dupuis’ presentation, Al Thompson discussed the curriculum implications of philosophy for children emphasizing how the content can enhance reading, mathematics, science, language arts, and the social studies.

The remainder of this first session was taken up by questions and discussions among the participants. Some of the key points of discussion included:
1. the role of thinking in the educational process,
2. the role of traditional logic, traditional philosophy in a program such as philosophy for children
3. the role of the teacher in tolerating

ambiguities in children’s thinking,
4. methods of evaluating the validity and correctness of children’s thinking.
5. methods of handling children’s thinking when it might conflict with the beliefs taught at home,

6. making the philosophical tenets of the school a part of the child’s thinking.

The last two points produced considerable discussion among the participants since most of the children are from Catholic homes, and the schools are Catholic schools (though not parochial schools). Would the philosophy for children program impel children to question their parents’ views on matters of morality and religion? Would the critical attitude encouraged in philosophy for children spill over into religion classes, causing children to question accepted doctrines?

After some discussion most of the participants appeared to agree that the philosophy for children program would not conflict with the religious instruction given at home or in school but would complement and strengthen those endeavors. Both the logical skills and the philosophical content could be used to enhance the moral and religious education of the children.

The second session was devoted mainly to a demonstration lesson taught by Al Thompson with a group of twenty-four boys and girls before the assembled teachers-administrators.

Preliminary to the large group session, Al met with the children so that they might feel somewhat comfortable with him. He passed out copies of Chapter One of *Harry* to the children and read segments of the chapter. The children also participated in the reading. This preliminary session took about twenty minutes. The group then joined the teacher-administrator assembly.

The following is excerpted from a transcript of the demonstration lesson which, although it had been planned as a half-hour session, lasted a full hour when it had to be stopped because of time limitations.

Al, “What story did we begin reading this afternoon?”

Jaime, “Harry.”

Al, “What was Harry’s last name?”

Alejandra, “Stottlemeier.”

Al, “Stottlemeier. When she said the name this afternoon, I asked if Harry’s last name sounded like a street on Polanco, your neighborhood. What did you tell me, Ramon?”

Ramon, “Aristotle Street and that street is near Plato Street!”

Al, “Who was one of Harry’s friends?”

Jose, “Lisa.”

Al, “What was Harry’s last name?”

Jose, “Stottlemeier.”

Al, “Stottlemeier. When she said the name this afternoon, I asked if Harry’s last name sounded like a street on Polanco, your neighborhood. What did you tell me, Ramon?”

Ramon, “Aristotle Street and that street is near Plato Street!”

Al, “Who was one of Harry’s friends?”

Ann, “Lisa.”

Al, “What was Harry’s mother’s name?”

Sharon, “Mrs. Bates.”

Al, “What was Harry’s last name?”

Jose, “Stottlemeier.”

Al, “What do you think Harry’s mother’s last name is?” Sharon, “Stottlemeier!” (Much laughter)

Al, “Who was Mrs. Stottlemeier’s friend?”

Patricia, “Mrs. Olson?”

Al, “Who were they discussing?”

Samuel, “Mrs. Bates.”

Al, “After only twenty minutes of reading the first chapter you have a good knowledge of the persons. Why were Mrs. Olson and Mrs. Stottlemeier talking about Mrs. Bates?”

Juan, “It had to do with Mrs. Bates wanting to help the poor and that radicals help the poor, and that all people who help the poor are radicals.”

Al, “Do you agree, Juan, that all people who help the poor are radicals?”

Juan, “No.”

Al, “Why?”

Juan, “Some people who help the poor are not radicals.”

Al, “Ann, what was one of the discoveries Harry made while thinking?”

Ann, “He found out that you cannot turn ‘All’ sentences around and have them be true.”

Al, “Jaime, what’s the word for turning sentences around?”

Jaime, “Reversing — reverse.”

Al, “Let’s all say the word together.”

Class, “Reversing — reverse.”

Samuel, “How about all clocks are watches, but not all watches are clocks.”

Al, (Writing Samuel’s sentence on the board.) “Let’s keep this sentence here for a while and come back to it later. Sam, make sure we don’t leave before we talk about it, O.K.?”

Samual, “O.K.”

Al, “What was one of Harry’s sentences?”

Jose, “All airplanes are toys.”

Al, “Miguel, please reverse Jose’s sentence.”

Miguel, “All air — , all toy airplanes.”

Al, “Tell me Jose’s sentence.”

Miguel, “All toys are model airplanes.”

Al, “Are all toys model airplanes?”

Class, “No.”

Al, “How about a sentence that Lisa gave to Harry that made Harry upset.”

Jaime, “No eagles are lions.”

Al, “Good, what did Harry discover about Lisa’s sentence, ‘No eagles are lions?’”
Ann, "That when you reverse the sentence... ah, that when you reverse the sentence, ah..."
Al, "Reverse the sentence, Ann."
Ann, "No lions are eagles. And that is also true."
Al, "(aside to observing teachers...)"

After a twenty minute exposure to this content, "There obviously is a level of interest.")
Al, "Ramon, how about another sentence?"
Ramon, "All pickles are... All cucumbers are... All cucumbers are vegetables, but not all vegetables are pick...", but not all vegetables are cucumbers."
Al, "What was the vegetable we all laughed about?"
Class, (Anxious chatting.)
Al, "Marcus."
Marcus, "Oh yes, all vegetables. No, all onions are... All onions are vegetables! Yes, all onions are vegetables. And if I reverse it, then all vegetables would be onions!"
Al, "And what would happen when I peel potatoes and carrots?"
Class, "You'd cry!"
Al, "Would that be good?"
Class, "YES!!"
Al, "Let's think about Sam's sentence on the board. When are clocks watches or watches clocks, or clocks not watches and watches not clocks?"
Sam, "I'd rather think some more about that by myself. Go on to something else."

Ann, "Read these words please, Ann."
Ann, "Discovery, invention."
Al, "Are they the same word, perhaps like watch and clock?"
Class, "No."
Al, "How and why are they different?" Let's make some small groups. You three discuss the question together, you three, your three, etc."

(Pause)
Al, "O.K. What have we got? Jaime, what does your group say?"
Jaime, "Discovery is when it's been around and you find it, you think for the first time."
Sylvia, "Like Columbus and Lief Erickson."
Jaime, "Can only one person discover some thing or some place?"
Anna, "Well, we know that the Pacific Ocean was discovered!"
Ramon, "I happen to think that the Pacific Ocean was invented."
Samuel, "By whom?"
Ramon, "God."

The "adult thinkers" were spellbound by these last few minutes of dialogue, and at this point could no longer restrain themselves from getting into the discussion with the children.

The final phase of the philosophy for children orientation program in Mexico was to have a session for the parents of fifth graders of the Colegio de Margarita de Escocia. Twenty-five parents attended this session with representatives of the School of Education, Anahuac University, and Al Thompson. Again, Dr. Carlos Bravo explained the relationship between Anahuac, Margarita de Escocia, and Marquette University and the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children. Lic. Francisco Huerta presented to the parents a rationale for providing children with an organized body of content drawn from the discipline of philosophy. Al Thompson discussed the place of philosophy within the school curriculum, emphasizing that it can be a vehicle for teaching of other content areas such as language arts and reading. The children of many of these parents had participated previously in the demonstration class and the parents were very positive in relating their child's reactions. The parents indicated strong support for the project at their school and agreed that this opportunity should strengthen the whole school curriculum.

Lic. Huerta and Al Thompson met on six different occasions with Alicia, the fifth grade teacher at Margarita Escocia to provide inservice assistance. It became clear after the third session that Alicia would have no serious difficulty with the philosophical content.

Philosophy for children is in its third week at Colegio de Margarita de Escocia as of November 1, 1979. Lic. Huerta visits the school twice a week. He attends the philosophy class and also meets with Al Thompson and the teacher for on-the-job inservice.

Plans are under way to begin a philosophy for children program at a second school, Vista Hermosa. This school is interested in the program as a vehicle for teaching English as a second language.

Thus, it seems that philosophy for children now has a well-established foothold in Mexico both as a regular course and as a bilingual program. To strengthen the program, Anahuac University offers a course in philosophy for children with a student teaching experience in the pilot school. Although the program is found only in the Capitol City, it appears that it may have a sponsor in the Monterey area. Since most educated Mexicans have a keen interest in philosophy, we believe that the philosophy for children program will receive acceptance in many schools.
The Philosophy for Children (P4C) Program was implemented in 12 elementary school classes in Hawaii during the 1978-79 academic year. The history, nature, and experiences of the project are described in an article in an earlier issue of this journal by Dr. Barry Curtis, the primary teacher-trainer for the project. This article describes the procedures and results of a quantitative evaluation of the project implementation. Since there is often a difference between the P4C Program as intended and the P4C Program as actually implemented, in this article the former will be referred to as the “P4C Program” and the latter as the “project.”

The evaluation focused on three of the major objectives of the P4C Program: improvement of reasoning ability, development of creativity, and personal and interpersonal growth (Lipman, Sharp, & Oscanyan, 1977). Assessment measures for the two cognitive dimensions consisted of instruments selected from those examined in the instrument-development project of the Educational Testing Service (Shipman & Bridge-man, 1977). Adequate assessment measures for the affective dimension, however, were not as readily available and consequently, the evaluation was limited to changes in “interpersonal sensitivity” (Lipman, et al., 1977) which was measured by student responses on a self-report questionnaire. In addition to
these measures, the evaluation included a standardized measure of reading comprehension since it had been thought that improved reasoning ability may lead to enhanced reading ability (Haas, 1975; Lipman, 1976). Finally, teacher self-reports were collected to examine their impression of and satisfaction with the project.

**Method**

The overall evaluation consisted of a pretest-posttest design for the assessment of changes related to participation in the project. Although the actual project involved 12 classes with 315 students in the fourth, fifth, and sixth grades, data from only the eight sixth-grade classes are reported for the purposes of this article. This limited reporting of the data is based on the rationale of having a sufficiently large sample of subjects within a grade to permit meaningful conclusions to be derived from a quasi-experimental study of the project. The use of the entire group of 12 classes does not materially change the major outcomes or conclusions of the evaluation using only the sixth-grade classes (cf. Higa, 1979).

Because the evaluation design did not contain a true non-program control group, a quasi-control group was created on the basis of the degree of teacher implementation of the project. Following the practice of previous work on the P4C Program (Shipman & Bridgeman, 1977), the trainers evaluated the teachers in terms of their mastery and implementation of the project. These evaluations were used to rank-order the teachers, and the four teachers ranked highest were then grouped together (High Group), while the other four teachers were grouped separately (Low Group). The High Group can thus be viewed as consisting of classes in which the project was judged to be successful or implemented to a high degree, while the Low Group can be viewed as consisting of classes in which the project was judged to be less successful or implemented to a lower degree. The Low Group was therefore regarded as the quasi-control group in this quasi-experimental investigation of the effects of the project.

**Subject Sample**

The students in the eight classes were from five schools (four public, one private) in the Hilo area of the Island of Hawaii. Although 232 students began the project, 15 left their schools during the year and, consequently, the evaluation was based on a sample of 217 participants who completed the program. The distribution of boys and girls within the two groups was approximately equal: 55 boys and 56 girls for the High Group (N = 111) and 49 boys and 57 girls for the Low Group (N = 106). The ethnic-racial characteristics of the entire sample were approximately as follows: 29.5% Caucasian, 6.4% Chinese, 11.6% Filipino, 10.1% Hawaiian or Part-Hawaiian, 27.8% Japanese, and 18.5% Portuguese. Although the ethnic-racial composition of the subject sample is generally representative of the overall population of the island, it is considerably different from that of most of the other 49 states.

**Assessment Measures**

The majority of the assessment measures employed in the study were derived from the work of the Educational Testing Service (ETS) in its project to develop instruments for the assessment of the P4C Program (Shipman & Bridgeman, 1977). Although ETS developed a large number of instruments, the present study employed only those measures that showed promising results in the ETS project, were judged important for the program’s goals, and involved group administration procedures. These considerations resulted in the selection of the following: Questioning Task III, California Test of Mental Maturity Inferences Subtest, What Can You Use It For?, What Could It Be?, and How Many Reasons? These instruments are considered by ETS to be the operational measures of reasoning ability and creativity (which was translated as “ideational productivity or fluency” or the ability to generate a number of different ideas from a given situation). These instruments as well as others employed in the evaluation are described more fully below.

**Questioning Task III (QT3).** This instrument was specifically developed by ETS for use as a criterion-referenced measure of reasoning ability. It is viewed by ETS as measuring most closely the kinds of reasoning activities treated in the P4C Program. The test contains 44 multiple-choice items with each item having two to four alternative answers. The score used in the data analysis consists of the total number of correct answers.

**California Test of Mental Maturity (CTMM).** This is the supplementary instrument used in the study for the assessment of reasoning ability. It was also used in the ETS instrument-development study and consists of subtest #9 (Inferences) in the Elementary Level 2, Long Form, 1963 Revision of the CTMM (Sullivan, Clark & Tieg, 1963). The test has 15 multiple-choice items with each item having three alternative answers and the score consists of the total number of correct answers.

"The overall evaluation consisted of a pretest/posttest design for the assessment of changes related to participation in the project."
asked to "see how many different ways you can think of to use it." Two scores are derived from the test: (1) a total score (USETOT) which consists of all responses except exact repetitions, clarifications, and comments such as "don't know"; and (2) an appropriateness score (USEAPP) which consists of acceptable responses defined by stricter criteria than those for the total score and pertain generally to what the object could be used for. The two scores are considered to be measures of ideational productivity.

What Could It Be? This measure was also developed by ETS on the basis of work done by Wallach and Kogan (1965). In this test, the student is shown four unfamiliar drawings and asked to "see how many different things you can think of that these drawings could be." A total score (BETOT) and an appropriateness score (BEAPP) are also derived from this test and both scores are regarded as operational measures of ideational productivity.

In general, these results suggest that there were statistically significant improvements associated with participation in the philosophy project in Hawaii.''

How Many Reasons? This third measure of ideational productivity was developed specifically by ETS to provide "a closer link between ideational fluency (productivity) and reasoning ability" (Shipman & Bridgeman, 1977, p. 10). In this test, descriptions of events that the student might experience in his or her daily life are presented and the student is asked to "write as many possible reasons as you can" to explain the events. The three events described in the test are a boy crying quietly in his seat at school, two girls running very quickly past a boy after school, and a usually on-time girl arriving an hour late at school. A total score (REASTOT) and an appropriateness score (REASAPP) are derived from the test, and both scores are viewed as additional measures of ideational productivity.

Student Questionnaire. This verbal self-report instrument consists of 16 items that assess the students' thoughts and feelings about the project and its effects on them. The questionnaire was developed and used by the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children in conjunction with the ETS project (Shipman & Bridgeman, 1977). It was employed in the present study to assess the students' reactions to the project, particularly its impact on their growth in interpersonal sensitivity.

Teacher Evaluation. This verbal self-report measure consists of 12 items that assess the teachers' thoughts and feelings about various aspects of the project. Most of the items were derived from a similar questionnaire used in an earlier study (Haas, 1975) on the P4C Program. The instrument was used in the present study to assess the teachers' impression of and satisfaction with the project.

Data Collection

A pretest-posttest design was used in the collection of data for all measures, except the student and teacher questionnaires which were administered only on posttesting. Pretesting was conducted during a two-week period in October 1978, while posttesting was conducted during a two-week period in May 1979. At the time of the posttest, no participating class had completed the 17 chapters in the text for the project, Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery (Lipman, 1977). Only one class had completed 15 chapters (88% of the entire text), four classes had completed 11 chapters (65% of text), and three classes had finished 10 chapters (59% of text). There was no systematic difference between the High and Low Groups in the number of chapters completed in the text.

With the exception of the SAT, all of the instruments used for pretesting and posttesting had no alternate form and thus, both test administrations employed identical forms. For the SAT, all but one of the classes were administered Form A for pretesting and Form B for posttesting; the exception was administered Form A for both test periods because of a special assessment effort conducted by the entire school.

For each testing period, most of the instruments were administered by the research staff in two one-hour sessions spaced one day apart. The student questionnaire was administered on the second day of posttesting for three of the classes; the other five classes had the questionnaire administered to them by their teachers on other days during the posttest period. The teacher questionnaires were completed by all teachers during or immediately after the posttest period and returned by mail to the research staff. The SAT was administered by the teachers in their classrooms in close temporal approximation to the re-
gular pretest and posttest periods. Although only the Reading Comprehension Subtest was of interest in the present study, the entire SAT battery was administered in several of the classes because of the annual assessment by the public school system (six classes for pretesting) or the special assessment at one school (one class for posttesting).

Results

Since the subjects in the High and Low Groups were all participants in the project, the data are first reported in terms of pretest-posttest changes to examine improvements associated with project participation. The results are then presented in terms of comparisons between the groups as a quasi-experiment designed to assess the effects of the project as implemented to a high versus low group participation. The results are then administered in several of the classes before school (one class for posttesting).

Because of the annual assessment by the school, Subtest was of interest in the predegree. Finally, the data from the teacher self-reports are summarized to supplement the student data for a more complete assessment of the project.

Pretest-Posttest Changes

As shown in Table 1, both groups showed statistically significant changes on all measures from pretest to posttest; with one exception, all changes are significant at a high level (p < .001, two-tailed, correlated t-test). These group results are also reflected in most of the data for the individual classes when examined separately. For the High Group, of the 36 possible pretest-posttest change scores (4 classes x 9 measures), 25 were significant at p < .001, three at p < .01, four at p < .05, and four were not significant. For the Low Group, 19 of the change scores were significant at p < .001, seven at p < .01, two at p < .05, and eight were not significant. Combining the results for both groups, of the 72 total change scores, 61.1% of the scores were significant at p < .001, 13.9% at p < .01, 8.3% at p < .05, and 16.7% were not significant.

In general, these results suggest that there were statistically significant improvements associated with participation in the philosophy project in Hawaii. The improvements were reflected on all measures when group results are considered and on most (83.3%) measures when individual class results are examined. Thus, these results suggest that participation in the project was associated with positive gains in reasoning ability, ideational productivity, and reading comprehension.

Group Comparisons

In an attempt to resolve the above problem, comparisons between the High and Low Groups were conducted on all nine assessment measures. Since there were pretest differences between the groups on some of the measures, analyses of covariance were conducted on all of the measures for consistency in reporting. These statistical analyses were performed on the posttest scores with pretest scores on the respective measures as the covariates and group assignment (High versus Low) and subject sex (Boy versus Girl) as the independent variables. Although the ETS instrument-development study (Shipman & Bridge- man, 1977) reported some effects due to the sex variable, the present evaluation found no significant sex main effects or sex X program interaction effects for any of the measures, except as noted below. For this reason, the adjusted posttest means and analysis of covariance results shown in Table 2 are reported only for group assignment.

Reasoning Ability. The results for the two measures of reasoning ability are not consistent: while the QT3 shows that the High Group performed better on the posttest than the Low Group, the difference between the groups is not statistically significant when measured on the CTMM. The discrepant findings could be understood in terms of the different domains assessed by the two instruments: the QT3 as measuring the specific effect of the P4C Program on reasoning ability and the CTMM as measuring a generalization effect of the Program. Thus, the results would suggest that the impact of the P4C Program is limited to only those aspects of reasoning ability that are assessed by the QT3. On the other hand, the assumption that underlies this interpretation may be questionable in that the content of many of the items on the QT3 overlaps that of the items on the CTMM. The amount of content overlap can be seen in part by the fact that correlations computed between the two instruments in this study were found to be highly positive (pretest r = 0.71, posttest r = 0.74) and statistically significant (p < .001). It is possible that the QT3 with 44 items is simply a more sensitive measure of the impact of the P4C Program than the CTMM with only 15 items. The data taken as a whole would therefore suggest strongly that the Hawaii project had a positive effect on the participants' reasoning ability as assessed by the QT3.

Ideational Productivity. The results for this project goal indicate that three of the measures (BETOT, BEAPP, USEAPP) show significant effects favor-
ing the High Group. The results for the other measures show no significant effect (USESOT) or effects that are in unexpected directions (significant for REASOT, p < .05, and approaching significance, p = .10, for REASAPP).

The latter two results are unexpected because they show that the Low Group scored higher on the posttest than the High Group. These findings, however, may simply reflect the peculiar nature of the How Many Reasons? instrument, rather than a negative effect of the P4C Program. In the ETS study (Shipman & Bridgeman, 1977), for example, the control group also had a significantly higher score on this measure than the program group in the Pompton Lakes sample. The authors of the study pointed out that this result was discrepant with their data for the What Could It Be? and What Can You Use It For? instruments, and concluded that "this task is assessing a different dimension than the other two (p. 33)."

In any event, the results for the other measures, especially BEAPP and USEAPP, provide strong support for the positive impact of the project on ideational productivity.

There was only one significant effect due to the sex variable: a significant Reading Comprehension. In contrast to the generally positive findings for reasoning ability and ideational productivity, the data for reading comprehension (SAT-S) as shown in Table 2 are discouraging. This negative finding is not consistent with previous positive findings reported by Bierman (1976) using the Iowa Test of Basic Skills and Haas (1975) using the Metropolitan Achievement Test. It is possible however that the lack of positive results in the present study was due to a district-wide emphasis in the public schools on improving reading skills for the 1978-79 academic year. Given this emphasis on reading improvement in the regular curriculum of the classes, the separate and independent impact of the project may not have been measurable within the design of the study. If the project had any impact on reading comprehension ability, it is more likely to be revealed in comparisons between students who participated in the project and those who did not. The latter group of students (an actual control group) was not included in the evaluation design and consequently, firm conclusions about whether the project had an impact on reading comprehension must be held in abeyance.

"...firm conclusions about whether the project had an impact on reading comprehension must be held in abeyance."

main effect for REASAPP (F = 5.155; df = 1,205, p < .05) indicating that girls scored higher than the boys on the posttest. Although the reasons for this sex effect are not clear, it can be noted that the main effect due to the program variable (High versus Low Groups) was in an unexpected direction and that there was no significant sex X program interaction effect. These considerations, together with the absence of sex effects and sex X program interaction effects for all of the other measures, suggest clearly that the sex variable was not related to the impact of the project, at least as implemented in Hawaii.

Interpersonal sensitivity. For the purposes of the evaluation study, it was assumed that the students' growth in interpersonal sensitivity could be estimated, although only roughly, by an assessment of their self-reported understanding of self and others. Thus, their responses to five relevant items on the Student Questionnaire were examined for the presence of a project impact on this affective dimension. As shown by the data for all of the subjects combined (Total Group) in Table 3, a sizeable majority reported that as a result of the philosophy class they had a better understanding of themselves (item #5, 70.6%), their classmates (item #4, 63.3%), and their teacher (item #7, 77.8%), and were able to express themselves more clearly (item #2, 83.7%) and to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others better (item #8, 85.1%).

On the other hand, although there are small differences between the High and Low Groups on these items, the results of chi-square (X²) tests show that none of the data for any of the items are statistically significant. Thus, it appears that, even if there were growth in interpersonal sensitivity among the students, the growth cannot be attributed reliably and solely to participation in the project.

One further effort to assess the project's impact on interpersonal sensitivity involved an analysis of student responses to one item on the How Many Reasons? instrument (boy crying quietly in his seat at school). This item was designed by the ETS instrument-development study (Shipman & Bridgeman, 1977) to "elicit students' ability to generate possible reasons for the feelings of another person, a variable which should be related to the third general program objective of personal and interpersonal growth (p. 10)." Although ETS did not report the results of data analyses on this item, the present study performed a 2 (High Group vs. Low Group) X 2 (Boy vs. Girl) analysis of covariance on the posttest data with the pretest data as the covariate. The results showed that the High Group (adjusted mean = 5.10) gave fewer responses on the posttest than the Low Group (adjusted mean = 5.71) at a significant level (F = 5.482; df = 1,205, p < .05) for total scores, and that the High Group (adjusted mean = 4.73) gave fewer responses than the Low Group (adjusted mean = 5.18) at a level approaching significance (F = 3.401; df = 1,205, p = .10) for appropriateness scores. These results are, of course, contrary to the expected superiority of the High Group, but they are consistent with the data reported earlier on overall performance on the How Many Reasons? instrument. Thus, inasmuch as the nature of this in-
instrument is presently unclear, the meaning of the results from one of its items must await further clarification of the entire instrument itself.

Other Assessment Data

Student responses to other items on their questionnaire and teacher responses to a different questionnaire were also examined for a more complete assessment of the operation and impact of the Hawaii project.

Student Assessment. Examining the data of the students as a whole in Table 3, nearly one-half (45.2%) of the students reported enjoying the philosophy class "a lot," while a similar percentage (43.4%) reported enjoying it "not so much." Because there is no response alternative between "a lot" and "not so much," it is likely that the latter group actually enjoyed the class but not as much as that represented by "a lot." Thus, if the number of students responding to these two alternatives are collapsed, the proportion of students who enjoyed the class is very high (88.6%). This figure is supported by the data from related items on the questionnaire. A majority of the students, for example, reported that they discussed the activities in the class with other classmates (51.1%) as well as with their parents and other adults (57.9%). It would appear that interest in the class discussions was sufficiently strong that many students continued them outside of the class sessions. A further index of student enjoyment of the project is that an overwhelming 93.7% of the students reported that they understood better why children are expected to go to school. In short, these data suggest that the philosophy project had a generalized positive impact on the self-perceived academic performance of some of the students and, if it did nothing else, the project had the positive effect at least of apparently convincing most of the students that they should be going to school.

When the high-low group distinction is considered in examining student responses to the questionnaire, only five of the possible 18 chi-square tests were found to produce significant results. Two of these (#1 and #14) are indices of student interest in the philosophy class and show that the High Group expressed greater interest than the Low Group. However, since significant results were not found for other indices of student interest (#9, #10, #12, and #16), these two findings cannot be regarded with a high degree of confidence. The other three significant results involve item #11 which asks whether the philosophy class has been helpful in math, social studies, and science classes. In all three cases, the Low Group had a larger percentage of students giving affirmative responses than the High Group. These results are not only unexpected, but also inconsistent with most of the rest of the assessment date in the study. An adequate explanation of these findings is not immediately apparent, although possibilities include: (1) differences in the administration of the questionnaire since five of the classes had the instrument administered to them by their own teachers; and (2) the more discriminating ability of the High Group students, suggesting a project effect opposite of that intended.

"...the philosophy project was enjoyed by and maintained the interest of a large majority of the student participants."

Teacher Assessment. The generally favorable student evaluation of the philosophy project was shared by the participating teachers, as indicated by their responses to a questionnaire. The eight teachers believed that the project was successful in achieving its goals (mean rating = 4.0 on a five-point scale). In addition, all of the teachers reported an interest in participating in the project again as well as a willingness to encourage their colleagues to also participate in it. Moreover, six of the teachers believed that the project was unique in the school curriculum offering "something fundamentally different from what is already being done in the classroom." On the other hand, the teachers were less enthusiastic in their assessment of student interest in the issues discussed during class discussions (mean rating = 3.63) and in their evaluation of the effectiveness of the class discussions (mean rating = 3.75). As a whole, however, the teachers had a generally positive evaluation of the philosophy class.

In regard to other aspects of the project, the teachers expressed general satisfaction with the curricular materials: the class exercises were judged to be useful (mean rating = 4.00) and the material suited to the students' level (mean rating = 3.88). The teachers also gave a high rating (mean = 4.33) to the summer training workshop as being helpful in their ability to teach the program. On
the other hand, they were not as positive in their assessment of the value of the biweekly seminars (mean = 3.63). Finally, all of the teachers thought that the class should be taught at least three days a week, and a majority of the teachers thought the project should be conducted for the entire school year.

When the high-low group distinction is introduced in assessing the teacher responses, some differences are found on items dealing with the usefulness of the exercises, the value of the summer workshop, the value of the biweekly seminars, and the difficulty level of the curricular materials. The teachers associated with the High Group gave more positive evaluations for the former three items. On the other hand, these differences cannot be regarded as reliable because of the small magnitude involved and the small sample included in the data analysis.

**Discussion**

The evaluation study produced an overall set of mixed, though generally positive, findings on the impact of the philosophy project in Hawaii. The evidence is strongest for the positive effect of the project on reasoning ability as measured by the QT3 and on ideational productivity as measured by two of the three relevant instruments. On the other hand, the evidence appears to be negative for a project impact on reading comprehension and interpersonal sensitivity. At the same time, assessments of the project by the participating students and teachers were generally positive and enthusiastic.

The last set of findings is instructive as it indicates that both students and teachers accepted what was essentially a new curricular program. This favorable acceptance in turn suggests that a P4C Program could be incorporated into the regular, permanent curriculum of the schools in which the project was implemented. Although many administrative questions would need to be resolved, the data from this study suggest at least that those who would be most affected by a curricular change (the students and teachers) would welcome it enthusiastically. In addition, the positive evaluations by the students further suggest that the philosophy class was intrinsically interesting. This intrinsic interest may have served as the basis for increasing their motivation to learn and, ultimately, for enhancing their overall educational experience. In other words, the general assessment of the students and teachers carries positive implications for the philosophy project in terms of curricular changes in the schools and the educational experience of the students.

Moreover, the positive findings for reasoning ability and ideational productivity appear to extend the generalizability of the P4C Program. In contrast to prior implementations of the Program, the Hawaii project involved a predominantly non-white, non-black group of students (Chinese, Filipino, Hawaiian, Japanese, and Portuguese) and teachers (two white, five Japanese, and one of mixed ethnic origin). The positive findings from the Hawaii project thus suggest that the P4C Program is "blind" as to the ethnic-racial characteristics of students and teachers.

Although the positive findings are encouraging, some limits are placed on the degree of confidence that can be assigned to the data because of several problems centering on design and assessment issues. With respect to design issues, the quasi-experimental nature of the study involving comparisons between the High and Low Groups was an attempt to control in part the influence of extraneous factors for a clearer examination of the impact of the philosophy project. This effort may not have been completely successful due to the possible contamination and confounding of the independent variable in the study, i.e., participation in the project to a high degree.

The independent variable was established by assigning the eight project classes to the High Group or the Low Group on the basis of the trainers' evaluation of the teachers' mastery and implementation of the project. Since the trainers performed this task toward the close of the project year, their evaluation may have been influenced by their observations of the students' behavior during the philosophy class discussions or teacher reports of the students' behavior. Thus, if the trainers evaluated the teachers' mastery and implementation of the project in terms of the quality of student performance, then there was contamination of the independent variable by the dependent variable or, more precisely, by correlates of the dependent variable.

In addition, because of the manner in which the independent variable was established, the assignment of students and teachers to the High and Low Groups was not random. This means that there may have been systematic differences between the two groups in terms of teacher characteristics (personality, teaching style, etc.) or student characteristics (overall academic ability, socio-economic background, etc.). Thus, any differences in the assessment measures between the High and Low Groups could have been due, not to the degree of project implementation, but rather to differences in the characteristics of the participating teachers or students. In other words, the independent variable may have been confounded by participant characteristics.

---

"The evidence is strongest for the positive effect of the project on reasoning ability as measured by the QT3 and on ideational productivity as measured by two of the three relevant instruments."

There were also some problems associated with the assessment instruments employed in the study. For example, although the results for the *How Many Reasons?* test are consistent with those from the ETS study (Shipman & Bridge, 1977), both sets of findings are in a direction opposite to that predicted for a project impact. Thus, it would appear that the nature and usage of this instrument in any evaluation of the P4C Pro-
gram needs to be re-examined. In addition, some difficulties were reported by the research staff in the present study in scoring student responses on the three measures of ideational productivity, especially What Can You Use It For? Even though the research staff employed the same scoring guidelines as the ETS staff, they reported areas of ambiguity in determining appropriate responses and, moreover, appeared to have used more liberal scoring standards than the ETS staff (Higa, 1979).

The three measures of ideational productivity also raise an additional assessment question because of the use of two separate scores (total and appropriate). These scores were found to be positively and strongly correlated at a high level of statistical significance. In fact, for two of the instruments, the correlations were so high (r \( \geq 0.95 \)) as to indicate that the two scores were measuring the same dimension. These findings thus suggest that only one of the scores should be used as the measure of ideational productivity; it is suggested that the appropriateness score be employed since it is defined by more stringent criteria than the total score.

A final assessment issue concerns the measurement of interpersonal sensitivity which, in the present study, involved the use of a self-report questionnaire. Self-report instruments are notoriously vulnerable to a host of extraneous variables that distort the nature of the resulting data (Anastasi, 1976). In the present study, the students may have responded to the questionnaire in ways to please their teachers and hence, their responses may not represent accurately their true feelings. This interpretation could account for the general lack of differences in questionnaire responses between the High and Low Groups. Although the assessment of interpersonal sensitivity in the present study was therefore inadequate, the task of measuring any aspect of the affective goals of the P4C Program (personal and interpersonal growth) is regarded generally as quite difficult. ETS, for example, in its instrument-development study notes that "This is an area of acknowledged importance, but one in which adequate assessment methodologies are lacking (Shipman & Bridgeman, 1977, p. 10)."

In spite of these design and assessment problems, an overall analysis of the Hawaii project suggests that the evaluation study may have underestimated the full potential of the P4C Program. For instance, the implementation of the project in Hawaii was a novel experience not only for the students, but also for the teachers and trainers. It is likely that, with the knowledge and skills acquired from this first year, both teachers and trainers will be able to implement the Program more effectively and efficiently in the future. In this regard, as noted previously by Dr. Curtis, one important area for improvement pertains to the teachers' use of dialectical techniques in class discussions for deeper probing of philosophical discoveries. In addition, none of the classes completed the entire Harry text, with seven of the eight classes completing only 59% to 65% of the text. It is interesting to speculate as to the possible outcomes if all of the classes had been able to complete the entire book. A related factor is that, although the approximate life of the project was 28 weeks, actual student exposure to the project was probably of shorter duration due to vacation periods and other administrative disruptions. Since prior research (Haas, 1975) suggests the importance of prolonged exposure to the Program, the possibility is raised that more favorable outcomes would have occurred if effective project exposure for the Hawaii students had been longer. These considerations thus suggest that the Hawaii effort may not have implemented the P4C Program as ideally as possible and, therefore, that the results of the evaluation study may be conservative estimates of the full potential of the Program.

The above considerations also raise, at a more general level, the question of the essential nature of the P4C Program. It is clear that the Program consists not only of the philosophical discussions involving teacher and students, but a total program package containing many components. As implemented in Hawaii, the package included the following ingredients: (1) college professors in philosophy and education who served as teacher-trainers and who had received prior training from the IAPC; (2) elementary school teachers who were identified by the trainers and school principals, and who volunteered to participate when invited; (3) teacher participation in a two-week, 40-hour summer workshop for which the teachers received three college credits; (4) meetings with the parents of the participating students during which the trainers explained the nature and purposes of the project; (5) teacher participation in two-hour biweekly seminars throughout the school year for which the teachers received six college credits; (6) teachers' use of the first edition of the instructional manual for Harry (Lipman & Sharp, 1975) to guide their conduct of the philosophy class; and (7) program exposure time per student that averaged a total of approximately 42 hours for the year (two 45-minute class sessions per week for 28 weeks).

For each of these ingredients, the basic question is which ones constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for effective implementation of the P4C Program. Is it necessary, for example, to have a college philosophy professor as the trainer for the teachers, is it necessary to provide training workshops and ongoing seminars that offer college credits for the teachers, etc.? The basic question also applies to the possibly more important cluster of ingredients having to do with the nature of the edu-

"...the evaluation study may have underestimated the full potential of the Philosophy for Children Program."
tional experience for the students. As in other implementations of the P4C Program, the Hawaii students read the Harry text, performed various exercises and activities, and participated in class discussions. Although all of the students engaged in these activities, the degree and quality of their participation are unfortunately not known since the project did not collect this process information. Even if this information were available, however, there is the further problem of determining whether the degree and quality of the students' participation meet the criteria that represent the essential nature of the P4C Program. Does the fact, for instance, that the Hawaii teachers did not probe more deeply into philosophical discoveries mean that the Hawaii effort did not represent accurately the nature of the P4C Program? Although this question is important because of the central role of the class discussions in the Program, the basic question of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the Program applies to all of the various components. Progress in resolving this question as well as in clarifying and refining the nature of the P4C Program will occur as further efforts are initiated to implement the Program and as more dialogue about the Program is conducted, such as in this journal.

For the Hawaii experience in implementing the P4C Program, it can be concluded that the Program had a positive impact on the reasoning ability and ideational productivity of the students, although confidence in this conclusion is limited by the methodological problems discussed previously. Moreover, the Hawaii experience suggests that there are positive implications for the Program in terms of curricular changes in the schools, the overall educational experience of the students, and the generalizability of the Program to students and teachers of diverse ethnic-racial characteristics. Finally, if the reported positive findings are accepted and given the less-than-ideal implementation of the Program, the Hawaii experience shows that the impact of the P4C Program may be sufficiently robust that even partially successful implementations can result in favorable outcomes. If the Program can be implemented to the level at which its full potential is realized and if the methodological problems and basic questions discussed earlier can be resolved, it is possible that future evaluations of the Program could be more favorable at a higher level of confidence than the conclusions of the present study.

### Table 1. Pretest and Posttest Means, Standard Deviations, and t-test Results for Each Measure by Comparison Groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>High Group</th>
<th>Low Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pretest</td>
<td>Posttest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QT3</td>
<td>22.37</td>
<td>27.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.36)</td>
<td>(6.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t = 11.19, n = 107</td>
<td>t = 6.48, n = 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTMM</td>
<td>10.32</td>
<td>11.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.42)</td>
<td>(2.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t = 6.01, n = 108</td>
<td>t = 6.25, n = 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETOT</td>
<td>23.91</td>
<td>32.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.32)</td>
<td>(13.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t = 9.15, n = 109</td>
<td>t = 4.30, n = 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEAPP</td>
<td>21.07</td>
<td>28.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.20)</td>
<td>(11.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USETOT</td>
<td>23.51</td>
<td>27.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12.18)</td>
<td>(13.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t = 3.48, n = 107</td>
<td>*t = 2.51, n = 101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEAPP</td>
<td>13.62</td>
<td>19.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.72)</td>
<td>(8.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t = 8.61, n = 107</td>
<td>t = 5.56, n = 101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REASTOT</td>
<td>12.16</td>
<td>15.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.22)</td>
<td>(5.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t = 9.19, n = 108</td>
<td>t = 10.22, n = 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REASAPP</td>
<td>11.53</td>
<td>14.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.00)</td>
<td>(4.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t = 8.95, n = 108</td>
<td>t = 9.44, n = 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAT-S</td>
<td>165.94</td>
<td>177.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19.84)</td>
<td>(21.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>t = 8.93, n = 108</td>
<td>t = 10.91, n = 102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses and sample sizes (n) differ from the actual samples (High = 111, Low = 106) due to missing data from some students. All t values are significant at p × .001 (two-tailed) except for the asterisked value (*) which is significant at p × .05.

### Table 2. Adjusted Posttest Means and Analysis of Covariance Results for Each Measure by Comparison Groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>HIGH</th>
<th>LOW</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QT3</td>
<td>27.47 (107)</td>
<td>25.41 (101)</td>
<td>11.74**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTMM</td>
<td>11.57 (108)</td>
<td>11.36 (102)</td>
<td>0.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETOT</td>
<td>32.23 (109)</td>
<td>29.09 (101)</td>
<td>4.754*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEAPP</td>
<td>28.82 (109)</td>
<td>26.06 (101)</td>
<td>4.878*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USETOT</td>
<td>27.58 (107)</td>
<td>26.84 (100)</td>
<td>0.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEAPP</td>
<td>19.89 (107)</td>
<td>16.64 (100)</td>
<td>12.658**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REASTOT</td>
<td>15.51 (108)</td>
<td>16.83 (102)</td>
<td>3.877*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REASAPP</td>
<td>13.89 (108)</td>
<td>14.84 (102)</td>
<td>3.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAT-S</td>
<td>175.69 (108)</td>
<td>176.22 (101)</td>
<td>2.048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Sample sizes in parentheses differ from actual sample sizes (High = 111, Low = 106) due to missing data from some students. Posttest means are adjusted on the basis of the covariate pretest scores.

* p < .05
** p < .001
### Table 3. Percentages of Students Within the High Group (N = 113), Low Group (N = 108), and Total Group (N = 221) Giving Stated Responses on the Student Questionnaire.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>High Group</th>
<th>Low Group</th>
<th>Total Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How much have you enjoyed the philosophy class? (X² = 5.07, p &lt; .05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so much</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very little</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Do you think, as a result of this philosophy class, you have learned to express yourself more clearly? (X² = 0.40, nonsignificant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Do you think this philosophy class has helped make your reading in other subjects more meaningful? (X² = 0.97, nonsignificant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Do you feel you understand your classmates better as a result of this philosophy class? (X² = 0.25, nonsignificant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Do you feel you understand yourself better as a result of this philosophy class? (X² = 0.0008, nonsignificant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Do you feel your classmates understand you better as a result of this philosophy class? (X² = 2.74, nonsignificant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Do you think you understand your teacher better than you did before as a result of this philosophy class? (X² = 0.79, nonsignificant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Do you feel that you are better able to accept the feelings and viewpoints of others as a result of this philosophy class? (X² = 3.27, nonsignificant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Do you discuss what happened in the philosophy class with other classmates outside of class? (X² = 1.35, nonsignificant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


10. Do you ever discuss with adults (parents or friends) what happened in the philosophy class? (X² = 0.06, nonsignificant)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>High Group</th>
<th>Low Group</th>
<th>Total Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Do you think the philosophy class has been a help to you in:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>High Group</th>
<th>Low Group</th>
<th>Total Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Math (X² = 4.34, p &lt; .05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Studies (X² = 10.91, p &lt; .01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sciences (X² = 6.76, p &lt; .01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. Would you recommend this philosophy class to: (X² = 2.89, nonsignificant)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>High Group</th>
<th>Low Group</th>
<th>Total Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All of your friends</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of your friends</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some of your friends</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of your friends</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Having read Harry, do you understand better why children are expected to go to school? (X² = 0.95, nonsignificant)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>High Group</th>
<th>Low Group</th>
<th>Total Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>88.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. How often each week would you like to have philosophy class? (X² = 6.72, p < .01)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>High Group</th>
<th>Low Group</th>
<th>Total Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 days a week</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 days a week</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 days a week</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 days a week</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 day a week</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 days a week</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. Are Harry and his friends as real to you as some of the people you know? (X² = 0.71, nonsignificant)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>High Group</th>
<th>Low Group</th>
<th>Total Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. Would you be interested in taking another course dealing with the further adventures of Harry and his friends, when they are a few years older? (X² = 0.54, nonsignificant)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>High Group</th>
<th>Low Group</th>
<th>Total Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The “Other” category includes response omissions and “don’t know” responses. The chi-square test was performed on the raw data, rather than percentages, in the form of a 2 x 2 contingency table with one degree of freedom. Thus, two changes were made to create the 2 x 2 contingency table for all items: (1) the data for the “other” category were omitted; and (2) the original response categories for items No. 1, 12 and 14 were collapsed to form two categories.
FOOTNOTES

1. This program evaluation was supported in part by the Philosophy for Children Project, Hawaii District, Department of Education, ESEA Title IV, Part C, P.L. 93-380. Appreciation is extended to Pearl Kimura, Russell Nakashii, and Sandra Tadaki for their assistance in the collection and scoring of the data, to Dr. Jerry L. Johnson for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this article, and to the students, teachers, and trainers for their cooperation in the data collection process.

2. The other trainers were Dr. Nobuko Fukuda (Professor of Education, University of Hawaii at Hilo) who also served as the overall coordinator for the Hawaii project, and Dr. George A. Spangler (Associate Professor of Philosophy, California State University at Long Beach) who was a visiting faculty member at the University of Hawaii at Hilo during the year of the project.

3. There is some measurement error in these data since the ethnic-racial characteristics of each student was determined on the basis of the student's surname. The error may be considerable because of the increasing number of children in Hawaii who are offspring of ethnically or racially mixed marriages.

4. In contrast to the generally high level of reported understanding of others, an interesting finding (item #6) is that a lower proportion of the students report that their classmates understand them better as a result of the philosophy class. The reason for this discrepancy is not immediately apparent.

5. An alternative possibility is to assume that the P4C Program improves both reasoning ability and ideational productivity and that the findings on the How Many Reasons? measure simply reflect the constraining effect of reasoning ability on ideational productivity. The content of this instrument is very similar to the kind of material that is treated in the P4C Program (real-life social situations) in contrast to the content of the other two measures of ideational productivity (What Can You Use it For? and What Could It Be?). Because of the similarity involving the How Many Reasons? test, the improved reasoning ability of the students may have also resulted in their being more discriminating in the kinds of reasons they provided on the test and, thus, led to the production of fewer responses. In fact, some students were observed on the posttest to spend some time in explaining or justifying their reasons, resulting in less time for the generation of more reasons. The content of the other two instruments is considerably different than the material treated in the Program and hence, the constraining effect of an enhanced reasoning ability does not emerge. This would account for the positive findings reported in this study for these measures of ideational productivity. In short, the alternative hypothesis is that, while the P4C Program improves both reasoning ability and ideational productivity, the enhanced reasoning overrides ideational productivity in situations that approximate real-life events with social components.

6. Pearson product moment correlation coefficients between the total score and appropriateness score for the pretest and posttest administrations are shown in the table below. The numbers in parentheses are the sample sizes upon which the correlations are based and all correlations are statistically significant at p < .001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Pretest</th>
<th>Posttest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What Could It Be?</td>
<td>+0.960 (211)</td>
<td>+0.974 (217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Can You Use it For?</td>
<td>+0.678 (213)</td>
<td>+0.803 (211)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Many Reasons?</td>
<td>+0.960 (211)</td>
<td>+0.956 (211)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. This ingredient may be an important consideration because casual observations of the philosophical class discussions in the current implementation effort (1979-1980 school year) suggest that there are major differences in the nature of the discussions between the new teachers who are using the recent second edition of the instructional manual and the returning teachers who are continuing to use the first edition.

REFERENCES


A State Evaluation of a Philosophy for Children Program

Title IV-C provides that educational projects under development with Title-IV-C support may apply to be "validated." That is, they may submit evidence of their educational significance, and if approved, will be permitted to join a select group of programs that is recommended to school districts. The evaluation of New Jersey projects is made by an out-of-state team of three individuals, who spend two days on-site in the school district examining experimental data, viewing demonstration classes, interviewing teachers, children and administrators, and reviewing curriculum materials.

The IAPC philosophy for children program was the subject of such an evaluation in the autumn of 1978. Members of the inspection team were Prof. Robert Lesniak of Capitol City State College, Harrisburg, Pa., John W. Holbert, of the Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit #16, Lewisburg, Pa., and Prof. Martin J. Higgins, Learning Research Center, West Chester State College, West Chester, Pa. The data examined was that of the 1977-78 ETS experiment in Newark, N.J. and Pompton Lakes, N.J.

Three objectives were considered: measurement of the program's impact on creative reasoning, mathematics and reading. The program was rated on fourteen effectiveness criteria for each of the three objectives. Out of a possible 126 points on this phase of the evaluation, the program obtained 124 points. (Examples of effectiveness criteria are: data accuracy, evaluation design, intervention process, educational significance of attainment of objective, and learner change and generalizability.)

Another phase of the evaluation process was concerned with the exportability of the philosophy for children program. Here there were fifteen criteria, such as suitability of curriculum materials, qualifications of personnel, and procedures for training. Out of a possible 45 points, the program obtained a rating of 45 points.

The evaluation team concluded that "the total program is important and viable for dissemination." From their interviews with teachers, the members of the team drew the conclusion that "the Philosophy for Children program provides spinoffs into almost every area of the curriculum." According to the report:

"Students seem to analyze arguments for historical incidents such as the causes of the American Revolution, or to understand a unit on propaganda or advertising faster than children who have not experienced the program.

"Several teachers suggested that the concepts could be incorporated into a reading series which might extend below Harry (Grades 5-6) into the earlier grades. With such a series, basic thinking skills could be introduced concurrently with reading skills. Similar statements were made regarding the teaching of science and mathematics.

"One teacher described a situation in which teachers and administrators were being challenged in a polite and acceptable manner to provide a rationale for decisions and rules. The administrator would state that he could tell which students were from the philosophy class by the way they asked questions. Another teacher thought that the students were having an effect because the administrator had been using more logical arguments for his position on issues lately.

"In summary there appear to be spinoff possibilities in at least four curriculum areas: reading, social studies, mathematics and science. None of the teachers mentioned it, but if speech patterns indicate more logical thinking then perhaps writing patterns also demonstrate such an influence.

"Human relations also seem to be strongly affected by the program."

With regard to exportability, the visiting team of educators concluded that "the materials and the process of exporting the project appear to be realistic and appropriate. . . . The in-service training and materials are the same for any site, so there should not be any problem in the replication of experiences for exportability to another district.

The validation team unanimously accorded the program New Jersey validation, adding that:

"Some aspects of the project content may be found in curriculum units such as value clarification, critical thinking, propaganda and advertising.

"Validation team members are unaware of a project or curriculum which synthesizes these curriculum areas and more in such a way that it focuses not so much on content, e.g. propaganda, but on the approaches to the process of reasoning itself."
School came to bore me. It took up far too much time which I would rather have spent drawing battles and playing with fire. Divinity classes were unspeakably dull, and I felt a downright fear of the mathematics class. The teacher pretended that algebra was a perfectly natural affair, to be taken for granted, whereas I didn’t even know what numbers really were. They were not flowers, not animals, not fossils; they were nothing that could be imagined, mere quantities that resulted from counting. To my confusion these quantities were now represented by letters, which signified sounds, so that it became possible to hear them, so to speak. Oddly enough, my classmates could handle these things, and found them self-evident. No one could tell me what numbers were, and I was unable even to formulate the question. To my horror I found that no one understood my difficulty. The teacher, I must admit, went to great lengths to explain to me the purpose of this curious operation of translating understandable quantities into sounds. I finally grasped that what was aimed at was a kind of system of abbreviation, with the help of which many quantities could be put in a short formula. But this did not interest me in the least. I thought the whole business was entirely arbitrary. Why should numbers be expressed by sounds? One might just as well express $a$ by apple tree, $b$ by box and $x$ by a question mark. $a, b, c, x, y, z$ were not concrete and did not explain to me anything about the essence of numbers, any more than an apple tree did. But the thing that exasperated me most of all was the proposition: If $a = b$ and $b = c$, then $a = c$, even though by definition $a$ meant something other than $b$ and, being different, could therefore not be equated with $b$, let alone with $c$. Whenever it was a question of an equivalence, then it was said that $a = a, b = b$, and so on. This I could accept, whereas $a = b$ seemed to me a downright lie or a fraud. I was equally outraged when the teacher stated in the teeth of his own definition of parallel lines that they met at infinity. This seemed to me no better than a stupid trick to catch peasants with, and I could not and would not have anything to do with it. My intellectual morality fought against these whimsical inconsistencies, which have forever debarked me from understanding mathematics. Right into old age I have had the incorrigible feeling that if, like my schoolmates, I could have accepted without a struggle the proposition that $a = b$, or that sun = moon, dog = cat, then mathematics might have fooled me endlessly — just how much I only began to realize at the age of eighty-four. All my life it remained a puzzle to me why it was that I never managed to get my bearings in mathematics when there was no doubt whatever that I could calculate properly. Least of all did I understand my own moral doubts concerning mathematics.

—from Carl Gustav Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*
On Developing My Own Line of Thought

In very early years there awoke in me an interest in philosophical problems, and already as a boy I became conscious of my philosophical vocation.

At school I was a mediocre pupil, and was always made to feel my ineptitude. At one time I had a coach at home who came to my father and said that it was difficult for him to work with such a stupid pupil. By then I had already read a great deal and begun to meditate on the meaning of life; yet I could not solve a single mathematical problem, or learn four lines of poetry by heart, or write a page of dictation without making a host of mistakes....

But fundamentally I was unable to reconcile myself with any institutional education, even that of the University. This is, perhaps, partly due to the fact that I never managed to succeed at school, even though, or because, I began to develop intellectually earlier than is usual, and liked to read books which no other boy of my own age would dream of reading. When I took the examination in logic I had already read Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Mill's Logic. My abilities betrayed themselves only when I took the initiative in my thinking, when my mind became consciously active and creative: they remained hidden and unknown to myself while my mind was passive, merely assimilating or memorizing something that was external to me. In point of fact, I could never 'assimilate' knowledge, learn by heart and commit to memory; I could not, so to say, put myself in the position of someone who is set a task. For this reason I found examinations quite unbearable. I am incapable of retorting, echoing in a passive way: I instantly want to develop my own line of thought. At an examination in divinity I once got one out of twelve marks — an unheard of event in the history of the Cadet Corps. I have never succeeded in making a summary of a single book, and had I been asked at an examination to summarize one of my own books I should probably have failed to do so.


Children Discover Their Identity

And then an event did occur, to Emily, of considerable importance. She suddenly realised who she was. There is little reason that one can see why it should not have happened to her five years earlier, or even five years later; and none, why it should have come that particular afternoon. She had been playing house in a nook right in the bows, behind the windlass (on which she had hung a devil's-claw as a door knocker); and tiring of it was walking rather aimlessly aft, thinking vaguely about some bees and a fairy queen, when it suddenly flashed into her mind that she was she. She stopped dead, and began looking over all of her person which came within the range of her eyes. She could not see much except a fore-shortened view of the front of her frock, and her hands when she lifted them for inspection; but it was enough for her to form a rough idea of the little body she suddenly realized to be hers.

She began to laugh, rather mockingly. "Well!" she thought, in effect: "Fancy you, of all people, going and getting caught like this! — You can't get out of it now, not for a very long time: you'll have to go through with being a child, and growing up, and getting old, before you'll be quit of this mad prank!"

Determined to avoid any interruption of this highly important occasion, she began to climb the ratlines, on her way to her favorite perch at the masthead. Each time she moved an arm or a leg in this simple action, however, it struck her with fresh amazement to find them obeying her so readily. Memory told her, of course, that they had always done so before: but before, she had never realized how surprising this was. Once settled on her perch, she began examining the skin of her hands with the utmost care: for it was hers. She slipped a shoulder out of the top of her frock; and having peeped in to make sure she was really continuous under her clothes, she shrugged it up to touch her cheek. The contact of her face and the warm bare hollow of her shoulder gave her a comfortable thrill, as if it was the caress of some kind of friend. But whether her feeling came to her through her cheek or her shoulder, which was the caresser and which the caressed, that no analysis could tell her.

Once fully convinced of this astonishing fact, that she was not Emily Bas-Thornton (why she inserted the "now" she did not know, for she certainly imagined no transmigrational nonsense of having been anyone else before), she began seriously to reckon its implications.

— from Richard Hughes, A High Wind in Jamaica

Logic and Teaching

I first articulated my opinion of teachers when I was about 6 or 7. Somehow I got into conversation with one of our teachers who was always very pleasant to me.

— Why are you a teacher? I asked.
— Oh, well, because I like children, she said, rather surprised.
— But I thought teachers had to hate children.
— Oh, no, you have to like children if you're to be a teacher.

I was taken aback by the apparent illogicality of this remark.

— from an anonymous autobiography, cited by Peter Abbs in Autobiography in Education.
Who Should Learn Writing of Whom: Peasant Children of Us, or We of Peasant Children?

Lev Tolstoy

In 1860, Tolstoy created Yasnaya Polyana, a school in which Russian peasant children were encouraged to learn in a free and creative environment. Here curriculum took on a completely new character. Lessons were similar to casual chats between an adult and the students. Every conceivable topic was touched upon — from grammar to carpentry — by way of religious history, singing, geography, gymnastics, drawing and writing. Emphasis was on the skills and sensibilities which all needed to acquire.

The school at Yasnaya Polyana was located in a small, two-story building adjacent to Tolstoy’s house. There were two classrooms and one additional room used as a study. The atmosphere was casual and comfortable. Each of the classrooms were painted pink and blue. In one room, mineral samples, butterflies, dried plants and physics apparatus lined the shelves around the room. Gymnastic equipment was installed in the downstairs vestibule and in the upstairs hall, there was a carpenter’s bench. The walls were lined with tools. A bell and bell-rope hung under the porch roof.

At 8:00 A.M. in the morning, peasant children would appear by twos or threes, swinging their arms and singing. When they entered, they would sit where they liked, on the floor, on the window ledge, on a chair or on the corner of a table. They would draw near the teacher when he was discussing something that interested them; and they would leave the room when they weren’t interested. It was not unusual to be silenced by one’s peers if one was preventing the others from hearing the discussion. Tolstoy understood the role of peer pressure in the development of self-discipline.

Tolstoy believed that all human nature was basically good and that evil was a product of civilization. Thus, teachers should refrain from smothering children under the weight of learning. Rather, they should concentrate on helping them, little by little, to shape their own personalities for the purpose of creativity. At Yasnaya Polyana, Tolstoy strove to maintain as “natural” an environment as possible. In his view, teachers could learn much about pedagogy by contemplating the mother-child relationship.

A mother loves her child, wants to satisfy his wants, and consciously, without the least mystical necessity, feels the need of adapting herself to his incipient reason, to speak the simplest language to him. She does not at all strive after equality with her child, which would be in the highest degree unnatural, but, on the contrary, to transmit to him the whole supply of her knowledge. In this natural transmission of the mental acquisitions of one generation to the next lies the progress of education.

Tolstoy has often been criticized for confusing art with pedagogy. He was convinced that it was the duty of artists to educate, and were they to neglect their role as educators, they would prostitute their art. All great art is universally accessible and comprehensible, he contended, and one can learn a great deal about art by teaching the masses. In his inspirational form of teaching, he tried to put himself on the level of his students, and marveled at their every word. Should the muzhik’s children learn to write from us, he wondered, or should we learn to write from them?

One day he proposed that the class improvise a tale on the theme of a Russian proverb, “He feeds a man with a spoon and then pokes the handle in his eyes.” The children stared at him blankly. “Suppose a peasant gives shelter to a pauper and then tries to hold his good deed over his head?” Then, to show the students how a story is formed, he wrote out the beginning himself. The children leaned over his shoulder and began to dictate: “No, not like that...” “Make him an ordinary soldier...” “It would be better if he stole them...” “There has to be a wicked woman in it.” Taking down their dictation, Tolstoy realized the wealth of their talent:

I cannot describe the emotion, the joy and fear I felt that evening. I saw a new world of delight and suffering rising up before him (Fyodka): the world of art. It seemed to me I had witnessed what no one has the right to see: the opening of the mysterious flower of poetry. I felt such joy because, all of a sudden, by sheer chance, I saw unveiled before my eyes that philosopher’s stone I had been seeking in vain for two years: the art of learning to express one’s thoughts. I felt fear because that art created new demands, a flood of desires foreign to the world in which, I believed at first, the pupils lived.

Once he realized how capable the peasant children were, he tried to introduce them to Russian literature, but with little success. Convinced of their ability he proclaimed, “Perhaps they do not understand and do not want to understand our literary language, simply because our literary language is not suited to them and they are in the process of inventing their own literature.” It was a short step to concluding that any art which is not accessible to the masses is counterfeited.

Whether or not we agree with Tolstoy’s views on art, we can appreciate his insights regarding the pedagogy of creative writing. His stress on the relationship between speaking, thinking and writing in a communal environment in which children are encouraged to discuss ideas and feelings freely and build on each other’s thoughts is uncannily ahead of his time. Initially, he insisted students should not have to worry about the formal conditions of writing. Rather, they should be encouraged to express their thoughts and feelings by means of a procedure which, little by little, takes on form. In assigning the teacher at Yasnaya Polyana the role of scribe and provoker of dialogue among the children themselves, many classroom stories emerged of which Tolstoy was very proud. He wisely capitalized on the intrinsic relationship between speaking, thinking and writing, or encouraging children to do what they like to do: talk among themselves, think for themselves and create for themselves.
I

In the fourth volume of the journal

Yasnaya Polyana there was printed

among the children’s compositions by

an editorial mistake, “A History of how

a boy was frightened in Tula.” This lit-
tle story was not written by a boy, but

was made up by the teacher from a

dream which he had, and which he

related to the boys. Some of the readers,

who followed the numbers of Yasnaya

Polyana, expressed their doubts whether

this tale really belonged to the boy. I

hasten to apologize to my readers for

this oversight, and seize the opportunity

to remark how impossible are counter­

feits in this class of work. This tale was

rich, and the descrip-

tion on the scholars.

The best scholars, Fedka, Semka, and

the others, pricked up their ears.

“What do you mean, ‘on a prover­b’?;” “What is that?” “Tell us!”

were the various exclama-
tions.

I happened to open to the proverb:

“He eats with your spoon and puts your

eyes out with the handle.”

“Now imagine,” said I, “that a

muzhik had taken in some old beggar;

and then, after the kindness that he had

received, the beggar had begun to revile

him, it would mean that he had eaten

with your spoon and put out your eyes

with the handle.”

“Well, how would you write it?” said

Fedka and all the others, who had prick­
ed up their ears; but suddenly they gave

it up, persuaded that this task was

beyond their strength, and resumed the

work on which they had been engaged

before.

“You write it for us,” said one of

them to me.

All were busy in their work; I took the

pen and inkstand, and began to write.

“Now,” said I, “who will write it the

best? and I will try with you.”

I began the story which is printed in

the fourth number of Yasnaya Polyana,

and wrote the first page.

Every unprejudiced man with any

feeling for art and nationality, on

reading this first page written by me,

and the following pages of the story writ­
ten by the scholars themselves, will

distinguish this page from all the others,

— like a fly in milk, — it is so artificial,

so false, and written in such a wretched

style. It must be noted that in its first

form it was still poorer, and has been

much improved, thanks to the sugges­
tions of the scholars.

Fedka kept looking up from his copy-

book at me, and when his eyes met mine

he would smile and wink, and say,

“Write, write! I will show you!”

It evidently interested him to have a

grown person also write a composition.

After finishing his composition, less

carefully and more hurriedly than usual,

he leaned over the back of my arm-

chair, and began to read over my

shoulder. I could not write any longer;

others joined our group, and I read

aloud what I had written. It did not

please them; no one praised it.

I was mortified; and in order to

soothe my literary vanity, I began to tell

them my plan of what was to follow. As I

went on telling them, I was carried

away. I felt better in my mind, and they

began to make suggestions.

One said that the old man should be a

wizard.

Another said:—

“No; that is not necessary; he must

be simply a soldier.”

“No; let him rob his benefactor.”

“No; that would not be according to

the proverb,” said they.

All were thoroughly interested. It was

evidently something new and

fascinating for them to watch the process

of composition, and to take part in it.

Their opinions were for the most part

similar and just, both in regard to the

construction of the story, the details,

and the traits of the characters.

Nearly all took part in the composi­
tion of the story, but from the very

beginning the positive Semka stood out

with especial clearness by the artistic

sharpness of his description, and Fedka

by the truth of his poetic delineations,

and more than all by the vividness and

force of his imagination. Their struc­
tures were to such a degree given ad­
visedly, and with reason, that more than

once, when I argued with them, I was

obliged to yield.

It was my idea that accuracy in com­
position, and the close fitting of the

thought to the proverb, should enter in­
to the story; they, on the contrary, cared

only for artistic accuracy.

For example, I wanted the peasant

who took the old beggar into his house to
regret his kindly action; they felt that this was an impossibility, and they brought into the action a vixenish woman.

I said:—

"The peasant at first felt sorry for the beggar, but afterward felt sorry that he had given his bread."

Fedka replied that such a thing would be absurd.

"From the very first he did not listen to his wife, and surely afterward he would not yield to her!"

"But what sort of a man is he in your idea?" I asked.

"He is like Uncle Timofer," said Fedka, smiling, "his beard is rather thin, he goes to church, and he keeps bees."

"Good-natured but obstinate?" I suggested.

"Yes," said Fedka; "that's the reason he will not heed his wife."

From the moment when they introduced the old man the composition began in lively earnest. Here for the first time, evidently, they began to feel the delight of putting artistic work into words. In this respect Semka was particularly brilliant; the most lifelike details followed one another. The solitary fault which might be charged against him was this: that these details pictured only the present moment, and had no relationship to the general idea of the story. I did not hurry them, but rather urged them to go slow, and not to forget what they had said.

It seemed as if Semka saw and described what went on before his eyes: the frozen, snow-covered bark shoes, and the mud which dripped down from them as they thawed out, and the biscuits into which they dried when the woman put them into the oven.

Fedka, on the other hand, saw only those particulars which aroused in him such a sentiment as he would have experienced at the sight of a real person. Fedka saw the snow which had stuck to the old man's legwrappers, and he felt the feeling of pity which inspired the peasant to say:—

"Lord! how can he walk!"

Fedka went so far as to express in pantomime the manner in which the peasant said these words; waving his hand and shaking his head. He saw the old man's thin, tattered cloak, and his torn shirt, under which showed his emaciated body wet with melting snow. He imagined the woman, as she grumblingly obeyed her husband's command, and pulled off his lapti, and the old man's pitiful groan muttered through his teeth:—

"Easy, little mother, my feet are sore there!"

Semka wanted objective pictures above all, — the lapti, the thin cloak, the old man, the peasant woman, without much of any connection among them; Fedka wanted to express the feeling of pity with which he himself was filled.

He went on to speak of how the old man would be given his supper; how he would fall sick in the night; how afterward in the field he would teach the boy his letters, so that I was obliged to tell him not to hurry and not to forget what he had said. His eyes gleamed with unsheared tears; his dirty, thin hands contracted nervously; he was impatient, and kept spurring me on: "Have you written it? have you written it?" he kept asking me.

He was despotically irritated with all the others; he wanted to be the only one to speak, — not to speak as men talk but to speak as they write, — in other words to express artistically in words the images of feeling; for example, he would not permit the words to be changed about, but was very particular about their order.

His soul at this time was softened and stirred by the sentiment of pity, — that is, love — and it pictured every object in an artistic form, and took exception to everything that did not correspond to his idea of eternal beauty and harmony.

As soon as Semka was drawn into describing incongruous details about the lambs huddled in the corner near the door, or anything of the sort, Fedka would become vexed and say:—

"Ho, you; you are talking twaddle."

I needed only to suggest anything, — for example, what was the peasant doing while his wife went off to her neighbor's — and Fedka's imagination would immediately construct a picture of lambs bleating near the door, and the old man sighing, and the lad Serozha delirious; I had only to suggest some artificial and flase detail in the picture, and he would become angry instantly, and declare with irritation that it was not necessary.

For instance, I proposed that he describe the peasant's external appearance; he agreed: but my proposal that he should describe what the peasant thought while his wife was gone to her neighbor's immediately brought up in his mind this idea:—

"Ekh! woman! if you should meet the dead Savoska, he would tear your hair out."

And he said this in such a weary and calmly naturally serious, and at the same time good-natured, tone of voice, leaning his head on his hand, that the children went into a gale of laughter.

The chief condition of every art — the feeling of proportion — was extraordinarily developed in him. He was wholly upset by any superfluous suggestion made by any of the boys. He took it upon himself to direct the construction of this story in such a despotic way, and with such a just claim to be despotic, that very soon the boys went home, and he alone was left with Semka, who did not give way to him, though he worked in a different manner.

We worked from seven to eleven o'clock; the children felt neither hunger nor weariness, and they were really indignant with me when I stopped writing; then they tried to take turns in writing by themselves, but they soon desisted — the thing did not work.

Here for the first time Fedka asked me what my name was. We laughed at him, because he did not know.

"I know," said he, "how to address you; but what do they call your estate
name? You know we have the Fokanui-
chef family, the Zabrefs, the Yermilinas,""
I told him.

"And are we going to be printed?" he
asked.

"Yes."

"Then it must be printed: The work of
Makarof, Morozof, and Tolstoi!"

He was excited for a long time, and
could not sleep; and I cannot represent
the feeling of excitement, of pleasure, of
pain, and almost of remorse which I ex­
perienced in the course of that evening.
I felt that from this time a new world of
joys and sorrows had been revealed to
Fedka, — the world of art; it seemed to
me that I was witnessing what no one
has the right to see, — the unfolding of
the mysterious flower of poetry.

To me it was both terrible and de­
lightful; just as if a treasure-seeker
should find the lady-fern in bloom.

The pleasure consisted for me in sud­
ddenly, unexpectedly, discovering the
philosopher's stone, for which I had
been vainly seeking for two years — the
art of expressing thought.

It was terrible, because this art would
bring new demands and a whole world
of desires incompatible with the sphere
in which the pupils live — or so it seemed
to me at the first moment.

There could be no mistake. This was
not chance, but conscious, creative
genius. I beg the reader to peruse the
work of Fedka, — the world of art; it seemed to
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The pleasure consisted for me in sud­

...
man must feel who has witnessed something that no one has ever seen before.

It was long before I could explain the impression which I had received, though I was conscious that it was one of those which in mature life lift a man to a higher stage of existence, and compel him to renounce the old, and give himself unreservedly to the new.

The next day I could not believe in the reality of the experience through which I had passed that evening. It seemed to me quite too strange that a half-educated peasant lad had suddenly developed a conscious, artistic power, such as Goethe, with all his measureless height of development, was unable to attain. It seemed to me, too, strange that I, the author of "Childhood," who have now gained a certain success and reputation for artistic talent in the literary circles of Russia, that I, in the matter of art, was not only unable to guide or aid this eleven-year-old Fedka, and Semka, but that barely,—and that only in a happy moment of excitement,—could I

nuinely, as the first. These pages were only a little poorer in details, and these details were sometimes not introduced with perfect skill; there were also two repetitions. All this evidently arose from the fact that the mechanism of composition troubled them. On the third day it was the same.

During these lessons other boys were frequently present, and knowing the spirit and idea of the story, they made suggestions and added their genuine strokes. Semka went away and stayed away. Only Fedka kept on with the story from beginning to end, and acted as censor on all the changes proposed.

There could be no doubt that this success is a matter of chance: we evidently struck accidentally on that method which was more natural and more stimulating than those we had tried hitherto. But all this was too unusual, and I did not believe in what was going on before my eyes. Something which seemed like an extraordinary chance was required to dissipate my doubts.

"...we evidently struck accidentally on that method which was more natural and more stimulating than those we had tried hitherto... I did not believe in what was going on before my eyes."

follow them and comprehend them. It seemed to me so strange, that I could not believe in what had happened the evening before.

On the next day we occupied ourselves with the continuation of the tale. When I asked Fedka whether he had thought out the sequel and how, he made no reply, but waving his hands simply said:—

"I know, I know! Who will write it?"

We began to write the continuation, and again, as far as the children were concerned, with the same sense of artistic truth, proportion, and enthusiasm.

When the lesson was half done, I was compelled to leave them. They continued without me and wrote two pages as beautifully, as sympathetically, as ge-

I had been away for several days, and the story remained unfinished. The manuscript,—three large sheets fully written over,—was left in the room of the teacher to whom I had been showing it.

Just before my departure, while I was engaged with the composition, a new pupil who had come had been showing the children the art of making fly-swatters out of paper, and throughout the whole school, as apt to be the case, had come a time of fly-swatters, taking the place of snow-ball time, which in its turn had taken the place of carved sticks.

The fly-swatter time lasted during my absence. Semka and Fedka, who belonged to the choir, used to go to the teacher's room to sing, and they would spend whole evenings and sometimes whole nights there.

In the intervals and during the time of singing, of course, the fly-swatters were in full swing, and every available piece of paper which fell into their hands was turned into a fly-swatter. The teacher went to supper and forgot to caution the children not to touch the papers on his table, and so the manuscript containing the work of Makarof, Morozof, and Tolstoi was turned into fly-swatters.

On the next day, before school, the slapping had become such a nuisance to the pupils themselves, that they themselves declared a general persecution of fly-swatters; with a shout and a rush the fly-swatters were all collected, and with general enthusiasm flung into the lighted stove.

The time of fly-swatters was ended, but with it our manuscript had also gone to ruin.

Never was any loss more severe for me to bear than that of those three written sheets. I was in despair.

Wringing my hands, I went to work to rewrite the story, but I could not forget the loss of it, and involuntarily I kept heaping reproaches on the teacher, and the manufacturers of the fly-swatters.

Here I cannot resist observing in this connection that as the result of this external disorder and perfect freedom among the scholars, which have furnished decorous amusement for Mr. Markof, in the Russian Messenger, and Mr. Glyebof, in the journal Education, without the slightest trouble, and without having to use threats or cunning, I learned all the details of the complicated history of the manuscript turned into fly-swatters, and of its cremation.

Semka and Fedka saw that I was disturbed, and though, evidently, they did not know the reason, they seemed to be very sympathetic; Fedka at last timidly proposed to me to rewrite the story.

"By yourselves?" I asked; "I cannot help any in it."

"Semka and I will come and spend the night at your house," replied Fedka.

And indeed, after the lessons, they came to my house about nine o'clock and locked themselves in my library. I was not a little delighted that after some giggling, they became quiet, and at twelve o'clock when I went to the door, I
heard merely their low conversation and the scratching of the pen. Only once they asked me about something that had been in the former copy, and wanted my opinion on the question. — Had the peasant hunted for his wallet before or after his wife went to the neighbor's? I told them it made no difference.

At twelve o'clock, I tapped at the door and went in. Fedka, in a new white shubka with black fur trimming, was sitting, buried in the easy-chair, with his legs crossed and his bushy little head resting on one hand, while his other played with the scissors. His big black eyes, gleaming with an unnatural but serious and mature light, had a far-away look; his irregular lips, puckered up as if to whistle, evidently waiting for the phrase, which, though ready-made in his imagination, he was trying to formulate.

Semka, standing in front of the great writing-table, with a big white patch of black fur trimming, was writing very crooked lines and constantly dipping the pen in the inkstand. I rumpled up Semka's hair, and when with his fat face, and its projecting cheek-bones, and his disheveled hair, he turned to me with a startled look in his thoughtful and sleepy eyes, it was so ludicrous that I laughed aloud; but the children did not laugh. Fedka, not altering the expression of his face, pulled Semka by the sleeve to make him go on with his writing.

"Wait," said he to me; "done in a minute!" (Fedka used the familiar tui, thou, to me when he was excited and eager), and he went on dictating something more.

I took their copy from them and at the end of five minutes, when they were installed near the cupboard eating potatoes and kvas, and looking at the silver spoons, to which they were so unaccustomed, they broke out, without themselves knowing why, into ringing, boyish laughter. The old woman in the room above hearing them laugh, laugh ed too, without knowing why.

"What are you filling up so for?" said Semka. "Sit straight, or you will eat yourself one-sided."

And while they were taking off their shubas and bestowing themselves under the writing-table for the night, they did not cease to bubble over with the charming, healthy laughter of the peasant child. I read through what they had written. It was a new variation of the former story. Some things were left out, some new artistic beauties were added. And once more there was the same feeling for beauty, truth, and proportion.

Afterward one sheet of the lost manuscript was found. In the story as it was printed I welded the two variants together by the aid of the sheet that was found and by bringing my recollection to bear upon it. The composition of this story took place in the early spring, before the end of our school year.

Owing to various circumstances I was prevented from making new experiments. Only one tale was written on a proverb, by two of the boys who were most ordinary in their talents and most sophisticated, being sons of house servants. The story on the proverb, "He who is happy on a holiday is drunk before daylight," was printed in number three. The same occurrences took place again with these boys and with this story as with Seroka and Fedka and the first story, only with the difference of degree of talent and degree of enthusiasm, and of my cooperation.

In the summer we have no lessons, have had no lessons, and intend to have no lessons. The reason why teaching is impossible in our school in summer we explain in a special article.

One part of the summer Fedka and the other boys lived with me. After they had bathed and played, they were thinking what they should do with themselves. I proposed to them to write a composition, and suggested several themes. I told them a very remarkable story of a robbery of money, the story of a murder, the story of a miraculous conversion of a Molokan to Orthodoxy, and again I proposed to them to write in the form of autobiography the story of a lad whose poor and dissolute father was sent off as a soldier, and on his return proved to be a reformed and excellent man. I said:—

"I should write it this way: I remember when I was a little fellow we had living at home a mother, a father, and several other relatives, and what they were. Then I should describe my recollection of how my father used to go on sprees, how my mother was always weeping, and how he beat her; then how they sent him as a soldier, how she waited when we began to live even more wretchedly than before; how my father came back, and I should not have known him if he had not asked if Matriona did not live there — this was regarding his wife — and how we rejoiced and we began to live well."

Man is born perfect; — that is a great dictum that is enunciated by Rousseau, and that dictum stands like a rock, firm and true. Having been born, man sets up before himself his prototype of harmony, truth, beauty, and goodness. But every hour in his life, every minute of time, increases the distance, the size, and the time of those relations which at his birth were found in perfect harmony, and every step and every hour threatens the violation of this harmony, and every succeeding step threatens a new violation, and gives no hope of restoring the violated harmony. The majority of educators lose from sight the fact that childhood is the prototype of harmony, and they take as an end the child's development, which goes on according to unchangeable laws. Development is mistakenly taken as an end, because with educators happens what takes place with poor sculptors.

Instead of trying to establish a local exaggerated development, or to establish a general development, in order to wait the new opportunity which puts an end to the previous irregularity, like the poor sculptor, instead of scratching off the superfluity, they keep sticking on more and more; so also educators apparently strive for only one thing, — how the process of development may not cease; and if they think of harmony at all, then they always strive to attain it, approaching the unknown prototype in the future, receding from the prototype in the past and present. However irregular the education of a child has been, there still remain in it the primitive features of harmony. Still modifying, at least not helping, the development, we may hope to attain some nearness to regularity and harmony.

But we are so self-confident, so
Dreamily given over to the false ideal of mature perfection, so impatient are we toward the anomalous near us, and so firmly confident in our power of correcting them, so little are able to understand and appreciate the primitive beauty of a child, that we make all possible haste to rouse the child, to correct all the irregularities that come under our observation; we regulate, we educate: First, prove a man. The more the child is spoiled, the less it is necessary to educate him, the greater is the freedom he requires. To teach and educate a child is impossible and senseless on the simple ground that the child stands nearer than I do, nearer than any adult does, to that ideal of harmony, truth, beauty, and goodness to which, in my pride, I wish to lead him.

To teach and educate a child is impossible and senseless on the simple ground that the child stands nearer than I do, nearer than any adult does, to that ideal of harmony, truth, beauty, and goodness to which, in my pride, I wish to lead him.

We must bring up one side even with the other, then the other with the first. They keep developing the child more and more, and removing it farther and farther from the old and abolished prototype, and ever more and more impossible becomes the attainment of the imaginary ideal of the perfectibility of the adult man.

Our ideal is behind us and not before us. Education spoils and does not improve poetic composition. All that we can do is to show them how to get started.

If what I have done for the attainment of this end may be called methods, then these methods are the following:

I. To propose the largest and most varied choice of themes, not inventing them especially for children, but proposing the most serious themes, such as interest the teacher himself.

II. To give children children's works to read, and to propose as models, because children's works are always more genuine, more elegant, and more moral than the works of adults.

III. (Especially important.) Never, while examining children's works, make for the pupils any observations about the neatness of the note-books, or about the calligraphy, or about the spelling, or, above all, about the order of topics or the logic.

IV. As in authorship the difficulty lies not in the dimensions, or the contents, or the artfulness of the theme, so the progression of the themes ought not to lie in the dimensions, or the contents, or the language, but in the mechanism of the action, consisting first in the choice of one out of a large number of ideas and images presenting themselves; secondly, in the choice of words wherewith to array it; thirdly, in remembering what has been already written, so as not to indulge in repetitions, and not to omit anything, and including the ability to write what follows with what precedes; fifthly and lastly, while thinking and writing, not letting the one interfere with the other.

With this end in view, I did as follows: Some of these phases of work I at first took on myself, gradually transferring them all to their care. At first I chose for them from among the thoughts and images those which seemed to me the best, and I remembered and pointed out the places, and I corrected what had been written, preventing them from repetitions; and I myself wrote, leaving it to them only to clothe the thoughts and images in words; afterward I gave them full choice, then I let them correct what had been written; and finally, as in the story called Soldatkinno Zhityo, — "A Soldier's Life," — they took upon themselves the whole process of the writing...
The feelings of truth, beauty, and goodness are independent of the degree of development. Beauty, truth, and goodness are concepts, expressing only the harmony of relations toward truth, beauty, and goodness. False-truth: there is no such thing as absolute truth. I do not lie when I say that tables turn from the contact of fingers, if I believe it, although it is not the truth; but I lie when I say I have no money, if, according to my notions, I have money. A large nose is not necessarily ugly, but it is ugly on a small face. Ugliness is only inharmoniousness in relation to beauty. To give one’s dinner to a beggar, or to eat it oneself, has nothing wrong in it; but to give it away or eat it when my mother is dying of starvation is inharmoniousness toward goodness.

In training, educating, developing, or doing whatever you please to a child, we must have, and unconsciously have, one object,—the attainment of the greatest harmony as regards truth, beauty, and goodness. If the time did not pass, if the child did not live in all its phases, we might calmly attain this harmony, adding where there seemed to be a lack, and subtracting where there seemed to be a superfluity.

But the child lives; every side of his being strives toward development, one outstripping another, and for the most part, the forward motion of these sides of his we take for the goal, and cooperate only with the development, and not with the harmony of development.

This contains the eternal mistake of all pedagogical theories. We see our ideal before us when it is really behind us. The inevitable development of a man is not only not the means for the attainment of this ideal of harmony which we carry in ourselves, but is an impediment set by the Creator against the attainment of a lofty ideal of harmony. In this inevitable law of the forward motion is included the idea of that fruit of the tree of good and evil which our first parents tasted.

The healthy child is born into the world, perfectly satisfying those demands of absolute harmony in the relations of truth, beauty, and goodness which we bear within us; he is like the inanimate existences,—the plant, the animal, nature,—which constantly present to us that truth, beauty, and goodness we are seeking for and desire. In all ages and among all people the child represents the model of innocence, sinlessness, goodness, truth and beauty.
Education of the People

D.H. Lawrence's Education of the People is an 87-page tract which remained unpublished during his lifetime. It was only in 1936 that Viking Press printed it as part of a collection of Lawrence posthumous papers. Throughout much of the monograph, Lawrence's voice is shrill, and certain of his ideas may well strike us as obnoxious:

Whipping, beating, yes, these alone will thunder into the moribund centres and bring them to life. Sharp, stinging whipping, keen, fierce smacks, and all the roused fury of reaction in the child, these alone will restore us to psychic health. Away with all mental punishments and reprobation. You must rouse the powerful physical reaction of anger, dark flushing anger in the child. You must. You must fight him, tooth and nail, if you're going to keep him healthy and alive.

Elsewhere, Lawrence comments that old-fashioned parents were tedious when they found religious and moral justification for corporal punishment. No, he insists, if we punish children, it must be because they make our blood boil, not because some ethical or religious code sanctifies us:

"Miss, if you eat in that piggish, mincing fashion, you shall go without a meal or two." "Why?"

"Because you're an objectionable sight."

"Well, you needn't look at me."

Here Miss should get a box on the ear.

"Take that! And know that I need to look at you, since I'm responsible for you. And since I'm responsible for you, I'll watch it you don't behave like a mincing little pig."

What are we to make of these fulminations? Is Lawrence just a cantankerous grouch taking out his spite on children, a literary version of W.C. Fields? Or is this an instance of some higher (or deeper) nuttiness, in which Lawrence is flirting with some of the totalitarian ideas that were beginning to lift their heads in the first quarter of the 20th century? Neither possibility is altogether far-fetched. As to the source of such ideas, one likelihood is that Lawrence had been reading Sorel. Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, had mourned the complacency which he felt had everywhere in class societies replaced healthy combative ness. Class conflict, he argued, has a positive, functional role to play. His counsel was characteristically simple and clear: if your employer reaches out to shake your hand, kick him in the shins; that will remind him of his class situation, and it will remind you of yours.

To Lawrence, the value of this argument lay in its applicability to the family rather than to society at large. He saw conflict to be the very essence of the family structure. To strengthen the family, we must intensify the conflict. We are to encourage family discord and hatred because it will lead us to overcome blandness and complacency, passivity and inertia — for Lawrence, the most pernicious characteristics of modern existence. His warning to us is that we must fight for our lives; if he concedes violence, it is as a means towards a moral end. The means are inconsistent with the end only if we fail to see, Lawrence implies, that healthy existence is itself, always and everywhere, mortal struggle.

Lawrence's radical individualism is familiar to us from such 19th century writers as Thoreau and Nietzsche. Indeed, published in the same volume, Phoenix, is a paean to democracy. The truly democratic society is one in which we can be true to ourselves, be fully ourselves. The trouble with equalitarian conceptions of democracy is that they fail to recognize that individuals are incommensurable.

What, then, are we to make of Lawrence's Education of the People? Should we continue to ignore it (there appears to be no critical literature on it), or is there something we can learn from it?

We may recall, in this connection, the plea of John Stuart Mill for free and unrestricted competition of ideas:

"...since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied."

Unless we allow our ideas to be challenged and contested, Mill urged, we will hold those ideas as dogma, having forgotten the reasons which first led us to adopt them, and having eventually forgotten their very meaning.

Is the merit then of educational ideas like those of Lawrence merely that they are so dramatically wrongheaded that they compel us to reexamine our beliefs and refresh our understanding of the reasons we have always had for thinking as we do? Or do they possess, in addition, some germ of truth — just enough to supply what we lack? Might they even be suggestive of lines of further development upon which Lawrence himself was unable to capitalize?

The passages that follow seem to us those in the Lawrence essay most worthy of consideration in the present context. They present us with an opportunity to refute them, if we will, or to find, perhaps, better reasons to support them than Lawrence himself was able to adduce. Thus, some will see in his rejection of intellectualism a deplorable dualism, while others will hold that Lawrence is not rejecting the intellect per se: he is simply objecting to the simpering self-consciousness which he feels has corroded all of modern life. Not that we think too much, but that we think too much of things which should come naturally and unreflectively to us, and too little of things which are in urgent need of reconsideration. In this latter sense, Lawrence may be taken as cautioning proponents of reflective education to take care that the areas which children are urged to reflect upon be those most worthy of their appraisal.
In the early years a child's education should be entirely non-mental. Instead of trying to attract an infant's attention, trying to arouse its curiosity, to make it perceive, the mother or nurse should mindlessly put it into contact with the physical universe. What is the first business of the baby? To ascertain the physical reality of its own context, even of its own very self. It has to learn to wave its little hands and feet. To a baby it is for a long time a startling thing, to find its own hand waving. It does not know what is moving, nor how it moves. It is quite unconscious of having inaugurated the motion, as a cat is unconscious of what makes the shadow after which it darts, or in what its own elusive tail-tip consists. So a baby marvels over the transit of this strange something which moves again and again across its own little vision. Behold, it is only the small fist. So it watches and watches. What is it doing?

When a baby absorbedly, almost painfully watches its own vagrant and spasmodic fist, is it trying to form a concept of that fist? Is it trying to formulate a little idea? "This is my fist: it is I who move it: I wave it so and so!" — Not at all. The concept of I is quite late in forming. Some children do not realize that they are themselves until they are four or five years old. They are something objective to ourselves: "Jackie wants it" — "Baby wants it" — and not "I want it." In the same way with the hand or the foot. A child for some years has no conception of its own foot as part of itself. It is "the foot." In most languages it is always "the foot, the hand," and not "my foot, my hand." But in English the ego is very insistent. We put it self-consciously in possession as soon as possible.

The volitional centre in the shoulders establishes itself bit by bit in relation to the sympathetic plexus in the breast, and forms a circuit of spontaneous-voluntary intelligence. The volitional centres are those which put us primarily into line with the earth's gravity. The wildly waving infant fist does not know how to swing attuned to the earth's gravity, the omnipresent force of gravity. Life flutters broadcast in the baby's arm. But at the thoracic ganglion acts a new vital power, which gradually seizes the motor energy that comes explosive from the sympathetic centre, and ranges it in line with all kinetic force, in line with the mysterious, omnipresent centre-pull of the earth's great gravity. There is a true circuit now between the earth's centre and the centre of ebullient energy in the child. Everything depends on these true, polarized or orbital circuits. There is no disarray, no haphazard.

Once the flux of life from the spontaneous centres is put into its true kinetic relation with the earth's centre, adjusted to the force of gravity; once the gravitation of the baby's hand is spontaneously accepted and realized in the primary affective centres of the baby's psyche, then that little hand can take true and voluntary direction. The volitional centre is the pole that relates us, kinetically, to the earth's centre. The sympathetic plexus is the source whence the movement-impulse leaps out. Connect the two centres into a perfect circuit, and the moment the baby's fist leaps out for the tassel on its cradle, the volitional ganglion swings the leaping fist truly to its goal.

But this requires practice, for a baby. And in the course of the practice the infant bangs its own nose and swings its arm too far, so that it hurts, and brings a fair amount of trouble upon itself. But in the end, the fluttering, palpitating movement of the first days becomes a true and perfect flight, a gesture, a motion.

Has the mind got anything to do with all this? Does there enter any idea of movement into the baby's head, does the child form any conception of what it is doing? NONE. This whole range of activity and consciousness is non-mental, effective at the primary centres.

"This whole range of activity and consciousness is non-mental, effective at the primary centres. It is not mere automatism. Far from it. It is spontaneous consciousness, effective and perfect in itself."

None the less, it is some time before a child is possessed of its own ego. A baby watches its little fist waving through the air, perilously near its nose. What is it doing, thinking about the fist? No! It is establishing the rapport or connexion between the primary affective centres which controls the fist. From the deep sympathetic plexus leaps out an impulse. The fist waves, wildly, to the peril of the little nose. It waves, does it? It leaps, it moves! And from the fountain of impulse deep in the little breast, it moves. But there is also a quiver of fear because of this spasmodic, convulsive motion. Fear! And the first volitional centre of the upper body struggles awake, between the shoulders. It moves, the arm moves, ah, convulsively, wildly, wildly! Ah, look, beyond control it moves, spurting from the wild source of impulse. Fear and ecstasy! Fear and ecstasy! But the other dawning power of impulse deep in the little breast, it moves. Shall it move, the wildly waving little arm? Then look, it shall move smoothly, it shall not flutter abroad. So! And so! Such a swing means such a balance, such an explosion of force means a leap in such and such a direction.
It is not mere automatism. Far from it. It is *spontaneous consciousness*, effective and perfect in itself.

And it is in this spontaneous consciousness that education arises. One of the reasons why uneducated peasant nurses are on the whole so much better for infants than over-conscious mothers is that an uneducated nurse does not introduce any *idea* into her attitude towards the child. When she claps her hands before the child, again and again, nods, smiles, coos, and claps again, she is stimulating the infant to motion, pure, mindless motion. She wants the supreme adjustment to the multiple forces of the winds of heaven and the pull of earth, mindless, idea-less, a speck of perfect physical animation. That is the whole point of real physical life: its joy in spontaneous mindless animation, in motion sheer and superb, like a leaping fish or a hovering hawk or a deer which bounds away, creatures which have never known the pride and the blight of the idea. The idea is a glorious thing in its place. But interposed in all our living, interpolated into our every gesture, it is like some vile mildew crept in, some vile blight.

"Anything, anything rather than the nervous, twisting, wistful, pathetic, centreless children we are cursed with: or the fat and self-satisfied, sheep-in-the-pasture children who are becoming more common: or the impudent, I’m-as-good-as-anybody smirking children who are far too numerous."

child to clap too. She wants its one little hand to find the other little hand, she wants to start the quick touch-and-go in the little shoulders. When you see her, time after time, making a fierce, wild gesture with her arm, before the eyes of the baby, and the baby laughing and chuckling, she is rousing the infant to the same fierce, free, reckless *geste*. Fierce, free, wild, reckless *geste*! How it excites the child to a quaint reckless chuckle! How it wakes in him the desire, the impulse for free, sheer motion! It starts the proud *geste* of independence.

This is the clue to early education: movement, physical motion, the attuning of the kinetic energy of the motor centres to the vast sway of the earth's centre. Without this we are nothing: clumsy, mechanical clowns, or pinched little automatons.

But if you are going to make use of this form of education you must find teachers full of physical life and zest, of fine, physical motor intelligence, and mentally rather stupid, or at least quiescent. Above all things, the *idea*, like a strangling worm, must not creep into the motor centres. It must be excluded. If we move, we must move primarily like a bird in the sky, which swings in

Let children be taught the pride of clear, clean movement. If it only be putting a cup on the table, or a book on a shelf, let it be a fine pure motion, not a slovenly shove. Parents and teachers should be keen as hawks, watching their young in motion. Do we imagine that a young hawk learns to fly and stoop, does a young swallow learn to skim, or a hare to dash uphill, or a bound to turn and seize him in full course, without long, keen pain of learning? Where there is no pain of effort there is a wretched, drossy degeneration, like the hateful cluttered sheep of our lushest pastures. Look at the lambs, how they explode with new life, and skip up into the air. *Already a little bit gawky!* And then look at their mothers. Whereas a wild sheep is a fleet, fierce thing, leaping and swift like the sun.

So with our children. We, parents and teachers, must prevent their degenerating into physical cloddishness or mechanical affectation or fluttered nervousness. We must be after them, fiercely, sharply, and chasten their movements, their bearing, their walk. If a boy slouches out a door, throw a book at him, like lightning. That will make him jump into keen and handsome alertness.

And if a girl come creeping, whining in, seize her by her pigtail and run her out again, full speed. That will bring the fire to her eyes and the poise to her head: if she's got any fire in her: and if she hasn't, why, give her a good knock to see if you can drive some in.

Anything, anything rather than the nervous, twisting, wistful, pathetic, centreless children we are cursed with: or the fat and self-satisfied, sheep-in-the-pasture children who are becoming more common: or the impudent, I’m-as-good-as-anybody smirking children who are far too numerous. But it's all our own fault. We're afraid to fight with our children, and so we let them degenerate. Poor loving parents we are!

There must be a fight. There must be an element of danger, always. How do the wild animals get their grace, their beauty, their allure? Through being on the *qui vive*, always on the *qui vive*. A lark on a sand-dune springs up to heaven in song. She leaps up in a pure, fine strength. She trills out in triumph, she is beside herself in mid-heaven. But let her mind her p’s and q’s. In the first place, if she doesn't flick her wings finely and rapidly, with exquisite skillful energy, she'll come a cropper to earth. Let her mind the winds of heaven, in the first place. And in the second, let her mind the shadow of Monsieur the kestrel. And in the third place, let her be wary of who sees her dropping. For, the moment she alights on this bristling earth she's got to dart to cover, and cut some secret track to her nest, or she's likely to be in trouble. It's all very well climbing a ladder of song to heaven. But you've got to have your wits about you all the time, even while you're cock-a-lorying on your ladder: and inevitably you've got to climb down. Mind you don't give your enemies too good a chance, that's all. And watch it that you don't indicate where your nest is, or your ladder of song will have been a sore business. On the *qui vive*, bright lark!

So with our children. On the *qui vive*. The old-fashioned parents were right, when they made their children watch what they were about. But old-fashioned parents were a bore, dragging in moral and religious justification. If we are to
chase our children, and chasten them too, it must be because they make our blood boil, not because some ethical or religious code sanctifies us.

"Miss, if you eat in that piggish, mincing fashion, you shall go without a meal or two."

"Why?"

"Because you're an objectionable sight."

"Well, you needn't look at me."

Here Miss should get a box on the ear.

"Take that! And know that I need look at you, since I'm responsible for you. And since I'm responsible for you, I'll watch it you don't behave like a mincing little pig."

Observe, no morals, no "What will people think of you?" or "What would your Daddy say?" or "What if Aunt Lucy saw you now!" or "It's wrong for little girls to be mincing and ugly!" or "You'll be sorry for it when you grow up!" or "I thought you were a good little girl!" or "Now what did teacher say to you in Sunday-school" — None of all these old dodges for shifting responsibility somewhere else. The plain fact is that parents and teachers are responsible for the bearing and developing of their children, so they may as well accept the responsibility flatly, and without dodges.

"I am responsible for the way you grow up, milady, and I'll fulfill my responsibility. So stop pushing your food about on your plate and looking like a self-conscious cockatoo, or leave the table and walk well out of my sight."

This is the tone that any honourable parent would take, seeing his little girl mincing and showing off at dinner. Let us keep the bowls of our compassion alive, and also the bowls of our wrath. No priggish brow-beating and mechanical authority, nor any disapproving superiority, but a plain, open anger when anger is aroused, and pleasure when this is waked.

The parent who sits at table in pained but disapproving silence while the child makes a nuisance of itself, and says: "Dear, I should be so glad if you would try to like your pudding: or if you don't like it, have a little bread-and-butter;" and who goes on letting the brat be a nuisance, this ideal parent is several times at fault. First she is assuming a pained ideal aloofness which is the worst form of moral bullying, a sort of Of course I won't interfere, but I am in the right attitude which is insufferable. If a parent is in the right, then she must interfere, otherwise why does she bring up her child at all? If she doesn't interfere, what right has she to assume any virtue of superiority? Then, when she is angry with the child, what right has she to say, "Dear," which term implies a state of affectionate communion? This prefixing of the ideal rebuke with the term "Dear" or "Darling" is a hateful travesty of all good feeling. It is using love or affection as a bullying weapon: which vile, sordid act the idealist is never afraid to commit. It is assuming authority of love, when love, as an emotional relationship, can have no authority. Authority must rest on responsible wisdom, and love must be a spontaneous thing, or nothing: an emotional rapport. Love and authority have nothing to do with one another. "Whom the Lord loveth, He chasteneth." True! But the Lord's love is not supposed to be an emotional business, but a sort of divine responsibility and purpose. And so is parental love, a responsibility and a living purpose, not an emotion. To make the emotion responsible for the purpose is a fine falsification. One says "Dear" or "Darling" when the heart opens with spontaneous cherishment, not when the brow draws with anger or irritation. But the deep purpose and responsibility of parenthood remains unchanged no matter how the emotions flow. The emotions should flow unfalsified, in the very strength of that purpose.

Therefore parents should never seek justification outside themselves. They should never say, "I do this for your good." You don't do it for the child's good. Parental responsibility is much deeper than an ideal responsibility. It is a vital connexion. Parent and child are polarized together still, somewhat as before birth. When the child in the womb kicks, it may almost hurt the parent. And the reaction is just as direct during all the course of childhood and parenthood. When a child is loose or ugly it is a direct hurt to the parent. The parent reacts and retaliates spontaneously. There is no justification, save the bond of parenthood, and certainly there is no ideal intervention.

We must accept the bond of parenthood primarily as a vital, mindless conjunction, non-ideal, passion. A parent owes the child all the natural passion reactions provoked. If a child provokes anger, then to deny it this anger, the open, passion anger, is as bad as to deny it food or love. It causes an atrophy in the child, at the volitional centres, and a perversion of the true life-flow. Why are we so afraid of anger, of wrath, and clean, fierce rage? What cowardice possesses us? Why would we reduce a child to a nervous, irritable wreck, rather than spank it wholesome? Why do we make such a fuss about a row? A row, a fierce storm in a family is a natural and healthy thing, which we ought even to have the courage to enjoy and exult in, as we can enjoy and exult in a storm of the elements. What makes us so namby-pamby? We ought all to fight: husbands and wives, parents and children, sisters and brothers and friends, all ought to fight, fiercely, freely, openly: and they ought to enjoy it. It stiffens the backbone and makes the eyes flash. Love without a fight is nothing but degeneracy. But the fight must be spontaneous and natural, without fixities and perversions.

The same with parenthood: spontaneous and natural, without any ideal taint.
And this is the beginning of true education: first, the stimulus to physical motion, physical trueness and elan, which is given to the infant. And this is continued during the years of early childhood not by deliberate instruction, but by the keen, fierce, unremitting swiftness of the parent, whose warm love opens the valves of glad motion in the child, so that the child plays in delicious security and freedom, and whose fierce, vigilant anger sharpens the child to a trueness and boldness of motion and bearing such as are impossible save in children of strong-hearted parents.

Open the valves of warm love so that your child can play in serene joy by itself, or with others, like young weasels safe in a sunny nook of a wood, or young tiger-cubs whose great parents lie grave and apart, on guard. And open also the sharp valves of wrath, that your child may be alert, keen, proud, and fierce in his turn. Let parenthood and childhood be a spontaneous, animal relationship, non-ideal, swift, a continuous interplay of shadow and light, ever-changing relationship and mood. And, parents, keep in your heart, like tigers, the grave and vivid responsibility of parenthood, remote and natural in you, not fanciful and self-conscious.

X

From earliest childhood, let us have independence, independence, self-dependence. Every child to do all it can for itself, wash and dress itself, clean its own boots, brush and fold its own clothes, fetch and carry for itself, mend its own stockings, boy or girl alike, patch its own garments, and as soon as possible make as well as mend for itself. Man and woman are happy when they are busy, and children the same. But there must be the right motive behind the work. It must not always, for a child, be "Help mother" or "Help father" or "Help somebody." This altruism becomes tiresome, and causes disagreeable reaction. Neither must the motive be the ideal of work. "Work is service, hence work is noble. Laborare est orare." Never was a more grovelling motto than this, that work is prayer. Work is not prayer at all: not in the same category. Work is a practical business, prayer is the soul’s yearning and desire. Work is not an ideal, save for slaves. But work is quite a pleasant occupation for a human creature, a natural activity.

And the aim of work is neither the emotional helping of mother and father, nor the ethical-religious service of mankind. Nor is it the greedy piling-up of stupid possessions. An individual works for his own pleasure and independence: but chiefly in the happy pride of personal independence, personal liberty. No man is free who depends on servants. Man can never be quite free. Indeed he doesn’t want to be. But in his personal immediate life he can be vastly freer than he is.

How? By doing things for himself. Once we wake the quick of personal pride, there is a pleasure in performing our own personal service, every man sweeping his own room, making his own bed, washing his own dishes—or in proportion: just as a soldier does. We have got a mistaken notion of ourselves. We conceive of ourselves as ideal beings, nothing but consciousness, and therefore actual work has become degrading, menial to us. But let us change our notion of ourselves. We are only in part ideal beings. For the rest we are lively physical creatures whose life consists in motion and action. We have two feet which need tending, and which need socks and shoes. This is our own personal affair, and it behooves us to see to it. Let me look after my own socks and shoes, since these are private to me. Let me tend to my own apparel and my own personal service. Every bird builds its own nest and preens its own feathers: save perhaps a cuckoo or a filthy little sparrow which likes to oust a swallow, or a crazy ostrich which squats in the sand. Proud personal privacy, personal liberty, gay individual self-dependence. Awake in a child the gay, proud sense of its own aloof individuality, and it will busy itself about its own affairs happily. It all depends what centre you try to have the mindless motor activity and reaction in primal consciousness, sold and bought and automatized, divested of individual singleness and privacy.

The actual doing things is in itself a joy. If I wash the dishes I learn a quick, light touch of china and earthenware, the feel of it, the weight and roll and poise of it, the peculiar hotness, the quickness or slowness of its surface. I am at the middle of an infinite complexity of motions and adjustments and quick, apprehensive contacts. Nimble faculties hover and play along my nerves, the primal consciousness is alert in me. Apart from all the moral or practical satisfaction derived from a thing well done, I have the mindless motor activity and reaction in primal consciousness, which is a pure satisfaction. If I am to be well and satisfied, as a human being, a large part of my life must pass in mindless motion, quick, busy activity in which I am neither bought or sold, but acting alone and free from the centre of my own active

wolf or deer. I want about me a clear, cool space across which nobody trespasses. I want to remain intact within my own natural isolation, save at those moments when I am drawn to a rare and significant intimacy. The horrible personal promiscuity of our life is extremely ugly and distasteful. As far as possible, let nobody do anything for me, personally, save those who are near and dear to me: and even then as little as possible. Let me be by myself, and leave me my native distance. Sono io—and not a thing of public convenience.

Self-dependence is independence. To be free one must be self-sufficient, particularly in small, material, personal matters. In the great business of love, or friendship, or living human intercourse one meets and communes with another free individual; there is no service. Service is degrading, both to the servant and the one served: a promiscuity, a sort of prostitution. No one should do for me that which I can reasonably do for myself. Two individuals may be intimately interdependent on one another, as man and wife, for example. But even in this relation each should be as self-dependent, as self-supporting as ever possible. We should be each as single in our independence as the wild animals are. That is the only true pride. To have a dozen servants is to be twelve times prostituted in human relationship, sold and bought and automatized, divested of individual singleness and privacy.
isolation. Not self-consciously, however. Not watching my own reactions. If I wash dishes, I wash them to get them clean. Nothing else.

Every man must learn to be proud and single and alone, and after that, he will be worth knowing. Mankind has degenerated into a conglomerate mass, where everybody strives to look and to be as much as possible an impersonal, non-individual, abstracted unit, a standard. A high standard of perfection: that's what we talk about. As if there could be any standard among living people, all of whom are separate and single each one natively distinguished from every other one. Yet we all wear boots made for the abstract "perfect" or standard foot, and coats made as near possible for the abstract shoulders of Mr. Everyman.

I object to the abstract Mr. Everyman being clapped over me like an extinguisher. I object to wearing his coat and his boots and his hat. Me, in a pair of "Lotus" boots, and a "Burberry," and "Oxonian" hat, why, I might just as well be anybody else. And I strenuously object. I am myself, and I don't want to be rigged out as a poor specimen of Mr. Everyman. I don't want to be standardized, or even idealized.

If I could, I would make my own boots and my own trousers and coats. I suppose even now I could if I would. But in Rome one must do as Rome does: the bourgeois is not worth my while, I can't demean myself to epater him, and I am much too sensitive to my own isolation to want to draw his attention.

Although in Rome one must do as Rome does; and although all the world is Rome today, yet even Rome falls. Rome fell, and Rome will fall again. That is the point.

And it is to prepare for this fall of Rome that we conjure up a new system of education. When I say that every boy shall be taught cobbling and boot-making, it is in the hopes that before long a man will make his own boots to his own fancy. If he likes to have Maltese sandals, why, he'll have Maltese sandals; and if he likes better highlaced buskins, why, he can stalk like an Athenian tragedian. Anyhow he'll sit happily devising his own covering for his own feet, and machine-made boots be hanged. They even hurt him, and give him callouses. And yet, so far, he thinks his machine-made standardized nullity is perfection. But wait till we have dealt with him. He'll be gay-shod to the happiness and vanity of his own toes and to the satisfaction of his own desire. And the hors-d'oeuvre, even though she was a Bible worker all her life. She lays it all on from the outside, powdering her very soul.

But of course, when the little girls from our schools grow up they will really consider the lily, and put forth their flowers from their own roots. See them, the darlings, the women of the future, silent and rapt, spinning their own fabric out of their own instinctive souls—cotton and linen and silk and wool into the bargain, of course—and deliberately unfolding the skirts and bodices, or the loose Turkish trousers and little vests, or whatever else they like to wear, evolving and unfurling them in sensitive form, according to their own instinctive desire. She puts on her clothes as a flower unfolds its petals, as an utterance from her own nature, instinctive and individual.

Oh, if only people can learn to do as they like and to have what they like, instead of madly aspiring to do what everybody likes and to look as everybody would like to look. Fancy everybody looking as everybody else likes, and nobody looking like anybody. It sounds like Alice in Wonderland. A well-dressed woman before her mirror says to herself, if she is satisfied: "Every woman will envy me."

Which is absurd. Fancy a petunia leaning over to a geranium and saying: "Ah, miss, wouldn't you just love to be in mauve and white, like me, instead of that common turkey-red?" To which the geranium: "You! In your cheap material! You don't look more than one-and-a-halfpenny a yard. You'd thank your lucky stars if you had an inch of chiffon velvet to your name."

Of course, a petunia is a petunia, and a geranium is a geranium. And I'll bet Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. Why? Because he was trying to cut a dash and look like something beyond nature, overloading himself. Without doubt Solomon in all his nakedness was a lovely thing. But one has a terrible misgiving about Solomon in all his glory. David probably unfolded his nakedness into clothes that came naturally from him. But that Jewish glory of Solomon's suggests diamonds in jumps. Though we may be wrong, and Solomon in all his glory may have mov-
ed in fabrics that rippled naturally from him as his own hair, and his jewels may have glowed as his soul glowed, intrinsic. Let us hope so, in the name of wisdom.

All of which may seem a long way from the education of the people. But it isn’t really. It only means to say, don’t set up standards and regulation patterns for people. Don’t have criteria. Let every individual be single and self-expressive: not self-expressive in the self-conscious, smirking fashion, but busy making something he needs and wants to have just so, according to his own soul’s desire. Everyone individually and spontaneously busy, like a bird that builds its own nest and preens its own feathers, busy about its own business, alone and unaware.

The fingers must almost live and think by themselves. It is no good working from the idea, from the fancy: the creation must evolve itself from the vital activity of the fingers. Here’s the difference between living evolving work and that ideal mental business we call “handcraft instruction” or “handwork” in school today.

Dozens of high-souled idealists sit today at hand-loom and spiritually weave coarse fabrics. It is a high-brow performance. As a rule it comes to an end. But sometimes it achieves another effect. Sometimes actually the mind is lulled, by the steady repetition of mechanical, productive labour, into a kind of swoon. Gradually the idealism moults away, the high-brow resolves into a busy, unconscious worker, perhaps even a night-and-day slogger, absorbed in the process of work.

One should go to the extremity of an experience. But that one should stay there, and make a habit of the extreme, is another matter. A great part of the life of every human creature should pass in mindless, active occupation. But not all the days. There is a time to work, and a time to be still, a time to think, and a time to forget. And they are all different times.

The point about any handwork is that it should not be mindwork. Supposing we are to learn to solder a kettle. The theory is told in a dozen words. But it is not a question of applying a theory. It is a question of knowing, by direct physical contact, your kettle-substance, your kettle-curves, your solder, your soldering-iron, your fire, your resin, and all the fusing, slipping interaction of all these. A question of direct knowing by contact, not a question of understanding. The mental understanding of what is happening is quite unimportant to the job. If you are of an inquiring turn of mind, you can inquire afterwards. But while you are at the job, know what you’re doing, and don’t bother about understanding.

Know by immediate sensual contact. Know by the tension and reaction of the muscles, know, know profoundly but for ever untellettably, at the spontaneous primary centres. Give yourself in an intense, mindless attention, almost as deep as sleep, but not charged with random dreams, charged with potent effectiveness. Busy, intent, absorbed work, forgetfulness, this is one of the joys of life. Thoughts may be straying through the mind all the time. But there is no attention to them. They stream on like dreams, irrelevant. The soul is attending with joy and active purpose to the kettle and the soldering-iron; the mindless psyche concentrates intent on the unwilling little rivulet of solder which runs grudgingly under the nose of the hot tool. To be or not to be. Being isn’t a conscious effort, anyhow.

So we realize that there must be a deep gulf, an oblivion, between pedagogy and handwork. Don’t let a pedagogue come fussing about in a workshop. He will only muddle up the business of this sort be given to the children, who will set off to the workshop and get the job done, under supervision, in the hours of occupation. A good deal can be done that way, instead of the silly theoretic fussing making fancy knickknacks or specimen parts, such as goes on at present.

What we want is for every child to be handy: physically adaptable, and handy. If a boy shows any desire to go forward in any craft, he will have his opportunity. He can go on till he becomes an expert. But he must start by being, like Jack at sea, a handy man. The same with a girl.

Let the handwork be a part of the family and communal life, an extension of family life. Don’t muddle it up with the mindwork. Mindwork at its best is theoretic. Our present attempts to make mindwork “objective” and physical, and to instil theoretic mathematics through carpentry and joinery is silly. If we are teaching arithmetic, let us teach pure arithmetic, without bothering with piles of sham pennies and shillings and pounds of sham sugar. In actual life, when we do our shopping, every one of our calculations is made quickly in abstraction: a pure mental act, everything abstracted. And let our mental acts be pure mental acts, not adulterated with objects.” What aids modern education is that it is trying to cram primal physical experience into mental activity—with the result of mere muddledness. Pure physical experience takes place at the great affective centres, and is de facto pre-mental, non-mental. Mental experience on the other hand is pure and different, a process of abstraction, and therefore de facto not physical.

If our consciousness is dual, and active in duality; if our human activity is of two incompatible sorts, why try to make a mushy oneness of it? The rapport between the mental consciousness and the affective or physical consciousness is always a polarity of contradistinction. The two are never one save in their incomprehensible duality. Leave the two modes of activity separate. What connexion is necessary will be effected spontaneously.
As philosophy for children becomes better known, it becomes increasingly apparent that it is a discipline without age barriers. Philosophy is not just for a single generation; it is intergenerational. Issues such as truth, justice, and friendship arouse as much interest among the young and old as they do among those in their middle years. Little wonder then that models of dialogue in the philosophy for children curriculum so often show grandparents and grandchildren engaged in mutually satisfying philosophic discourse. This potential of philosophy deserves to be more widely known, as does the capacity of grandparents to be educators, the theme of the article that follows. It appeared originally in THE FAMILY AS EDUCATOR, Hope Jensen Leichter, ed., Teachers College Press, New York, 1974, and is reprinted with the publisher’s permission.

Margaret Mead was curator emeritus of ethnology at the American Museum of Natural History and adjunct professor of anthropology at Columbia University. She was the author of a great many books, among them CULTURE AND COMMITMENT: A STUDY OF THE GENERATION GAP, published by Doubleday in 1970.

Grandparents as Educators

Within anthropology we have developed several useful distinctions in discussing the questions of how grandparents do or do not play a role in the education of children in any given society, and particularly in our own. Within the context of this article I shall use the word education to include conscious teaching of any sort, whether of speech, manners, morals, or skills, but include also the process of socialization, which occurs in all societies as children learn to restrain their impulses, postpone gratification, control their sphincters, walk, talk, and participate in social life, and the process of enculturation, by which children learn a particular culture. In terms of the problem at hand, education will be used to cover all three activities.

At the same time it is also useful to distinguish between those societies in which change is so slow that the child sees its own future as it observes its grandparents, which I have called postfigurative societies; societies in fairly rapid change in which a large proportion of children learn from their peers who are at the same stage of learning as themselves, which I have called configurative societies; and societies like our own post World War II world, in which the experience of children differs so markedly from that of their parents or grandparents that elders must learn also from the experience of the children, an experience to which they themselves have only secondary access, as immigrants in time into a world which has changed so drastically since they themselves grew up, I have called prefigurative societies.

The simplest way to give children access to the past and to rapid change is the presence of older people within their immediate community, if not their own grandparents, then someone else’s grandparents. But to provide such educational experiences for children, we
need quite drastic changes in the organization of our towns and cities, so that there are the necessary arrangements for older people to live near younger people, with apartments which they can afford and manage, and within walking distance of young children. We have gone so far in building huge tracts of "homes" all the same size and price that the problem of converting a suburb into a real community, and of shaping new "developments" into multigenerational communities, is a massive one. Yet somehow we have to get the older people, grandparents, widows and widowers, spinsters and bachelors, back close to growing children if we are to restore a sense of community, a knowledge of the past, and a sense of the future to today's children.

**Bridging the Generational Gap** But while better proportioned communities are being built, there are many things that a school system itself can do. Older people, even if they have been segregated in some distant housing, can be brought into nursery schools, day-care centers, and kindergartens, if only to sit in the sun, watch the children play, and be ready to listen to a child's questions and hopes and fears. In this way, children learn to relate to older people, grandparents, widows and widowers, spinsters and bachelors, back close to growing children if we are to traverse if they too, as they well may, become blind. An early habituation to such inter-relationships with elderly people can thus be established for children who live in age-segregated areas.

If children have learned to relate to very old people, then vigorous older people, alert in mind and body, will not seem so old to them. A second important way in which the two-generational gap can be bridged constructively is by developing ways in which both parents and teachers, after graduating or retiring from their earlier responsibilities, can resume contact with the next generation of school children. At present, active workers in the PTA retire when their youngest child graduates from the local school system. And most of them are initially very glad to do so; glad that there will be no more frantic calls just as dinner is ready to go on the table, no more frustrating committee meetings, no more scrambling about for the last few dollars needed for a project. But after that wonderful respite, many of those same once-active members will miss the organization that occupied so much of their thought and effort. Where the older members of a community cannot afford to go away in winter, or can only go away for two or three months, there could be a new activity related to the school, a kind of initiation rite for first grandparents. When the first grandchild is born, although that grandchild may be on the other side of the world, the grandparents might form or join a new society of Grandparents and School, and again assume responsibility for the well-being of the school their children entered two decades ago. This would not only prevent much of the alienation of the senior citizens on a fixed income who come to resent the school taxes that no longer seem to relate to anything they care about, but also provide a new pool of resourceful people, with time and energy to spare, to help the school. If arrangements were made to bring together the members with the school children, an automatic contact would be established, and the school children given an opportunity to meet with grandmothers, even if not their own. The struggles of a quarter of a century ago, and the lessons learned a quarter of a century ago and later forgotten, would all be there, ready to be heard for the asking. Recently I met someone from the town where I graduated from high school and heard that the building, which had been used a half century later as a neighborhood elementary school, had burned down. And we remembered together that there used to be a "boys' entrance" and a "girls' entrance," and how daring I had been when I went back to visit and walked in the boys' entrance just to see what it felt like. One could go very easily from there to stories of hayrides, where the forward little girls would whisper to the shy boys, "My hands are cold" and the boys would mutter, "Sit on them. God loves you."

Parallel with the Grandparents and School association, but overlapping it because so many people today are both retired teachers and current grandparents, retired teachers should be brought back into closer relationships with school children, perhaps to the fifth grade they once taught, or perhaps for a pleasant change to the fourth or sixth, to wonder at how much more the children know, or how their manners have again changed for the better, seen against the background of five or six years with no smell of chalk and no clamor of children's voices. After a decent interval, they become lonely again and miss the children. But at present our institutions for bringing them back into the life of the school are poor. Retired teachers may be asked back to lunch once a year or for a single social evening. A boys' club may give a lunch for the retired teachers. In some places retired teachers are participating actively in day-care programs for children of working mothers. But for the
most part there is no continuity. The retired teacher may be smiled at and greeted wherever she goes, and her heart may be wrung when three of her former students join the highway patrol and themselves then yield to temptation and become thieves. But students don’t talk with her anymore. What is needed is a chance for more give and take, more of an opportunity for each to talk and each to listen. The older, retired teachers shy away because they feel that young people don’t like older people, and the young people, in turn, feel that older people don’t like them. Each act of hesitation increases the mutual shyness.

It might be fun to have a “skip a generation night” with teenagers and retired teachers, but without the present teachers and principal. The teenagers would be responsible for finding the retirees and bringing them along to discuss how tricks have changed over twenty-five years. One of the great appeals of the grandchild-grandparent generation is, as someone has said, that “they have a common enemy.” The older generation’s talk about one’s own tired teachers, but without the present teachers and principal. The teenagers would be responsible for finding the retirees and bringing them along to discuss how tricks have changed over twenty-five years. One of the great appeals of the grandchild-grandparent generation is, as someone has said, that “they have a common enemy.” The older generation’s talk about one’s own tired teachers, but without the present teachers and principal. The teenagers would be responsible for finding the retirees and bringing them along to discuss how tricks have changed over twenty-five years. One of the great appeals of the grandchild-grandparent generation is, as someone has said, that “they have a common enemy.” The older generation’s talk about one’s own tired teachers, but without the present teachers and principal. The teenagers would be responsible for finding the retirees and bringing them along to discuss how tricks have changed over twenty-five years. One of the great appeals of the grandchild-grandparent generation is, as someone has said, that “they have a common enemy.” The older generation’s talk about one’s own tired teachers, but without the present teachers and principal. The teenagers would be responsible for finding the retirees and bringing them along to discuss how tricks have changed over twenty-five years. One of the great appeals of the grandchild-grandparent generation is, as someone has said, that “they have a common enemy.”

And today young people swarm around him wherever he goes. So the felicity of a contact that occurred sixty-three years ago is carried on and recreated today.

I have an aunt who is a hundred years old, and visiting her is a terrific strain on my ability to keep up, as her mind leaps from a fire sixty years ago to a fire forty years ago to a fire eighty years ago to the Chicago fire which happened just before she was born. I am supposed to follow these leaps without a pause. But when I bring a child to see her, she tempers her conversation to his age and knowledge and never requires that he understand more than she knows he can. Many of those who try to separate young and old, or of those who as they become older withdraw from contact with the young, do so because they as adults have been tired by older members of their own family, forgetting that it is only the particular strain on familial memory that has tired them. In greeting new young minds, it is not the demand on compliant memory but the equally strong desire to respond to something new and fresh which comes to the surface.

In many of our high schools and community colleges today, educators face a student body where the students come from vastly different backgrounds, and it is hard for the teacher to bridge the gaps in experience and home background without embarrassment. This is particularly true of classes in family life. If, however, there is a recognition of how rapidly all our lives have changed and that all grandmothers, peasants from southern Europe, refugees from a war-torn world, sharecroppers from the Deep South, Japanese Americans scattered during World War II, grew up in old-fashioned ways,” students may be able to go home and interview their grandparents or their neighbors’ grandparents and report the memories of their youth without embarrassment, all bound together by the points that are in common, unembarrassed by the differences.

One of the greatest challenges to contemporary education is how to impart a knowledge of the immediate past, ten years, twenty years, thirty years ago. The cry of the fifties, just before the first generation born after the War reached college, of the parent who was finding it hard to talk to the children of affluence, “You’ll never understand the Depression,” separates old and young who have not talked enough together through the years. The difference between those of us whose first thought was of Lincoln when John Kennedy was shot and those who said, “That this should happen in America,” is very deep.

The next twenty-five years are going to be demanding ones if growing chaos is to be ordered again upon a greener earth, now seen as one planet in a solar system where there is no other life. The strength that comes from a sense of continuity with the past and hope for the future is solely needed. Our overgraded schools, our patterns of zoning which condemn people to live within narrow socioeconomic and age segments, all introduce dangerous discontinuities. We will need every institution we can find, or invent, to keep society from disintegrating along age lines, old teachers from young teachers, parents of adolescents from adolescents—for today all parents of adolescents are still on the other side of the generation gap. In the schools there are beginning to be many young teachers who are on the same side as their high school students. But if they make common cause against the older teachers, there will be no real communication across the gap, and older teachers, younger teachers, and students alike will all lose. Exercises in exchange of classrooms, in long conversations in small groups, in looking at old movies and new movies together can start up communication again and keep our social system, and our own minds, from cracking under the strain of very rapid change.


...from the reviews of philosophy for children literature...

"Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children looks to be a treasure for educators on the elementary and secondary level. It distinguishes itself from other journals in a number of ways. It addresses a topic heretofore ignored, the teaching of thinking and analytical skills of children, and the guiding of their attempts to make sense of the world, to 'do' philosophy. In this respect, Thinking is long overdue."

"While the Critique of Pure Reason is not a good gift for a child, Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery may be. And for us adults, Growing Up With Philosophy is an excellent idea, for it challenges us to reevaluate our conception of children's capacity for thinking and intellectual curiosity. After all, our greatest gift is relating to them in a manner that facilitates personal autonomy."
—Phi Delta Kappan, September 1979

"Whether Philosophy for Children gains broad acceptance, as Lipman and his colleagues hope, one thing is certain. The program is designed to counteract overspecialization and shotgun approaches present in many areas of education today. If there is a single quality that sets it apart from other curriculums and other teaching strategies, it is the effort to be comprehensive and interdisciplinary. If problems are overcome, and ways found to widely disseminate such a program, maybe we're talking about a rebirth of the Renaissance man."
—"Philosophy for Children" by James Alvino, Teacher, March 1980

"Within the past few years, children's thinking often has had a philosophic cast. As a result, an exciting new discipline has developed that promises to enrich both childhood and philosophical thinking... Growing Up With Philosophy presents a broad, comprehensive variety of viewpoints, from the existentialist to the analytic, and focuses them on key issues such as the adequacy of childhood understanding, the relationship between philosophy and developmental theory, and the role of teachers in the philosophical education of the child."
—Contemporary Education, Vol. LI, No. 1, Fall, 1979

"Substantial instructional manuals (the second one entitled Ethical Inquiry) have been published by the Institute to aid teachers in making the most of the first two volumes. They are most remarkable pieces of work. If the same pedagogical skill, fertility of ideas, and philosophical competence reappear in the manual for Suki that is now well under way, then I should think even junior high school students — in the hands of the right teacher — could do some very good philosophical thinking in aesthetics."
—Monroe Beardsley in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Fall, 1979
...from the reviews of philosophy for children literature...

"Is it possible to help children think with greater skill? The Dialogues of Plato have had this role for adults. And are not children and philosophy natural allies...? Both begin in wonder."

Review of La decouverte d'Harry Stoltlemeier, la Nouvelle Critique, January 1979

"Aimed at an adult world involved in the formal (and informal) education of young people, the new, impressive magazine, Thinking, is a remarkable publication and is highly recommended for educators, students of education and parents who want their children to think."

— New Magazine Review, Vol. 1, No. 9, September, 1979

"Growing Up With Philosophy... presents the reader with some representative views of what is possible and desirable in teaching philosophy to children, with many of the obstacles to doing it, and with a number of searching, sensitive, and challenging treatments of a great many topics from the new field of philosophy and children."

—Kurt Baier, in Teaching Philosophy, Fall 1979
CONVERSATION
AND COMMUNICATION

Ruth L. Saw

Just what is a conversation? Could we properly describe a tenant and a landlord as having a "conversation" with regard to overdue rent? Does the judge call lawyers from both sides into his chambers for a "conversation"? Does the Judge call lawyers from both sides into his chambers for a "conversation"? Do we have a "conversation" with our children when we find they have not shown up in school for several days? How do conversations differ (if they do) from discussions? from dialogues? from arguments? And what is the connection between conversation and communication?

These are some of the questions which, directly or indirectly, Ruth Saw comes to grips with in this essay, which was her inaugural lecture delivered at Birkbeck College in October of 1962. The essence of conversation, she contends, is its innocence of any ulterior purpose. A conversation cannot be guided or directed, nor can one in any way attempt to manipulate the person with whom one converses. Conversations are carried on for their own sake, very much as if they were pure art forms. "Whenever people speak in order to impress, to exhibit their wit, their wealth, their learning, or to bring about some advantage for themselves, they are failing to treat their hearer as a person, as an end in himself, and conversation with him as carried on for its own sake."

It does not matter that the purpose of our manipulations is a commendable one: it cannot be a conversation. If we are engaged in "drawing out" a child so that he or she might better display their intelligence, conversation cannot be said to take place. Or if we are devious in our disclosure of our attitudes, or of facts we want to make known indirectly, our doing so disqualifies the personal interaction from being a conversational one.

Conversation is predicated upon there being a rational partnership of those who converse, a partnership of free and equal individuals. The direction the conversation takes will be determined not so much by the laws of consistency, as by the developing needs of the conversation itself, much as a writer, halfway through a book, begins to find it dictating to him or her what henceforth must be written. The author may still introduce some surprises, just as those who engage in conversation may introduce revelations by which they surprise and delight one another. Indeed, so guileless is a conversation that in the course of it we listen to ourselves and draw inferences about ourselves in ways we previously had been unable to do. One listens to oneself talk and remarks, "I must be jealous," thereby witnessing a disclosure about oneself no less objective than it would have been if we had inferred, from the other person's remarks, "He must be jealous." For in a conversation we are capable of stepping back and listening to what we say, just as an artist, in the act of painting, can still step back and take stock of what he has been doing.

For Professor Saw, conversation is a symmetrical relationship. "A cannot converse with B if B does not converse with A." It is a mutual exploration of one another's individualities. One cannot exact disclosures from the other without being prepared to make similar disclosures regarding oneself. Perhaps this stipulation can be better understood if we refer back to Prof. Saw's earlier distinction between "communicating something to someone" and "being in communication with someone." The first suggests conveying a content of some kind from one person to another; to be more specific, it suggests a quasi-believing situation. But the second suggests that sort of interpersonal experience in which each participant causes the other to think; it is when we are truly in communication with others that we are provoked to think independently.

Professor Saw contrasts conversation with dialogue in a way that is decidedly unflattering to the latter. She sees dialogue as a symmetrical — that is, as a one-way street, rather than as involving a healthy interchange of ideas. This is very odd, since it has generally been agreed that dialogue has precisely the honorable qualities which are here reserved for conversation. This reservation aside, Professor Saw's study of conversation is an exemplary one.
Webster, said T. S. Eliot, was "much possessed by death". Nowadays, we are possessed not so much by death as my destruction, taken simply as an unpleasant and wholesale onset of death which is seen as an absolute end. Death, considered as an event in a long, even an eternal life, no longer presents itself as a fruitful object of thought. Perhaps this is why we are also preoccupied with what is seen as the inevitable isolation of human beings from one another. People used to look on death as the preliminary to a state in which all misunderstandings would be cleared up, but now we accept a state of affairs in which a misunderstanding here now is a misunderstanding for ever. It is therefore of the utmost importance that we should not misunderstand one another, but along with our sense of this importance and the consequent importance of communication, goes a profound and melancholy conviction that communication is never achieved.

It is noteworthy — I hesitated over this word for a long time, and finally left it as a neutral term — it is noteworthy that the period of doubt about the possibility of communication coincides with a period in which the physical means of communication have never been so efficient, so much studied and so well understood. The air is literally humming with conveyors of messages, wireless waves, telegraph and telephone vibrations along the wires and our own little contributions of sound waves as we speak and lecture to one another. When the physical methods of communication have reached a pitch of perfection never approached before, we are assailed by doubts as to whether that towards which it is essentially directed even takes place.

The reason why I hesitated over my adjective was because I was torn between two contrary opinions, that it was surprising, and that it was just what one might expect. Perhaps the truth is that it is surprising only at the first glance. At first sight, it would be natural to think that since we have now mastered the technique of communication, it will go on more efficiently than ever before. On further reflection, we begin to think that what can be done so efficiently, even that poem, or even a love letter, was triggered off by a mechanical device and not by the presence of an exciting object. This may come later — I do not trust machine makers to stop at anything. The more then, makers of machines say of communication: "We've done it!" the more ordinary people say: "If you've done it, it can't be done, as we understand it." We do not then, feel surprise when our novelists and playwrights present human beings as simply existing side by side, soliloquising in one another's presence rather than holding conversations with one another. Even here, however, there is something odd. What should be shown is perfectly ordinary conversations failing to make contact instead of the very special conversations of Waiting for Godot, The Waves and The Caretaker.

When people deny that something exists, they are not denying the facts on which belief in its existence are based, but the interpretation of those facts. People who maintain the essential separateness of human beings from one another, after all, living in our common world in which they, like everybody else, buy things from shops, ask for tickets and travel on trains and buses and call in plumbers to mend the pipes. They are then, not denying that people can and do give one another instructions, orders and information. Since the orders and information are acted upon or rebelled against, they have at least been received by the other person. Such people do not even deny that what looks like conversation between human beings takes place; what they are denying is that by these means, people are in communication with one another. What more do they ask, before agreeing that communication has indeed taken place?

Peiffer recently had a cartoon in The Sunday Observer in which each one of a couple makes just this complaint of the breakdown of communication against the other. The woman begins: "I'm standing right in front of you. Do you see me?" The man, shown as gazing dreamily over her head, replies: "I can't talk to you. I just can't get through to you any more." By the third picture, the situation is reversed and the man is saying: "I'm standing right in front of
you. Do you see me?” In the last epi-

sode but one they are saying together:

“What’s the use? You haven’t heard a

single word I’ve said.” Then one says:

“What?” and the other says: “What?

What?” (It is significant that one is not

sure how to read the double ‘what’ Is it

‘what what’? ‘What what’ sounds too

flippant, though perhaps this is only to

English ears. Perhaps it is just a dead

‘What, what’.)

Here is a case in which two people are

shown as speaking to one another. One

leaves off speaking when the other be-

gins and begins when the other leaves

off. At least each knows when the other

is speaking, and there is even some con-

nexon between what they are each say-

ing. In fact, they seem to be doing the

paradoxical thing which so many of our

novelists and playwrights are doing —

they are saying: “Will you please listen

to me complaining that people cannot

talk to one another.” The metaphor

which Feiffer’s two people use is illumi-

nating; they complain that they cannot

‘get through’, the complaint which we

so frequently have to make to the girl at

the telephone exchange. The invention

of the telephone enabled us, from a long

way off, to ‘get through’ to one another,

where before we should have been safely

not-get-at-able, each in his own house.

But it doesn’t always work. We hear the

bell pealing away in an empty house, or

we have a feeling that the house is not

empty, but for some reason it is ignoring

the pealing of the bell. For whatever rea-

son, the physical apparatus is doing its

part, but we cannot ‘get through’. This

gives us the model for the modern view

of human communication. I may stand

before you, agitating the sound waves as

I speak. They fall on your ears and set

up a vibration in your brain substance,

but somehow I have not got through.

Karl Pearson used the telephone box

metaphor to exhibit the separation of

human beings from the outside world.

We are each shut up in our own heads,

receiving messages from the outside

world but never in direct contact with it.

Similarly, people seem to say nowadays,

we are each shut up in our own heads,

receiving only messages from our fel-

lows, never in direct contact with them.

This is, perhaps, the secret of the fright-

ening fascination of the Sidney Nolan

pictures and films of Ned Kelly. Kelly is

shown in his homemade armour, his

square tin head completely blank, no

holes through which messages can enter

in or come out. Is this supposed to be

typical of the true situation of men in

their attempts at communication with

one another?

“But”, you may say, “sometimes

someone, even the person you wish to

speak to, lifts the receiver and says

‘Hullo’.” Does this constitute ‘getting

through’ in any other than the literal

sense in this context? Before we consider

this question, let us examine some cases

in which communication admittedly

breaks down. We shall then be free to

consider whether, these cases aside,

communication must fail under the most

favorable circumstances, whether, that

is to say, there is anything at all which

can count as communication. Com-

munication fails where two people are

speaking together, but from two very

different viewpoints, social, national,

etc. I do not mean from two points of

view representing conflicting interests; it

is not communication but agreement

which fails here. I mean cases where the

hearer takes the remarks of the speaker

in a different context from that assumed

by the speaker. As frequently happens,

communication fails where the hearer

takes the remarks of the speaker in a dif-

ferent context from that assumed by the

speaker.”

The best examples come from the

humorists. There are P. G.

Wodehouse’s two burglars who are en-

joying a peaceful glass of port after pack-

ing up the valuables in an empty house.

One of them prides himself on his

knowledge of the aristocracy and their

ways. Leaning back in his chair and gaz-

ing at the light sparkling through his

glass of port he asks idly: “Who do you

think would go in to dinner first, the

sister of an earl or the daughter of a

baronet?” His companion replies from

an entirely different context: “It de-

fends who’s quickest on her feet.”

Communication has failed so completely

here that reproaches of commonness and

ignorance from the one side quickly lead
to accusations of ‘side’ from the other,

and to their falling on one another with

punches and blows, until they are col-

lected up and carted off unconscious by

the police. Except for this result, this

type of exchange could be paralleled in

many philosophical discussions, when,

say, a theist is confronted by a positivist.

In fact, a wary philosopher will find out

first in what context an admission will be

taken before he makes it. An exchange

from the Moral Science Club at Cam-

bridge went as follows: A. — At least

you will admit that 2 and 2 make 4. B. —

No I won’t, not till I know what you are

going to do with it.

Communication may fail where the

context evoked may be the same in

speaker and hearer, but where the hear-

er lacks the experience to give content to

what he hears. The story from Grimm,

The Man Who Could Not Shiver, tells of such a
case. The young man is called Dumm-

ling, naturally, since it is he who is to

marry the beautiful princess. Dumpling

constantly hears people saying that

things make them shiver. He sits by the

fireside with them listening to ghost stor-
of men which fall down the great chimney, with cat-headed dogs and many other unusual combinations. Dummling still does not know what it means to shiver, but his friends have literally done the best possible for him; they have arranged for him to be put in situations in which normal men would feel the experience in question. If it fails, then there is nothing more to be done, but this is a special case; our question is whether communication is such that it must fail by its very nature.

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"...our question is whether communication is such that it must fail by its very nature."

The method used by Dummling’s friends is not always open to people who wish to ensure that they are conveying their meaning to one another. Suppose A assures us that he cannot think what we mean when we talk about nostalgia. We describe to him occasions on which we mean when we talk about nostalgia. Dummling assures us that he cannot think what their meaning to one another. Suppose we have felt it; he recalls similar occasions and reports no peculiar feeling which might be called homesickness. We cannot kidnap him and take him further away from home and for a longer period than he has ever experienced before, in the hope that he will then understand what we are talking about. Our only result would be to turn to artists in words or sounds or coloured shapes, who succeed in conveying to people of normal sensibility the experience in question. (I have no facts which would bear on the question whether people completely failing to feel a given emotion under the circumstances which would normally arouse it might be led to feel that emotion by a work of art which presented similar situations.) But after all, is this what Wordsworth in The Highland Lass, or Proust, are as a matter of fact, conveying? And even if it were, would my sitting beside you while you read Swansway, waiting for an expression of comprehension to appear ("Oh, now I know what homesickness is"), would it have done my job? What I started off by wanting to convey to you was the exact flavour of my feeling when I was in America. How does it help for you to be moved by an evocation of homesickness in the figure of Ruth in the alien corn? This is not a sensitive awareness of me in America, but perhaps the answer is that we stand a better chance of becoming sensitively aware of the emotions of our friends if we have met similar situations in books, pictures and plays.

But we first have to consider the question whether artists, as a matter of fact, convey or communicate the natural emotions of human beings towards their surroundings and towards their fellows. Romanticists believe that the artist embodies the emotions aroused in him by the stimulating or originating experience in an object which directly arouses similar emotions in his spectator-audience and towards the artist’s object. The difficulty here is that it is in the very respect of what we may call primary emotion towards the primary objects, sunsets, death and betrayal, fog on the river, that the artist differs from the ordinary man. No sooner is an artist moved by a situation, event or object than his experience begins to shape itself in phrases, images, shapes or musical tones. Wagner expressed this situation exactly in A Happy Evening (Paris, 1841). He writes: "When a musician feels prompted to sketch the smallest composition, he owes it simply to the stimulus of a feeling that usurps his whole being at the hour of conception. This mood may be brought about by an outward experience or have arisen from a secret inner spring; whether it shows itself as melancholy, joy, desire, contentment, love or hatred, in the musician it will always take a musical shape, and voice itself in tones or however it is cast in notes. These greater moods, as deep suffering of soul or potent exaltation, may date from outer causes, for we are all men...; but when they force the musician to production, these greater moods have already turned to music in him." Such an account meets the common but shallow objection to a communication theory of art, that if an artist is to communicate emotion, he must feel that emotion all the time he is at work. Not at all. What the artist feels is not, say, melancholy, but delight in his power to depict melancholy, and it is this delight which is communicated to his audience. This is why we can witness tragedies without distress or, rather, with positive delight. The object placed before us is exactly what it should be, and though jealousy, hatred, treachery may be be-
composers make no attempt to communicate, that, at a time when scientists are making great strides in the understanding of the forms of communication, the very people who are traditionally the transmitters of experience to their fellows have given up the attempt. But if artists are communicating their painterly or writerly experiences and not the ordinary emotions towards everyday objects, then the essential difference between Constable and Braque lies in the nature of the originating experience and not in the fact or the lack of communication. Constable is transmitting not his love for the countryside of Suffolk, but his delight in being able to render his beloved flat fields and wide skies in pig-

ments. The originating experience of the moderns seems to be more directly concerned with the nature and possibilities of their medium. We may even get the delight of the action painter as he rides over his canvas on his bicycle.

We have now reached the position that if A and B wish to be sure that they are communicating with one another, they will find no real difficulty if all they are talking about is giving one another pieces of information, instructions and orders. If they wish to inform one another as to their mental states, there will be more difficulty than if the information were about sights and sounds. "If writers and artists cannot convey the peculiar emotional flavour of jealousy, horror, love, then nobody can."

Let us suppose that all these difficulties have been overcome. We now feel confident that we can make one another understand that we have had certain kinds of experiences, and sometimes are able to bring them to feel their peculiar emotional flavour. If all this has happened, would this be good enough? Would our Feiffer couple feel that they had 'got through' to one another? My feeling is that they would still not be satisfied; that in fact they cannot be satisfied, because they are asking for a logical impossibility. A looks at B. He has done his best to make B share a given experience and B has expressed himself in such terms that for a moment, A feels satisfied. Only for a moment however. Even suppose B feels an exactly similar repugnance and shrinking of the flesh that A has presented to him so eloquently, it is still B's own repugnance and shrinking. A may still look at him and think: "How do I know that it feels the same to you as it feels to me? I am behind my face and you are in front of it, and that is how it remains."

A is like Walt Disney's Harry Hare who played himself at tennis, leaping over the net so quickly that he was in time to return his own services, then back again to return his return. He wanted to be on both ends of his service and return, and in the same way, our A wants to be on both ends of his messages. He knows what it feels like to send out a given message; he wants to know also, what it feels like to receive it. Only so, he thinks, can two people really be in communication with one another. The only snag is that there is now no point in sending out messages. Why bother to send out messages which you yourself are to receive? I could easily have made Harry Hare an extremely discontented animal. There he was, gaily leaping backwards and forwards, nonchalantly returning his hardest services and volleys, but completely missing the unexpectedness of an opponent's tactics in dealing with such strokes. That is much more important, even in learning your own strength and weakness, than knowing how it is to receive your own service. Communication between persons who remain stubbornly themselves and separate is the only communication worthy of the name. What our melancholy people are demanding for perfect communication is the destruction of its essential condition. What I hope to show however, is that there is a satisfactory exercise in which human beings engage, which leads to their becoming better acquainted with themselves and with one another, and which is therefore worthy of the name of communication. It sounds too easy an answer, but I am hoping to exhibit conversation between human beings as such an exercise.

Before embarking on this, however, I must make a distinction the need for which must have been obvious to you all. I have not overlooked it, but was waiting for the most convenient place to make it. This distinction is between A's communicating x to B, where x may be

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"If writers and artists cannot convey the peculiar emotional flavour of jealousy, horror, love, then nobody can."
emotion, whatever you like to B, and
A's being in communication with B. There are important logical differences
between these two relationships; the first
is a three-termed while the second is a
two-termed relationship. Moreover, if
we ignore the x for the moment, and
think of the giving-receiving relation as
if it were two-termed, it is an a-symmet­
rical relation, i.e., one which holds only
one way round, while the second is symmet­
rical. If A gives (x) to B, then B does
not by that same act, give whatever it
was to A. But if A is in communication
with B, then B by that same act is in
communication with A. Now the people
who complain that they cannot get in
touch with one another are not com­
plaining that they cannot communicate
some things to one another, but that
they cannot be in communication with
one another. They may or may not feel
difficulty about the communication of
emotion, but they certainly feel the diffi­
culty of being in contact with other hu­
man beings.

"Giving orders to, taking
instructions from, making
suggestions to, vetoing the
suggestions of, are all
examples of a-symmetrical
relations."
The essence of conversation as I hope to show, is that it must not be used for any ulterior purpose.

course we must draw CD parallel to AB. . . .

The other way in which something might appear as a conversation — and now it will be clear why I wanted to use the vague 'something' — is that used by two people who want to present the appearance of conversing without using words, but simply by making suitable noises. It may be noticed here that if you wanted to present the appearance of a conversation in German, you would have to use a series of noises different from those you would make if it were to appear as a conversation in Irish or Italian, or in any other language.

I spoke earlier of 'misused' conversation. This was a mis-description. The essence of conversation, as I hope to show, is that it must not be used for any ulterior purpose. Conversation can, then, neither be used nor misused; what we want to say in the latter case is that someone has pretended to converse when he is in reality guiding the sequence of remarks to his own end. I will give some examples. The first is from Mrs. Gaskell's *Wives and Daughters*. Mrs. Gibson is ostensibly concerned about the health of Lady Cumnor, but her hearers are not taken in. 'Cynthia: 'They're in London now, and Lady Cumnor hasn't suffered from the journey'". They say so," said Mrs. Gibson, . . . 'I am perhaps over-anxious, but I wish — I wish I could see and judge for myself. It would be the only way of calming my anxiety. I almost think I shall go up with you, Cynthia, for a day or two, just to see her with my own eyes. You shall write to Mr. Kirkpatrick and propose it if we determine upon it. You can tell him of my anxiety; and it will only be sharing your bed for a couple of nights'. That was the way in which Mrs. Gibson first broached her intention of accompanying Cynthia up to London for a few days' visit. She had a trick of producing the first sketch of any new plan before an outsider to the family circle; so that the first emotions of others, if they disapproved of her projects, had to be repressed, until the idea had become familiar to them.' That is to say, Mrs. Gibson, under the guise of carrying on a conversation with her family and guests, shaped what she said so as to bring about her own ends.

The next example, from *Martin Chuzzlewit*, is even plainer. Mrs. Gamp is being conveyed by Mr. Pecksniff to lay out old Anthony Chuzzlewit, who has just died. Mrs. Gamp hopes for a new and profitable connection, but wishes to make her requirements quite plain. She delivers herself thus to Mr. Pecksniff: "'Mrs. Harris' I says, at the very last case as ever I acted in, 'Mrs. Harris' I says, 'leave the bottle on the chimley piece, and don't ask me to take none, but let me put my lips to it when I am so disposed, and then I will do what I am engaged to do to the best of my ability.' 'Mrs. Gamp', she says in answer, 'if ever there was a sober creature to be got at eighteenpence a day for working people, and three-and-six for gentlefolks — night watching'" said Mrs. Gamp with emphasis, "'being an extra charge — you are that inwallable person'." Here, Mrs. Gamp, by means of a reported conversation, it is true, and as we suspect, an imaginary one, has managed to mention several matters that it is important for her comfort that her employers should know.

Here is a misuse of conversation in a more important and subtle sense, from *Pride and Prejudice*. Mr. Bennet is ostensibly engaged in conversation with his cousin, Mr. Collins, but is really leading him on to exhibit himself as a flatterer who is so stupid as not to see how other people would regard him. Mr. Collins has been speaking of the daughter of his patron, Lady Catherine de Bourgh. "Has she been presented? I do not remember her name among the ladies at court." "Her indifferent state of health unhappily prevents her being in town and by that means, as I told Lady Catherine myself one day, has deprived the British Court of its brightest ornament. Her Ladyship seemed pleased with the idea; and you may imagine that I am happy on every occasion to offer those little compliments which are always acceptable to ladies. I have more than once observed to Lady Catherine, that her charming daughter seemed born to be a duchess; and that the most elevated rank, instead of giving her consequence, would be adorned by her. These are the kind of little things which please her Ladyship, and it is a sort of attention which I conceive myself bound to pay." "You judge very properly," said Mr. Bennet; "and it is happy for you that you possess the talent of flattering with delicacy. May I ask whether these pleasing attentions proceed from the impulse of the moment, or are they the result of previous study?" "They arise chiefly from what is passing at the time; and though I sometimes amuse myself with suggesting and arranging such little elegant compliments as may be adapted to ordi-
nary occasions, I always wish to give them as unstudied an air as possible." Mr. Bennet's expectations were fully answered. His cousin was as absurd as he had hoped; and he listened to him with the keenest enjoyment, maintaining at the same time the most resolute composure of countenance, and except in an occasional glance at Elizabeth, requiring no partner in his pleasure."

To call this a misuse of conversation is not, of course, a reflection on that master of dialogue, Jane Austen. She knows and shows us just how people make use of others for their enjoyment, their advancement, just as much in their words as in their actions. Whenever people speak in order to impress, to exhibit their wit, their wealth, their learning, or add, but, some creatures having the human form are not worthy of the name 'person'. It is safer to assume that any creature having the human form is a person, is to be treated as such, and is to be found worthy of being engaged in rational enterprises, including that of conversation. (While we are on the subject of misuse of conversation, I will draw your attention to an entry in Who's Who under the name of a recent winner of the Nobel Prize in Medicine. This gentleman gives as his only recreation, 'conversation, especially with pretty women').

We may now draw together the requirements for giving the name conversation to a set of utterances by two people. It could be between more than two

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"A and B are conversing when they are each interested in the experiences, attitudes and opinions of the other."

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To bring about some advantage for themselves, they are failing to treat their hearer as a person, as an end in himself and conversation with him as carried on for its own sake. Mr. Bennet, of course, thinks of Mr. Collins as an unworthy partner in any rational enterprise; it is true also that Mr. Collins is being exhibited as one who shamelessly exploits conversation with his wealthy patron, who herself is not a rational being in her composure of countenance, and except in an occasional glance at Elizabeth, requiring no partner in his pleasure."

To call this a misuse of conversation is not, of course, a reflection on that master of dialogue, Jane Austen. She knows and shows us just how people make use of others for their enjoyment, their advancement, just as much in their words as in their actions. Whenever people speak in order to impress, to exhibit their wit, their wealth, their learning, or

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people, but no new principle would arise with a third participant, so for the sake of simplicity we will assume that conversation is between two people. We might notice also, that sometimes, an apparent soliloquy could equally well have been a conversation, where the person soliloquising is able to see alternating points of view clearly enough to produce surprises to himself in his ruminations. Groucho Marx, playing a dictator who has been persuaded to receive the head of a neighbouring and unfriendly nation ruminates thus: (He has found the phrase 'extend the right hand of friendship' particularly persuasive.) "Yes," he says: "I will receive him. I'll show the big baboon what it is to be magnanimous. I'll extend the right hand of friendship to him." He dwells with pleasure on this prospect, but suddenly goes on: "But suppose he won't take it! Suppose I extend the right hand of friendship to him and he just stands there sneering! A nice fool I shall look standing there with my hand stuck out and he won't take it, the big gink!" At this moment the man appears at the door and Groucho promptly knocks him down. This could easily have been a dialogue between two people, rather than between Groucho and his alter ego, since these two latter are sufficiently unlike to be thought of as two people.

We will put the negative conditions for conversation first: A may be said to converse with B, when it is not the case that:

1. A is manipulating the succession of remarks in such a way that B may be, without his knowledge, presented to others in a given light. It need not be an unfavourable light; if B were being 'drawn out' so as to exhibit his wit, he would be being used just as much as if it were to exhibit his stupidity.

We will put the negative conditions for conversation first: A may be said to converse with B, when it is not the case that:

2. A is manipulating the exchange of remarks in such a way that he informs B, or those standing by, as if it were casually, of facts that he wishes to make known, but which he does not wish to mention directly, or if he wishes to display an attitude towards B or others without appearing to do so.

3. A is manipulating the exchange of remarks in such a way as to exhibit himself as possessing some quality, good or bad, which for some reason, he wishes to have noticed.

There may be other ways of using and so destroying conversation, but the important general condition, is that it, no more than persons, may be used. In a rational partnership, neither may be worked on, without his knowledge and consent.

Positively, A may be said to converse with B when:

1. They exchange remarks in such a situation that they are free and equal partners. Equals, of course, may put themselves into hierarchical organisations. This does not destroy their equality with other members of the organisation if they have chosen to enter it, and so long as there is some area outside that organisation where its members may gather together and talk with one another as equals. This does not mean of equal value to the community, but simply of equal worth as persons. It is the sense in which people are equal in the sight of the
law, or better still, in the sight of God. This I take to be the foundation of the anarchist's creed — that human beings ought not to enter into relationships which will make it appear that some people are more important than others. Certainly, if we want a bridge built, then for the time architects, engineers and quantity surveyors are the most important people. Therefore, say the anarchists, take care to disband the bridge-building committee as soon as the bridge is built, and do not let the habit of estimating people according to their usefulness take possession.

2. A and B are conversing when they are each interested in the experiences, attitudes and opinions of the other. They begin to explore a situation, talk about a thing or event, and allow the conversation to take its own way. This is not quite like 'following the argument where it leads' since the course of the argument is determined by the logical relation between the steps. The conversation goes where it will in the sense that 'the spirit bloweth where it listeth'. It is not only about something, it is also expressive of the feelings and attitudes of the two people towards it.

3. Each person can give the other some surprises.

At this point, we may look back and notice that our requirements begin to make conversation look like a work of art. It is the spontaneous and free expression of two people sharing a common object, who are enjoying the process of making a new object, the conversation. Since this object has been made by the two together, and since neither would have been moved to his utterances without the stimulus of the other, it is an object which they can both contemplate as revealing A to himself and to B, and B to himself and to A. It is an object which embodies the knowledge which the two people have achieved of one another and each of himself.

It is usually assumed that each man is at least acquainted with himself, but it seems to me that the process of becoming acquainted with oneself necessarily goes along with the process of becoming acquainted with another person. If I never exchange remarks with another person, never have any dealings with or evoke a response from him, I do not really know what my emotions are. We say of someone who utters an unusually spiteful remark: He must be jealous. Equally, and with the same shock of surprise, we feel a pang when we hear of a friend's success and say: I must be jealous. The difference between the two cases is that in the first we hear the spiteful remark while the friend had the pang. In the second case, we had the pang, but this led us to say, just as hearing the remark led us to say of our friend: I, the person who had the pang, must be jealous. Not am jealous, but must be: it is an inference in both cases. It seems to be assumed that the self which remains stubbornly mine and from which others are inescapably cut off, is a congerie of such pangs, flashes of hopefulness, feelings of nostalgia. Certainly, our growing knowledge of and acquaintance with our companions and the world has a running accompaniment of such feelings, but what makes us separate from but interested in one another is not that running accompaniment but that which it accompanies. It is our growing knowledge of the world, each from his own point of view, our changing and developing attitudes towards it and our own peculiar methods of dealing with it. It is this which makes communication necessary, possible and worthwhile.

A further paradox arises from our demand to be in direct and complete communication with one another, to feel one another's feelings and think one another's thoughts. Let us take an example first, of an attempt to enter completely into the concerns of another person, in which it is easier to exhibit the paradox, and then go on to the attempt to take up one another's thoughts, feelings and attitudes towards the external world.

A and B each wishes to demonstrate his tender concern for the other. A says: I worry only about your worries, B. B says: I worry only about your worries, A. In that case, neither has any worries, although A has headaches and an overdraft at the bank, and B has a weak chest and chilblains. They see this to be absurd and each amends his position. A says: I worry about all our worries, both yours and mine. B says the same. But now they have too many worries; A worries not only about B's weak chest, but about B's worry about his weak chest, and this constitutes a new worry for B, and consequently a new worry for A and so on, indefinitely. They see this to be as absurd as the first state, and agree on the following amendment. The tender concern of each for the other is to be shown reasonably by concern for all the ills of both, that is to say, each will feel first order worry. Second order worry for the feelings of worry of the other will be a matter of concern only if it constitutes a first order worry, i.e., A might be worried about B's worry because about his chilblains as a sign of bad circulation and so of a weak heart.

Let us now draw a parallel to this case in the mutual desire of A and B to feel each as the other feels towards their common world. They stand in A's garden which is bedded out with scarlet geraniums, blue lobelias and white alyssum. B hates it, and thinks his own arrangement of delphiniums, heliotrope and pink rambler roses is much to be preferred. He stands and looks at A's red, white and blue, trying to feel A's delight in it. But A is trying to feel B's dislike of it. It is a hopeless case, since neither is feeling his usual feeling for what he sees, and so neither has anything to communicate to the other. Their first amendment leads them to admit first order feelings: each must hang on to his primary feelings, A of delight in his flower arrangement and his depreciation of B's dislike of it. But he has now presented a new feeling to B, namely his depreciation of B's feeling, and A will now have a new feeling about his feeling and so on. They now reach the third and reasonable position. Each must be allowed to feel his own private feeling towards his own things. Each can tell the other that they feel in a certain way towards those things. A can understand that his feeling for his red, white and blue resembles B's feeling for his pink, blue and mauve. But if each feels the other's feelings for these diverse objects, there is no longer an A-ish state for B to become aware of, or a B-ish state for A to become aware. Plotinus said that if individual souls were not separate and distinct, we should all experience one another's sensations, desires and thoughts, even everything that occurred anywhere in the universe. (This of course, assumes that there are no unoc-
ocupied points of view, which may be allowed to pass, if we include the omnipresence of God.) In either event, it would mean, in effect, that there were no points of view, since whatever was experienced from any point of view would be experienced from every point of view.

So far, we have been concerned only with deliberate utterances by human beings, deliberate conveying of information, giving of orders, engaging in conversation. We must qualify the deliberations in the latter case, for conversation is deliberate in one sense and not in another. It is deliberate in the sense that it is a human action, but it is not reflected upon at every step on the way. It is deliberate in the way in which a work of art is deliberate. An artist chooses to write, to paint or to model, but once embarked upon the process, he cannot be said to proceed altogether deliberately. It is not like embarking upon a mathematical proof in which each step is seen as determining the next by the nature of the material, and yet there is a connexion between each step and the next. Henry James talks of ‘the logic of the particular case’, and Barbara Hepworth describes how the first line drawn upon the blank canvas narrows the possibilities for the next. Having drawn the first line, the artist cannot place the next line anywhere, though he could not produce a general principle justifying the placing of the next line. It is seen as what must be in this case. I want to call conversation deliberate in this latter sense; it is one of the desirable activities in which human beings engage, both for its own sake and for the sake of the product, and since it is desirable, we may urge it upon one another, and this is to presuppose that it is willed. It has its own rules, however, and its course is determined by the particular nature of each case.

The question of the deliberateness of our exploring of one another’s individuality by conversation leads on to my last point. There are certainly ways in which we learn about other people, if not necessarily against their will, at least not with their cooperation. We may betray emotion rather than express it, to adopt R. G. Collingwood’s distinction. If we are on the alert, we may read the signs and, as we say, ‘read one another like a book’. This cannot count as communication, nor can the being acted upon by signs given to us without our knowledge or consent. We cannot be said to receive a message from a sub-liminal flash upon the screen, even though it affects our behaviour. We are justifiably annoyed if we find that we have been so acted upon. There is one kind of case, however, in which it is legitimate to read the signs of another person’s emotions and intentions. Where two people willingly enter themselves against each other as antagonists, it is part of the game to read the signs, to provoke one another to give such signs, and part of the training to keep a poker face and give no hint of intentions. Two boxers who have met one another frequently in the ring, two tennis players who know one another’s game thoroughly, are keeping our rules for treating with persons; they are treating one another as equals each worthy of the other’s steel. Each is submitting himself to what he is giving, and there is no doubt that they are becoming very well acquainted with one another.

It is significant that ideal courtesy between people is often exemplified not by close friends, but by people who are strangers to one another. They are not hampered by any of the complicating circumstances troubling friends and acquaintances. If you want an example of absolute good will between persons, an unadulterated desire to help, a going out of the way to make sure that the required help has been given, ask a stranger the way somewhere. Of course, if he does not know the way, the experiment has failed, but if he does know it, he all but carries you there and bears you through the doorway. With the natural and native good will of human beings towards one another, he meets with joy a situation in which he really can do for somebody, just what that person wants done. He keeps looking back to savour the full, the pleasant experience of seeing another person going right through his agency. When we are in more complicated relationships with one another, we cannot behave in this way, but how we wish we could. This brings me to what really is my last point. People who complain that they are not able really to know others seldom think of themselves as to be known in the same way in which they wish to know others. Knowing and being known are co-relative terms, as are loving and being loved. 

"Knowing and being known are co-relative terms, as are loving and being loved."
Philosophical Encounters With Children

Susan, age nine, and Ray, age eleven, have just emerged from the cold waters of Lake Michigan. Susan is standing rigidly in her wet, cold bathing suit.

Susan: I feel like a stiff penguin.
Ray: How do you know what a stiff penguin feels like?
Susan: I feel like it looks like a stiff penguin would feel.

A few years ago someone asked me if I thought that philosophy could be a suitable subject matter for children. I had to admit that I had never really seriously considered the question. And my initial reaction was somewhat skeptical.

After all, my own educational experiences, both as a student and teacher, had led me to accept the then prevailing view that philosophy is primarily for adults — and that serious philosophy is primarily for only those adults who have a peculiar sort of curiosity and persistence.

However, it was at about this time that Harry Stottlemeier made his first appearance. Not satisfied with my initial doubts about philosophy for children, I decided to read Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery. There was no doubt in my mind that Harry, Lisa, Tony, Mark, and their friends were capable of philosophical thinking. And they were only fifth graders! But, I asked myself, are real children like that? Fortunately, I had my own children to listen to. When I listened with greater care than I had before, I was pleasantly surprised. Here are some samplings.

While eating dinner, Susan, then 7, announced: "God couldn't have created everything." Since this remark was greeted with silence, she pressed further. "Would you like me to explain?" We nodded yes. "God has to have a mother and father too." When I asked if God's mother and father had to have a mother and father as well, Susan replied, "I don't know; I haven't thought about that."

A short time later our son Scott, then 10, playfully initiated a dialogue with Susan that went like this:
Scott: If I believed in God, I would believe that thunder is God clapping his hands together, lightning is his flashlight, and rain is his tears.
Susan: If I believed in God, I would believe that thunder is two clouds bumping together, lightning is electricity, and rain is water from the clouds.
Scott: That's silly, Susan. Don't you believe in God?
Susan: No, but I do believe in thunder, lightning, and rain.

By this time I was fairly certain that Scott was ready to meet Harry and his friends. It was becoming apparent that our empiricist daughter was ready and willing as well.

Both children listened with great interest to the early chapters of Harry. Occasionally Susan expressed puzzlement about what was being said. But she seemed eager to hear more. I wasn't certain what impact Harry was having on them, especially since there were only two of them discussing it with me, and sometimes their age differences got in the way of establishing common ground for dialogue. However, one day, quite without Harry in mind, I reversed a sentence.

Dad: I guess it is. But sometimes it's alright to turn sentences around.
Scott: I know.
Dad: Like, "All fools are little boys" and "All little boys are fools."
Susan: Yes, tea for two is the same as two for tea.
Scott: Well, I guess I'm not a little boy.
Dad: Why not?
Scott: I'm no fool. But you're a little boy!
Susan: If he is a little boy, what's a big boy?
Dad: Yes, Scott, what's a big boy?
Susan: I know. To Grandpa, Dad is a little boy. Grandpa is a big boy. Scott is a little, little boy to Grandpa.
It is difficult to determine how much *Harry* has influenced Susan and Scott. And one might suspect that living under the same roof with a professional philosopher has some bearing on their thinking. But examples of philosophical thinking are readily available from children who have never read *Harry* and whose parents are not professional philosophers. Our friend Chrissy, age 9, provided some illustrations on our recent vacation with her family.

My wife, Millie, noticed that Scott was in danger of getting a sunburn while making sandcastles at the beach, and she urged him to put some suntan oil on his back. Scott replied, “Mom, can’t you tell from my digging that I’m a machine and can’t stop?” Chrissy quickly responded, “If you’re a machine, you do need oil. And besides, if you can get a sunburn, you couldn’t be a machine.” At breakfast, while I was preparing French toast, Scott and Ray, Chrissy’s brother, asked if I would cook their toast “extra”. This prompted Chrissy to say, “If everyone has theirs cooked extra, no one will really have it cooked extra.”

Encouraged by the samplings of philosophical thinking provided by my children and their friends, I decided to try out philosophy for children in the classroom. I was invited to meet with a portion of my daughter’s 4th grade class during the Winter semester of 1979. From January to June I met once a week with Ms. Louise Miller’s class at the West Main Elementary School. She selected 9 students to meet with me in one corner of the classroom, while she met with the remainder of her class in another portion of the classroom.

Since these were only 4th graders, I was not sure how well received *Harry* and his older classmates would be. However, it soon was apparent that this group was equal to the challenge. In response to the question of how discoveries and inventions differ, I was quickly presented with a very good analytical definition. And I was bombarded with examples. One example in particular provoked some controversy within the group. Sean suggested that electricity was discovered. Susan replied that she thought it was both discovered and invented. Since it was already there, it was discovered; but we invented uses for it. This would be in contrast to the concept of lightning. Could this have been reflected in Susan’s answer?

It did not take my group long to sort out *Harry* and Lisa’s rules about sentence reversals. When I asked if anyone could find an exception to Harry’s rule that ‘all’ sentences cannot be reversed, Emily suggested, “All animals are animals.” I said that a 5th grader in another group came up with “All trees are trees”; but he commented that his sentence was boring. So, I asked if the group could come up with a more interesting example. Soon the group was trying to come up with a pair of words with the same referent. Finally, Karen suggested, “All rabbits are hares.”

Next I said, “Since we found an exception to Harry’s rule about ‘all’ sentences, how do we know there aren’t any exceptions to his rule about ‘no’ sentences?” Immediately several people began talking at once, trying to come up with exceptions. I ended our first session with the suggestion that everyone should see if they could come up with an exception, and if they could not, try to explain why they could not. Emily’s parting words were, “It’s impossible!”

At the outset of our second session Gabe announced very excitedly that he had come up with an exception: “No school, no basketball practice.” He pointed out that, while this statement is true, its reversal is not. At first the others seemed puzzled by what Gabe said. I asked if what he had said was really a sentence. Some said, no. Jessie said that what Gabe meant was, “If there is no school, then there is no basketball practice.” Gabe agreed. Then Sean remarked that Harry’s rules did not say anything about sentences like that. Soon it was noted that ‘if-then’ sentences behave very much like ‘all’ sentences, with Celia pointing out that sometimes ‘if-then’ sentences can be reversed.

Since I had the only copy of *Harry*, I had to read it aloud to my group. Frequently I paused to discuss something with the group or to answer questions. When it was suggested by Harry and Lisa that there might be more than one way of expressing a sentence like “All dogs are animals,” I asked the group how many ways they could think of. To my surprise, every one of the ways subsequently mentioned in *Harry* was brought up by my group. In fact, one of the first responses was Celia saying that she did not think it was necessary to have a word like ‘all’ or ‘every’.

Our group sat in a cloistered corner of the room, surrounded by bookshelves and small panels. Overhead hung some plants. 3:00 was cleanup time for the entire class. However, we were running a bit late. Suddenly a girl marched into our corner with a watering can and proceeded to pour water on the plants, with occasional splashes falling on our heads. Concerned that our session was being disturbed, Ms. Miller called across the room: “If your job interferes with the group, don’t do it; if the group interferes with your job, don’t do it!” The girl retreated, and we resumed our discussion without significant delay.

At the end of our session, Emily approached me with Ms. Miller’s two sentences written on a piece of paper. She announced that these sentences were the reverse of each other, and they provided another exception to the rule that ‘if-then’ sentences cannot be reversed. Although there are important differences between these ‘if-then’ sentences and the ones we had been considering, Emily’s observation was quite astute. And I was pleasantly surprised by her attempt to apply what we had been talking about to what had seemed to the rest of us to be an interruption.

Our third session was devoted primarily to Chapter 3 of *Harry*. Some of the responses were particularly interesting and amusing. In response to Lisa’s statement that no one has ever seen numbers walking down the street, Sean drew a picture of a number doing just that. Several insisted that numbers can be seen — as when written down. At one point I asked where our feelings are. Gabe immediately stood up, clutched his heart and said, “Me feelings come from me heart.” Sean said that his feelings are in his brain, although sometimes they are in his stomach when he is nervous.

We still had not answered the question of why ‘no’ sentences can always be reversed. I showed the group the circles drawn by Mr. Melillo to explain why ‘all’ sentences cannot be reversed. I then asked if anyone could use circles to ex-
plain why “No cats are dogs” can be reversed. First it was suggested that the cat circle could be put inside the dog circle. When I explained that this would mean that all cats are dogs, someone suggested reversing the circles. Finally, Karen suggested that we draw two circles touching each other, but which do not intersect.

The kinds of remarks and responses during these first three sessions were typical of those that occurred in later sessions. However, there had begun to develop a problem I had not anticipated. The group was getting progressively more rambunctious - moving around, whispering, pushing, shoving, and the like. This was all done good-naturedly, but it sometimes presented a problem when we were reading or discussing Harry. Any number of factors could account for their behavior. One may have been that I had approached them in a very non-authoritarian manner. Now that they had gotten to know me rather well (and some had known me before), it was time to see what my limits of tolerance were. When I asked them why they were acting in the ways they were, I was informed that, unlike Ms. Miller, I really had no power — I was like a substitute! And we all remember how substitutes are put to the test.

Reluctant to assert power in this situation, I asked Ms. Miller if she would read Shiver, Gobble, and Snore to her class before I met with my group the next time. This book is one of a series by Marie Winn that explores concepts involved in social behavior. Shiver is about rules. Shiver, Gobble and Snore live in a land ruled by a King who loves to impose arbitrary rules. They decide that they do not want to live under arbitrary rule any longer. So, they go off by themselves, vowing to live without rules. However, they soon discover that without rules they constantly interfere with one another. Rather than return to the kingdom they decide to come up with rules of their own. They conclude that having rules can be alright if they are for the good of everyone, and if they are mutually acceptable. My thought was that my group would see the need for having rules regulating our discussions, and I hoped that we would be able mutually to determine some rules.

At our next session I asked if anyone could guess why I had their teacher read Shiver to them. I did not get the answer I expected. Instead, I was disarmed by Karen’s observation that Shiver and Harry talk about different kinds of rules — respectively, those that we make up ourselves (invent) and those that we discover. This delightful response put off our discussion of the need for establishing our own rules for a while.

Eventually, however, we began to consider whether we needed to have some rules to regulate our discussions. The consensus was that this would be a good idea. But the students were reluctant to suggest any rules. Finally, Karen urged that I suggest some rules, and the group would vote on them. My first candidate was: “Everyone must sit in his or her own chair.” (At that moment two students were occupying the same chair.) Immediately five hands shot up in favor of the rule, while four remained down. Then one hand went down, and I now became aware of another reason for the distracting behavior in the group. Our group consisted of five boys and four girls. Originally, four girls and one boy had raised their hands in favor of the rule. The one boy pulled down his hand as soon as he noticed that none of the other boys favored the rule. This declaration of war made it impossible for the group to make any progress with the rules for the rest of the session. And, in retrospect, I realized that much of the commotion in the group had pivoted around boy/girl relationships — something that would have been noticed immediately by a more experienced elementary school teacher.

I expressed my frustration with the group to Ms. Miller. She suggested that I present my students with a list of absurd rules and challenge them to come up with some better ones. This seemed like a promising idea to me. As I thought about possible rules, it suddenly occurred to me that I might write a story based on the behavior of my group. This proved to be an unexpectedly rewarding and enjoyable project. The children were naturally interested in learning which characters in my story represented them. I cannot say that the group dynamics were dramatically changed by the presentation of my story to the students (although there was some improvement). But there were some interesting responses. One in particular was noteworthy.

Instead of directly portraying a boy/girl clash in my story, I opposed right-handers and left-handers. In the story Slumpy eventually concludes that he was arbitrary in dismissing the ideas of left-handers, and he votes with the right-handers. When I read this to my group, the boy who had pulled his hand down in order to remain in alliance with the rest of the boys applauded Slumpy’s change of heart.

For our final gathering, my group read a scripted version of my story to the rest of Ms. Miller’s class and to the school principal, Ms. Shirley Gregory. This unanticipated activity seemed worth the frustrations that resulted in it. The students enjoyed presenting the story to their classmates. Their classmates enjoyed trying to figure out which students were being portrayed by which characters. And, for me, it was a satisfying conclusion to a sometimes exasperating, but always exciting, series of meetings with some bright and energetic fourth graders.

Undaunted by my first excursion into the world of elementary school children, I have now embarked on a more ambitious project. During the 1979-1980 academic year I am meeting once a week with two groups of fourth graders in a local public library. This project is being supported by the Michigan Council for the Humanities. The idea for the grant came from Ms. Jan Park, head librarian of the Ransom Public Library in nearby Plainwell. She had heard of the IPAC program quite independently of me, and she thought it had great potential as an enrichment program for Plainwell elementary school students. The Council typically restricts its support to projects for adults. However, it was so intrigued by the idea of philosophy for children that it made an exception.

By now I am painfully aware of my limitations in my dealing with fourth graders. Being a college level teacher of philosophy does not carry with it qualifications for sharing philosophical ideas with children. Yet, with persistence, I hope to progress as the children do in these uncharted but exciting waters.
Fifth-graders Discuss Evidence, Knowledge and Truth

The following transcript was made by Ronald Reed, who presently teaches at Texas Wesleyan College, and who had previously conducted a class in a Rochester, N.Y. public school. The introductory remarks are by Prof. Reed.

By Ronald Reed

This is one of the first tapes made in the fifth grade public school classroom. The class had been meeting for approximately five weeks. Class meetings were held twice a week. We had read up to Chapter 7 of Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery.

The class discussion was very energetic. We attempted to define terms that (1) we had been using in previous classes and (2) had proven troublesome. We then tried to see how these terms related one to the others. Because of the energy level of the class and because of my unfamiliarity with the tape recorder, there are a number (three or four) of interruptions in the taped conversation. These interruptions have been noted in the transcript.

Ron Reed does philosophy with Jeremy, Laurie, Rebecca and Adam.
make believe some people knew it was true and some people knew it was false. Then could you prove it?

Beth —If some people knew it was true...

Ron —Isn’t that a different case. Weren’t we talking about it being false.

Mitch —Right. It is false for some people, but it is true for other people.

Ron —Remember the discussion we had on contradiction. A sentence can’t be both true and false at the same time. 2 + 2 = 4 is either true or false. Can’t be both, right?

Mitch —Right.

Ron —Right. You did agree before. You can change your mind if you want.

Mitch —O.K. What about if... If... What Beth said was something... Beth said something would not be a proof because I know it was false and you know it was false.

Beth —Beth is saying...

PAUSE

Ron —... that you can’t prove something that everybody knows is false. Or really you can’t prove something that is false.

Beth —... that you can’t prove something that everybody knows is false. Or really you can’t prove something that is false.

Mitch —O.K. What about if... If... What Beth said was something... Beth said something would not be a proof because I know it was false and you know it was false.

Ron —Beth is saying...

Mitch —Right.

Ron —Right. You did agree before. You can change your mind if you want.

Mitch —O.K. What about if... If... What Beth said was something... Beth said something would not be a proof because I know it was false and you know it was false.

Beth —Beth is saying...

PAUSE

Ron —That’s a pretty big change, an addition you made there? No?

Beth —What.

Ron —Well first you said you can’t prove something that everybody knows is false. Then you said you can’t prove something that simply is false. — Whether people know its true or false doesn’t seem to matter then.

Beth —O.K.

PAUSE

Ron —Well, what do you want to say now.

Beth —The second one. It doesn’t matter whether anybody knows or not.

Ron —O.K. Anybody else have anything to say.

PAUSE

Mitch —What about if you were proving it to ten people and
you could prove that the Dodgers will win even if the Dodgers do win. I mean could I prove it now? Anybody?

NO RESPONSE.

Ron —We said that belief, I mean, we said that proof gives you a kind of guarantee of truth. Now, say, I pick up this glass and I say "Jim used this glass to have a drink of water because the glass is ½ full now and Jim's fingerprints are on the glass." Two questions (1) Do we have evidence to support our claim that Jim drank water from the glass.

Stacy —We can't say for sure that Jim had the glass because his fingerprints...

Craig —His fingerprints are on the glass.

Jim —Somebody else could have put my fingerprints on the glass. They could have a machine that steals fingerprints, comes and gets them in the middle of the night. Or like a camera. Takes a picture of your fingerprints and puts them on the glass.

PAUSE

Ron —You're saying it's possible to sort of forge fingerprints. Counterfeit fingerprints.

Jim —Yeah.

CONVERSATION VERY LOUD, HARD TO MAKE OUT ON TAPE.

Six minutes of discussion and anecdotes on the art of stealing fingerprints. Class agrees that it is possible but highly unlikely that anyone would want to "forge" Jim's fingerprints.

Ron —O.K. Say they really were Jim's fingerprints.

Mitch —Then Jim's guilty.

Craig —Just because Jim's fingers are on the glass doesn't mean he couldn't have just handed the glass to Stacey.

Wendy —... Then

Stacy —I didn't do it, honest. I promise. I didn't even see the glass.

Ron —Just make believe.

Mitch —But Stacey's fingerprints are not on the glass.

Gail —How do you know?

Mitch —(to her) Are they on the glass?

Ron —No, I don't think so.

Mitch —Then she wiped them off.

Beth —How could she just wipe off hers and not Jim's? You can't do that. You can't even see the fingerprints to wipe them off.

Craig —But even if Jim's fingerprints are only on the glass, it still doesn't prove that Jim drank something else or he could have just held the glass.

Ron —So, we haven't proven our case against Jim. But what can we say about Jim's fingerprints. Does that, the fingerprints, count as evidence.

PAUSE

Ron —Well, if someone gives you a bunch of real good evidence... I wish you liked Sherlock Holmes... What do you do?

PAUSE

Ron —Do you believe them then?

Holly —Sometimes. Sometimes I don't. No matter what the evidence.

Ron —That's interesting. Let's get right back to that after we finish this. A lot of good evidence may not cause you to believe... but doesn't it give you some really good reasons for believing?

Shaun —Yeah.

Ron —And a little... some really "shaky" evidence might just give you a little reason to believe.

Shaun —But if it was really shaky, you wouldn't believe it.

Ron —Right, but if it was really shaky evidence, if it was evidence, couldn't that give you some, just a little reason to believe.

Shaun —Yes, but not enough to make you believe.

Ron —I see you and Holly want to do "belief". O.K. But first we, you said that proof gives a kind of guarantee of truth while evidence only gives us some reason to believe something is true. O.K. Now what about belief. (Pause) What is the relationship between evidence and belief. Can I believe something for which I have no evidence?

Craig —No.

Jim —Yes. Evidence is something which will make you believe something.

Ron —O.K. That's one point. But look at my question. Can I believe something for which I have no evidence. Jim says evidence makes you believe something. That's one point. I also want to know if you can believe without having any evidence.

Craig —Evidence can help you have a belief but it can't make you believe. I can believe anything I want to. I can believe with no evidence at all. I can believe that Jim drank from the glass...

Ron —That's evidence.

Gail —His fingerprints are the evidence.

Craig —That's believing when I have evidence. But I could also believe...

Ron —That there are little invisible orange men that live on top of your head...

Craig —What?

LAUGHTER

Ron —I'm trying to say, to help you with an example...

Craig —That doesn't help.

LAUGHTER

Ron —What I meant was you might want to say "I believe that there are little orange men living on top of my head even though I have no evidence for that claim."
Wendy —Unless you saw little orange footprints.

Gail —That would be evidence.

Tape runs out here: Conversation continues while new tape is inserted.

Stacy —You could present all the evidence in the world and if I didn’t want to believe it I just wouldn’t believe it.

PAUSE

Shaun —You mean you could believe I’m not here right now.

PAUSE

Ron —Aren’t there two questions involved here. First, could Stacey or anyone else simply make–up their minds not to believe. Second, could Stacey or anybody simply not believe.

Jim —Sometimes there might be a lot of evidence that, say, your team lost the ball game but you still might not believe it. You might not believe that your team lost.

Ron —Is that what you mean or do you mean that you don’t believe you should have lost.

Jim —Well, sometimes... You mean like the other team cheats?... O.K. sometimes, yeah, you don’t believe that you should have lost but... and other times like you’re thinking about the game and you believe that you really won.

Ron —What happens to the evidence here.

PAUSE

Jim —What do you mean?

Ron —I take it you (1) your team really did lose and (2) there are scorecards, reports from friends, etc. a good deal of evidence to support the claim that your team lost. What happens to that evidence?

Beth —You can sometimes just ignore the evidence.

Ron —Ignore it?

Beth —Yeah forget about it or say it’s not good enough evidence. Like a mirage you could be in a desert and “see” a mirage and know you’re in the desert and so not really believe what you are seeing.

Ron —Everybody understand that? That was pretty complicated. Do you understand that? Shaun?

PAUSE

Wendy —You know there aren’t real mirages. So when you think you see one, you don’t really believe it.

Ron —Anybody ever see a mirage?

Gail —In the movies on T.V.

Ron —What about in person.

Series of No’s

Ron —Say a guy came here and he looked just like George Washington, and he knew all sorts of stuff about George Washington, and he said he was George Washington. Would you believe him?

Wendy —No.

Ron —Why?

Holly —Because George Washington is dead.

Ron —So you reject one set of evidence statements... I mean, you have on the one hand some evidence to support a belief that this guy is really George Washington. He looks just like the picture, he says he is etc. On the other hand, you have heard that (a) George Washington is dead and (b) even if he was still alive, he would have to be over 250 years old.

Inaudible

Beth —They’re both evidence. The first and the second one. But the second one, if you don’t know is stranger. So you don’t accept, you forget about the first.

Ron —O.K. That’s good. But now I’m getting mixed up. I feel like Harry. What is the relationship between evidence and belief. We said, I think, that evidence doesn’t make you, doesn’t force you to believe. What does evidence do?

Holly —It sort of helps you to believe. Like it says its O.K. to believe something.

Ron —Like a kind of support? Like the more, the stronger the evidence, the greater the chance that you’ll be right in what you believe.

Holly —Right.

Ron —That seem right to everybody?

Right, Yeah, etc.

Ron —Could you try and connect some of the words that we’ve used together.

Goes to the board

Ron —How about evidence. How does evidence relate to truth?

Shaun —You can have evidence for something that is true and evidence for something that is false.

Ron —So evidence can’t guarantee truth.

Shaun —Right.

Ron —But the stronger the evidence, the greater the likelihood of truth?

Shaun —Yeah, but still no guarantee.

Ron —What about belief. Does belief guarantee truth?

Pause

Ron —Can I believe something that is false.

Debbie —Yes.

Ron —So belief does not guarantee truth.

Pause

Ron —Does it seem to you that one thing keeps leading to another?

Series of Groans

Ron —I’m getting tired too. We’ll stop now. But just think about this for the next class. How does knowledge fit in with all these other words. Does knowledge guarantee truth? Can I know that it’s raining when it’s not really raining? Also, could I know that it’s raining (when its really raining) but not believe that it’s raining.

Inaudible

Ron —See you next week.