



MONTCLAIR STATE
UNIVERSITY

Montclair State University
**Montclair State University Digital
Commons**

Department of Political Science and Law
Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works

Department of Political Science and Law

6-15-2017

Yin and yank? Public opinion in Europe toward the US and China

Soo Yeon Kim
National University of Singapore

Sophie Meunier
Princeton University

Zsolt Nyiri
Montclair State University, nyiriz@montclair.edu

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/polysci-law-facpubs>



Part of the [American Politics Commons](#), and the [International Relations Commons](#)

MSU Digital Commons Citation

Kim, Soo Yeon; Meunier, Sophie; and Nyiri, Zsolt, "Yin and yank? Public opinion in Europe toward the US and China" (2017). *Department of Political Science and Law Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works*. 10. <https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/polysci-law-facpubs/10>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Science and Law at Montclair State University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Political Science and Law Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works by an authorized administrator of Montclair State University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@montclair.edu.

Original Article

Yin and yank? Public opinion in Europe toward the U.S. and China

Soo Yeon Kim^a, Sophie Meunier^{b,*} and Zsolt Nyiri^c

^aNational University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore.

E-mail: sooyeon.kim@nus.edu.sg

^bPrinceton University, Princeton, USA.

E-mail: smeunier@princeton.edu

^cMontclair State University, Montclair, USA.

E-mail: nyiriz@montclair.edu

*Corresponding author.

Abstract Perceptions of the United States in European public opinion greatly improved around 2008, while perceptions of China simultaneously deteriorated. The Transatlantic and Sino-European relationships stem from radically different historical contexts. Yet could the image of China and the image of the U.S. be related in the eyes of Europeans? This paper examines whether attitudes toward China have contributed to determining attitudes toward the U.S. in Europe by analyzing data from the Transatlantic Trends survey taken in 2010, a critical juncture in Europe's relations with both the U.S. and China. We investigate three hypotheses about this relation: the “yin and yank” or negative correlation (the more Europeans fear China, the more positive they become about the U.S.); the more favorably Europeans view China, the more negatively they see the U.S.); the “open vs. closed” or positive correlation (the more favorably Europeans see China, the more favorably they see the U.S.; the more negatively they see China, the more negatively they see the U.S.); and no relation (European attitudes toward China and the U.S. are independent). To the question of whether anti-Chinese sentiment has the potential for replacing anti-Americanism in Europe, our main conclusion is that positively correlated attitudes toward the U.S. and China reveal a deep cleavage in Europe between those who are “in” and those who are “out” of globalization.

Comparative European Politics (2017) **15**, 577–603. doi:10.1057/s41295-016-0005-6; published online 4 August 2016

Keywords: anti-Americanism; China; Europe; globalization; public opinion; United States

The image of the United States in Europe reached a low point during the George W. Bush administration. Anti-Americanism was rampant, especially in Western Europe, where the biases were mostly based on a contemptuous critique of



American hypocrisies and an existential fear of American hegemony and ubiquitous power. The election of Barack Obama transformed this anti-American vision almost overnight, and Europe quickly became the most “pro-American” continent, at least temporarily. What a difference a few years and a new leader make. The approval rate of the U.S. president abroad is an important metric of America’s foreign image. In 2008, about one-in-five Europeans polled approved of how George W. Bush handled international policies. Just one year later, after the election of Obama but before he could actually make his mark both domestically and internationally, the presidential approval rate skyrocketed to 83% in the European Union countries polled by Transatlantic Trends (German Marshall Fund, 2010). The Obama-bounce was especially marked in some of the most important allies of the U.S.: the German public’s approval rate jumped from 12% to 92% and in France it went from 11% to 88%. While somewhat declining, Obama’s approval rates in Europe remained remarkably high at 78% in 2010 and 75% in 2011 (Nyiri, 2014).

This apparent conversion of Europe to a more positive disposition toward the U.S. coincided with the “rise of the rest” (Zakaria, 2008), and notably the relative decline of the U.S. and the dramatic economic ascent of China. The 2008 financial crisis in the U.S. and the sovereign debt crisis that hit Europe in early 2010 consecrated the arrival of China as a major actor on the European scene. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the European Union (EU) surged from virtually nothing in 2008 to flows of 2 billion euros in 2010 and close to 20 billion euros by 2015 (Meunier, 2014; Hanemann and Huotari, 2016). Interestingly, while Europeans warmed up to the U.S., many of them simultaneously cooled down toward China. Indeed, at the turn of the decade, the top four countries in the world with the most negative image of China were all in Western Europe (BBC World Service Poll, 2011a, b). Even though the Transatlantic and Sino-European relationships stem from radically different historical contexts, could the image of China and the image of the U.S. be related in the eyes of Europeans?

This paper examines whether attitudes toward China have contributed to determining attitudes toward the U.S. in Europe by analyzing data from the Transatlantic Trends survey taken in 2010,¹ a critical juncture in Europe’s relations with both the U.S. and China.² We test three hypotheses about this relation: the “zero-sum” or negative correlation (the more Europeans fear China, the more positive they become about the U.S.; the more favorably Europeans view China, the more negatively they see the U.S.); the “open vs. closed” or positive correlation (the more favorably Europeans see China, the more favorably they see the U.S.; the more negatively they see China, the more negatively they see the U.S.); and no relation (European attitudes toward China and the U.S. are independent).

The main findings generally support the positive correlation hypothesis. Positive attitudes toward China are accompanied by similar attitudes toward the U.S. However, this is most pronounced in the case of negative sentiments. Where



European publics find the U.S. leadership on the global scene undesirable, they also dislike China and see its rise as an economic threat more than an opportunity. The results of the analysis suggest that rather than replacing the United States, China may be joining it as yet another major global actor subject to hostile public opinion from the “anti-hegemony” and “anti-globalization” camp in European countries. The findings also point to a real line of cleavage in European public opinion between those who fear economic and cultural openness and those who feel curious and optimistic about globalization (Kriesi *et al.*, 2012; Hall *et al.*, 2014).

Few, if any, studies have looked at this question of whether anti-Americanism in the 21st century is now influenced by attitudes toward China. Zixiao Yang and David Zweig asked whether pro-American sentiments increased the likelihood of being anti-Chinese, but we are not aware of any study asking the reverse question (Yang and Zweig, 2009). Also, how the American public looks at China has been studied in more detail than how Europeans do the same (Page and Xie, 2010 and Pew, 2012).

As Jeffrey Legro and Peter Katzenstein remarked in their task force on the U.S. standing in the world, American foreign policy seriously needs more gathering of information and collection of data on how the U.S. is viewed abroad (American Political Science Association, 2009). With this article, we hope to fill this gap by providing the first systematic study of the impact of attitudes toward China on attitudes toward the U.S. among the publics of its most important security allies in Europe.

After presenting how China has become an actor in Europe and comparing the reality of American and Chinese power today, the article introduces three hypotheses about the potential role of European attitudes toward China as a determinant of their attitudes toward the U.S. We then explore this relation by analyzing data from the 2010 Transatlantic Trends survey. We conclude by asking how transitory or permanent these changes are and by exploring some of the policy implications of these results.

China as an Actor of Globalization in Europe

Until recently Europeans were either indifferent toward China or looked at its rise with curiosity and even excitement. And yet in 2010 Europeans, especially in the West, had among the most unfavorable attitudes toward China in the entire world. What has changed is that China, although not a major global military actor and certainly not one on the European continent, had suddenly become a visible economic actor in Europe.

The role played by China on the European continent has been transformed in recent years. In the mid-2000s, China was viewed with interest as one of the BRICS and with surprise as an example of how capitalism and democracy were not



necessarily going hand in hand. The Chinese economic boom was a source of enormous opportunity for European companies, whether because of the potential size of the Chinese market or because of the savings provided by outsourcing cheap labor. European workers, especially those in low-skilled jobs and the manufacturing sector, saw China with fear as a source of unfair competition. European consumers saw China as a source of cheap stuff, a central factor in driving down the price of consumer goods. But if China was already a major economic power, it was not yet a major actor on the European scene.

By 2010, the picture was markedly different. China has become an economic actor on the European continent. This rise to actorness was precipitated by the strategic push by the Chinese government to prompt its firms to “go out” and invest abroad, by the 2008 financial crisis in the U.S., and by the 2010 sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. As a result, European fears about the growing power of China have increased dramatically (Meunier *et al*, 2014; Godement and Parello-Plesner, 2011). This continued fear of China’s increasing power is reflected in European public opinion as well. Transatlantic Trends finds that the majority (65%) of Europeans polled find China’s leadership in world affairs undesirable, on par with the “undesirability” of Russia’s global leadership (68%) in 2014 (Transatlantic Trends, 2014).

With its “Go Out” policy edicted in 1999, the Chinese government encouraged Chinese firms to develop operations overseas with the help of preferential long-term loans. The push for Chinese outward FDI started initially in countries that could provide China with needed raw materials and natural resources, mostly in developing countries in Africa and Latin America. By the end of the 2000 decade, however, Chinese firms were actively investing through a multitude of greenfield projects and mergers and acquisitions in Europe and the United States, where they could obtain technology and know-how while diversifying their reserves, building brands, and maximizing their profits. While China still had a very modest presence in Europe in 2010, accounting for only 0.2% of all FDI stock that year, it has been growing very rapidly and visibly, and Chinese investments are increasing at a faster pace in Europe than they are in the U.S. (Hanemann, 2014).

This rise to Chinese actorness in Europe was precipitated by the U.S. financial crisis of 2008, which dealt a blow to the status of the United States. First, because it did originate in the U.S. and the main source of culpability lay mainly with American actors, be they big banks or regulators (Meunier, 2013). Second, by revealing and accelerating the extent of American debt, the crisis weakened the ability of the U.S. to project its power. Finally, the coup de grace was given by China stepping into purchase American debt, reinforcing the impression that the center of gravity of international power had shifted toward the orient.

This article focuses on 2010, a watershed year for Sino-European relations. In 2010, China overtook Japan to become the world’s second largest economy (Barboza, 2010). China also passed Germany as the world’s top exporter (Bradsher



and Dempsey, 2010). The Copenhagen conference on climate change in December 2009 revealed to Europeans that it was now China, no longer the U.S., who was now the main obstacle to an agreement and consecrated China as a major actor in international negotiations. 2010 also saw several important state visits by Chinese officials in Europe, including Hu Jintao's pompous visit to France in November 2010.

More important than anything else, however, was the European sovereign debt crisis in Europe which exploded in Greece in the spring of 2010 and then spread to other European countries. The U.S. could be of no help since its own economy was mired in debt (much of it owned by the Chinese). China used the opportunity provided by the Greek turmoil to invest massively in the country, leasing, for instance, commercial operation at the Port of Piraeus for 35 years, as well as acquiring major stakes in distribution, telecommunications, and real estate, providing welcome relief to Greece in the process (Faiola, 2010; Meunier, 2015). Ireland, next in line of the euro countries in crisis, was promised massive investment from China to create a manufacturing hub in Athlone (Inman *et al*, 2010). When it was Spain's turn to face its own debt crisis, China provided a lifeline by investing in banking, tourism, real estate, and energy (Moya, 2011). China similarly came to the rescue of Portugal through massive investments there. This catapulted China as an essential actor in Europe.

Consequently, the power of China became an obsession in the European media in 2010. European magazines used menacing images of China and provocative titles on their covers, such as *The Economist's* "Facing Up to China" (*The Economist*, 2010), "Buying Up the World" (*The Economist*, 2010), and "The Dangers of a Rising China" (*The Economist*, 2010), and France's *L'Express* "How China Invades Europe" (*L'Express*, 2010). The "yellow peril" of the 21st century became one where greedy Chinese capitalists take over prominent and sensitive European companies, steal and copy European technology, and destroy European manufacturing jobs while inundating the continent with potentially defective goods, all produced while ignoring human rights.

As a result, Europeans were overestimating Chinese economic power and underestimating European power. In reality, the EU was, and still is, the world's largest economic actor, whether measured in GDP, percentage of world trade, or percentage of inward and outward foreign direct investment (both flows and stocks). By contrast, Chinese investment in Europe was still very modest and incommensurate with European investment in China: European companies invested €5.3 billion in China in 2009, while China invested €0.3 billion in 2009. This is, respectively, less than 3% and 1% of both sides' total investment outflow (European Commission, 2010).³ According to data provided by the European Commission, the total U.S. investment in the EU is three times higher than in all of Asia and the EU investment in the U.S. is around eight times the amount of EU investment in India and China together (European Commission, 2013).



But it is true that China's role in Europe is changing, and European attitudes toward China seem to be determined more by perceptions of the tangent and the trajectory than by a snapshot of contemporary reality. Indeed, when asked who is the leading economic power in the world today, Europeans in their majority started to answer China over the U.S. in 2010 for the first time: 51% in Germany (vs. 18% for the U.S.), 47% in France (vs. 41% for the U.S.), 44% in Britain (vs. 38% for the U.S.) (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2010). Europeans had already determined that China has become the main driver and the main beneficiary of globalization several years before the Chinese economy, by some measures, actually made it to the top. The trend-line of China becoming the dominant global power in the public eye, while the U.S. is losing its status, does not seem to be showing signs of slowing down. Nor is it solely contained in Europe. In 2008, 49% of the 20 countries in the world surveyed by Pew considered the U.S. as the world's leading economy and only 19% considered China to be the same. By 2014, 31% of the people in the same countries considered China as the world's leading economy and percentage of those considering the U.S. as the leading economy dropped to 40%. In 2014, half of the populations in those 20 countries surveyed by Pew in 2008 thought that China will replace or has already replaced the U.S. as the world's superpower as opposed to only 41% 6 years prior to that (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2014).

The Potential Impact of Attitudes Toward China on Attitudes Toward the U.S.⁴

This article explores whether the actual and perceived rise of China is affecting attitudes toward the United States in Europe. After all, anti-Americanism in Europe was attributed in large part to American hegemony, including economic hegemony (Chiozza, 2009; Holsti, 2008; Katzenstein and Keohane, 2007). If the U.S. has indeed been dethroned from its economic pedestal by China, what will happen to attitudes toward the U.S. in Europe as a result? We posit three hypotheses about the impact of attitudes toward China on attitudes toward the U.S., grounding our question broadly in the political, historical, and cultural contexts of public sentiment in Europe. The surveys used in this paper reveal that the public is very much aware of the value congruence between Europeans and Americans in general. Seventy-one percent of the people in the European Union polled agree that the United States and the European Union have enough common values to be able to cooperate on international problems and 77% of the Americans also have the same opinion. In contrast, only 30% of the EU respondents and 55% in the U.S. agree that they share common values with China (Transatlantic Trends, 2010).

The three hypotheses reflect a diverse set of approaches for understanding how European citizens may be interpreting the relative roles of the United States and China in shaping the global commons. Each approach reflects distinctly an individual's



worldview about the leadership of the U.S. and the perception of China in the global economy. The first, zero-sum ‘yin and yang’ approach yields the expectation of a negative correlation, in which positive sentiment toward China is associated with a negative view of the U.S. We contrast the ‘realist’ approach of the first hypothesis with the second ‘globalization’ hypothesis that captures an individual’s broader orientation toward the intense flows of goods, money, and people across the globe. Under this hypothesis, we expect sentiments toward China and the U.S. to move largely in tandem in the same direction, reflecting public opinion on these actors as leaders in the process and trajectory of globalization. The third hypothesis of ‘no relation’ captures the view that Europe’s relationship with the China and with the U.S. are separable, each the subject of different relations of identity and the product of very different historical contexts. Below we examine each hypothesis in turn.

Hypothesis 1: The “yin and yang” or negative correlation hypothesis

According to this hypothesis, grounded in classical realist and neo-realist theory, international power is treated as a ‘zero-sum’ game and states react to shifts in the distribution of power by balancing against or bandwagoning with the rising power (Waltz, 1979). By extension, one could expect individuals to react the same way in their opinions toward the great powers, leading to a negative correlation between attitudes toward China and toward the U.S. If individuals are mostly balancing against the rising power in their attitudes, the more fearful Europeans become of China (especially in the economic sphere), the more they minimize their anti-Americanism. Increases in anti-China sentiment lead to decreases in anti-American sentiment. Anti-Chinese sentiments are becoming a substitute for anti-Americanism, resulting from similar causes and fulfilling similar functions. China is increasingly seen as a regional, and soon to be global, hegemon, and Europeans have to take sides, like they did during the Cold War, with anti-Soviet and anti-American sentiment inversely related, as shown by Pierangelo Isernia (Isernia, 2007). Conversely, if individuals are mostly “bandwagoning” with the rising power in their attitudes and are abandoning the former hegemonic power which has now lost its luster, it could be that the more favorably Europeans view China, the more negatively they see the U.S.. In either case, according to this “zero sum” view, the rise in attitudes toward one power leads to a decrease in attitudes toward the other.

Hypothesis 2: The “globalization” or positive correlation hypothesis

This hypothesis, by contrast, does not assume that attitudes toward great powers represent a fixed sum. On the contrary, these attitudes are positively correlated. Increases in anti-China sentiment are paralleled by increases in anti-Americanism, and increases in pro-Chinese sentiment are associated with increases in pro-American sentiment. This could be because public opinion is just wary of any hegemony, wherever it comes from. Both hegemons stand in their way, and the



public does not distinguish one from the other. They are both seen as rivals instead of alternatives to one another. Useful comparisons can also be made to the Cold War era on how some Europeans viewed both the Soviet Union and the U.S. as threats to their own country when tensions escalated in the mid-1960s, and as a result were both anti-American and anti-Soviet (Isernia, 2007). Alternatively, it could be that anti-China sentiments and anti-Americanism reflect a disposition to worry about globalization and in general openness to the world – which could also coexist with racism, anti-immigrant sentiment, and negative attitudes toward European integration, as they coalesce in the platforms of far-right populist parties in Europe.

Hypothesis 3: The “independence” or absence of correlation hypothesis

Finally, it might be that attitudes toward China and the U.S. are unrelated, as they are the product of very different sets of bilateral relations, each with its own distinct political and historical contexts. This hypothesis captures the separability and independence of European countries’ relations with the United States and with China, in which anti-Americanism in Europe is qualitatively different from whether Europeans also view China as an economic opportunity and threat. The United States and Europe share a long history as members of the transatlantic community, a security community with dependable and convergent expectations for peaceful change (Deutsch *et al* 1957) and shared identities and values (Adler and Barnett, 1988). It is an enduring alliance of democracies, in which strong economic and military ties bound the United States with Europe through the Marshall Plan and NATO, and in the process the United States also supported European integration. Anti-American in this context is thus animosity among ‘friends’ and reflects the variation in European public opinion that is part of everyday transatlantic relations. Europe’s relations with China have no similar parallel and have followed a very different path. Indeed, European relations with China, and with Asia more broadly, are marked more by a tempestuous colonial past and general uncertainty regarding the ‘rise of China’ in the contemporary period. China’s ‘actorness’ in Europe is very much a recent phenomenon and almost exclusively economic, which became most prominent after the outbreak of the global economic crisis and subsequently the Eurozone crisis. China has emerged as a very visible economic actor and, as described above, has engaged in extensive economic activities that have led to a Europe wary of China’s presence and power in the region (Meunier *et al*, 2014; Godement and Parello-Plesner, 2011; Hanemann, 2014). Given the marked differences in these two bilateral relations in terms of their past and present trajectories, this hypothesis reflects the expectation that there is no significant correlation between European views toward China and toward the United States.



Research Design

To test the three hypotheses, we utilize for our analysis data from the 2010 Transatlantic Trends, an annual survey of public opinion in the United States, Turkey, and 11 European Union countries. The survey evaluates the state of transatlantic relations through personal interviews, in which respondents provide their views on the U.S. and the EU as well as global threats, foreign policy objectives, world leadership, and multilateral institutions. The survey is unique in the sense that it focuses on a wide range of foreign policy issues, ranging from political economy to security concerns. Our analysis examines the pattern of responses regarding U.S. leadership in the world and in world economic affairs and the extent to which they may be associated with corresponding respondent views about the rise of China. This survey allows us to go beyond the popular ‘favorable or unfavorable’ attitudes toward a given country. The batteries of nuanced questions on China and the U.S. in the survey are able to give us a more sophisticated view of how Europeans view these two powers, and we are able to distinguish between them as military or economic actors, among other equally important facets of international power.

The sample of analysis includes the 11 European Union member countries from Transatlantic Trends. The countries covered by the survey – Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and the United Kingdom – represent the diversity of the European Union very well. It includes all the largest economies and military powers as well as some smaller countries. The group also contains countries from the “old” and “new” Europe.

Dependent Variables: Respondent Views on U.S. Leadership

To operationalize the public’s attitude toward the U.S., our dependent variable, we utilize data from individual survey responses to two questions about the United States and its leadership in international politics, broadly conceived, and another question on the desirability of U.S. leadership in the global economy.⁵ The questions include i) “How desirable is it that the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs (question 1); and ii) “How desirable is it that the United States exert strong leadership in world economic affairs (question 2)”?. For each question, respondents chose from the following five responses: i) very desirable; ii) somewhat desirable; iii) somewhat undesirable; iv) very undesirable.⁶

Independent Variables: Views on China

The independent variables of interest are respondent views on China and how respondents view China’s role in the global economy. The first question is



formulated to measure the respondent's overall view of China: "... please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of China."⁷ As the question itself indicates, respondents chose among four responses: i) very favorable, ii) somewhat favorable, iii) somewhat unfavorable, and iv) very unfavorable. The second question, and the major independent variable of interest in the multivariate analysis, gauges respondent views on China's economic role: "There are different views about the rise of China. In economic terms, some people see China as more of an opportunity for new markets and investment, while others see it as a threat to our jobs and economic security. Which view is closer to your own?" Respondents may choose either China as an "economic opportunity," "economic threat," "both," or "neither".

Bivariate Analysis

Our baseline analysis examines bivariate associations between responses to questions about China and about U.S. leadership, aggregated at the national level for the 11 European countries. The results are presented in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4. They illustrate Europe-wide patterns in public opinion on China and on U.S. leadership. Tables 1 and 2 show the pattern of "favorable" and "unfavorable" views of China, tabulated against individuals' views of U.S. leadership in world affairs and in global economic affairs. We separate responses regarding U.S. leadership more broadly in international politics from leadership in the global economy, and the responses are consistent across the two questions. As the Tables show, European public opinion is generally support of U.S. leadership, with about 57% of the responses in the "desirable categories" (3232 of 5662) for U.S. leadership and similarly (58%) for U.S. leadership in the global economy (3239 of 5629). Tables 1 and 2 show general attitudinal patterns regarding the relationship between views of China and U.S. leadership. Tables 3 and 4 delve deeper into the relationship between sentiments toward China and toward the U.S. by focusing on the economic role of China as an economic "opportunity" or "threat."

The major patterns that emerge from these bivariate associations, all of which are also statistically significant, indicate strong support for the positive correlation hypothesis. First, favorable sentiments toward China and toward the United States largely move together. That is, respondents who view U.S. leadership as "desirable," whether in world affairs or world economic affairs, also have a "favorable" view of China. In Table 1, for example, among those respondents who find U.S. leadership in world affairs as "very desirable" or "somewhat desirable," over half of the respondents in both categories also have a "very favorable" or "somewhat favorable" view of China (approximately 57% and 52%, respectively). Most of the observations are concentrated, however, in the moderate response categories for views on China. For all responses to U.S. leadership questions, at

**Table 1:** Views of China and U.S. leadership in world affairs*

<i>View of China</i>	<i>Desirability of U.S. leadership</i>			
	<i>Very desirable</i>	<i>Somewhat desirable</i>	<i>Somewhat undesirable</i>	<i>Very undesirable</i>
Very favorable	142 (14.14%)	145 (6.51%)	73 (4.66%)	91 (11.04%)
Somewhat favorable	435 (43.33%)	1,007 (45.20%)	632 (40.36%)	300 (36.41%)
Somewhat unfavorable	295 (29.38%)	876 (39.32%)	667 (42.59%)	274 (33.25%)
Very unfavorable	132 (13.15%)	200 (8.98%)	194 (12.39%)	159 (19.30%)
Total	1,004 (100.00%)	2,228 (100%)	1,566 (100%)	824 (100%)

*Number of respondents: 5,622, Pearson $\chi^2(9) = 185.70$ (Pr = 0.000).

Table 2: Views of China and U.S. leadership in world economic affairs*

<i>View of China</i>	<i>Desirability of U.S. leadership</i>			
	<i>Very desirable</i>	<i>Somewhat desirable</i>	<i>Somewhat undesirable</i>	<i>Very undesirable</i>
Very favorable	161 (16.05%)	157 (7.02%)	67 (4.40)	85 (9.82)
Somewhat favorable	411 (40.98%)	1,029 (46.02%)	601 (39.44%)	311 (35.91%)
Somewhat unfavorable	299 (29.81%)	848 (37.92%)	664 (43.57%)	289 (33.37%)
Very unfavorable	132 (13.16%)	202 (9.03%)	192 (12.60%)	181 (20.90%)
Total	1,003 (100.00%)	2,236 (100%)	1,524 (100%)	866 (100%)

*Number of respondents: 5,629, Pearson $\chi^2(9) = 231.00$ (Pr = 0.000).

least 70% of those surveyed held either a “somewhat favorable” or “somewhat unfavorable” view of China. This pattern was more pronounced for those who viewed U.S. leadership as “somewhat undesirable” or “very undesirable.”

The pattern of positive correlation, where both U.S. leadership and China are viewed favorably, is less evident in the case of European public views on China’s economic role as an economic “opportunity” or “threat.” As Table 3 illustrates, among the respondents who find U.S. leadership in world affairs to be “very desirable” or “somewhat desirable,” responses are relatively equally distributed between those who see China as an economic opportunity versus China as an economic threat, suggesting in this case that there is no clear association between sentiments toward the U.S. and toward China when it comes to perceptions of the latter’s role as an economic actor in Europe.

Second, we also find a very interesting positive correlation that concerns negative sentiments. As Tables 3 and 4 show, negative views, whether toward U.S. leadership or toward China, move in tandem, and it is here that we find the strongest support for the positive correlation hypothesis. Among respondents who

**Table 3:** China's economic role and U.S. leadership in world affairs*

<i>China's economic role</i>	<i>Desirability of U.S. leadership</i>			
	<i>Very desirable</i>	<i>Somewhat desirable</i>	<i>Somewhat undesirable</i>	<i>Very undesirable</i>
Opportunity	442 (43.04%)	1,019 (43.85%)	546 (33.35%)	249 (29.54%)
Threat	470 (45.76%)	1,026 (44.15%)	872 (53.27%)	456 (54.09%)
Both	97 (9.44%)	212 (9.12%)	155 (9.47%)	94 (11.15%)
Neither	18 (1.75%)	67 (2.88%)	64 (3.91%)	44 (5.22%)
Total	1,027 (100.00%)	2,324 (100%)	1,637 (100%)	843 (100%)

*Number of respondents: 5,831, Pearson $\chi^2(9) = 97.68$ (Pr = 0.000).

Table 4: China's economic role and U.S. leadership in world economic affairs*

<i>China's economic role</i>	<i>Desirability of U.S. leadership</i>			
	<i>Very desirable</i>	<i>Somewhat desirable</i>	<i>Somewhat undesirable</i>	<i>Very undesirable</i>
Opportunity	457 (44.37%)	966 (41.57%)	531 (33.46%)	254 (28.35%)
Threat	450 (43.69%)	1,069 (46.00%)	818 (51.54%)	493 (55.02%)
Both	101 (9.81%)	228 (9.81%)	176 (11.09%)	112 (12.50%)
Neither	22 (2.14%)	61 (2.62%)	62 (3.91%)	37 (4.13%)
Total	1,030 (100.00%)	2,324 (100%)	1,587 (100%)	896 (100%)

*Number of respondents: 5,837, Pearson $\chi^2(9) = 84.84$ (Pr = 0.000).

find U.S. leadership “somewhat undesirable” or “very undesirable,” over half the respondents in each category also view China as an economic “threat” much more than an economic “opportunity.” The results are consistent across both Tables 3 and 4, which examines views on China's economic role vis-à-vis views on U.S. leadership in world affairs and in the global economy. In offering our interpretation of these results in the following section, we develop the argument that these negative sentiments may well be proxies for sentiments about hegemony and globalization more broadly.

Underlying these macrolevel patterns that aggregate across these European countries are significant country-level differences in attitudes toward China and toward the U.S. Table 5 presents the survey results broken down by country. In terms of views of China as an economic opportunity or threat, France has the highest percentage of respondents (72.56%) who see China as an economic “threat,” while the Netherlands, in contrast, has the highest percentage (73.34%) of respondents who see China as an economic “opportunity.”

Tables 6 and 7 show the cross-tabulations of views of China vis-à-vis views of U.S. leadership for two key actors in Europe: Germany and France. Public opinion

**Table 5:** China as economic opportunity or economic threat? country views

<i>Country</i>	<i>Opportunity</i>	<i>Threat</i>	<i>Totals</i>
Netherlands	641 (73.34%)	233 (26.66%)	874
Romania	460 (63.27%)	267 (36.73%)	727
United Kingdom	539 (57.34%)	401 (42.66%)	940
Germany	496 (53.80%)	426 (46.20%)	922
Bulgaria	319 (47.47%)	353 (52.53%)	672
Spain	368 (38.61%)	585 (61.39%)	953
Italy	294 (33.87%)	574 (66.13%)	868
Slovakia	198 (33.85%)	387 (66.15%)	585
Portugal	288 (31.00%)	641 (69.00%)	929
Poland	240 (29.02%)	587 (70.98%)	827
France	239 (27.44%)	632 (72.56%)	871

Table 6: China's economic role and U.S. leadership in world affairs: Germany*

<i>China's economic role</i>	<i>Desirability of U.S. leadership</i>			
	<i>Very desirable</i>	<i>Somewhat desirable</i>	<i>Somewhat undesirable</i>	<i>Very undesirable</i>
Opportunity	23 (57.50%)	142 (55.25%)	71 (43.03%)	14 (50.00%)
Threat	14 (35.00%)	94 (36.58%)	85 (51.52%)	12 (42.86%)
Both	3 (7.50%)	16 (6.23%)	6 (3.64%)	1 (3.57%)
Neither	0 (0.00%)	5 (1.95%)	3 (1.82%)	1 (3.57%)
Total	40 (100.00%)	257 (100%)	165 (100%)	28 (100%)

*Number of respondents: 490 Pearson $\chi^2(9) = 12.16$ (Pr = 0.205).

regarding U.S. leadership and China diverge dramatically in the two countries. Respondents in Germany strongly support U.S. leadership in world affairs as desirable, while public opinion in France, although generally favorable toward the U.S., is more divided on the question of U.S. leadership. In terms of views of China and of U.S. leadership together, Table 6 shows that in Germany, individuals who express a favorable (“very desirable” or “somewhat desirable”) view of U.S. leadership of world affairs also view China more as an economic opportunity (57.5% and 55.25%, respectively) than a threat (35% and 36.58%, respectively). Similarly, among respondents that view U.S. leadership as “somewhat undesirable” or “very undesirable,” more respondents also see China more as an economic threat (51.52% and 42.86%, respectively) than an opportunity (43.03% and 50%, respectively). Germany is thus a good illustration of the Europe-wide pattern of views of U.S. leadership and of China that largely move in tandem.

France exhibits a dramatically different pattern, in which a strong anti-China sentiment is apparent. Though the public is more divided than in Germany on

**Table 7:** China's economic role and U.S. leadership in world affairs: France*

<i>China's economic role</i>	<i>Desirability of U.S. leadership</i>			
	<i>Very desirable</i>	<i>Somewhat desirable</i>	<i>Somewhat undesirable</i>	<i>Very undesirable</i>
Opportunity	15 (34.88%)	47 (25.27%)	37 (21.64%)	21 (26.25%)
Threat	21 (48.84%)	110 (59.14%)	118 (69.01%)	48 (60.00%)
Both	6 (13.95%)	24 (12.90%)	13 (7.60%)	7 (8.75%)
Neither	1 (2.33%)	5 (2.69%)	3 (1.75%)	4 (5.00%)
Total	43 (100.00%)	186 (100%)	171 (100%)	80 (100%)

*Number of respondents: 480, Pearson $\chi^2(9) = 10.65$ (Pr = 0.301).

whether U.S. leadership in world affairs is desirable or undesirable, respondent views of China are consistently negative in France. Respondents consistently viewed China as an economic threat, irrespective of views of U.S. leadership. Among respondents with a favorable view (“very desirable” or “somewhat desirable”) of U.S. leadership, 47.84% and 59.14%, respectively, see China as an economic threat. This trend is even more pronounced among those who view U.S. leadership in world affairs as “somewhat undesirable” or “very undesirable,” with 69.01% and 60%, of respondents, respectively, viewing China as an economic threat.

Multiple Regression Analysis

Building on the results of the bivariate analyses above, we conduct multiple regression analyses controlling for a host of additional explanatory factors. The dependent variable is sentiment toward U.S. leadership in world affairs, measured as an ordinal variable with four levels indicating the extent to which the respondent views U.S. leadership in world affairs or world economic affairs in a positive light: ‘very desirable,’ ‘somewhat desirable,’ ‘somewhat undesirable,’ and ‘very undesirable.’ Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, the analysis employs ordered logistic regression to model the level of positive sentiment for U.S. leadership.

The independent variables of interest are the responses to questions on i) un/favorable view toward China and ii) view of China as economic opportunity/threat. For respondents’ views of China, responses ‘somewhat favorable,’ ‘somewhat unfavorable’ and ‘very unfavorable’ were constructed as dummy variables, with the base category being the ‘very favorable’ view of China. For the question on China as i) economic opportunity or ii) threat, these were also constructed as dummy variables, with the response ‘neither’ or ‘both’ together forming the base category. Our motivation in constructing these responses as dummy variables, as opposed to collapsing these variables into fewer categories for simplicity, was to exploit as much



as possible the information on the level of sentiment provided by the survey responses.

Control Variables

In the multivariate analysis, we control for a host of factors that may be correlated not only with individual views on U.S. leadership but also with respondents' views of China. First, the analysis controls for set of socioeconomic and demographic variables, including gender and age as well as education and employment. We employ the natural logarithm of age, and education is operationalized as the highest level of completed education.⁸ The variable *Education* is indicated by a 5-point ordinal scale, with higher values corresponding to higher levels of education: i) elementary (primary) school or less; ii) some high (secondary); iii) graduation from high (secondary) school; iv) graduation from college, university or other third-level institute; and v) post-graduate degree (Masters, PhD) beyond the initial college degree. Employment is measured as a dichotomous variable, indicating whether the respondent is employed (0) or unemployed (1).⁹ We suggest that education and employment status are also reflective of the respondent's exposure to globalization, where lower levels of education and unemployment, in particular, capture greater risks of economic insecurity arising from open markets (Scheve and Slaughter 2006, Rodrik 1997, 1998). Exposure to globalization, we argue, is correlated with individual attitudes toward China, the most important emerging market economy, and toward the U.S., the current leader of the global economy.

Second, we also take advantage of three very important questions posed in the survey regarding respondents' views on China, the European Union, and the perception of common values between these key global actors. We include responses to these questions also because they are very likely to shape both respondents' views on U.S. leadership as well as the major independent variables of interest concerning views on China. The first of these questions provides a control for respondent views on support for the European Union, an important and relevant factor for the sample of analysis. We utilize responses to the following question: "Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the European Union?" Again, utilizing the 'favorable' response as the base category, the analysis employs dummy variables to reflect the level of support for the European Union. We expect support for European integration to shape both sentiments toward China and toward U.S. leadership, although we are agnostic about the direction of effect in either case. We take the opportunity of this analysis to investigate the extent to which and the direction in which support for the EU shapes the public's views on these leading actors.

The second question in this battery of controls includes responses to the question of whether the respondent sees China as a military threat or not.¹⁰ We employ the



response ‘China is a military threat’ as the base category to control for public perceptions of China in the security realm. We expect that not viewing China as a military threat is likely to be associated with a generally favorable view of China and also with the view of China as an economic opportunity (rather than a threat). At the same time, we expect that not viewing China as a military threat should have a dampening effect of anti-Americanism, leading respondents to favor U.S. leadership in international affairs as a different way of expressing sentiment toward the rise of China.

Finally, the third control variable captures a strong ideational component. We employ the set of questions about whether EU citizens see enough compatibilities in the values and/or interests held by EU and Chinese citizens that makes cooperation in the international arena feasible.¹¹ Among the two responses, which include ‘have enough common values/interests’ and ‘have different values/interests,’ we employ the former as the base category. We expect that those who see EU and China as having different values and interests will also have an unfavorable view of the China and will see the China as more of an economic threat rather than an opportunity. Moreover, as the bivariate results that show that sentiments toward China and toward the U.S. appear to be positively correlated in either direction (favorable or unfavorable), views of different values and interests between EU and China should also be associated with unfavorable views of U.S. leadership and, by implication, common values between the EU and China would be linked to favorable views of U.S. leadership.

Findings and Discussion

We employ ordinal logistic regression to gauge the impact of views on China on views of U.S. leadership, which is a four-level ordinal variable indicating the respondent’s degree of support: ‘very desirable,’ ‘somewhat desirable,’ ‘somewhat undesirable,’ ‘very undesirable.’ The results of the analysis are presented in Table 8. The first column of results shows the estimates for the model that examines sentiment toward U.S. leadership, and second column those for the model for U.S. leadership in world economic affairs. Overall, the multiple regression analyses controlling for other factors provide further support for the positive correlation hypothesis that we found in our bivariate analyses. The results generally show that sentiment toward China is positively associated with sentiment toward U.S. leadership. Interestingly, this pattern is most prominent in the responses for the question on U.S. leadership in world economic affairs. This is likely due to the climate of the global economic crisis at the time, which may have served to contextualize the survey, frame the questions posed, and sharpen the views regarding leadership in the global economy. Below we examine the results in greater detail.



Table 8: European Views toward U.S. Leadership: Multiple Regression Analyses

<i>Dependent variables</i>	<i>U.S. Leadership in world affairs</i>	<i>U.S. Leadership in world economic affairs</i>
Views of China		
“Somewhat favorable”	0.267 (0.210)	0.340* (0.169)
“Somewhat unfavorable”	0.319 (0.214)	0.332 (0.173)
“Very unfavorable”	0.743** (0.254)	0.580** (0.202)
China as “economic opportunity”	−0.266 (0.182)	−0.544** (0.140)
China as “economic threat”	0.116 (0.183)	−0.371** (0.137)
Views on EU		
“Somewhat favorable”	0.207 (0.128)	0.205 (0.106)
“Somewhat unfavorable”	0.602** (0.161)	0.630** (0.130)
“Very unfavorable”	0.557 (0.290)	1.600** (0.202)
“China is not a military threat”	0.126 (0.107)	−0.012 (0.084)
“EU and China have different values/interests”	−0.024 (0.105)	0.188* (0.083)
Gender (Female)	0.098 (0.101)	0.035 (0.080)
Age	−0.131 (0.141)	−0.412** (0.108)
Ideology	−0.196** (0.037)	−0.114** (0.030)
Education	−0.104* (0.042)	−0.136** (0.032)
Employment	0.147 (0.105)	−0.026 (0.083)
<i>cut1</i>	−2.636** (0.723)	−3.837** (0.564)
<i>cut2</i>	−0.330 (0.719)	−1.690** (0.560)
<i>cut3</i>	1.505* (0.721)	−0.237 (0.558)
Log-likelihood	−1,728.977	−2,734.933
Chi2 (15)	88.802	182.454
P <	0.000	0.000
N	1,439	2,180

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

Findings

Impact of Views on China

For the general question regarding the favorableness of views toward China, responses include ‘very favorable’ (base category in the analysis), ‘somewhat favorable,’ ‘somewhat unfavorable,’ and ‘very unfavorable.’ The results of the analysis shows that the response ‘very unfavorable’ is positively associated with equally unfavorable views U.S. leadership, whether in world affairs or world economic affairs. Notably, respondents that hold an unfavorable view of China also tend to see U.S. leadership as ‘undesirable.’ However, there is a slight bifurcation in the results on views toward U.S. leadership in world affairs: even those who hold a ‘somewhat favorable’ view of China tend to view U.S. leadership in world economic affairs as more on the ‘undesirable end.’ It suggests that, at least for the



international economic arena, anti-American sentiment operates consistently in the European public, whether or not views toward China are favorable or not.

For the more specific questions regarding China, perceptions of whether the rising power is an 'economic opportunity' or 'economic threat' are both associated with a view of U.S. leadership in world economic affairs that moves away from the 'undesirable' direction and veers instead toward the 'desirable' end of the sentiment ordering. Though the more generally worded favorable view question concerning China appears, as discussed above, to tap into a consistent form of anti-American sentiment, questions directed specifically toward the role of China as an economic actor ('opportunity' or 'threat') appear, instead, to elicit more clear-cut responses regarding U.S. leadership in world economic affairs. The results suggest that, in considering China as a possible contending leader in the world economy, European citizens may find instead U.S. leadership in the management of international economic exchange to be more 'desirable,' notwithstanding a general and perhaps preexisting antipathy toward the U.S.' role in international affairs. This finding is corroborated by the results for the general U.S. leadership question, in which estimates for both views of China's as an economic actor – 'economic opportunity' or 'economic threat' – are not statistically significant and appear to have no discernible impact. The results for the views on China as a 'military threat' are also interesting and informative in this regard, as such views have no impact on any of the questions regarding U.S. leadership. They are indicative of the salience of the economic dimension in the European public's views on China and how these views shape European citizens' support of U.S. leadership in the international economy.

Finally, on the question of shared values and interests between the EU and China, respondents who see more differences on values and interests, relative to those who see more commonalities, exhibit a divergent pattern in the sentiments toward the two forms of U.S. leadership. Those who see more differences between the EU and China on values and interests tend toward more favorable views of U.S. leadership overall, although this result is not statistically significant. On the other hand, these same respondents that emphasize differences tend also to view U.S. leadership in world economic affairs are more undesirable, and this result is statistically significant. Thus, overall on this normative dimension, as in the case with the general view question on China, the question appears to tap into a widespread antipathy toward U.S. and its leadership of the global economy, although this effect is weak from a statistical standpoint. It contrasts notably with the more focused questions on the role of China as an economic actor, which instead elicits more favorable views of U.S. leadership in the global economy. They suggest perhaps two parallel currents of EU public opinion regarding U.S. leadership, one that reflects a general antipathy toward U.S. leadership and other a more favorable view that is elicited by an explicit juxtaposition with the economic role of China in the global economy.



Views on EU

As noted above, we took an investigative approach to the effect of views on the EU as a control variable in the analysis. We posited that such views are likely to have some effect on views toward U.S. leadership, although we were less definitive on the direction of the impact. The results of the analysis show that for this question that contextualizes the broader frame of the EU in shaping views of U.S. leadership, European citizens who are unfavorably disposed to the EU are also equally unfavorably disposed to U.S. leadership. This holds more strongly for leadership of the U.S. in world economic affairs, where the estimates for the categories denoting ‘unfavorable’ views of the EU are statistically significant. This result sheds an interesting insight regarding the motivations of anti-Americanism in Europe, which appear to be positively and strongly associated with antipathy toward regional integration and a general stance against an internationally oriented outlook.

Other Controls

The results for the remaining control variables – *Gender*, *Age*, *Ideology*, *Education*, and *Employment* – are interesting in that their impact is slightly more evident in the question regarding views on U.S. leadership in the world economic affairs, for which the results for *Age*, *Ideology*, and *Education* are statistically significant. Concerning the more general question on U.S. leadership, only *Education* and *Ideology* are statistically significant. Their estimates are also negative, which indicates that the more highly educated individuals and those that are more conservative on the ideological spectrum also tend to have more favorable views of U.S. leadership. This result is also consistently prominent in the results for views of U.S. leadership in world economic affairs. In addition, for views on U.S. leadership in the economic arena, the estimate for *Age* is negative and statistically significant, indicating that older respondents also tend to have more favorable views of the U.S.. The results of the analysis also show that *Gender* and *Employment* are not associated with views on U.S. leadership, whether general or in world economic affairs. The estimate for *Gender*, although the effect is positive indicating that female respondents tend to have more unfavorable views of U.S. leadership, is not statistically significant. As for *Employment*, the results diverge for U.S. leadership questions, tending toward unfavorable views in the general question but toward more favorable views on U.S. leadership in world economic affairs. However, these results are not statistically significant. Overall, the results for these variables indicate that there is no significant “gender gap” present in anti-American sentiment in Europe. Similarly, those who are unemployed are neither more nor less likely to have a negative view of U.S. leadership.



Discussion

Overall, the analysis demonstrates general support for the positive correlation hypothesis and indicates the presence of a strong current of public opinion that sees both the United States and China as hegemons and as rivals of Europe in the current global economy. They also suggest that respondents, in perceiving both the standing power – the United States – and the rising power – China – may well see them inseparably as representing globalization itself. The strong positive association in the hostile attitudes toward both actors, as illustrated in the bivariate analysis and in large part corroborated by the multiple regression analysis, may capture the degree of “anti-globalization” in the population at large, opposition to globalization that manifests itself in strong sentiments against the current two leaders.

The findings of the analyses, which demonstrate a consistent anti-American sentiment in the European public, suggest that a real line of cleavage exists in Europe today between individuals who favor an “outward-looking” society and those who favor an “inward-looking” society. The proponents of openness, who might also be called the “Cosmopolitans”, are confident about their place in the world, focus on the positive benefits brought about by globalization, and do not worry that their national sovereignty is being attacked, neither by European integration nor by existing or rising hegemons. By contrast, the proponents of a closed society, who might also be called the “Protectionists”, feel threatened by globalization, both in its economic and cultural dimensions, and worry that outsiders (e.g. big countries, the European Union, immigrants, etc.) challenge their welfare and prospects. Their worries fuel populist parties.

Education is an important factor in this interpretation, as it serves as a proxy for individual attitudes toward globalization more broadly. The multiple regression analysis shows that more educated respondents are less likely to exhibit anti-American sentiments and, by extension, less likely to be hostile toward China as well, given the positive correlation between views toward the United States and toward China. In the context of public attitudes toward globalization, the more educated the people are, the less likely they are to fear China because their job is less directly at stake for now.

On the other hand, more educated individuals may also be more likely to be aware and concerned about human rights violations in China. Indeed, the issue of human rights is usually the most common explanation of why Europe is the region of the world with the most negative public attitudes toward China. Europeans may focus on their differences in political values with China, more so than Americans who may admire China as an entrepreneurial and successfully business-minded country. The Dalai Lama is a well-known political figure in Europe, and many European leaders have met with him prominently. But this focus on human rights may well be an excuse masking the real European fears about China, which are primarily economic. Indeed, Table 5 above shows, when it comes to the growing economic power of China, public opinion in many European countries sees this development as more of a threat than an opportunity.



Conclusions

This article utilized data from the 2010 Transatlantic Trends survey to analyze the extent to which public opinion in Europe toward the United States is becoming more driven by attitudes toward China. We found that a positive correlation holds in attitudes toward China and toward the United States. This pattern is especially prominent where survey respondents had more negative attitudes toward the United States. Such individuals were relatively equally likely also to exhibit similarly negative attitudes toward China, by having either an unfavorable view of this rising power or looking upon China as an economic threat. In substantive terms, the results of this study indicate that where anti-Americanism is strong, anti-Chinese sentiment is also strong. That is, if one (dis)likes one of these actors, it also (dis)likes the other.

Surprisingly, we did not find evidence for the “yin and yank” hypothesis, whereby individuals substitute their negative feelings from the U.S. to China. However, the patterns we found may be transitory and may change over time, as China becomes an even more prevalent economic actor and the presence of Chinese investment increasingly visible in Europe.

Further research should look more into country-level differences or focus on regional differences of opinions between Western and Eastern Europe, the North and South, or those countries that were hit the hardest by the economic crisis. While attitudes toward the U.S. are mostly positive in Europe nowadays (although this could change after the 2016 American presidential election), there are indeed important variations when it comes to attitudes toward China, although these have grown more positive in the years since 2010 (Meunier, 2014). Further research should also investigate the temporal dimension of these attitudes, extending the analysis over time by utilizing past and subsequent surveys with similar questions. Upcoming surveys may also provide important new information about the extent of China’s actual involvement in the European economy in the wake of the Eurozone crisis. These surveys will capture the impact of the massive Chinese investment that has happened in some European countries in the wake of their sovereign debt crisis, possibly splitting Europe into those who see China as a savior and those who see China as a predator. Future research into EU public opinion about U.S. leadership, and the role of China in the European and global economies, would benefit greatly from examining this critical new development of the expansion of Chinese overseas investment.

About the Authors

Soo Yeon Kim is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University and B.A. in Political Science and International Studies from Yonsei



University. She is the author of *Power and the Governance of Global Trade: From the GATT to the WTO* (2010, Cornell University Press). Her current research focuses on production networks and the politics of free trade agreements in Asia, and rising powers in the global economy. Soo Yeon Kim's recent publications include "Regional Trade Governance" (2016, with Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner), in Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, Eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; and "Hubs of Governance: Path Dependence and Higher-Order Effects of Preferential Trade Agreement Formation" (2016, with Mark S. Manger), *Political Science Research and Methods*. Soo Yeon Kim gratefully acknowledges the support of the Singapore Ministry of Education (MOE) Academic Research Fund (AcRF) Tier 2 Grant MOE2014-T2-2-157, 'From Emerging Markets to Rising Powers? Power Shift in International Economic Governance,' in the completion of this project.

Sophie Meunier is a Research Scholar in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and Co-Director of the EU Program at Princeton. She is the author of *Trading Voices: The European Union in International Commercial Negotiations* (Princeton University Press, 2005) and *The French Challenge: Adapting to Globalization* (Brookings Institution Press, 2001), winner of the 2002 France-America book award. She is also co-editor of several books on Europe and globalization, most recently *The Politics of Interest Representation in the Global Age* (Cambridge University Press, 2014) and *Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU as an Effective Actor in Global Governance?* (Routledge, 2015). Her current work deals with the politics of Foreign Direct Investment in Europe, notably Chinese investment in Europe.

Zsolt Nyiri is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Law at Montclair State University. Prior to joining the faculty at MSU, he was the Director of the Gallup World Poll in Europe and the Director of Transatlantic Trends at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. His current research focuses on comparative public opinion, transatlantic relations, security, and integration. He has published on European and American politics in books and refereed journals including *Political Research Quarterly*, *The World Bank Economic Review*, *Harvard International Review*, and *Foreign Policy*.

Notes

- 1 Transatlantic Trends is a comprehensive annual survey of American and European public opinion on foreign policy issues. The data used in this paper are based on polling conducted by TNS Opinion between June 1 and 29, 2010, in the United States, Turkey, and 11 European Union member countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. More detailed Methodology in Appendix A.



- 2 The data used in this paper are publicly available and accessible through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan and the Roper Center.
- 3 China became a net investor worldwide, and in some European countries in particular, in 2014.
- 4 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to consider the broader political, historical, and cultural contexts of our hypotheses and ground them in different and important substantive debates.
- 5 The analyses presented in this paper utilize unweighted data from the Transatlantic Trends survey unless otherwise noted.
- 6 The ambivalent response “neither or both equally,” which does not provide clear information on the respondent’s sentiment toward U.S. leadership and comprised a small proportion of cases (less than 3%), was set to missing for the questions on U.S. leadership in world affairs and world economic affairs. The “don’t know” response was also set to missing, for all questions that have this response category.
- 7 This battery of questions asks for respondents’ views of China as well as Russia and India, and also Turkey.
- 8 Question D3: “At what stage did you complete your full-time studies?” “Don’t know” responses were set to missing.
- 9 The analysis employs responses to a question about the respondent’s type of employment, namely whether he/she is self-employed, an employee or a manual worker. Responses were converted to a dichotomous indicator for employment/unemployment.
- 10 **Q23.** There are also different views about China’s military power. Some people see China as a military threat, while others do not. Which view is closer to your own?
 - (1) China is a military threat
 - (2) China is not a military threat
 - (3) Don’t know (set to missing)
 - (4) Refused to answer (set to missing)
- 11 **Q24_2.** “Some people say that China and the EU have enough common values/interests to be able to cooperate on international problems. Other people say that China and the EU have such different values/interests that cooperating on international problems is impossible. Which view is closer to your own?
 - (1) Have enough common values/interests
 - (2) Have different values/interests
 - (3) Don’t know (set to missing)
 - (4) Refuse to answer (set to missing)

References

- Adler, E. and Barnett, M. (1998). *Security Communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- American Political Science Association. (2009) *U.S. Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future*.
- Barboza, D. (2010, August 15) *China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy*. The New York Times.
- BBC World Service Poll. (2011, March 27) *Rising Concern about China’s Increasing Power*.



- BBC World Service Poll. (2011, March 7). *Views of US Continue to Improve in 2011 BBC Country Rating Poll*. Retrieved April 12, 2011, from http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar11/BBCEvalsUS_Mar11_rpt.pdf
- Bradsher, K. and Dempsey, J. (2010, February) *China Passes Germany as World's Top Exporter*. The New York Times.
- Chiozza, G. (2009). *Anti-Americanism and the American World Order*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- European Commission. (2003, November). Globalisation. *Eurobarometer 151b*
- Deutsch, K. W., et al (1957). *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- European Commission. (2008a) *Eurobarometer 70*.
- European Commission. (2008b) *Standard Eurobarometer 69*.
- European Commission. (2010, December 20) *EU and China to debate economic and trade issues at high level dialogue*. Retrieved May 6, 2011, from European Commission Trade: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=666&serie=391&langId=en>
- European Commission. (2010) *Standard Eurobarometer 73*.
- Faiola, A. (2010) *Greece is tapping China's deep pockets to help rebuild its economy*. The Washington Post.
- German Marshall Fund (2010). *Transatlantic Trends 2010*.
- Godement, F. and Parello-Plesner, J. (2011) *The Scramble for Europe*. European Council on Foreign Relations.
- Hall, P., Jacoby, W., Levy, J. and Meunier, S. (2014). *The Politics of Representation in the Global Age: Identification, Mobilization, and Adjudication*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hanemann, T. (2014) Chinese Direct Investment in the EU and the U.S.: A Comparative View. *Asia-Europe Journal* 12(1): 127–142.
- Hanemann, T. and Huotari, M. (2016) *A New Record Year for Chinese Outbound Investment in Europe*. Mercator Institute for China Studies, February 2016: http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/COFDI_2016/A_New_Record_Year_for_Chinese_Outbound_Investment_in_Europe.pdf
- Holsti, O. (2008) *To See Ourselves as Others See Us: How Publics Abroad View the United States After 9/11*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- L'Express (2010) *Comment la Chine Envahit l'Europe*. 3109.
- IFOP-La Croix. (2011) *Perceptions towards globalization across ten countries*.
- Inman, P., Macalister, T. and Wachman, R. (2010) *Ireland at forefront of Chinese plans to conquer Europe*. The Guardian.
- Isernia, P. (2007) Anti-Americanism in Europe during the Cold War. In P. Katzenstein and R. Keohane (Eds.), *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics* (pp. 57–92). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Katzenstein, P. and Keohane, R. (2007) *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kriesi, H., et al (2012) *Political Conflict in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meunier, S. (2013) The Dog that Did not Bark: Anti-Americanism and the 2008 Financial Crisis in Europe. *Review of International Political Economy* 20(1): 1–25.
- Meunier, S. (2014) Beggars can't be choosers: The European Crisis and Chinese Direct investment in the European Union. *Journal of European Integration*, 36(3), 283–302.
- Meunier, S. (2015) A tale of two ports: The Epic Story of Chinese Direct Investment in the Greek Port of Piraeus. *CritCom Forum for Research and Commentary on Europe*, December 2015.
- Meunier, S., Burgoon, B. and Jacoby, W. (2014) The Politics of Hosting Chinese Direct Investment in Europe. *Asia-Europe Journal*, 12(1), 109–126.
- Moya, E. (2011) China to Make Multimillion Pound Investment in Beleaguered Spain. The Guardian.



- Nyiri, Z. (2014) Public Opinion and Public Diplomacy in a Transatlantic Perspective. In S. Roy, D. Cooper and B. Murphy (eds.), *Transatlantic Relations and Modern Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Examination*. London: Routledge.
- Pew Global Attitudes Project. (2010) Obama More Popular Abroad Than At Home, Global Image of U.S. Continues to Benefit. <http://pewglobal.org/2010/06/17/obama-more-popular-abroad-than-at-home/>.
- Rodrik, D. (1997) *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* Washington: Institute for International Economics.
- Rodrik, D. (1998) Why do more open economies have bigger governments? *Journal of Political Economy*, 106(5), 997–1032.
- Scheve, K. and Slaughter, M. J. (2006) Economic Insecurity and the globalization of production. In D. R. Cameron, G. Ranis and A. Zinn (eds.), *Globalization and Self-Determination: Is the Nation-State Under Siege?* London: Routledge.
- The Economist. (2010a) *Buying Up the World: The Coming Wave of Chinese Takeovers*. The Economist.
- The Economist. (2010b) *Facing Up to China*. The Economist.
- The Economist. (2010c) *The Dangers of a Rising China*. The Economist.
- Yang, Z. and Zweig, D. (2009) Does anti-Americanism correlate to pro-China sentiments? *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 2(4), 457–486.
- Zakaria, F. (2008) *The Post-American World*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Appendix

Methodology

Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviews (except in Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania where face-to-face interviews were conducted due to the low telephone penetration rate in these five countries). The basic sample design applied in all countries was multistage random (probability). In each household, the respondent was drawn at random (following the “closest birthday rule” or Kish grid). Up to five call-backs for telephone interviews and four visits in total for face-to-face interviews were attempted before dropping a potential respondent.

The U.S. survey fieldwork was carried out by a new survey organization in 2010. This resulted in some changes in trend data due to different interviewing protocols used by the new survey organization, a phenomenon called “house effect.” Specifically, the results showed a drop in the number of “don’t know” responses. For this reason, some of the questions were asked again from a representative sample of 456 Americans between July 29, 2010 and August 4, 2010. This time, interviewers were retrained to be more in line with previous year’s protocols. For questions Q1b_1, Q11, Q25b, and Q26, the results of the new survey were reported after a careful comparison of the data from the two surveys.

For results based on the national samples in each of the 13 countries surveyed, one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus three percentage points. For results based on the total European sample, the margin of error is plus or minus one percentage point. In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in

**Table A1:** Detailed methodology

<i>Country</i>	<i>Mode</i>	<i>Field Period</i>	<i>Representative</i>	<i>Sample Design</i>	<i>Sample Size</i>	<i>Geographic Non-Coverage</i>
France	Computer Assisted Telephone Interview	June 2–16, 2010	Adults 18 and older with access to landline telephone	Random Digit Dialing	1000	The overseas islands/territories belonging to France are excluded
Germany	Computer Assisted Telephone Interview	June 1–21, June	Adults 18 and older with access to landline telephone	Random Digit Dialing	1001	All areas are covered
Italy	Computer Assisted Telephone Interview	June 3–19, 2010	Adults 18 and older with access to landline or mobile telephone	Random Digit Dialing	1001	All areas are covered
Netherlands	Computer Assisted Telephone Interview	June 7–29, 2010	Adults 18 and older with access to landline telephone	Random Digit Dialing	1000	All areas are covered
Portugal	Computer Assisted Telephone Interview	June 4–23, 2010	Adults 18 and older with access to landline or mobile telephone	Random Digit Dialing	1000	Açores and Madeira (Portuguese islands) are not included
Spain	Computer Assisted Telephone Interview	June 4–22, 2010	Adults 18 and older with access to landline or mobile telephone	Random Digit Dialing	1003	All areas are covered
UK	Computer Assisted Telephone Interview	June 2–24, 2010	Adults 18 and older with access to landline telephone	Random Digit Dialing	1000	All mainland UK, including Northern Ireland
USA	Computer Assisted Telephone Interview	June 5–23, 2010	Adults 18 and older with access to landline or mobile telephone	Random Digit Dialing	1000	Alaska and Hawaii are not covered. This equals 0.6% of the US population

**Table A1:** (Continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Mode</i>	<i>Field Period</i>	<i>Representative</i>	<i>Sample Design</i>	<i>Sample Size</i>	<i>Geographic Non-Coverage</i>
Bulgaria	Face-to-face Interview	June 1–10, 2010	Adults 18 and older	Multistage Stratified Random Sample	1016	All areas are covered
Poland	Face-to-face Interview	June 1–21, 2010	Adults 18 and older	Multistage Stratified Random Sample	1000	All areas are covered
Romania	Face-to-face Interview	June 1–21, 2010	Adults 18 and older	Multistage Stratified Random Sample	1042	All areas are covered
Slovakia	Face-to-face Interview	June 1–20, 2010	Adults 18 and older	Multistage Stratified Random Sample	1006	All areas are covered
Turkey	Face-to-face Interview	June 1–19, 2010	Adults 18 and older	Multistage Stratified Random Sample	1003	All areas are covered

conducting surveys can also introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

For all questions, European averages were weighted on the basis of the size of the adult population in each country to maintain consistency with previous years' reports. For new questions, the results were also weighted so that the sample matches certain population characteristics, including age, gender, and education.

Trend Questions: 1_1, 1_2, 1b_1, 1b_2, 4, 6_1, 6_2, 7, 8a, 8b, 9, 10, 11, 13.1, 13.2, 14, 18, 22, 23, 25a, 25b, 26, 27, 32, 33.1, 33.2, 33.3, 33.4, 33.5, 36a, 38, 39

New Questions: 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 8c.1, 8c.2, 8c.3, 8c.4, 12, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21.1, 21.2, 21.3, 21.4, 24_1, 24_2, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36b

When processing is complete, data from the survey are deposited with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan (ICPSR), the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut, and the GESIS-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences and are available to scholars and other interested parties (See Table A1).