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Thinking in Stories

By Gareth Matthews

Wilfrid Gordon McDonald Partridge by Mem Fox,
illustrated by Julie Vivas. Brooklyn, NY: Kane Miller, 1985.

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Wilfred Gordon McDonald Partridge was a very small boy with a very big name. He lived next to an old people's home, where he liked to go and socialize with the eccentric old people he found there. Mrs. Jordan played the organ for him, Mr. Hosking told him scary stories, Mr. Tippett, who was himself crazy about cricket, played with him, he ran errands for Miss Mitchell and admired the giant voice of Mr. Drysdale. But his favorite person of all was Miss Nancy, to whom he told all his secrets.

One day Wilfrid Gordon overheard his mother and father say that Miss Nancy, who was 96, had lost her memory.

"What's a memory?" asked Wilfrid Gordon.

"It's something you remember," his father told him.

Dissatisfied, Wilfrid Gordon began to ask the old people in the home what a memory is.

"Something warm," said Mrs. Jordan.

"Something from long ago," said Mr. Hosking.

"Something that makes you cry," said Mr. Tippett.

"Something that makes you laugh," said Miss Mitchell.

"Something as precious as gold," said Mr. Drysdale.

Wilfrid Gordon went back home to look for memories. In a basket he collected: shells he had put in a shoebox, a puppet on strings, a medal his grandfather had given him, his football, and a nice warm egg, fresh from under the hen.

Wilfrid Gordon took his basket of precious objects to Miss Nancy, who was indeed very pleased. As Wilfrid Gordon took each precious thing out of the basket and gave it to Miss Nancy, she remembered something. The warm egg reminded her of eggs she had once found in a bird's next in her aunt's garden. She put a shell to her ear and remembered going to the beach by tram long ago, in button-up shoes. She touched the medal and remembered sadly her big brother, who had never come back from the war. The puppet on strings reminded her of a puppet she had once shown to her sister. The football reminded her of the day she had first met Wilfrid Gordon. With these memories fresh in her mind, Miss Nancy had her memory back again.

Like Proust's memories of childhood, our own memories are sometimes locked in the precious objects of the world, waiting to be unlocked by a taste, a glance or a touch. In a sensorily deprived environment—a hospital, say, or a nursing home—memories may fade, and with them, memory.

Of course organic deterioration, or physical or psychological trauma, may play the leading role in the loss of memory. I once phoned long-distance a friend I hadn't seen in fifteen years. I wanted to announce that I was about to fly to the city where he was then residing and I wanted to see him.

The voice on the other end of the phone was familiar enough. I gave my name and waited for an expression of recognition and pleasure. None came. There was only silence. Feeling increasingly uncomfortable, I began recalling some of the experiences we had enjoyed together. There was still no response. Yet the voice was friendly. I was invited to visit.

I went. The figure I encountered was what I expected—a little older than I remembered, but with the familiar face, voice and gestures. Yet at no time during the evening we spent together did I receive any recognition of our common experience together. The person I socialized uneasily with that evening was either unable or unwilling to dredge up the memories that, according to John Locke, are both necessary and sufficient to make him the person I had once known so well.

Locke's views on personal identity (see his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chapter 27), though they harbor many difficulties familiar to all serious students of the subject, retain a natural appeal. On Locke's view, Wilfrid Gordon is not just using his collection of precious objects to help Miss Nancy to have certain experiences—some of them warm and comforting, others sad or funny. He is helping her to be able to make connection with the past in such a way as to *be* the person who waved goodby to her big brother as he went off to war, and to *be* the person who first met the little boy with a big football and a very long name on the porch of the old people's home some months before.

It is difficult to spend time with a favority old person, as Wilfrid Gordon did, and not puzzle over personal identity. Just as one things one may have lost forever the person one cherishes, a precious object may bring her back again, perhaps with a force that removes all doubt she is still there.

Education and Philosophy

Frederick J.E. Woodbridge

In view of what we human beings are, and in view of the natural necessity under which we live and labor, the cultivation of language, mathematics, and tools would seem to be the first duty of all organized and systematic attempts at education. There is no need of a theory or philosophy of education to support this duty. Its support lies in that constitution of things in consequence of which human life depends, not on the operation of natural forces, but on the discovery and use of these forces. Abolish such discovery and use, life would still exist, but it would not be human life with its institutions, its culture, its industry, its society, its art, and its religion. Indeed, when attentively considered, nature and human life are seen to be profoundly antithetical. They define an opposition which is the prolific cause of many philosophies. It is easy to say that human life is as natural as any other kind of life, since it is, with all its peculiarities, one of the kinds of life which nature has produced. It is, consequently, as natural for a man to be a man as it is for an ape to be an ape or a star to be a star. One need not quarrel with the comparison. Nor need one quarrel with the contention that there has been in cosmic history a movement from stars to apes and from apes to men. All this may be said to be

natural enough and so natural that nature, instead of being anththetical to human life, exhibits in human life an example of her resourcefulness. We are, however, brought face to face with considerations of a totally different character when we reflect on what man, as an example of nature's resourcefulness, does. What he does is to make nature an object of inquiry and thereby turn her into the servant of his purposes. He is not content to take nature as he finds her. He insists on making her over. And he justifies doing this by reasons drawn from his own imagination. He makes some sort of a philosophy of life. That is why nature and human life are antithetical.

The antithesis grows more radical and profound the more it is attentively examined. We are building and using automobiles in such numbers that these artificial speeders of transportation often defeat the purpose for which they were intended and give place in efficiency to the legs with which nature has endowed us. An automobile is a great improvement over legs in the matter of transportation. If the value of it is to be conserved, something must be done about it. The automobile must be disciplined. If it is disciplined, human freedom must be restricted. The moment we begin to re-

strict human freedom and say thou shalt and thou shalt not, we raise a multitude of questions which seem wholly irrelevant to nature's way of doing things and to which she seems to give no inkling of an answer. We must find answers by considering something else—our convenience, our pleasures, our business, our mutual rights and wrongs. We must take the responsibility for what we do about it. Nature has given us legs and the ability to improve on their speed if we are dissatisfied with it, but we must take the responsibility for the consequences of the improvement wholly on ourselves. We cannot shift it nor can we appeal to her in working it out.

I have taken an example from the city streets. It is readily generalized. Nature never interferes with the operation of her own forces. She lets them run their own course inevitably to their own end no matter what happens. It is we who interfere—a part of nature, if you will, interfering with the rest of nature, but so interfering that responsibility is lodged wholly with the part for weal or woe. It is we, not nature, who make automobiles. It is we, not nature, who are discontented with what nature is, who insist on improving her and on interfering with the natural conditions of our existence. Our improvements result in limitations on

our freedom. They put us under new restraints and obligations which we have to defend to one another. They create a state of things which increasingly robs each new child of the freedom it might claim as a child of nature. It is really a child of society, compelled, whether he likes it or not, to learn and do a multitude of things which society and not nature demands of him. There is a profound truth in Rousseau's remark that man was born free, but is now everywhere in chains. They are, however, chains of his own forging. It is useless to cry: "Back to nature!" For nature is precisely the thing with which man is everlastingly discontented. He either prefers the chains of society or, when he breaks them, forges new ones in their stead. Thus it is that by improving on nature we find ourselves under increasing responsibility for the kind of world

into which we let new beings be born. How shall we justify ourselves? It looks as if we needed a philosophy.

These homely facts are worth repeated emphasis even among educators. Are we not expected to improve nature and make a better world? Do we not glory in our profession and point with pride to ourselves as the benefactors of mankind? We are the doers of good, the laborers in the human vineyard who work for a penny a day. I share the egotism of our profession, but I am constantly appalled by it. My admiration for the self-sacrificing doers of good is unbounded, but often it takes the form of amazement at their daring. And I am the more amazed when they profess to be carrying out the intentions of nature. The more I learn of nature, the more stoutly I become convinced that it is silly to talk of her intentions. She intends nothing. Perhaps it were more accurate to say that if she has intentions, she has kept them discreetly hidden. She has left intention and deliberate purpose to us to inject into her affairs and so make out of her something which is absurd to say she ever purposed or intended herself. If she ever intended to make a better world, she has taken a very curious method of doing it. In this matter it is difficult to credit her with any wisdom, decency, or shame.

We sometimes hear it said that nature intended human beings to be healthy, to be sound in mind and body. If she did, what method has she taken to accomplish so desirable an end? She has made human beings subject to innumerable diseases, filled the air they breathe, the water they drink, the food they eat with enemies that can destroy them, and then trusted or hoped or expected that some of these human beings would have sense enough to become doctors and try to cure the ills of their fellows. We sometimes hear it said that nature intended human beings and children in particular to be happy. How has she provided for their happiness? By making them products of a passion which fills the world with ecstasy and pain, with love and hate, with shame and glory; by making them fickle, egotistical, and willful; by filling them with likes and dislikes; and then trusting, hoping, or expecting that some of them would be kind

and generous enough to lead others in the ways of kindness and generosity. Nature intended a better world for men! How has she gone about it? By producing beings with a power to discover what she is and leaving it to them to make a better world if they can. Every improvement they make involves restraint, suppression, limitation, discipline. Every improvement involves a choice of what will be allowed to control the growth and shape the lives of each new generation. Nature has provided that she can be mastered by language, mathematics, and tools. She has left it to human beings to decide for what purposes they will use these instruments to master her. That is a rather heavy responsibility. It is not strange that those who really believe that nature originally intended us to live in a paradise should also believe at times in original sin, suspecting that once, long ago, we disobeyed the commands of nature and have incurred her disfavor ever since. But as we search for that long ago we do not seem to find it. Our history seems to run back to something quite different. If we must believe in any great error, that error is not likely to be found long ago once for all, but repeatedly recurring; and an error which is not against nature, but against the possibilities of human life. Again we seem to glimpse the need of a philosophy.

Let me take another illustration. In our neighborhood men are building a great cathedral to the glory of God and as a witness to the Christian religion. It is a very human thing to do. This is sufficiently proved by the number of people interested in it and by the millions of dollars that have been and will be given for its building and support. To the Cathedral human beings will go to be baptized, to be confirmed, to be married, to be buried. They will praise God. They will confess their sins and ask to be forgiven. They will be taught how God loved and loves the world. They will hear the Gospel. They will draw near to Christ in the sacrament of his body and blood. They will say: "We beseech thee to hear us." They are all thereby witnessing to their faith in something supernatural. Their faith would vanish if it could be literally reduced to the terms we employ

when we inquire into natural processes and formulate them. The language of the Cathedral is not the language of the investigator. It uses the words of earth, but gives to them an unearthly meaning. Birth and death are something else than being born and dying. What men believe in the Cathedral is something quite different from what they believe in a laboratory. They believe, for example, in the forgiveness of sins. Now sin is something impossible to define in

nature's terms. She is innocent of it. And as for forgiveness, it is quite unintelligible to say that nature forgives. She just does things and lets the consequences be what they will without ever undoing what she has once done. She is fate and not forgiveness.

There is an amusing fairy tale by Max Beerbohm which admirably illustrates this. A fairy sold a boy a stick of candy and told him that if he took a bite of the candy and made a wish, that wish would

be immediately granted. The thing is not quite so impossible as it sounds. We do not have to believe in fairies in order to believe the story. There may be no such candy; but it is quite clear that if you wish to die, you can readily have your wish fulfilled by biting a piece off the right kind. Wishes are fulfilled by using implements of some sort, so there is no telling what may be had for the wishing when once we have the candy. Well, the boy was in love with a girl who had been kept after school and stood in a corner with a dunce cap on her head. The boy went to a field full of flowers and the songs of birds. Then he took a bite of the candy and wished that the girl might be with him forthwith; and there she stood, dunce cap and all. With joy the boy took the girl in his arms and told her about the candy. She snatched it from him and swallowed it all at one gulp. "I hope you made a wish," said he. "I did," said she, "I wished that you had not had the first bite." That is a very profound story. The dunce cap is not the least profound thing about it. Nature lets us, like fairies, interfere with nature, but she does not let us interfere with the interference. She gives, but does not forgive. That is left for us or God to do. Whether human beings are right in so believing is not a matter of great consequence. The thing which is of consequence is the fact that we human beings, products of nature that we are, do none the less entertain that belief in some shape or other. We are bent on finding some way of relieving ourselves from the oppressive consciousness of what we have done. We are forever trying somehow to undo the consequences of the first fateful bite that was taken. We try to prevent it, never really knowing which it is.

As I have repeatedly said: constituted as we are, our life cannot be sustained except by the instrumentality of language, mathematics, and tools. We must first of all acquire the education which these instrumentalities afford. We must acquire the art of expressing ourselves intelligibly and of understanding the expressions of others. We must learn to measure, calculate, and predict. We must learn how to make fire, to cut, to saw, to hammer, to fashion, and to experiment. All this we must learn first of all. What next? Shall

we now go on to make improvements? Shall we now make wishes for others? Shall we put dunce caps on their heads, stand them in corners, take them to pleasant fields, let them hear birds' songs and look at flowers, asking them or God to forgive us our sins? It is quite clear that we do go on in just this way and set up schools to do it in. It is equally clear that in going on in this way we repeatedly wish that someone else had not had the first bite. The graduate school wishes that the colleges had not had it; and the colleges wish, the secondary schools wish, the primary schools wish, the kindergarten wishes, parents wish, until we get back to Adam, Eve, and the apple, or, if you prefer, to psychology, heredity, and environment—to nature and begin all over again. We turn to the philosophers to help us out. We expect them to find reasons for the faith in education that is in us.

The spectacle of them is a little absurd. Recall that brilliant procession from Plato down to me who say to the world: "Let me have the first bite; the problems of education will then be solved and fewer sins, perhaps none at all, will have to be forgiven." How to educate, when that means the practical problem of discipline in the basal instrumentalities of educaiton, can be solved. We can improve our methods of doing it. We can be brutal about it, or humane, stupid or clever. It is obviously unwise to go at the matter as teachers without training and without taking thought. A school is a wholly unambiguous institution when it conceives its job in these terms or when it chooses a definite occupation or profession, and trains for that. When we listen to the philosophers, however, we are apt to hear something very different. They tell us what we ourselves believe, that if schools are no more than this, they fall far short of what they ought to be. There must be a reason for education

other than the necessity of it, *in terms* of which reason education is properly defined. How to educate, when philosophers raise that question, is pretty sure to involve a problem of morals. Our attention is no longer fixed on the instrumentalities of education and their cultivation and improvement. It is turned to problems of what is proper and improper, what is fair and unfair, what is right and wrong, what is better and worse. In these matters, philosophers are apt to be more confident than other peo-

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ple. They are expected to be. But they are human beings after all. They share the frailties of mankind. They have brought about many revolutions in education, but they have never quite succeeded in solving their problems. It is as much of a problem today as it was with Plato. That makes the procession of philosophers look a little absurd. Every new philosopher might wisely enjoy the consciousness that he, too, will in time join that procession.

Yet philosophers seem to be generally respected. They bear a proud name which they accept with humility because it is so proud. They would like to be what they profess to be, masters of the subtle and elusive distinction between knowledge and wisdom, loving wisdom supremely and loving knowledge only as it contributes to wisdom. In spite of all their defects, which are many, their merit lies in keeping that distinction alive. They ask us to pause and reflect in the midst of our excitements and enthusiasms. Like signposts at life's crossings they halt us with stop, look, and listen! They know that we are all pretty sure to have a philosophy of some sort. They would have us look at it and see what it is like, what we get by having it and what we lose. To be critically conscious of what one is doing seems to them to be of at least equal importance with the doing it. So when a philosophy is asked for and

mating, the sun's warmth, the shadow's cool, the comforts of repletion and repose, disturbed by the surprises and fears of their precarious world, but struggling untouched by the Promethean spark. Rather than accept the alternative, they have preferred to go to school and sing:

Multiplication is vexation,
Division is as bad,
The rule of three, it puzzles me,
And fractions drive me mad.

They have preferred to write a hundred times such ambiguous truths as: "Be good, and you will be happy." They have preferred to draw moral lessons from nature, distorting her evident facts:

Birds in their little nests agree,
And 'tis a shameful sight
When children of one family
Fall out and quarrel and fight.

Rather than be larks singing at heaven's gate, they have mimicked the ovenbird and cried: "Teacher! Teacher!" I believe in the teacher, is humanity's unchanging creed.

And faith in education is a sublime faith. Let us look at it squarely and face its great assumption. It assumes that some of us are so much wiser than others that we have both the right and the obligation to mould their lives, to decide what is best for them, to take them in our own hands and try to make them believe and do what we think is best. It would be a pity if this assumption were foolish. Whether it is so or not, is a question about which a philosopher need not worry. He should be more interested in the fact that it is made. If I am handier than others in the use of tools or have developed any technique greater in refinement and effectiveness than that of others, if in anything we do, my skill is a superior skill, then, surely, my fellows, if they have any right at all, have some right to my instruction, and I, if I have any obligation at all, have an obligation to teach them. If my experience has been richer and fuller that that of others, it is idle to speculate about the reality of rights and obligations. It is idle because those rights will be claimed and those obligations driven home. It is faith in education and not the speculations of philosophy which turns human life into

especially when education asks for one, perhaps the giving of it is the lst thing which a philosopher ought to do. He is often expected to supply it on demand. He is often regarded as incompetent if he hasn't one ready; and being human and not liking to be despised, he often yields to temptation. I must believe that he might render a better service by asking us to consider first the faith in education which professes that education, if guided by the right philosophy, can produce the world of our desires.

In the first place it is a faith hard to uproot. Men cling to it after they have lost others. It is the last which they let go, and when they let it go, there seems little left worth troubling about. If there is nothing to be accomplished by education, then there is nothing to be accomplished. Human beings might as well give up trying to be human and become like the things on which they feed, animals or plants, which struggle for existence, experiencing the pleasures which visit them now and then, the luxury of

an essentially moral life. To find this out one does not have to study ethics or search for the origin of morality in folkways of primitive peoples. Let him try to teach a child the way to go and he will find himself in the thick of it.

Now a moral life is a matter of better and worse and reasons for better and worse are of their own sort. We seem to succeed in finding reasons why many things are as they are: why a bridge supports its traffic, why a man has indigestion, or why a child becomes frightened. Whenever we deal with the causes of effects and the springs of human behavior, we generally seem to be on the way to finding out what these causes and springs are. Industry alone seems adequate to satisfy our curiosity in this direction. But when we seek a reason for the better or the worse, we must first specify better for what and worse for what. Without a preliminary specification, nothing is better or worse than anything else. A mountain is not better than a molehill, pleasure than pain, health than disease, life than death. The qualities in things which lead us to seek some and avoid others or find satisfaction in some and dissatisfaction in others, all the natural and positive goods and evils in the world may confidently be said to be what they are in their own right without the bias of any human judgment, but an arrangement of them in a scale of preference requires some specification of what the preference is for. The better and the worse do not simply emerge in the course of our experience confidently labeled so that there is no trouble in detecting them. They emerge only when drawn out in view of some end to be attained, some purpose to be realized, some desire to be fulfilled. They are better or worse for that, and, given that, it may well turn out that a natural evil is better than a natural good. Ends, purposes, desires vary with individuals, times, places, circumstances. In their turn, they are subject to specifications. They force us to choose between them and to discover that the choice of some inevitably involves the rejection of others. So human life increases in moral intensity the more preferentially it is lived. It requires sustained criticism and the formation of habits which will keep it from

idle dispersion. Why this is all so, is a question which we seem to ask in vain. I say "in vain," not because no answers have been given to it, but because no answer has yet been given to it which has made human life cease to be a moral enterprise. Faith in education makes it moral and that is why that faith is sublime.

Let us not misunderstand the matter. That our power to control nature increases by discovery and teaching what she is, is not a matter of faith. It is a matter of fact. The proof of it is the automobile. That by increasing our power to control nature we shall have a better world, is not a matter of fact. It is a matter of faith. The proof of it is the Cathedral. If that proof is disliked, a multitude of others could be cited—the League of Nations, the protective tariff, socialism, nationalism, service, the Rotary Club, prohibition, the Rand School, the Lincoln School. The Cathedral is not the only house which shelters a cult to save mankind.

The faith we are considering would seem, therefore, to imply that there is something in us worth saving. The belief that education can produce a better world, is probably founded less on the experience of its actually doing so than it is on our imagination playing with our desires and sense of power. Experience fortifies convictions more often than it generates them, and those it generates usually amount to no more than the settled habit of expecting the same thing again under the same circumstances. Even here imagination plays its part. That acute baby of the psychologist who, having burned its finger in the first candle flame it sees, avoids all candle flames thereafter, was clearly not lacking in imagination. For candles numbered two and three have not yet burned it and, by hypothesis, never will, which proves conclusively that the leap from number one to all the rest was never made by experience. Having been burned is something quite different from expecting to be burned again. In the latter case imagination has outrun experienced fact, and made a universe of flame which robs a phototropism of its effectiveness. So while it is true enough that the world we experience existed before we experience

it, it is also true that it is discovered out of our imagination. Our baby must equally avoid a candle in a mirror unless, haply, it has altered its expectations. Such babyhood events we call today conditioned reflexes, but the useful name ought not to blind us to the fact. And for the fact, we do not have to go to babies. We may go to Einstein and be well assured that if he has discovered something new about the physical world, he has discovered it by reducing his imagination to fit facts. If experience alone were sufficient, we should have no difficulty in understanding him for we both live in the same physical world.

Thus it is that convictions are born of the imagination and this is why I have said that faith in education is founded on our imagination playing with our desires and sense of power. I often wonder why so many of us fall into the habit of reversing the process. I think I know why philosophers sometimes do. Perhaps they are ultimately to blame. For each of us knows that he has never learned anything from experience unless in learning his imagination has been disciplined in its expectations. The moment we begin to think we begin to tell ourselves stories about existence and find out later the truth about them. Think of the stories. The procession of them is far more impressive than the procession of philosophers. They tell us what we are far more truthfully and far more realistically than any treatise on human nature ever written. Such a treatise is itself a story and needs the others to illustrate it and give it vitality. As we recall the stories, is it not clear that spurred on by our desires and sense of power we tell ourselves the story of a better world? But again, a better world for what? To live in? We have a world to live in already. What then do we mean by a better world?

I have pushed the question so far for quite a different purpose than arousing curiosity about the answer. I have pushed it so far because it, itself, keeps pushing us in very much this way. There are, of course, a thousand answers that might be given. A better world is a world in which people will write and read more intelligently, calculate and predict more accurately, tool and experiment more effectively; where hair will last longer and

teeth decay less rapidly; where there will be less pain, disease, and misery and more happiness, joy, and fun; where everybody will love and nobody hate; where perhaps even the lion will lie down with the lamb and a little child shall lead them; where we shall not die so soon and perhaps not at all. Clearly there are at least a thousand answers. It is not difficult to define the better world in terms like these. It is easy to define it simply by leaving out the evils to be found in this. And since it is so easy, we are easily beguiled into thinking that, if the evils of this world were left out of it, we should have the better world at once. We need to be reminded again and again that the better world is not a better world to live in, but a better living in the world. Clearly it can never be a world in which nature and human nature have been so made over that our desires, emotions, instincts, glands, and internal secretions will all be so admirably adjusted that we shall never go astray and never need an education. The better world is not a substitute for the world we have, but an achievement within it. To get a better world, we do very little to nature because we can do very little. But we have to do a good deal to ourselves.

What does all this rambling discourse of mine amount to? I have wandered about, talking of nature and human life, of automobiles and cathedrals, saying what everybody knows and trying to say it as if nobody knew it. That's what a philosopher does and that's what the philosophy of education amounts to when it amounts to anything at all worth considering. I should have been more foolish than I have been, if I had done anything else. What then does it all amount to? It seems to me to amount simply to this, that education, seen first as a matter of necessity, is seen last as a matter of the imagination. Nature is not a product of

the imagination. It is the world of brute facts and events which is discovered after long and laborious research. It has no value and affords no guidance unless it is confronted with the world of the imagination. The baby and the candle afford the illuminating illustration. What goes on in the imagination becomes, therefore, a matter of almost supreme importance. In it are all sorts of worlds which never were on sea or land and some which will never be. In terms of them we reach decisions about the better and the worse. If these decisions are to be good and sensible, the imagination must be disciplined. Left to itself, it runs riot.

Now the imagination may be disciplined by sorrow, disappointment, and failure. That is a frequent way and it is a hard way. We do not like it, although some of us are disciplined in no other way. Like the baby, we must have our fingers burned. If we are to have a constructive discipline, we must do something else with our desires than try to satisfy them. When dealing with the better and the worse, philosophy cannot commend to education the practice of having experiences just to see what they are like. It cannot recommend experimentation in these matters. There is no sense in burning the baby as a part of its education. There are already enough people in the world who know that fire burns. Nature provides enough incentive to all sorts of emotional curiosity and indulgence. She is a bad model to follow, yet she is an instructive witness to the consequences which follow from following her. We may find out what she is in this respect as well as in any other for she provides abundant examples. She makes it very clear that a fuller and freer satisfaction of our desires does not lead to a discipline of the imagination or assist in making a better world. The construc-

tive discipline of the imagination is, therefore, not a matter of satisfying our desires at all. It is a matter of detaching ourselves from them and observing how they operate and what they effect. Humanity has had a long experience with them. Nature has provided an ample laboratory for them. As we study that experience and observe the experiments in that laboratory, we learn that our desires must be controlled, restricted, and idealized until the manner in which they are satisfied becomes more important than their satisfaction. When they can be enjoyed without regret and renounced without despair, the discipline of them has been fully attained.

In this whole matter of philosophy and education, the great thing is that education should go into philosophy and not philosophy into education. Deciding first on a philosophy and then proceeding to teach in terms of it is about the worst thing that one can do. We should protest against it with unflagging energy. The reason is quite simple. When education is founded on a philosophy and bent to serve its purposes, education is pretty sure to be sectarian. The widow Lenin is credited with saying: "We must make our school boys and girls not merely non-religious, but actively and passionately anti-religious." This is a bad thing to say, not because boys and girls should be religious, but because it justifies my saying: "We must make our school boys and girls not only non-scientific, but actively and passionately anti-scientific." Shall we turn education from the greatest enterprise in which we engage into a controversy? Shall we let it be controlled by the wavering and conflicting opinions of mankind? Which is better, to let what one passionately believes control what one finds in human life or to let what one finds in human life control what one passionately believes? I do not mean that we should never teach our passionate beliefs, for the world would be a poorer place without such teaching. If I believe that religion is bad and science good, I am going to teach that. And I am going to teach the contrary if I believe the contrary. No one has a right to stop me unless I have promised to teach the one and persist in teaching the contrary. But I have no business whatever to teach a con-

"The belief that education can produce a better world, is probably founded less on the experience of its actually doing so than it is on our imagination playing with our desires and sense of power."

troversy or promote the controversial habit of mind. I have no right to make my students so hate what I disbelieve that they will never know what it is. If I do, then I give clear proof that I am scared. I get no light on what I am doing. Philosophy should give light. When it is not an illumination, it is worth nothing. It is only calling a prejudice by a word which is supposed to have enough magic to remove the prejudice. And if philosophy is to be a light, it must be something in which education culmi- nates. That is what I mean when I say that education should go into philo- sophy. I might almost say that it is for philosophy that education exists, to lead one finally to a view of life which he ac- cepts with confidence and joy, which frees him from worrying about life and lets him concentrate his worries on the work he has to do.

There seems to me to be, therefore, strictly speaking, no philosophy of edu- cation at all. If we mean by philosophy the effect of mature reflection on human life, I think there are several things that can be said, things which are the pro- ducts of no one man's reflections, but which the experience of mankind has emphasized repeatedly. Some of these things I have tried to say in this lecture. That they should not be wholly lost in consequence of my way of saying them, I would now put them in the form of one, two, three. They are all an emphasis on obvious facts.

The first of these is education itself. I have belabored it in an effort to make it impressive, for it seems to me to be about the most impressive fact there is. That we live by learning, by going to school, by conserving through teaching what nature does not conserve through heredity, is so obvious that we often forget the wonder of it. Our sciences of nature, even our psychologies and sciences of human nature, as I read them, seem bent on convincing us that the world in which we live and of which we form a part consists of a set of opera- tions, sufficient unto themselves, going on in their own way, and ending with no concern as to how they end. They work in certain ways, but they have never learn- ed anything. Gravitation has never learn- ed anything, but Newton and Einstein

have. I can't get over this contrast. We philosophers often use such words as mind, intelligence, or soul to explain it. They don't explain it at all. They only name it. I like the name soul the best and I never cease wondering that there should be beings in the world who seem to care more about their souls than they do about anything else. They do the most amazing things for it and they set up schools to save it. That is what makes life interesting, perplexing, and profound. We sometimes belittle ourselves as pro- ducts of education. I cannot conceive, however, how a human being, had he the choice, would want to be a product of anything else. He hasn't the choice. He is under the necessity. And that fact makes education supremely impressive.

The second thing is that education does not have to wait for a philosophy to shape and guide it. It knows well enough what it has to do. It has to develop and teach those instrumentalities by which nature and human nature is controlled. It is a discipline in learning from beginning to end. To let it be this often seems a hard thing to do unsup- ported by some faith or some en- thusiasm. Philosophy may confidently reply that education has never been sup- ported by a great faith or a great enthu- siasm without developing them itself. Philosophy is not its root but its flower. Putting philosophy first is a vain attempt to try to grow upside down. All our faiths and enthusiasms which are more than expressions of exuberant or desperate liv- ing are products of our attempts to make something out of the world in which we live. By digging into it, by measuring it, by reflecting on it and trying to put into fitting words what our reflections reveal, we come by our considered faiths and our supporting enthusiasms.

Finally, education begets its own faith in spite of all philosophies. The proof of this is that it keeps going on no matter what schools of philosophy may do to it. Whenever I reflect on this and try to think it through I always come to the same conclusion, that education begets a faith which is not sectarian. It is the faith that human life is significant, not in terms of its origin, but in terms of its achievements. It is significant in terms of what can be made out of it through dis-

cipline. Its hopes are disciplined hopes and its loves are disciplined loves. In proportion as it renounces discipline and reverts to nature, it suffers a loss in significance. So convinced am I of this, that I can only be amazed at those phi- losophers who preach that discipline is a misfortune, that it thwarts the purpos- es of nature and robs our lives of their proper fullness and beauty. It makes me wonder where in the world they ever went to school. I can see plenty of good and evil in nature, but I can see no bet- ter or worse. This latter distinction is a product of human reflection and leads straight to discipline and control. In education, the springs of behavior are of minor importance while the ideals of conduct are of major importance. Knowledge of the former is worthwhile only as it may serve to support the lat- ter. By itself it gives no guidance, for the springs of behavior never produce any- thing better than themselves. Because education begets the kind of faith it is, the discipline of the imagination is its ultimate fruitage. Psychology and the science of human nature can make plainer to use those springs of human behavior which have to be controlled if that discipline is to be effective. But they do not determine the end for which that control is sought. For the end is their control and not their indulgence. The end is so to rise above them that they can be viewed with increasing detachment and seen in their concrete operations in human society. It is there we learn what they really are, how they work, what they bring about, and what they are worth. It is there we find out the candles which burn babies. So far as we have disciplin- ed our own imaginations and have seen what education is, we may, if we can have any faith at all, have the faith that we do not have to put the candles out in order to keep the baby from being burned. He will be burned as sure as fate if we cultivate his egotism instead of disciplin- ing his imagination.

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Mexico in 1979, and to Guatemala in 1985-86.

Notes Taken at a Critical Thinking Conference: 1988, A.D.

A. Gray Thompson

This spring while sitting at a conference on critical thinking in the environs of Minnesota, I found my mind smiling at the kids in Colegio Loyola, Guatemala City. I remembered parents coming to talk with me about their child's experiences with Philosophy for Children. Their enthusiastic discharge of paragraphs in Spanish through smiling lips and "thank you" eyes provided meaning for a myriad of words which passed may ears at thrice the speed of light. The long and short of the messages were, "My husband and I are thrilled that our child had such a wonderful experience."

. . . . if we are going to prepare competent citizens for tomorrow, for the future, the teaching of critical thinking will have to find its way onto our agenda. . . . .

"Gracias, gracias, muchas gracias, Señora." The smiling mother, the smiling child, and the smiling gringo. Of course the mother understood. The child understood. I understood. Meaning was inferred. Vocabulary notwithstanding. While I was remembering this I was also remembering how the kids would rattle on and on in animated dialogue. For minutes. Then they'd stop. Silence. They looked at me as with one set of eyes. Large, black eyes. "Well, what do you think?" Those eyes could speak. *"Bien,"* I'd say and hang on to the final "n" for several seconds, head nodding, while giving the impression to myself, anyway, that I understood all that was going on. I even, on occasion, believed I knew the vocabulary the kids pumped out like so much puffed rice . . . shot from guns.

. . . . metacognition is something all kids have got to master. They have to be taught to learn to think about their own thinking. Broad, narrow, open, closed . . .

Would I have known more about what was going on in the Philosophy for Children classrooms in Guatemala if I were better at Spanish? Or was I growing more aware of other vital aspects of learning-teaching because vocabulary did not get in the way? Might a deaf-mute be an effective observer-evaluator in the Philosophy for Children classroom when determining the extent to which democratic values and processes emerge in that classroom? When is shadow taken for substance in these situations? Is there other than oral discourse? . . . Tell me . . . Tell? . . . How to "tell"? . . . Sensory discourse? . . . Visual discourse? . . . With meaning?

After 30 years as a teacher at all levels, it was only in Guatemala that I realized that most college students have spent 16 years in schools looking at hair . . . the backs of heads, even as they speak. Too, it was in Guatemala that I realized that teachers really serve the function of a funnel. Receives all that kids say. Translates. Rebroadcasts it to the class with a kind of stamp of approval. Kids never speak with kids in the classroom. Always funneled through the teacher for the official translation. I found myself in Guatemala saying, "Hey, look at Maria when you are talking about her ideas." (I became increasingly more uncomfortable as these kids spoke to me with their eyes trying to give greater meaning to their vocabulary. Those eyes. Large and black. Meaning?). "Don't tell me your point of view about Juan's analysis. Tell Juan. Look at him. Then, ask what he thinks about your thoughts on the matter." *Madre de Dios.* How uncomfortable it is to address another's ideas while looking into his/her eyes. Large black eyes. With seriousness. With respect. With love?

. . . . . now the exercises, which tell us whether the skill is concrete, graphic, or abstract are embodied within the notion that mastery of such matters is preliminary to teaching critical thinking. That is to say . . . .

Another thing I discovered in Guatemala was that teachers like me are always asking questions and demanding immediate answers from students. The limitations of my Spanish vocabulary forced me into a most useful invention: *"Por favor, pensemos por veinte segundos acerca de . . .* please, let's think for twenty seconds about this question . . . let's listen

carefully ... What are some differences between just plain old characteristics ... and the essential characteristics of two different objects ... maybe a dog-cat, maybe a horse-cow, maybe a North American-Central American. What good reasons will you offer to support your thinking?" (After 20 seconds): "Now let's talk with our neighbors about what we think ... you three, you three, you three" ... (After three minutes): "Marta, what would you say now about just plain old differences and essential differences ... any characteristics vs. essential characteristics" ...:"Tomas, speak with Marta. What are your ideas?" ... "and Tomas, when you are finished, please identify a companion to share more ideas ..."

The first thing I knew was that students were becoming more and more responsible for giving direction to their own learning. More learning than teaching. Learners teaching learners. Learners teaching teacher as teacher backs out of the scene. Watching eyes. Watching brows. The mouth. The head. Who is listening? Who is talking? Anyone else daydreaming, now? Oh, the words. The vocabulary. What really are they all saying? Do I know? How do I know that I really know? What goes on more in the classroom? Teaching? Or, learning?

......

.... and it's the teaching of critical thinking ...., you can put the lights back on now ..... it's the teaching of critical thinking ..... the teaching̲g̲g̲g̲g ....

......

Yea. Are these kids doing "critical thinking"? Are they providing good reasons for making the decisions they are thinking about making? Are they analyzing the potential consequences of their thinking which tends to lead to decision-making, which may lead to behavior? How would I ever know?

Well, one day a kid brought a newspaper ad into the class which said that Esso gasoline brings Guatemalans the future today! That kid wanted the class to explore the truth of the ad. There was quick agreement that one place to start their investigation was to fuss with the essential characteristic for the word "today" and the word "future." Dictionary pages were searched. Encyclopedias too. The kids discussed the matter in small groups, recorded their decisions, then listed them on the board in the appropriate column. After giving analysis to the two columns it was decided that no essential characteristics for "today" appeared in the "future" column. Hector slammed his hand on his neighbor's desk while shouting, *"Fantasia!"* Lisa, with li-

quid black eyes and a Mona smile whispered, "If it's not the truth, it's a lie."

......

..... in the text you will find a list of definitions which make up *thinking* skills and thinking processes which need to be taughtttttt. They are different, you know. I'm going to take you *through* the key concepts and their definitions. Can you see them on the overhead? No? Well, ...

......

I was remembering how excited I was when at the next class session, six other kids brought other Esso ads to the room. I found myself talking really fast in English thinking I was speaking Spanish. I think the kids thought I was speaking Spanish too, because they took the ads to the back table, shut up, and sat down. Maybe I was speaking Spanish. Or were the kids reading between the lines ... the words ... the inflections ... or my narrow grey eyes?

The strange thing was that grown-ups seldom knew what I was saying when I attempted Castellano with them in Guatemala. The kids, though, had few problems. There was always at least one kid who knew what I was about. That kid became a funnel. Received. Translated. Rebroadcasted. Just like teacher. But the difference was that the kid radiated pride because the gringo was saved from another failure. And, I submit there was something mysterious about my language. My Castellano. The mystery was in its simplicity. Just plain simple language. Like magic. Easy words. The kids, unlike grown-ups, were quite aware of my limitations. They wanted to reciprocate my wanting to help them by wanting to help me. Grown-ups, perhaps, get so convoluted in their language-conversation-thinking that kid-talk can't make sense in a senseless adult world, and consequently, they can't really understand kid-talk. Maybe like, "What was Keats thinking about when he wrote his "Ode On A Grecian Urn"? (Was that concrete or abstract? Perhaps graphic? I wonder if he got punished?)

......

.... and .... so .... but .... yet .... then .... teaching ... ing ... inging oral discourse ......

......

It got so that the kids were making me more and more comfortable with what I could then call "My maturing expertise with Spanish." The kids were doing very well with Philosophy for Children. Pre- and post-test scores attest to that fact. I was doing better in really knowing what kids were learning. Words wer but one of our many modes for communicating in the Philosophy for Children classroom. The kids, too, were demanding that a companion "Look at me when you are speaking about my ideas!" Kids were more willing to risk sharing ideas when time was provided to think about questions before answers were demanded. Kids found that could formulate better ideas when opportunity was provided to "think with" companions before having to give responses. Quiet kids often talked more freely with a companion than to the group as a whole. Bright, vocal kids quickly found that many quiet kids were equally bright because all kids were "conned" into participating many times in each and every class.

.....and besides, oral discourse.... no!... put them on now....yes!... oh...no!....

They were going hot and heavy one day. Those fifth-graders. Fussing with differences of degree and differences of kind. I asked different kids to discuss the matter as though each were the president of Guatemala...to see...to feel... to hear, and that each had a message of vital importance for all Guatemalans. Various kids would carry on as follows: "My fellow Guatemalans. I come here today to tell you that we have made a grand discovery. If we have something with a certain set of significant and essential characteristics, we can say that we have a tree or a cat or a chair. We can say that these significant and essential charactgeristics make up a definition for that something. For example, everything with the significant/essential characteristics of a feline, is a feline. And, too, Guatemalans, all cats are felines and all felines are cats, because all of these somethings have the very same significant/essential characteristics." Then the kids would applaud, and another gave a "speech" of

discovery perhaps dealing with the essential characteristics of "freedom." The kids listened to each and every word of each and every president. Misstatements were questioned. Clarifications were asked for. Arguments ensued. Then more applause. Exciting.

The kids knew they could really reward me with strokes which really became lashes when they'd conclude their "freedom" speech with, "...y, *mis companeros, sin la responsibilidad no tenemos nada! La libertad es imposible sin responsibilidad*... and, my companions, without responsibility, we have nothing! Freedom is impossible without responsibility." Silence. A roar of applause.

.....we have to find some ways of getting children going in this new area of emphasis, teaching critical think- ing....teaching....ingingingingggg........teach....ing...ing... g..g....

One hang-up which I like remembering involved a group of kids who "understood" the feline-cat affair but refused to accept the "fact" that lions and tigers are also cats. "Too big!" "Too big!" They even gave good reasons for this being a matter of degree, not kind. It didn't matter. "Too big!" "Too big!" After Esso neither teacher nor newspaper could convince these kids of anything that didn't make meaning for their minds. No teacher-talk could persuade. Not even talk from their real teacher.

Walking from my class to the car that day, again I noticed the gigantic oak in the patio's center. A mammoth umbrella. From eye to mind. The oak. From mind to memory. A bonsai. That bonsai. In my mind. I remembered. I remembered I had bought a bonsai tree the previous year when living in Guatemala. Off to the nursery.

With bonsai in hand I walked the classroom the next day asking about the significant/essential characteristics of what I held in my hand. "Trunk," "leaves," "branches," "bark," (I thought, dogwood), "roots," "veins," "odor," "Life," and more responses including some other non-essentials like "a bird's nest." "Then," I asked, "what do we name objects-ideas which possess these characteristics?" All

replied, "A tree." "Does size make any difference?" I asked. "NO!!!" they screamed. And, Hector again slammed his hand down on his neighbor's desk and shouted, "....and that's why tigers are cats and lions are cats...size has nothing to do with it! Just don't call a tiger a kitty!!"

These kids were not being controlled by my talking because they knew that their talking was better than mine. I learned to watch with my ears and listen with my eyes. Seeing more of kids than seeing myself, and listening more to kids than listening to myself made me realize that many of these kids were, in fact, smarter than I. Fifth graders smarter than I?

......so thank you for your provocative questions. I have been asked to announce that lunch will now be served in the cafeteria downstairs......the lights......thank you........

But, the best thing that really happened to me after Guatemala was returning to Marquette University and my class in social studies methods.

"Why," I now ask, "as teachers don't we give kids a chance to think about our questions and time to formulate answers in a thoughtful and reflective manner? Why don't we organize the learning situation so that kids can question and fuss with tentative responses with their companions? Why can't we organize the learning setting so that we break the "I only remember looking at the backs of heads and hair for 16 years" syndrome? Why can't kids talk with kids rather than maintaining the teacher as a funnel for receiving, translating, and rebroadcasting?) Why can't kids call on kids for analysis, ideas, assessments, questions? Why can't teachers back off and let kids learn from kids and teacher learn from kids, too? Why can't we admit that some kids in our classrooms, even first graders, are smarter than I, the teacher?......(Had I realized all of this before my first year of teaching would that knowledge have made any difference?)"

........going to lunch, Al?......huh, Al?......Al!........"Oh, sure. And I'll get the lights........."

Reverend Father Dr. Stan Anih is the Director of the Institute of Ecumenical Education, Thinkers Corner, Enugu, Nigeria

Nigerian College Adopts "Community of Inquiry" Approach

By Stan Anih

The Institute of Ecumenical Education, Thinkers Corner, Enugu, Nigeria, has emerged with a new technology for the teaching-learning situation. This new concept regards the school classroom as a community of inquiry. This innovation is necessary today in Nigeria because the system of pedagogy which we inherited from Western culture is now abysmally inadequate to cope with the day-to-day problems of the man of the 21st century. The African man was condemned to the thought patterns of the Greco-Roman heritage, which was patterned on an archaic, fossilized and hackneyed pedagogical base.

The Institute is fashioning an educational system which is known to us as andragogy. In this system of education, everybody in the classroom—the teacher and the taught—form a single community where people contribute from different sides to arrive at the desired goal.

Andragogy (or Community of Inquiry or Reflective Education) is premised on four cardinal assumptions concerning man:

1. That, as people mature, their self-concepts move from that of a dependent personality towards a self-directing personality;

2. That people's personal experience is the greatest source of their reflection and growth in knowledge;

3. That through the community of inquiry to which people belong, they become increasingly aware of their social roles and tasks;

4. Through the system of andragogy, knowledge is no longer a storehouse for postponed application but a desirable skill for immediate application to here-and-now problems; this shifts learning from subject-centeredness to problem-centeredness.

Andragogy is the lost educational method of Africa as we know from the moonlight story-telling and fireside story-telling where adults and youngsters stay together sharing experiences, teaching one another and learning from one another, without only one person standing out as the only reservoir from which everybody must tap. Andragogy is a sharing of educational experience: it is communitarian and functional in nature, and gears towards solving immediate problems of the members of the community.

If somebody dies, stories concerning the happiness of the underworld would be told and the bereaved would in this way deal with the problem of the sorrow surrounding them.

The African educational system has always accepted the form of the community of inquiry, even when there is a problem to be settled by the traditional jury. People would sit around the tree in front of the village shrine and each individual would be allowed to shed his personal light on the problem being discussed. When this participatory problem-solving process had taken place, a solution would emerge and the people would have convinced themselves that they had done their best. Nobody is neglected and nobody is over-inflated, as happens in the European classroom of pedagogy where the teacher is the only pinnacle that everybody must climb in order to know anything.

In andragogy, where education becomes reflective, participatory and dialogical, we notice that the spirit of dialogue develops in the Community of Inquiry. The constant search for truth and knowledge becomes everybody's business

with the Community of Inquiry. Both adults and children have equal opportunity to learn that, in the community, we are not only our 'brother's keepers,' but we are our brother's brothers. In the community of inquiry or the classroom, the spirit of tolerance for each other's views, feelings, imaginings and creation, as well as care for one another's happiness, increases daily.

This is education in its quintessence: people commit themselves to objectivity, they spontaneously fight for impartiality, they communally strive for consistency and reasonableness. In fact, the supreme law guiding the Community of Inquiry is the law of reasonableness; if it is reasonable, accept it, not because Okonkwo or Jones has said it but because it is reasonable. This type of education is deeply concerned with the moral, social and political implications for the community. The classroom becomes a living community where everybody not only participates but also gains from the participation of others.

The alien system of pedagogy has stultified and killed the growing generation because the educational system was defined as the transmission of the knowledge and experience of the past to the present generation. The children trained in this system come out with certificates and roam the streets without jobs. When they do become employed, they are non-performers, and when they try to employ themselves, they are non-starters. They always carry a superiority complex that they are educated, when in actual fact they are only lettered.

One of the great merits of the Community of Inquiry is that it predisposes all the pupils in the class to be open-minded and to be attitudinally ecumenical. Consequently, the child in the classroom willingly accepts corrections by peers. The child is also:

1. able to listen to others attentively

2. able to revise his or her views in light of reason from others

3. able to take his or her ideas seriously

4. able to build upon other people's ideas

5. able to develop his or her own ideas without fear of rebuff or humiliation from peers

6. open to new ideas

7. concerned about the rights of others to express their views

8. capable of detecting underlying assumptions

9. concerned about consistency when arguing a point of view

10. one who asks questions

11. one who verbalizes relationships between ends and means

12. one who shows respect for persons in the community

13. one who shows sensitivity to context when discussing moral conduct

14. one who asks for reasons from one's peers

15. one who discusses issues with impartiality

16. one who asks for criteria

If our educated people are all able to discuss issues with impartiality and ask for criteria for those actions carried out in our country, the continuous wallowing and meandering from one ideology to the other which Nigeria has suffered from in the past thirty years would not be the case. People do things whimsically and arbitrarily, whether they are the leaders or the led. Consequently, we have come to a point of no question, no answer, a situation of political doldrums, a situation of financial fiasco, yet in the presence of plenty in Nigeria. People are just looking for enjoyment and cheap corn instead of trying to build the nation. Those who receive education on the platform of an alien pedagogy are always looking for gold, glory and gain but hardly ever look for God, grace and growth.

Now the Community of Inquiry, based on the educational system called Andragogy, helps us to become clearer about what we know, more able to make better distinctions, more able to recognize underlying assumptions, more able to distinguish better from worse reasons, more able to think consistently and comprehensively, more able to criticize our own goals and others', more able to criticize our own thinking as well as the thinking of others.

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Some Notes on P4C in Ecuador

By: A. T. Lardner

When working at the second grade level or below, the first thing one notices is that the students are both more physical and more affectionate. They need to move around more, and one must work harder to facilitate student to student dialogue. The students will sit around your feet as though you were a wandering sage, or perhaps Hans Christian Anderson telling his tales. Either way, they gather around your feet as though you are ready to bestow wisdom. While this is good in terms of transferring this affection into the discussion process, it is not good if the students cannot de-center from you. "Mr. Philosophy" becomes a personality. S/he must become more like Elfie. Pied pipers lead the dancing troupe with their own tune; we must be more in role of passing the pipe.

Never read too much with the children at any one time. Be careful to guide them in explicating the text. Keep a clear foundation in the development of the discussion; with each lower grade level the children are more apt to diverge into totally unrelated anecdotes. They are easily sprung in these directions; any word from a sentence may remind them of a personal experience. Yet they have little practice in relating these anecdotes to a developing discussion. Thus, we need to continually remind them, with "kid gloves", as it were, that their stories should relate in some way with previous points made in the discussion. That they tie everything into personal experience

On Working with the Elfie Program

is obviously a good thing; we must use our experience in integrating such experience into discussions to guide them towards such a skill.

Second graders and below are still very sensitive to various external goings on in the room, which often can be an excellent springboard for philosophical discourse. We must be willing to diverge in any fruitful direction should such an occurrence happen.

One day, as we were beginning to discuss a topic gleaned from the reading, a bee landed on the rug between us all. There was general amusement and mild panic before one of the children got up and promptly stamped on the bee. At this point, little Jana whispered to me, "is

it OK to kill animals?" Once the group had quieted down, I had Jana put the question to the whole group. What followed were two sessions of animated discussion concerning animals, their rights, differences between various species and between animals and humans, justifications for killing animals granting their normal right to live, etc. Like Augustine's educational encounter with the overflowing water, this two-day discussion sprang from an utterly natural, experiential source.

We should truly be on the lookout for these opportunities—when working with philosophy at any grade level, but more so the younger the students. Young children are still not textually centered; they

remain attuned to the more general classroom experience.

With few exceptions, a second grade or lower class has a relatively short attention span for strictly verbal discourse; they have yet to develop the screening capabilities necessary to concentrate for sustained periods on voices, decoding, etc. The classroom environment, the sounds from outside, the faces of class-mates and the teacher, other unrelated thoughts bubbling up—all combine to make any prolonged attention on one thing (especially verbal) quite difficult.

With this in mind, we have to adapt in several ways. Early elementary teachers take these qualities as a given, and struc-ture the class time so as to bring in as much variety and hands-on activity as possible. We must work to keep the dis-cussion jumping, to maximize "verbal play" as much as possible. We also should resort to other approaches than the stan-dard discussion format. For instance, when the students began discussing Elfie's not having the words to express her thought, and about whether words themselves are necessary, we played a

game of one-word charades. Similar ac-tivities can be found to correspond to many of the topics the students take up.

All in all, the *Elfie* program has been one of the most enjoyable programs in P4C to work with. The children are enthusiastic, creative (if somewhat over-ly divergent) and affectionate. The manual, I found, is especially well done, with an eye towards the verbal play men-tioned above. As long as we keep in mind that a quiet and linear discussion for 45 minutes is difficult for these creative and constantly wandering minds, a kind of ef-fervescent community can be built. Most importantly, this is an age when tapping into their natural wonder is most fruit-ful. When continued into the later grades, perhaps the goal of helping to preserve this sense of wonder is facilitated.

Philosophy for Children in the "English as a Second Language" Classroom

In 1988/89, my work with Philosophy for Children (P4C) at Academia Cotopaxi

American International School (in Quito, Ecuador) was quite extensive. Among the many areas of implementation were several English as a Second Language (ESL) classes, ranging from the mid-elementary to the high school level.

ESL classes are quite a unique setting for P4C, and I had heard or read little about work done in this area before. In-itially, we decided to bring P4C into ESL so as to make the ESL classes as consis-tent with the mainstream curriculum as possible (P4C was being initiated from early elementary to the eighth grade). At Cotopaxi, English language acquisition for students who don't arrive able to speak the language is a primary and highly necessary process. Other than Spanish language and literature, there are no bi-lingual courses. Thus, students are moved as quickly as possible into mainstream classes, sometimes after less than half a year. Since these students would be encountering P4C in the regu-lar curriculum, we felt that they should be introduced to it in the ESL class. Yet we were quite unsure about the results.

After a year of working in differing

amounts with four different ESL classes, we were quite pleasantly surprised at the success of P4C with these groups. My knowledge of the field of ESL is quite limited, but I believe that I can perceive several ways in which P4C and ESL are complimentary. Below I will describe the ways in which the two interanimate.

First, let us look at several ways in which work with P4C helps to facilitate the acquisition of English. The basis of a P4C session is discussion which is student-centered in the sense that the content of the discussion arises as much as possible from the ideas of the students. All of this, as with everything else in an ESL class, takes place in English. Yet here the discussion, the use of the language, is with a purpose; it is not an isolated exercise.

A main goal of ESL is to have attention focused on the activity at hand, rather than on the language. In a P4C session, the activity is a sharing of open ideas and thoughts coming from the students. When students communicate in a philosophical discussion, they are employing the language in a real and meaningful context. When they have an idea to share with the group, they search for and experiment with words and phrases with a purpose, with motivation.

Obviously, when working with one of the P4C texts in an ESL class, much more preparation must be done in terms of new vocabulary and meaning acquisition. Yet here there is a clear purpose to the new vocabulary, for it will form the basis of discussion in which the students will employ that vocabulary in their own way.

In a community setting, which is the P4C classroom, students work together to clarify abstract ideas, or question ideas which may appear mistakenly obvious. In the ESL class, they also work together to produce the vocabulary needed to express these ideas and questions. Many were the times when I looked on with pleasure while a young student, enthusiastic about an idea, would struggle to find the words to express him/herself. Others, eager to hear his/her thought, would eagerly call out suggested words. Such struggle and later success at expressing something vital in terms of meaning, all in a second language, seem to me highly useful in acquiring facility in that language.

Finally, in this same context, we can note that group philosophical inquiry requires that each participant be able to be understood, since others must listen and build on his/her ideas. This creates the responsibility in each participant to make his/her ideas as clear as possible, to make him/herself understood.

Another area where P4C may contribute to the goals of second language acquisition is in philosophy's tendency to concentrate on specific words and meanings. This is a norm in philosophy in general, and is found in the P4C manuals. Many words are given a comprehensive treatment in discussion, with time spent discussing meanings, not simply memorizing them. Thus, students are given a chance to acquire a richer set of connotative meanings in their new vocabulary.

One particularly interesting example, with students whose first language is Spanish, is the exercise (in the *Kio and Gus* and *Pixie* manuals) which examines the difference between "to make" and "to do". In Spanish, the single word "hacer" carries both meanings. Thus, it is not only useful for these students to discuss at length the differences between these two words, but we have the added benefit of hearing their particular views on the difference between the two concepts.

In addition to the utility of P4C in the ESL classroom, the ESL environment also benefits greatly the doing of P4C. One of the greatest barriers to doing philosophy at any age is a mind which is

conceptually hardened. When the world is seen as being made up of empirical truths or untruths which are known or to be learned, all divided and classified so as to facilitate this mastery, then open questioning of these classifications, or of the very validity and sufficiency of empirical truths, is seen as useless, frustrating, even destructive. Young children are not so conceptually hardened. Most adults are. The process is inexorable as we march from third to fourth to sixth grade, so that by the time we finish with elementary school, most open wondering curiosity has been contained.

We have a different picture in the ESL class, for in the new language of the students, few concepts are solidified. In a regular fifth or sixth grade class, students will often be skeptical as to why time is being spent on either something they already know, or something for which there is no distinct answer. When asked to analyze the concepts of "just", "fair", etc., they may scurry for their dictionaries, find the "answer", and that's it.

An ESL class seems more open to philosophical inquiry precisely *because* of their unfamiliarity with the language. The students' curiosity remains alive due to the strangeness of the new words and phrases. The newer the language is for them, the more this seems to hold true. When I first began to work with these classes, especially with a group made up of third to fifth graders where we employed *Kio and Gus*, I was amazed at how many responses they would have me writing down. Finally, the classroom teacher informed me that the basis behind many of the questions and responses was the mysteriousness of the words. This was fine, as many of the responses were springboards for inquiry into concepts which many a regular class would not have noticed.

I believe that our success with P4C in ESL classes at Academia Cotopaxi is not isolated, and if what I describe above holds true, could be replicated anywhere. More work and research by someone with more expertise in the theory of the teaching of ESL (and familiarity with P4C) seems warranted.

Some of the ideas and inspiration for this article can be attributed to Sue Mann and Sylvia Brecht, two ESL teachers with whom I worked at Cotopaxi.

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Working with Philosophy for Children in Catalonia

By Josep Cullell

This is the second year I have worked with nine- to eleven-year-old children using the I.A.P.C. curriculum, specifically the *Kio & Gus* program. In addition, I have been working with *Harry* and *Lisa*. I should point out that working with the *Kio & Gus* program offers a series of opportunities and advantages which are not as readily available with the other programs just mentioned. *Kio & Gus* not only allows one to work on the early stages of acquisition of thinking skills, but brings one much closer to the linguistic, semantic and logical foundations which make possible the acquisition of these skills. In addition, this circumstance allows one to work on something I find quite interesting at the moment, *i.e.*, the relationship between these skills and the facilities or difficulties which appear during their acquisition.

I have noticed, for instance, that some skills include other previously acquired ones. In any case, these relationships do not always automatically appear in a similar manner, and therefore it is very interesting to follow a few cases of hierarchical organization of skills, as they are acquired, developed or strengthened. Consider, for example, a skill like exemplification (finding examples to illustrate a given explanation), which may seem to be a skill quite easy to acquire.

When one follows its development closely, one often finds that children make exemplification mistakes which further complicate the comprehension of that which they are explaining.

Furthermore, such incorrect exemplification is due not only to their poor exemplifying ability, but to the lack of other skills. Thus a deficiency in the area of inclusion or exclusion of concepts may affect the ability to draw conclusions which underlies one's skill in exemplification. In fact this is not a mechanical process, nor does any particular skill in one case automatically imply the presence of another. But in the course of an academic year, many situa-

tions occur in which such skills come into play forming a cluster.

In the course of the past academic year, I began to consider this question and to address it as soon as the development of the program has made it possible, *i.e.*, whenever the exercises and discussion topics allowed the introduction of this investigation as just another exercise for the community of inquiry. One of the thinking skills with which I have encountered more problems is the ability to draw (deduce or induce) conclusions. This has led me to analyze some of the children's logical and psychological processes involved in reaching a conclusion, such as, for instance, establishing exclusion or inclusion relationships among concepts.

As this is a new task for me, I would like what follows to be seen as an attempt to approach closer to an enormously wide field, but also as an aim or desire to obtain suggestions and guidance from other teachers who, like myself, are interested in this matter which is ever present in daily teaching.

Thus, for the purpose of analyzing the foundations of the ability to reach conclusions, I began with two standardized propositions, (in *Harry Stottlemeier*), with a particularizing quantifier:

"*Some children are students who have passed.*"
"*Some children are mammals.*"

In the first place children are asked to draw the conclusion or inclusion relationship, using Venn diagrams. The graphs corresponding to each sentence coincide in both cases: they always depict an "X" individual who shares both concepts (sets) which appear in the sentence.

In the second place, I ask the students if they think these sentences are true or false. Although the truth or falsehood of these sentences should be independent of any conclusion to be drawn from them, for children of this age the possibility of drawing a conclusion is largely determined by the truthfulness or falsity of the sentences.

The children reply that the first sentence could be true, because the situation it refers to often occurs. I then ask them what conclusion they would draw if the teacher were to tell them that sentence. At first the children say that they would conclude that some children in the class have passed. One of the children replies

that, since this is precisely the information contained in the teacher's sentence, it cannot be a conclusion.

At this point I tell them that when I ask for a conclusion, I would like them to tell me if they can discover something else, apart from what the sentence says. This "something else" would be the conclusion I am asking them for. What they know from the sentence can be considered the premise (the sentence itself should be taken as a premise), and whatever else they discover (as a result of what they know from the actual sentence) can be called conclusion.

They then give me two conclusions:
a) Not all children (in the class) are students who have passed.
b) Some children are students who have not passed.

They justify (a) by saying that unless the teacher wanted to mislead the class he would never say, "Some students in the class have passed," if they had really all passed; thus, if he says so, it is because he knows that not all the children in the class have passed.

The children who have drawn conclusion (b) say that they know that whenever a teacher tells them "some of the children in the class have passed," there are also children who have not passed.

It seems certain that, in order to have drawn these conclusions, the children must place themselves in an imaginary situation where the teacher tells them that sentence and then they apply what they have learned through experience to this imaginary situation.

It is the reality, or potential reality, of the situation which enables them to know the circumstances which would apply. And it is also due to this experiential knowledge that they reach the cited conclusions.

In brief: the conclusion was possible because:

1st. The children have made a survey of the proposed situation.
2nd. They have applied the experience acquired in similar situations.
We then go on to the second example, "Some children are mammals".

After establishing the relationship between "children" and "mammals" using Venn diagrams, we inquire about the truth or falsity of the proposition. The

conclude another falsehood: "Some children are not mammals," while maintaining its falsehood and at the same time its validity as a conclusion (as long as—as already stated—we interpreted as they do, "Some" as "Only some").

Out of twenty students who form the group, only one raises his hand and proclaims, to everyone's astonishment, that the sentence, "Some children are mammals," is true. The rest of his classmates express their surprise and ask him why. The child answers: "Since it is true that *all* children are mammals, it is also true that *some* of these children are mammals. Since they all are, some are, too."

The flawless reasoning and conclusion of this child soon overcomes the attitudes of some of his classmates who had maintained that the sentence was false, and who now realize—as if struck by lightning—that they were wrong.

In spite of all this, some children persist in their original opinion; they even get angry with the classmate who has sustained a different opinion from theirs: "But, can't you see that, if they were all mammals, which is the case, it would not say that some are, but rather that they all are?"

The objection repeats itself, as in the case of the previous sentence, "Some children have passed."

To find out the children's tendency in the use and interpretation of the quantifier, "Some," I asked each one of them for an example of a sentence with the same logical structure and with the quantifier, "Some."

The following are their examples:
—Some children are football players.
—Some whales are mammals.
—Some mammals are men.
—Some pens are red.
—Some sweets are mint-flavored.
—Some boxes are made of cardboard.
—Some eggs are small.
—Some animals can fly.
—Some insects are poisonous.
—Some flowers are lilies.
—Some children are silly.
—Some blackboards are green.
—Some animals are reptiles.
—Some animals are dogs.
—Some cans are Coke cans.
—Some furniture is small.
—Some cats are black.

first answer is that it is untrue. When asked for the reason for their answer, the children state that it is not true that *some* children are mammals, but that *all* children are mammals. That is why it is untrue.

It is easy to notice, by the children's answer, that they take for granted the same situation which appeared in the case of the teacher telling the students that some students in the class had passed. In that statement, and in that imaginary situation, they perceived the adverb "only" as if it were implicit in the sentence. This "only" took part in the situation, without being explicit.

Since the sentence was interpreted as referring to the fairly frequent situation of some of the students having passed and others having failed, children tended to interpret "some students have passed" as "only some students have passed." The children then did the same with the new sentence, "Some children are mammals." Since the structure of the sentence is the same as the previous one, they interpret it in the same manner, and think of it as if it said, "Only some children are mammals." They realize that this

sentence is untrue and say so.

Here again, we find how the process of learning the way we use these sentences becomes connected to the situations or circumstances in which such use has been learned, in such a way that when the children hear the sentence from the teacher, they place it among the type of sentences common to their daily lives.

Also, we find that the children place themselves in that situation of learned experience, and they can thus understand, interpret, conclude, guess or whatever that has to do with the sentence. Hence, the children interpret, "Some children are mammals," as "Only some children are mammals." Since they interpret this sentence as being false, they do not think it correct to draw a conclusion from this "untrue" statement.

Separating the logical validity from the material truth of a given conclusion is perhaps too complex an exercise for them, so they prefer to think and say that no conclusion can be drawn from that sentence.

For us, if we were to admit that "Some children are mammals," (or "Only some children are mammals") is false, we could

which I had not yet been able to analyze, or to realize its full extent.

We were doing some exercises from Chapter 3 of *Kio & Gus*. The children were not finding it easy to draw valid conclusions. Gradually, the discussion of a conclusion drifted towards the subject of death, and whether everything ends with death or not. The children seemed quite comfortable with and interested in the subject, and from their reactions, they did not seem particularly obsessed or disturbed by it.

Suddenly, Ester, a ten-year-old girl, exclaimed, in a state of excitement, that since her two uncles had been killed, not long ago, she had missed them a lot, and her grandmother (the mother of the girl's two uncles) was very depressed.

At this point, due to a lack of perspicacity and subtlety, I made a mistake which had unpleasant consequences for the girl and for the class: I asked her whether, when she said "killed," she really meant "died." The girl immediately raised her voice and insisted she meant "killed," because they had really been killed by a bomb when they were working on a building site (the girl's uncles were bricklayers.)

I immediately remembered the case in question, which had happened a couple of years ago. The girl explained the whole tragic incident very quickly and ended up very excited, saying that the person who had killed her uncles was already out of jail now, because he was over sixty, and the penal code of the country decreed that no person over sixty years of age should remain imprisoned. She concluded straight away without pausing: "So, according to these laws, if now my grandmother were to kill this man, would she not go to jail either, because she is over sixty?" After this question, Ester started to cry, and could not be calmed down.

The situation created a tense and silent atmosphere in the classroom which I tried to soften, directing the children's attention towards another exercise.

Nonetheless, and even though it was a painful incident for the girl, the conclusion that she had reached, regarding the possible revenge of the grandmother

caught my attention.

Dwelling on the girl's speech was not advisable, however; I was worried about the possible impact of the whole episode on the rest of the pupils. For this reason, after the lesson and when the pupils were leaving, I decided to ask one of them whether he knew what had prompted Ester to start crying. The child answered immediately, as if stating the obvious: "She was crying because she loved her uncles a lot, and she is very upset that she will never be able to see them again, because they have been killed."

I was struck by the prompt, obvious and easy manner of the child's answer. I interpreted it as a *conclusion* which he himself had drawn from the situation he had just been through in the classroom; this situation had played the part of a premise or premises, and as the child placed himself in the situation, he understood the girl's feelings, and could give a reasonable and plausable explanation to what was happening inside the girl's mind.

The case was interesting because this same child had shown considerable difficulty drawing conclusions only a short while earlier in an exercise which we had done and discussed, where the child was supposed to draw conclusions following a simple, logical deduction process.

An analysis of the situation suggested that perhaps the difficulties that this child, and indeed all the children, faced when trying to draw conclusions from premises given by the teacher, were that these premises meant, or referred to, things which were quite distant from their field of real, or potentially real, experience or the use of concepts which appear in the sentences acting as premises. I mean premises of which there has been no previous learning process.

I also noticed that the same was applicable to the girl's case: in her intense emotional state, the girl had reached a conclusion (her grandmother's possible vengeance) through her own experience of the situation. Of course it is possible that the girl may have heard and copied this conclusion from some other member of her family. But even in this case

she had expressed a thought as the conclusion of a sequence of circumstances that she had lived and expressed.

Let us notice that in all of the cases I have explained, one finds that the conclusion to be drawn is found either when there is direct knowledge (obtained through situations that the children have lived) of the premises, or there is empathic survey by the child of the situations which the premises describe.

I think that here one can see how, at the age of nine to eleven, so-called empirical intelligence carries more weight than an abstract intelligence. And also that this is so strong that it even interferes with cases of exclusively formal deductions. Thus, a conclusion to be drawn from one or more premises, which will imply a logical or formal deduction process, will be much more difficult to reach than another, which can be obtained using premises with a previously acquired empirical content, and an imaginary or real context which is accessible to the child.

Experience, experimentation, empathic survellence, learning process ... all of these contribute to efficiency in the ability to draw conclusions. The further we get from here, the more abstraction is needed, and the more difficult it gets for the child.

All of these considerations could point us in the right direction to develop in children the capacity to draw conclusions. This "right direction" is a process which consists in drawing the field of (formal-logical) abstraction as close as possible to the field of experience, so that the distance between these fields is small enough not to be an impediment to the development of this ability.

Finding and building this process is a laborious task, because, as can be seen in the case we have analyzed, it is not only a matter of exercising an ability through exercises having a defined aim (though this is, in itself, difficult enough), but also an attempt to connect this processs with the child's feelings, knowledge and experience. I think that this is an unavoidable step in the path towards more fertile and adequate results and ultimately, towards a more humane and comprehensive education and growth.

It is easy enough to notice that all these sentences refer to cases connected with everyday experience, except for sentences two and three, which are drawn from what they learn in school.

The girl who said the second sentence ("Some whales are mammals,") was immediately reprimanded by the rest of the class, who maintained that sentence was false. The same situation as with 'Some children are mannals," was repeated again. The truth or falsehood of this sentence would be discussed later.

Another interesting point is that all the sentences (except for the second one) allow the addition of the adverb, "Only." The tendency to interpret and use "Some" as "Only some," due to a learning process, is quite obvious.

Let us try to pinpoint this precise use of "Some." As a result of the discussions and reactions arising from the sentence, "Some children are mammals," it can be seen that, on the one hand, the children understand and agree that if all members of a given group possess a certain characteristic, then some of the members of the same group must therefore possess the same characteristic. However, on the other hand, the fact does not carry much weight for them that in the real, or potentially real, situations which constitute their field of experience, some individuals' characteristics are not expressed when these characteristics are common to the whole group.

This is the use of "some" that they have learned from their daily life. It is a use which makes "Some" synonymous with "Only some." This learning rpocess, this use of "Some," must be taken into consideration when one is trying to get the children to draw conclusions from sentences where this quantifier appears, and where it is a matter of including or excluding the members denoted by the said quantifier in a given group.

All of this analysis led me to consider another situation which had taken place in the classroom a few days earlier, and

Philosophizing with Children in the Glocksee School *in Hanover, Germany*

Detlef Horster
Translated by John v.I. Alexander

Having been inspired by Ekkehard Marten's report on his work, I had long been looking for an opportunity to work with *Pixie* in a school. In the winter of 1987-88, I finally got the opportunity to work in a small school in Hanover. A teacher in the fifth form in the *Glocksee*-school in Hanover had to drop out for six weeks, and in such a small school, it was not easy to find a replacement. In part, the parents offered themselves as instructors. Since I was also a parent in this class, I offered as my project philosophizing for one hour a week. First I would like to report about what happened in the classroom, and then I would like to share some results I regarded as worth noting.

Socratic Method as a Principle of Instruction

Not all the children were interested in what I had to offer. In contrast to Martens, I could not philosophize with the entire class, but had to withdraw into a small adjoining room with the children who were interested. There were seven children who wanted to philosophize. On top of that, none of them knew what philosophizing was. That was obvious from the first questions they asked. I answered them, "We'll just go ahead and start, and you'll see what philosophizing is all about. First I'll read you a story about a girl your age whose name is Pixie, and then we'll talk about the story afterwards." The children agreed to this.

In the first lesson, I read a section of a chapter. Then I stopped and took a discussion plan out of the Pixie manual and asked the questions I found there. At first, the questions had to do with self awareness. You see, Pixie talks about developments in herself. She claims to have become quieter than she was the previous year. The children took up the questions in the discussion plan. There was a lively back and forth of opposing viewpoints. I held myself in check and observed the development of the discussion. In that regard, I was true to a Socratic principle. I also did this in another way, in that I posed provocative questions. For example: to the question, "Would you still be yourself, if you had other fingerprints?" all the children answered "Yes!" as if on command. I said, "Consider: every fingerprint is unique in this world. You can identify any person by their fingerprints. So, the uniqueness of every human being expresses itself in this way." This brought on a discussion.

I also intervened, when the boys acted like "know-it-alls" to the girls. One of them, for instance, said, "What are you old goat always hung up on your 'strange customs' for? That's just trash!" I said, "but that's a good argument! You've traveled with your parents in foreign countries quite a bit. Suppose you always lived there? How would you feel about this then?" This intervention caused that boy to accept the girl's objections.

In contrast to Martens, my experience was that you could philosophize no more than 45 minutes at a time with the children. One could only expect concen-tration on a single problem for about ten minutes. So I changed the form of instruction several times. I used the discussion plans by asking the questions in them to all the children. In addition, I worked on the topics we had discussed in the previous hour, or that the children had discussed at home, and I gave every child a piece of paper with two questions which were answered by the child alone (without consulting the others). Later, we discussed these questions with the entire group. Thirdly, I distributed the discussion plans which contain questions which are to be answered by marking a box next to a suggested possibility (multiple choice). In addition, I took up Lipman's suggestions for games to be played.

In the Pixie-story, there are opportunities for thinking on three different levels: about our relationships to the world, about ourselves (the above-mentioned self-awareness) and about our moral beliefs. The last two topics were always accepted, whenever they were offered. The children did not find the topics dealing with their relationship to the world nearly as interesting. You can notice that right away, by the fact that their attention declines, and that they begin to occupy themselves with other matters, or that they whisper to each other about where they will meet in the afternoon. For example, in my course of instruction, the seeing of relationships was a boring topic for the children. (Example: when I compare two sizes, must I re-

late them to a third thing?) In such a case one ought to read on and take up a new topic, which one believes the children will find interesting.

It turned out to be a disadvantage that the children did not know the entire story. In each lesson, I read them only a part of it. They always wanted to skip parts, in order to get to Pixie's secret as soon as possible. So I think it is better if you let the children have the book to finish at home. Then one can take up specific topics at one's leisure.

After six weeks, the children were disappointed that the sessions were over. They would have liked to continue to do an hour of philosophy each week.

In Hannover, the subway runs too fast

Working with these seven children was my first opportunity to experience that they took an interest in, and claimed for themselves, all the questions with dealing self-awareness and moral beliefs which are also raised in *Pixie*. They said: "Occasionally, we have also thought about these questions, but not for so long a time. Sometimes I think about such things on the way to school in the subway. but then the subway already comes to a stop, and I have to get off." The girls said they had already thought about these questions for longer periods of time, and had also discussed them with their friends. With the boys, they were only flashes of thought. They are more oriented toward material objects and talk about computers or remote control cars.

Surprisingly, the boys took part in the discussion much more intensively. One can only guess at the reasons: did they want to make an impression, or did they have an unmet need for discussion by comparison with the girls? I don't know the answer.

If I was an ape...

Evidently the most interesting questions were the ones about personal identity. Those are the questions which are taken up in the first chapter of *Pixie*. I used the discussion plans pertaining to these questions from the Pixie manual. I noted the following statements on the topic:

—I am always the person who I am. I am always David and can never be Daniel. Besides, I don't want to be him, he's too stupid.

—I can change myself externally by changing hairdos and makeup, but I can't change myself inside.

—But there is such a thing as a sex-change. Then you would become someone else.

—One also changes as one gets older. Indians get a new name when they grow up. That must mean that they're someone else.

—Even Pixie changes. She wasn't as patient last year as she is now. The same thing happens to me.

—There is also such a thing as an organ transplant. That would really be weird: if I got the brain of an ape, I'd do all the things that apes do.

I suppose it is worth noting that the children were in agreement that the in-

ternal changes are the most important. Moreover, the children all agreed that, if the whole world thought they were someone else, that they would, in time, also become someone else, because of one's having to adjust to a different environment.

On the other hand, one can also trace the development of an identity; one girl was of the opinion that she would have turned into someone else, if she had grown up in China. This would even have been so, if she had had the same parents. The customs and mores in China would have changed her. —Half a year after this course, I discussed these

same questions with these same children once again, in a sense as a kind of test. This same girl now allowed herself to be confused by the others, and finally said that she was coming more and more to the conviction that she would be quite stalwart in resisting these strange influences.

Grandpa as Means

At the end of the second section of the 9th chapter of Pixie, I gave the children as an assignment to write a story in which they themselves had used someone as a means to an end, or in which they themselves had been so used.

Three of the stories were read in front of the class:

—A girl did not want to agree to meet someone, and talked herself out of the situation by claiming that she had already made a date with another friend. Here, the friend was used as a mean — without herself knowing about it—for the purpose of not having to agree to a get-together with someone else.

—A girl had been chasing a spider with her brother; the spider was on the window, and, in the ensuing process, the girl had broken the window. She asked her grandfather to confess this to her parents. Here Grandpa was used as a means.

—A girl had to say on the telephone that her mother wasn't at home, even though her mother otherwise always insisted that the children always tell the truth.

When these three cases had been told, I deviated from my lesson plan and asked the children to clarify the differences between these cases and evaluate them.

The clear result was that the third case was the worst case of using someone, then came Case 1 and then Case 2.

At this point one could also have asked the children, what the basis or origin of their own evaluations were. Unfortunately, because of time constraints, we never got around to that.

However, this shows how one can deviate from one's own preparation and just pursue topics that come up. This should help anyone involved to be flexible enough to recognize philosophical questions as they arise in teaching, so that the teaching of subject matter can be interrupted for a short time.

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Philosophy, Children and Teaching Philosophy

by Richard E. Hart

In a much-discussed line from one of his fragments, the pre-Socratic philosopher, Parmenides, illustrates his reasoning by saying, *tauton d'esti noein te kai houneken esti noema*, sometime taken to mean, "for the same thing can be thought as can be", or by further implication, 'only what can be thought can be.' Twenty-three or so centuries later, Bishop Berkeley articulated his now-famous, "*Esse est percipi*—to be is to be perceived." What possible connection, one asks, could such formidable hypotheses, uttered by mature and celebrated philosophers, have with the musings of a five year old named Kristin who, while learning to read, commented to her surprised father that she is glad we have letters? When asked why by her father, she responded: "Cause if there was no letters, there would be no sounds.. .If there were no sounds, there would be no words.. .If there was no words, we couldn't think.. .and if we couldn't think, there would be no world." Plenty of connections, argues philosopher Gareth Matthews of the University of Massachusetts, plenty of things to see (as the mind's eye sees) if only we "professional philosophers" open our minds and truly hear what children say to us as they naturally, intuitively ponder the mysterious and perplexing questions of the universe, questions that have never, and will never, go away. Indeed, the connections are sufficient, prompted as they were from the reasoning of a five year old, to, in Matthews's words, "take my breath away."

Matthews, the featured speaker at the 1988 AAPT session, held in conjunction with the Eastern A.P.A., delivered a wonderfully provocative paper titled "Teaching Philosophy as Reconstructing Childhood." An equally stimulating res-

ponse was provided by Karen J. Warren of Macalester College.

Early in the paper Matthews pointed out that "...it is common for young children to puzzle over what the universe is, and whether it had a beginning." Of course, there are numerous other puzzlements that children experience, and, interestingly, they don't really differ *in kind* from the things adolescents and adults wonder about. Consider a discussion of cosmogony as it unfolded with a dozen third and fourth graders in Matthews' philosophy discussion group in Newton, Massachusetts some five years ago. One of the youngsters, nine year old Nick, was genuinely hung up on the question of how the universe could have begun. His metaphysical principle was that everything had to have a beginning, including the universe. He questioned, "How did the universe start?", and further questioned, "But then if there was a big bang or something, what was the big bang *in?*" Classmate Same was more preoccupied with "on" rather than "in". Indeed, how different was Sam's conception of the universe, namely what everything else appears "on", from Plato's notion of the "receptacle" in his dialogue, *The Timaeus*, wherein he contends "...the mother and receptacle of all created and visible and in any way sensible things is ...an invisible and formless being which receives all things..." (*Timaeus*, 51a)? Switching from cosmogony to the mind/body problem, consider three year old Ursula's report to her mother that she has a pain in her tummy. Mommy suggests that if she lies down the pain will go away, but Ursula wishes to know "where will it go?" If Ursula were Gilbert Ryle's daughter, he might well have tried to convince her, as he did in *The Concept of Mind*, that no pain is ever really located in anyone's body, a contention that both Ursula and Matthews find less than useful.

Ursula, Matthews tells us, was puzzled and "Puzzlement incites philosophy", just as a child's frequent need to make sense of everything all at once, in a simple and direct manner, stimulates philosophic reflection. It is this very questioning child that Matthews struggles to recover and locate in himself and his university students. The import is significant for,

unless he succeeds in this search, "the philosophy we do together will lose much of its urgency and much of its point."

The principal thrust of Matthews' paper, thus, was to convey a view of philosophy as the "systematic and disciplined attempt to deal with a range of questions that can and do occur to young children." Moreover, he is convinced that it is helpful to think of teaching philosophy as a form of reconstructing childhood—to try to make ourselves like children once again. As we do so, we experience "afresh the magnetic pull of genuine philosophical inquiry" and continue to question assumptions we have been socialized to accept. These sorts of child-like responses in the classroom, therefore, constitute a wonderful invitation to do philosophy.

If Matthews is correct in his concept of philosophy, and its relation to the natural questioning of children, then he has a practical suggestion for college teachers—that such teachers "might use a child's question or comment, the transcription of a children's discussion, or a children's story to introduce a lecture or class discussion." On Matthews' account, while intellectual or emotional maturity or even non-philosophical knowledge may be useful in teaching philosophy, they are surely not required and sometimes actually get in the way. Conceiving of the teaching of philosophy as a way of connecting us with our own childhood is not, according to Matthews, the only way to think of teaching, but, based on his experience, it stands as a pretty good one.

In her commentary, Warren expressed considerable admiration and enthusiasm for Matthews' paper and his work with philosophy and children more generally. After clarifying the basic claims offered in his paper, she suggested some things, equally as significant, that he did not explicitly argue for. These are matters implicit in his very way of approaching and doing philosophy. Foremost among these are Matthews' ability to "model respect for the philosophical abilities of children, and illustrate, through his examples and commentaries, a liberating conception of philosophy, children, and a philosophical classroom." In this vein, she spoke elo-

quently of this philosopher's ability to "hear philosophy going on and delight in it," of Matthews' respectfullness and sincerity in working with children. She concluded by discussing the import of liberating the philosophy classroom, of of creating a safe environment for questioning, of Matthews' challenges to widely accepted theories of developmental psychology, and of the very real impact that Matthews' ideas and model as a teacher has had on younger teachers of philosophy, indeed, including herself. In Warren's succinct and provocative summarization, envisioning philosophy teaching as reconstructing childhood entails "substantial revision in current conceptualizations of both childhood and philosophy."

I would like to conclude with a brief personal anecdote. Some five or so years ago, when AAPT sought to convene one of its very first sessions at an A.P.A. meeting, I was invited to give a talk at the Western meeting in Chicago. My topic was "Research and Teaching in Philosophy", a theme I thought to be reasonably compelling. As I best recall, even though the congregates were enthusiastic, we barely had a handful in the room. By contrast, at the 1987 Eastern A.P.A. meeting in New York, Alasdair MacIntyre was the featured AAPT speaker, and it was standing room only. Similarly, in 1988, Gareth Matthews filled the large AAPT room almost to capacity. Furthermore, extensive spirited and enjoyable discussion followed his paper and the commentary. These latest attendance figures, and the quality of the discourse, for sure attest, in part, to the reputations of the two fine speakers. But I think more is involved. Having been involved in AAPT conferences and related activities for the past twelve years, to me this trend clearly reflects growing excitement among professional philosophers about the challenges and joys of teaching philosophy, about the importance of sharing experiences, about the need for new understandings of just what philosophy is, and about the search for new levels of passion and commitment to our discipline and our students. Without question the challenges Matthews posed for philosophy and teaching are well underway.

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The Apprenticeship Model:
What We Can Learn from Gareth Matthews

By Susannah Sheffer

Gareth Matthews has already been widely praised for his ability to recognize the philosophical worth of children's comments and speculations. In his books *Philosophy and the Young Child* (1980) and *Dialogues with Children* 1984), he invites us to join him in this recognition and to consider how we might respond to children's philosophical remarks as seriously and respectfully as he himself has been able to.

But Matthews' work does something else as well. It offers us a model of teaching philosophy — indeed, teaching anything — by apprenticeship, by letting children see us at work and then inviting them to take part. In this case, the work is philosophy, and the invitation — particularly the spirit in which it is extended — is at the heart of anything we might call Matthews' method or technique. He does not say to children, "This is what philosophy *is*", but rather, "This is what philosophers *do*." He is not designing a

curriculum as much as he is inviting children to join him in an activity that (and this is critical) he has already chosen for himself.

Matthews calls children natural philosophers. If they are, it's because philosophy is something people do, have found reason to do throughout the ages. We can also say that children are natural musicians or scientists, since these too are human activities. Perhaps the deeper truth is that children naturally want to belong to their culture, to join its older members in whatever pursuits they deem important. In reminding us that children are natural philosophers, then, Matthews is actually reminding us of philosophy's importance in human life.

If philosophy is something people do, then it's natural to assume that children will want to do it; hence Matthews' decision to enlist children's help in writing philosophical stories. It is in an important sense as if Matthews were building

a house and asking children to help him saw the wood. In the process he will learn about children, about wood, and about houses, but his chief business is doing something that he thinks is important, and he involves children in it because he suspects that they will enjoy it and that he will value their help.

It's this authenticity, this lack of contrivance, that characterizes the apprenticeship model. The theoretical physicist David Deutsch wrote about that model, "The guiding principle is that the child should be truly productive from the beginning."[1] The work we offer children must not be invented solely for their education, but must be a genuine part of the real work at hand. For Deutsch the physicist, this means finding "tasks integral to [his] overall problem" in physics with which to seek the apprentice's help. For Matthews the philosopher, the job is much the same. In his dialogues with the

children at St. Mary's Music School in Scotland, he is in fact seeking the children's help with tasks integral to an overall philosophical problem that has intrigued him and, often, other philosophers.

For example, after reading the transcript of a discussion in which children in an American classroom tried to determine how they could be certain that a package that said "lettuce seeds" did in fact contain lettuce seeds, Matthews wrote, "I would like to puzzle out with those kids whether we know and if so how we know that certain little seeds are lettuce seeds."[2] In this spirit, the spirit of wanting to puzzle out a problem that interested him, he offered the lettuce seed question to his children at St. Mary's. They, too, were interested.

Martin repeated the idea that one could plant all the seeds and then wait until the spring to see which ones came up lettuce. I suggested that Martin's procedure might give us a sufficient condition for "I know that those *were* lettuce seeds" but not "I know that these *are* lettuce seeds."

Suddenly David-Paul became animated. "You could sample some out," he said. "You could take two [seeds] of each [kind] and plant them and mark where you put them, and then put them in a greenhouse so they'll grow quicker and watch which came out lettuce and then you'd know and you could plan the right ones."

The idea was ingenious. Knowing which seeds are lettuce seeds is, in a way, knowing which seeds have a certain potentiality. We might determine that by forcing a sample of the lot to realize their potentiality on a speeded-up schedule. After learning in this way which seeds *were* lettuce seeds, we would have a splendid basis for inferring which of the remaining seeds *are* lettuce seeds.[3]

In the lettuce seed discussion, David-Paul became a real help to Matthews, a real colleague. But Matthews was not the only one who benefited. That children are natural philosophers does not mean that adults have nothing to offer them. We don't merely apprentice ourselves to activities, after all, but to people who engage in activities. In apprenticing themselves to Matthews the more expe-

rienced philosopher, the children at St. Mary's were able to focus and refine their natural philosophical wonder, and learn to use it as experienced philosophers do.

In seeing which possible solutions Matthews found most plausible and thus most helpful, for example, the children gained a sense of what makes one proposal philosophically tighter, or neater, than another. Matthews' saying, "That doesn't seem to be a sufficient condition" or "That doesn't convince me" gave the children important information about what a philosophical argument requires.

Over and over again, in his descriptions of the various philosophical issues that he brought before the St. Mary's class, Matthews makes it clear that these are questions he would have been thinking about even if he did not have the St. Mary's class to teach. About mental representation, for example, to which the class devoted some time, Matthews says, "Questions about whether one can think in pictures and, if so, what limitations a picture 'vocabulary' imposes, are debated heatedly these days among philosophers, psychologists, and computer scientists. I find that debate fascinating and important."[4] We can be sure that the children at St. Mary's sensed during their discussion that Matthews found the issue fascinating and important, and perhaps they even had the feeling that they were participants in that broader debate.

It is not important to recognize that Matthews' approach is not, though it may seem to be, a way to find out how children's minds work. It may, indeed often does, have this result, but it does not begin with this intention. The children with whom Matthews works are not laboratory rats but less-experienced colleagues, a difference which makes all the difference in the world.

It's a difference that can be difficult to discern, however. The spirit in which Matthews brings the lettuce seed problem to his classroom is not, "Let's see how these children learn about epistemology" as much as it is "Let's see if we can puzzle out this problem together." Of course — and this is why it becomes tricky — Matthews does indeed wind up learning a great deal about how children think about epistemology. But I maintain that learning this as a consequence of

shared work is critically different from setting out to learn it with the expectation that this is one's sole task and will be one's sole result. Matthews operates as though there is every reason to expect that the children will be helpful, interesting, valuable partners, or at least just as likely to be those things as anybody. His interest in the workings of their minds resembles, I imagine, the interest he would take in any philosophical partner, anyone with whom the conversation was stimulating.

Why, one might then ask, does Matthews focus his two books on children? Why make the age distinction at all? I cannot speak for Matthews, but it seems to me that the answer lies in the prologue to *Dialogues With Children*, where he writes:

> What has not been taken seriously, or even widely conceived, is the possibility of tackling with children, in a relationship of mutual respect, the naively profound questions of philosophy. I hope that what follows will convince my readers that children can help us adults investigate and reflect on interesting and important questions and that the children's contributions may be quite as valuable as any we adults have to offer.[5]

Because the relationship between children and adults that Matthews proposes has not been widely conceived, it is necessary for him to work to convince his readers of something that many not previously have been inclined to believe. Matthews writes about children; he also writes on behalf of children, on behalf of their ability to be a genuine help to us in philosophy or any other activity. Let us do all we can to move in the direction Matthews so eloquently urges us.

NOTES

[1] David Deutsch, "Becoming Experts," Growing Without Schooling 29.

[2] Gareth B. Matthews, *Dialogues With Children* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 52.

[3] Matthews, 1984, p. 55.

[4] Matthews, 1984, p. 104.

[5] Matthews, 1984, p. 3.

Literate Thinking and Schooling

By: Judith Langer

Literacy is generally associated with the ability to read and write. This is the common dictionary definition, the mark of literacy in society-at-large, and the one we most often apply to schooling. However, we can look at literacy in a broader and educationally more productive way: as the ability to think and reason within a particular society. As Heath (1983), Scribner and Cole (1980), and Vygotsky (1978) suggest, because the practices of literacy and ways of understanding literacy acts depend upon the social conditions in which they are learned, the skills, concepts, and ways of thinking that an individual develops reflect the uses and approaches to literacy that permeate the society in which the individual is a participant. In this view, literacy is culture specific.

For the student, the school is an influential cultural environment. If schools wish to prepare students to participate fully in the adult community, they need to focus on the ways of thinking that are involved in the many uses of literacy by people within society. They need to use approaches to literacy instruction that will insure that these different ways of thinking are an integral part of the school context. For example, in the Vai society described by Scribner and Cole (1980), the people need and value memorization and recitation in order to learn the Koran in Arabic. The ap-

propriate mode of instruction in this context would be to train students to memorize. However, if the uses of literacy require reflection and problem-solving, like the uses of English in the same Vai culture, instruction should help the students develop those kinds of abilities. There is no right or wrong literacy, just the one that is, more or less, responsive to the demands of a particular culture. Scribner and Cole (1980) and Traugott (1987) point out that particular ways of thinking are not a result of literacy *per se*. Rather, ways of thinking reflect the particular oral and written ways of solving problems, organizing knowledge, and communicating that are particular to a given culture. These ways of thinking are learned early, have the potential to be (but are not always) reinforced by schools, and have enormous consequences for the acquisition and uses of language and knowledge thoughout life. When the literacy of the classroom and the literacy needed in society differ markedly, we need to ask serious questions about the goals of schooling.

The current era, for example, requires that students acquire the kinds of critical thinking skills that are needed to use the communication devices and technologies we meet on a daily basis in our everyday living and in entry-level jobs (Langer, 1987). These new demands have been discussed by Noyelle (1985) who describes the shift in both the American workplace and in daily life from tasks involving manual skills to those requiring cognitive processes. Schools, Noyelle suggests, need to reflect these societal shifts by training students in the more flexible

thinking skills they will need for entry into today's job market. If we are to respond to these concerns as well as other cultural contexts for literacy, literacy instruction needs to go much beyond the acts of reading and writing, and to each culturally useful ways of literate thinking as well.

Because literate thinking is a reflection of the uses of literacy within a particular culture, the kinds of intellectual functions with which we are familiar, e.g., analysis and synthesis, are not necessarily the benchmarks of literate thinking in all cultures; ways of thinking follow use and function. We need, instead, to understand that ways of thinking are affected by culture and experience, and that literacy events in school provide an important set of contexts within which students may gain appropriate experience. Attention to cultural ways of thinking associated with literacy allows teachers to focus on how students think, as well as on the skills they use to read and write. It permits teachers and students to regard reading and writing as tools that enable, but do not insure, literate thinking.

When a group of American students read a social studies textbook and then discuss the contents and the implications, most people would say that the students are engaging in literate thinking (within the norms of this culture). But, what if the discussion had occurred after the students had seen a television news report about the same topic? I would still want to claim that the students had engaged in literate thinking even though they had neither read nor written. Now,

imagine a group of students who do not know how to read or write in English or another language engaged in the very same conversation about the television news report. I would claim that they too would have engaged in literate thinking. In contrast, imagine that the students had read the same social studies text and then completed end-of-chapter questions by locating information in the text and copying the information the questions asked them to itemize. I would claim that the kinds of literacy in this activity do not reflect the kinds of school literacy that, based on the many reports and articles in both the professional and public press, are needed and valued by American society today. That activity does not involve culturally useful literate behavior, even if the students get the answers right.

These examples highlight the distinction between literacy as the act of reading and writing and literacy as ways of thinking. It is the culturally useful way of thinking, not the act of reading or writing, that is most important in the development of literacy. Literate thinking manifests itself in different ways in oral and written language in different societies, and educators need to understand these ways of thinking if they are to build, bridge, and facilitate transitions among ways of thinking.

How well are our schools currently doing in teaching the more thoughtful literacy skills being called for by many researchers and educators? Results such as those from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP, 1985) continue to suggest that schools are successful in teaching what they have set out to teach. Whether by accident or design, school curricula and the tests that go with them have rewarded relatively simple performance, and have undervalued the attainment of more thoughtful skills. They have been driven by a model of of literacy that focuses on discrete skills and bits of information instead of big ideas and deeper understandings.

It is my argument that student performance such as reported by NAEP is no surprise, since these are the ways of thinking that are highlighted in the curriculum, supported by the instructional materials, and reinforced by the tests we use and the grades we give. The culture of schooling will need to change — to model, support, and value thoughtfulness — for students to learn to think in ways that are responsive to the requirements of our society.

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Oft-Told Tales

by David H. Millstone

"Of these adventures, Muse, daughter of Zeus, tell us in our time, lift the great song again."

(The Odyssey, *trans. by Robert Fitzgerald*)

The storyteller waits for silence, then takes a breath. All eyes focus on him, a shadowy figure in the dim light. He strikes a chord on his guitar; we hear the cry of a gull. He begins:

"This is the tale of Odysseus, master of land ways, master of sea ways." He pauses.

"Darkness . . ." We are in the belly of the Trojan Horse with Odysseus and his companions, and the children sitting on the rug move closer to the candles. "And silence . . . and the breathing of men closely held, so that it is not loud." A cough. "Silence! Choke on your cough if you need to, but make no sound!"

So we begin our study of Homer, listening to a modern bard bring new life to an ancient tale. I want my fifth graders to come to Homer's *Odyssey* as did the Greeks thousands of years ago, hearing the tale fresh from the lips of a stranger, a storyteller. For this reason, I provide beforehand no background information on ancient Greece, no cursory review of Greek mythology. I often read out loud to my students, and I could begin this unit by reading a good translation of Homer, but there is no real substitute for a storyteller's presence. The storyteller in the classroom brings the necessary majesty and mystery to the tale.

Let me tell you about a storytelling collaboration between older and younger children which centers on our study of *The Odyssey*. It begins in a darkened room with a professional storyteller and a rapt audience. Interest is sustained for months as all children in first and fifth grade learn to tell their own versions of Homeric episodes. Children read and write, to be sure, in many different forms, but the storytelling comes first and provides both the initial spark and the sustaining energy. As well as helping children absorb thoroughly a classic work of literature, this process has helped create strong friendships across grade levels.

Pictures in Your Mind

Odds Bodkin, our talesman-in-residence, believes that children's imagination is stunted by too much television. Before beginning his work with a new group of children, he reminds his listen-

ers of their responsibility for creating the story that follows:

> "When you watch TV or go to the movies, the pictures are all there for you on the screen. All you have to do is look at them. Remember that as you listen to stories, in your imagination the stories must grow. If you make pictures in your minds for each of the characters whom I describe, each of the places, then it will be like looking at a movie of your own creation. If you don't imagine, then my words will echo off these walls and you will sit there, like a mushroom."

Over the next three days, through hours of intense listening, children hear the story unfold in epic detail. It is a staggering tale, full of dozens of unfamiliar proper names in dozens of episodes. Before we can discuss the story at all, we need to build a common working vocabulary. After each of the six storytelling sessions, therefore, we spend time de-briefing, writing several columns on the chalkboard: characters and places, pictures, and ideas and emotions. Children take turns calling out contributions— "You know, that sea nymph who rescued him after he washed up on the beach!"—and we write in the appropriate names—"Oh, you mean Calypso." The "pictures" list contains the vivid images from the story: the gates of Troy, twelve black-hulled Greek ships, the purple ram under which Odysseus escapes the Cyclops' cave, a pinch of Circe's magic powder. The final category reminds me that these ten-year-olds get more from this story than a simple travelogue filled with monsters: "returning home," "revenge," "honor," "curiosity," "cleverness or sneakiness," "love" and "bravery" are among the many ideas that appear on their final list.

In the version told at school, our storyteller skips quickly over the background of the Trojan War, offering only a summary of that complex chain of events. But while our fifth graders are hearing about the fall of Troy and the subsequent wanderings of Odysseus and his crew, the school's first graders receive their own introduction to the classical world. Another storyteller, a local parent, visits their classes and tells them the relevant background myths: how Eris sent into a wedding feast the golden Apple of Discord

engraved "To the Fairest," how Hera and Athena and Aphrodite quarreled over the apple, how Zeus finally ordered mortal Paris to choose among them, and how Paris selected Aphrodite and was rewarded with the most beautiful woman on earth, Helen of Troy. Again, children hear the story first, followed by their teachers reading other versions out loud to them.

Young Children Take the Lead

The stage is set, with two groups of children knowing complementary parts of the oldest tale in Western literature. We ask the younger children to tell their part of the story first. Each first grader has a fifth grade partner, or occasionally two. The charge given the fifth graders? "You are scribes for your partners. Your task is to write down exactly what they say, every word just as you hear it." We spend twenty minutes practicing taking dictation, and then we're ready to get together. "You might be nervous, but chances are, they're even more scared than you are. Do the best you can, and we'll get back together later this afternoon to discuss the next steps."

What follows is a delightful afternoon for all. Children pair off and spread into all corners, and the room buzzes. Some first graders spill out their stories and have to be gently reminded to slow down; others talk word by word, watching intently to see that each word is written before moving on to the next. The younger children often take charge, since they're doing the talking: "Hephaestus made the apple...you know, the blacksmith god. He's over here if you can't spell him," and they lead the hardworking scribe to a large chart of proper names, pointly vaguely and secure that their older partner can find the right word. The older children, initially nervous, quickly relax as they are reminded of how much they've learned since they were in first grade, for even our weakest fifth graders can write better than their young partners.

That night, older children take home scribbled drafts and produce neat copies. The following afternoon, storytellers and scribes meet again. These meetings are editorial conferences. When the first-graders can, they read their stories aloud;

if they can't, the older partner does the reading. Our older children are trained in writing process conferences; they begin with positive comments, and only gradually do they make suggestions for revisions. Final authority rests with the author. Concerned that he might be too heavy-handed in his editorial suggestions, Jeff decides to make his point indirectly, and he reads one section aloud with emphasis on the words that bother him:

> "'And then the three goddesses started arguing and then Athena grabbed the apple away from Hera and then she grabbed it back and then Zeus finally got tired of them fighting so he put the apple next to his throne.' Do you hear anything funny there that we could change?"

With conferences completed, the older children have a week to prepare a final version, neatly printed or typed on computers. We spend one more afternoon together, jointly illustrating the stories, and mount for display in the front hall dozens of illustrated versions of the same tale. The entire school eagerly reads the results.

In our discussions comparing their experiences, the fifth graders realize that there are many different ways to tell the same story, that there is no single correct version. This loosens them up for their next task, to learn one episode from Homer well enough to teach it to the first graders. These preparations take weeks, as children immerse themselves in the story. I read selected passages out loud to the class. Children listen to their episode again and again on cassette tape. They read six or seven different versions of the story, ranging from comic books through elegant retellings to actual translations.

Several professional storytellers have told me that they don't memorize the plot of a story; rather, they see a succession of scenes in their head and simply describe what they see. Using guided imagery, I help children choose one scene from their story and explore it inside their imagination. After they have visualized their image in detail, I borrow a technique from storyteller Laura Simms to ask children to walk randomly around the room. At another signal they take as a partner the nearest per-

son. One child starts to describe the image; I cut off the telling after a minute or two. The listener responds with positive comments and suggestions; the roles reverse. Then—and this part is strange and exciting—children continue their wanderings and do the same thing again. That instant replay is a powerful experience. Children often discover that their image is now more clearly fixed in mind, that the oral description flows more easily.

G.I. Joe, Lizards and Stuffed Animals

Where do children practice their storytelling? How do they develop the confidence that allows each child in fifth grade to get up in front of an audience of first graders and tell a tale from Homer? One year, I asked my students how they found a practice audience:

*"My little brother and sister."

*"My mom when she was cooking dinner, but she couldn't really follow it so I told my dad instead."

*"I told my grandparents when they came over one weekend. They were impressed."

*"I just said it over and over to myself before I went to sleep at night."

*"I went into the bathroom and locked the door and looked at myself in the mirror and told it. It was hard."

*"I told it to my brother's G.I. Joe collection."

*"My brother's pet lizard."

*"I lined up all my stuffed animals on the rug in my room, like a real audience would be, and I told it to them."

*"I told it to my horse when I was mucking out the stable."

I imagine a sunny Saturday afternoon, and every fifth grader in this small Vermont town is busy telling an episode from Homer, bringing the ancient saga to new life with a wide-ranging audience: pets, dolls and people alike. I see grace and beauty and power in the story itself, in the transformed listeners and in 45 confident young storytellers.

After this preparation, we spend a full month teaching Homer to the younger children, the fifth graders taking turns telling tales. Rather than following Homer's flashback structure, we arrange the stories chronologically. One by one, older children visit the first grade classrooms.

For the first graders, each day simply brings the next installment in an exciting epic. Often there are several older children who have learned the same episode. This gives the listeners an opportunity to hear the tale told in different styles, for the storytelling styles do vary widely. Some tellers rely on singing, or dramatic voice characterizations; others concentrade on sights or sounds. The best stories include images and words with a lasting power, pieces of the tale which mystify and surprise even the teller. Heather includes information on a white scarf "because it just feels important to have it there" and after days of thought Becca decides to use the word "betrothed" in her story "because it's an unusual word. I didn't even know what it meant at first, but without it the story just sounds plain, like something is missing."

And while the stories are being told? The other fifth graders are busy. After additional research, children complete individual *Odyssey* projects, ranging from elaborate drawings of Bronze Age armor to an animated cartoon, from epic poetry to a detailed biographical dictionary of characters mentioned by Homer. Children try describing an incident from different perspectives: what happens in the cave of the Cyclops from Polyphemus's point of view? We produce a class newspaper, a spoof satirizing the entire epic. In all cases, because children already know the story so thoroughly, because they are free from worrying about plot development, they are able to concentrate on their written language, to make the story read just right. They discover as well that each medium imposes its own restrictions. Verbal sound effects are hard to transfer to the printed page, and long passages of narration must be replaced by dialogue for a successful puppet play.

For the older children, the *Odyssey* unit is both pleasurable and serious work. Over the three months, they demonstrate increasing mastery of a complex subject, and they are proud of their accomplishments. They seek fresh audiences for their newly-learned tales; as Mark explains, "Once you've learned it, you just want to go around and tell the story to everybody you know." They accept the responsibility of teaching the younger children, and they grow to enjoy that social contact. Judith holds up a stack of papers: "Three more love letters from my partner! What am I going to do with that kid?" They break into friendly conversation with their young partners and they become supportive older buddies. "Oh yeah, I remember when I was in first grade," says Eli to Jonah with a grin. "I had a real hard time writing anything." Jonah, who is having that very problem, nods solemnly and they return to their work.

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Teaching as Translation: The Philosophical Dimension

Tony W. Johnson

This essay briefly compares the mimetic and transformative approaches to education and develops the concept of "teaching as translation," a transformative approach. The relationship between teaching as translation and the structure of the disciplines is explained, and an argument suggesting that philosophical inquiry is essential for this kind of teaching is presented. Suggestions for developing transformative teachers are offered, and the essay concludes by explaining how teaching as translation represents both democratic and moral ideals.

For much of this century, the promise of and search for a science of education has dominated educational reform. The confidence "that scientific facts and laws could lift today's run-of-the-mill teachers past the achievements of a Socrates or a Pestalozzi. . ."[1] captured America's imagination, but, suggests Kneller, "despite prodigious efforts and enormous expenditures of money, human scientists have produced no universal laws or theories that are either scientific or precise".[2] Tom characterizes the research on effective teaching as "barren" and suggests that new theories of teaching are needed. Such theories "ought to be a source of insight and enlightenment rather than a source of specific rules and general prescription".[3] It is in response to Tom's call for additional theories that the con-

cept of teaching as translation is developed here. After briefly comparing the mimetic (scientific) and transformative approaches to education, an argument favoring an artistic approach is presented. The essay concludes by suggesting that teaching as translation, a transformative approach, represents both democratic and moral ideals.

The Mimetic and Transformative Approaches to Education

In an invited address before the American Psychological Association in 1977, Phillip Jackson began by stating "once I was an educational psychologist, or at least I professed to be. These days I am less certain about what to call myself." Jackson's ambivalence toward his specialty suggests a growing awareness of psychology's failure to provide a genuine science of education. But, according to Kneller, even now, almost a decade later, educational psychology remains for many the major or "only source of reliable knowledge about human behavior, or the mind, or teaching and learning. .." Kneller wonders "How long must we endure this charade?"[5]

Charade or not, education's over-reliance on the human science of psychology is not on the wane. As Jackson notes, teaching is becoming increasingly mimetic in orientation. The term "mimetic" is derived from the Greek mimesis and is defined as "getting the student to reproduce or to imitate in his own actions or words a form of

behavior that has already been settled upon as a standard. . ."[6] In short, this tradition emphasizes the transmission and regurgitation of established factual and precedural knowledge. Knowledge is presented to the learner who, in turn, demonstrates his acquisition of it by imitating the teacher.

The mimetic tradition has its origins in the sophistic movement of ancient Greece and found a natural ally in the scientific world view that emerged triumphant during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As already noted, this tradition dominated education in this century, but, despite noble efforts, the dream of a complete science of education appears to be little more than a mirage.

The mimetic approach is grounded in the assumption that knowledge is fixed and has or can be discovered by humans. From this perspective, the teacher need not be a creative, inquisitive intellectual but merely an efficient technician capable of transmitting the kind of prepackaged information, skills, and values that students need in order to adapt to the present social order. The mimetic approach seeks to prepare our children and youth for the world as it is, but why not do what Kant suggests "and give them an education so much better than this, that a better condition of things may thereby be brought about in the future".[7]

Herein lies an alternative to mimetic approach to teaching. Instead of think-

ing of teaching as "the methodical insertion of ordered facts into the student's mind,"[8] why not think of it as a creative enterprise that aims at developing individuals who not only understand their world but are capable and desirous of improving it. Teaching of this kind actually seeks to transform students into better persons, not simply to give them more knowledge or skills but to make them "better in the sense of being closer to what humans are capable of becoming—more virtuous, fuller participants in an evolving order."[9]

This transformative approach also has its roots in ancient Greece. Just as the mimetic tradition follows the sophists in believing that knowledge is fixed and obtainable by humans, the transformative approach follows Socrates in recognizing that while progress toward knowing the truth is possible, absolute certainty is not. The transformative approach aims not at preparing students for life as it is, but seeks to empower them to make of it what it can or should be. Unlike the mi-

metic approach which is closely aligned with the idea that teaching and learning are, or can be a sicence, the transformative approach considers teaching and learning to be artistic endeavors.

Teaching: The Art of Translating

The teacher as artist reconciles "respect for the child and respect for what is being taught"[10] As an artist, the teacher constructs bridges connecting the larger world of ideas with each individual's private world. Since no one bridge works for all, the teacher needs to know the background and previous experiences of his/her students and be well versed in the content or subject that is to be taught. Only by knowing both can the teacher construct bridges to empower each student to move from the comfortable realm of the familiar toward the unsettling, yet exciting, realm of the unknown. While information about an unknown realm may be offered to students, it remains inert and meaningless until students connect it with their own previous frame of reference,

making it their own. In this way, the teacher as artist serves as a kind of translator, representing the major concepts of the subjects to be taught in terms that connect student's previous way of viewing things.

Though it sounds simple enough, the task of translating, or bridge building, is not easy. In order to build bridges or translate knowledge for others, the teacher first needs to internalize the major concepts and logical structure of the subject to be taught. To do this, teachers, out of necessity, follow the path blazed by others, but, in so doing, modify the path or bridge to fit their own individual needs. In this sense, learning like teaching, is a creative process. Relying largely upon a hunch or a hypothesis that a particular bridge leads to greater understanding, mistakes are common as bridges often fail to span the gulf between an individual's unique frame of reference and the unknown. But, once a workable bridge is constructed, perhaps after numerous false steps, it can be used again and again, modified by both teacher and student to meet individual needs. In this sense, the teacher's task becomes one of finding, modifying, or constructing knowledge bridges that connect with each individual's unique world.

Teaching the Structure of a Discipline

The teacher as translater aims at developing what Passmore calls open capacities, i.e. capacities that lead beyond themselves, that open up new avenues of learning, that in Bruner's language, enable students "to go beyond the information given". To achieve this goal the teacher must do more than impart basic information skills. As Mark Twain implies in his *Life on the Mississippi*, it is not enough to master basic skills and information. Twain's tale of how he became a master riverboat pilot is a classic metaphor for both teaching and larning. While still an adolescent, Twain memorized every shoal, snag, and sandbar on the mighty Mississippi. Impressed with this accomplishment, Twain is ready, or so he believes, to join the ranks of professional riverboat pilots. He is quickly brought back to reality by Mr. Bixby (his teacher) who graphically demonstrates that

memorizing the location and peculiarities of the river's danger spots is not enough. Since the river is forever changing, a riverboat pilot must develop an understanding of how different forces and conditions interact to impact the river's course. Such an understanding is necessary if the pilot is to anticipate and safely avoid the location and characteristics of various water hazards.

Teachers as translators perform much like Mr. Bixby instructing a young Samuel Clemens.[11] Rather than requiring students to memorize information likely to become obsolete, teaching of this kind strives to equip students with the ability to analyze and apply the major ideas and general principles of the subjects under study. In short the teacher as translator seeks to teach the "structure" of the subject. If knowledge learned in one setting is to be useful in another, the nature of that knowledge and the manner in which it is taught is important. While the transfer of factual information or specific skills is often useful and sometimes essential, of more importance is the transfer of principles and attitudes. If a general idea is taught and learned, the student, when confronted with a new problem, can often move beyond that which is given by recognizing the new problem as a particular case or instance of an idea already mastered. Teaching the underlying principles of a discipline or field of study equips students with the ability to "generalize from what he has learned to what he will encounter later.."[12] By teaching the general ideas on fundamental principles of a discipline, students can and often do internalize these structures into their own particular frame of reference thus enabling them to grasp and incorporate additional information in a meaningful way.

Since the structure of a discipline, both in terms of its logic and general principles, is a product of critical intelligence, it is akin to the conceptual frameworks humankind has created to make sense out of the world. By focusing on the structure of the disciplines, the teacher as translator aims at assisting students to comprehend concepts by translating ideas into a form they can understand. In this process, students are encouraged and enabled to participate

in this uniquely human process of concept formation. What usually begins as a rather fuzzy notion becomes the unifying concept which binds the parts together. As this creative process of concept formation progresses, the student is empowered with "the means to establish continuity, unity and understanding from one item of experience to another.. ". As students recognize or formulate "the shared features of otherwise discrete events,"[13] they move from the unknown to the known. For students to succeed at concept formation, they need help in connecting the world beyond to their own conceptual frame of reference.

The Importance of Philosophy

According to Eisner all learning, whether of the sciences or the humanities, is the translation of human "imagination into some public, stable form, something that can be shared with others." Viewing knowledge in this way reduces "the tendency for students to regard the textbooks as sacred and knowledge as fixed."[14] Once they understand the subjects being studied are human constructions, students become more critical of things as they are and more willing to change them for the better. While absolute certaintly may not be possible, students, so transformed, embrace the Socratic notion that progres is possible only if we learn fromour mistakes. The connection between Socrates and the transformative approach to education is an important one in that philosophy, as practiced by Socrates, is uniquely qualified to assist us as educators in the task of translating the key ideas and general principles of a subject field into forms that our students can understand. Philosophy, as personified by Socrates, fosters greater understanding by taking an additional step to ask why those ideas are considered key or why the principles employed are the accepted ones. Philosophy, in this sense, is more concerned with the reasons behind the facts than the facts themselves. Such a philosopher seeks both to understand the epistemological basis of knowledge and to interpret it for others. In this way,

the philosopher can and should be an experienced ally of the educator.

The teacher as translator, in addition to being a scientist, a psychologist, or some other subject matter specialist, must also be a philosopher of the field of study that he or she is teaching. Only to the degree that the teacher has a firm grasp of the conceptual boundaries of the subject under scrutiny can he or she select curricular material so as to effectively translate the principles and key ideas into forms accessible to the student. Like Socrates, transformative teachers do not tell their students what to think, nor do they permit them to accept uncritically the truth of others. Instead, by developing a classroom atmosphere where all points of view, including the teacher's, are subject to careful scrutiny, transformative teachers encourage and empower students to think for themselves.

We need more transformative teachers, *i.e.,* teachers who emulate Socrates. Socrates built no philosophical system but "he 'questioned and cross examined' his fellow citizens, not to convey a new truth to them. . .but only to point out the path along which it might be found."[15] In a like manner, the transformative teacher translates the forms or structures of a discipline in such a way that students can understand them and more beyond them. Such teachers model for their students the art of philosophizing. Like Socrates, they refuse to think for their students, but demonstrate to them "how to undertake,. . ., the laborious regress that alone affords insight into basic principles."[16] Rather than being told how to think, students need to encounter first hand a community of inquiry in action.

Just as Socrates, in the Platonic dialogues, engaged his students in rigorous, but never condescending process of intellectual inquiry, teachers seeking to transform their students into independent thinkers should convert their classrooms into communities of inquiry. By emphasizing dialogue as an instrument of instruction, the teacher can challenge students to speak their mind, "to meet every counter question, and to state reasons for every assertion. . ."[17]. In this way the teacher as artist can instill in students "an enthusiasm for the give-and-take of critical discussion."[18] By

engaging students in a serious conversation of the keys ideas and epistemological underpinnings of a field of study, the teacher compels the students to think for themselves. As they listen attentively to others, students engage in a kind of self-translation, taking in what is being said and relating it to their own frame of reference. To respond to a question or an assertion, or offer a counterpoint, students must weigh carefully each word to ensure that it conveys the desired meaning. To engage in dialogue is to rehearse what others have said, to assess therelevance and significance of these remarks, to recognize other perspectives, and to explore previously unknown possibilities. The teacher as translator creates such a classroom both to expose students to the art of philosophizing and to initiate them into such an artistic endeavor. The goal

is to transform students into individuals who, regardless of the field of study "are unwilling. . .simply to accept a result,. . ." In short, the aim of such teaching is to develop individuals "with a philosophical turn of mind. . ."[19]

Developing Transformative Teachers

The development of such "a philosophical turn of mind" is not likely to occur in a teacher's classroom who has been trained in the mimetic tradition. In order to develop our children and youth into individuals capable of both understanding and changing our world, we need more teachers committed to the art of philosophizing. To develop such teachers requires no less than a revolutionary change in the way teachers are educated. Knowledge is important for all professions but teaching is about knowledge. For this reason it is not enough that

teachers possess knowledge. They need in addition an understanding of the epistemological warrants of the key ideas and principles of the subjects they teach. If, as the Holmes Report suggests, "education is the discipline of the disciplines", then educators more so than any other professional, must go beyond uncritical acceptance to genuine understanding. Since it is their task to help others see more clearly, it is essential that they possess a broad and liberal education—broad in the sense that they gain familiarity with multiple ways of knowing and liberal in the sense that through the "art of philosophizing" they free themselves from the dogma of ignorance.

The development of such teachers necessitates the restructuring of both teacher education programs and the non-professional components of the undergraduate curriculum. The undergraduate curriculum should be organized in such a way that future teachers "gain a sense of the intellectual structure and boundaries of their disciplines, rather than taking a series of disjointed, prematurely specialized fragments."[20] All undergraduates, but especially future teachers, need to know the origins and goals of the discipline or subject under scrutiny. They need to understand why some issues of a particular field or discipline merit serious investigation and why others may be only of minor or little significance. Instead of the largely received knowledge which typically characterizes undergraduate instruction in all subjects and fields, the question "how do we know. . ? should be an intrinsic part of general education."[21]

Reforming the non-professional components of the undergraduate curriculum along the lines advocated above is a step in the right direction, but it is not sufficient for the development of teachers as translators. Participation in communities of inquiry investigating the intellectual structure of various fields of knowledge is essential but equally important is a reflective examination of pedagogical studies. Future teachers, in addition to gaining familiarity with the structure of the subjects they are to teach, need to investigate such questions as "how do we learn?; What should be taught?; When are students ready to learn particular things?; and What does

it mean to be educated? By combining this philosophical approach to the studying of both the disciplines and pedagogy, we have the ingredients needed to develop teaching in the transformative tradition.

The time has come to replace the long-standing commitment to the mimetic approach to teaching and learning with an equally strong commitment to transformative approaches. If the goal of education is to develop future citizens capable of understanding and improving the world, more teachers committed to the art of philosophizing are needed. Such teaching is, suggests Harvey Siegel, the right or moral thing to do. Since teaching is an interactive process between or among individuals of equal worth, teachers are obligated to treat their students with respect. Translated, this means that teachers should recognize "the student's" right to question, to challenge, and to demand reasons and justifications for what is being taught. . ."[22] If human beings are capable of both understanding and transforming themselves and their worlds, then teachers, to the extent that they transmit predetermined truths to students, are disrespectful of them. Teachers as translators; i.e., teachers committed to the art of philosophizing, treat students with respect.

Teaching that fosters the art of philosophizing can also be justified on the grounds that such teaching fosters autonomy and self-sufficiency. Transformative teachers encourage their students "to ask questions, to look for evidence, to seek and scrutinize alternatives, to be critical of their own ideas as well as those of others." Through such efforts, students are encouraged and empowered to become self-sufficient, to take charge of their lives, to be free "from the unwarranted control of unjustified belief, unsupportable attitudes, and paucity of abilities"[23] that deny or limit life choices. Teaching of this kind not only represents a moral ideal but is indispensable for a society aspiring to be free. To free the mind from uncritical acceptance of fashionable doctrine is both a moral and democratic education ideal. These are ideas that we as educators must foster if we hope, individually and as a society, to avoid "the path to despotism."[24]

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Harry 17: Judgment, Perspective and Philosophy

by Clive Lindop

This final chapter brings on an evaluation of the 'thinking about thinking' project, with Lisa wondering whether the whole project has been worth it, or really just a waste of time. Others agree with Lisa, but there are some willing to say that they learned some things about thinking. Harry realizes that there are different points of view emerging, but not really opposing ones: "in a way Lisa's right. I guess different people understand things in different ways. . . .Tony and Lisa aren't really disagreeing about what's true and what's not true. It's just that Tony is used to finding things out step by step, according to rules, . . .while Lisa seems to size things up very fast, like she'll have a hunch or something, and right away she has the answer."

Tony's attitude to Lisa seems to stem from the fact that she is a girl, and therefore, in his view, unworthy of consideration, as well as from the fact that she seems to him incapable of thinking and reasoning properly; i.e. in his analytic, step by step, propositional way. His attitude illustrates what Buchler (1955) calls the prejudice of thinking that knowledge and judgment are mental functions expressed overtly in propositions (p. 31). Such a view distorts the nature of the individual, treating him/her as a plurality of functions, e.g. of a body which acts and a mind which thinks, knows, judges,

understands, rather than as an integral whole or unity capable of thinking, knowing, understanding, feeling, etc. But putting thoughts into propositions is not the only way we have of making assertions and expressing our point of view or judgments we make. We can, and do, communicate our views, attitudes, appraisals, etc., in what we do and make, as well as in what we say or write. Doing, making and saying are three modes of judgment, which Buchler calls active, exhibitive, and assertive (p. 20), all of which are efficacious in communication (p. 30). The traditional view, equating judgment only with the assertive (propositional) mode, ignores the other modes, giving a distorted picture of the individual and one's representation of the world and communication with others. In Buchler's view this seriously undervalues the cognitive status of the other forms of assertion, making and doing, as forms of knowledge and perspective. In questioning the adequacy of this view, Buchler seeks to restore the balance, not by totally rejecting it but by absorbing it into a "juster" view; he seeks a more unitary, holistic notion of man, judgment and perspective, by combining all three modes of production—action, exhibition, assertion—as defining one's perspective, because all three are the forms

in which individuals render experience tractable and expose their situation or circumstances (p. 28).

Now these three modes of experience are not directly comparable, Buchler contends (p. 39): making (exhibitive mode) and doing (active mode) are not 'systematic' in the same way as saying (assertive mode), but asserting is not vivid or consuming in the same sense as making and doing. This could well be the source of Lisa's dissatisfaction with the proceedings: she does not form or express her appraisals in the same analytic, propositional way that Harry and Tony prefer. It doesn't excite her, grip her, consume her, we could say, in the way that doing and making can. The class sessions proceed in the analytic, propositional manner and end up, according to Lisa, arriving at conclusions she already knows. So why bother with this tedious and laborious method; it just doesn't seem worth the effort.

Lisa has a valuable contribution to make to the pedagogy of Philosophy for Children, it seems to me. By and large, it does proceed in this propositional manner. Not enough attention is given to the other modes of assertion. Children like Lisa, are thereby denied opportunity to exercise, develop and understand their talent. Their way of understanding

and communicating is being devalued, even denigrated, if it encourages Tony's contempt, however unwittingly. The unintended message seems to be that these other modes of expression and understanding are inferior. Not everyone in this situation is as capable of the defiant retort, "it doesn't prove his way is better than mine" as is Lisa.

This tension is further heightened, if Buchler is right, by the fact that the three modes of judgment are not reducible to one another (p. 40). There can be no direct translation of one into the other, for there are no literal equivalents. But, in the right conditions, one mode can articulate another, for they are related through mutual influence: what we know theoretically may affect the content of how we act and what we make; and the way we act or what we make may determine the ideas we formulate. The challenge then, for teachers of P4C, is to promote and facilitate this mutual influence so that ideas, concepts, are exposed both actively and productively, as well as assertively, e.g. through action games, role playing, making models, representations, images, etc., and in such ways explore and articulate their individual points of view or perspective. In this way children may approximate the propositional assertions which philosophers are typically wont to make.

And P4C, being philosophy, has its own perspective. The philosophic perspective, Buchler claims (1951, p. 122), has two dimensions: construction and reflexive commentary. The constructive dimension gives philosophy an exhibitive character, while the commentative gives philosophy its assertive character. Every perspective is an order of interrelated concepts, and 'seeing' the meaning and 'feeling' the configuration of this conceptual order is the business of the constructive dimension of philosophy, while the assertive dimension emphasizes the 'reference' of the schema, its applicability, to 'experience'. Since the exhibitive judgments of the construction cannot be literally translated into assertive judgments, philosophy has traditionally made use of myth and metaphor to convey the message of reason (p. 123). Hence the novels? In assertion, consequences are traced; in exhibition (works of art,

moral acts), responses are ascertained. And the Manual exercises emphasize both of these aspects, asking children to consider the circumstances in which certain propositions would or would not be true; others asking children to respond to certain situations by describing how they would feel or act. In these ways children are led to explore their own and other possible points of view. But again, even here the chief mode of judgment exercised is the assertive (propositional) rather than the exhibitive or active.

Other points of view must be explored because, as Buchler says (p. 131), philosophical perspectives are not insular, private idioms, they are not personal feelings or unique personal attributes.

Philosophic perspectives, even when they fail to overlap and intersect, attempt to achieve universality (p. 132). The philosopher, in formulating categories and principles, represents a world that is always to some extent available to other perspectives—hence we attempt to connect with the childrens' perspectives in order to give them a glimpse of the philosophic. But philosophers are not just reporting their impressions; they are making tacit recommendations that their results fit other perspectives and that, in some sense, they are juster to these perspectives than the formulations which others design for them (p. 132). Thus philosophy invites criticism; the principle of criticism is explicitly present in the commentative dimension of philosophy. Hostile criticism, however, does not imply the insistence of one philosopher that another think the way he does or that the other abandon his conceptual references. Rather, negative criticism means that an alleged justification is not established by the conceptual materials deployed (p. 134). And this seems to be the purpose of many of the exercises in the Manual, to have children examine their perspectives in terms of the suppositions inherent in them. Fran realizes this when she tries to reconcile Lisa and Tony's opposition. As Ann puts it: "each of us lives in his own world that's different from other people's." But to prevent the slide into solipsism, a very present danger in philosophy class, Harry leaps in: "the important point is not that we see things differently, but that if each

of us were to change places, we could see what the other does." "So," concludes Lisa, "we should try to see things from other people's point of view?"

This exchange illustrates Buchler's point (p. 116), that since perspectives can intersect, overlap, be shared and/or include one another, misunderstanding and conflict can occur. This comes from unreasonable (hence fanatical) or unwitting (hence opposed) blindness to other perspectives. In fact, Buchler declares, rationality can be defined as the willingness to discover other perspectives, to attain community of perspective, and to reconcile community with conviction. Which seems to be the approach of Mr. Spence in seeking to have the children explain their point of view while steering clear of invective and insult. The crucial thing, as Lisa concludes, is to keep an open mind, and not to think one knows it all because one has figured out a few rules of thinking. We might also warn ourselves as teachers, against thinking we know it all because we've settled on a particular methodology—the assertive—which works, after a fashion, and not to close our eyes and mind to the exhibitive and active modes of expression, understanding, knowledge and judgment that Buchler brings to our attention. Otherwise we will end up in what he calls (p. 133), the grotesque and arrogant position of insisting, however unwittingly, that children adopt only the assertive mode.

Furthermore, the search for community does not mean compulsory adoption of one perspective (p. 117). As well as exploration, perspectives can lead to idolatory, wherein inquiry has dried into vested interest. Difference of perspective is as fundamental to communication as the sharing of perspective. Difference of perspective can save inquiry from sterility and inanity. And when inquiry gets stuck in the cave of the assertive mode, we might say, a 'graceful error' occasioned by a switch to the other modes of judgment and inquiry, may well correct our progress.

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Rationality, Self-esteem and Autonomy through Collaborative Enquiry

by N. R. Lane and
S. A. Jones

The need to develop reasoning skills in children through discussion is generally acknowledged by curriculum aims. There is, however, a lack of any definite teaching strategy to fulfill this need. Matthew Lipman's Philosophy for Children program has had success in this area. As with other 'collaborative enquiry-based' approaches to learning, it depends upon a teaching strategy which enhances children's self-esteem. This seems a necessary ingredient for the development of rationality, critical awareness and autonomy in children. Inadequate teacher training is suggested as a major reason for the failure of 'collaborative' approaches to influence greatly educational practice. With a shift away from the 'authority/knowledge-based' paradigm and the provision of effective teacher training, it is considered that our educational institutions could become more democratically organized, and we would move closer to realizing the liberal ideal of developing human potential to the full.

The Lack of a Strategy for the Teaching of Reasoning Skills to Children

Most curriculum aims acknowledge the need to develop reasoning skills in children but they do not give any clear indication of how this can be achieved. Thus, in the Introduction to the HMI report *The Curriculum from 5 to 16*, it is stated that there is need for "pupils to develop lively, enquiring minds, the ability to question and argue rationally" (HMI Curriculum Matters 2, 1985, para. 1; see also paras. 3, 8, 19) "to encourage a measure of autonomy" (para. 6), and that despite differences "of approach, subject matter, levels of abstraction and complexity" in what is taught this "should not result in a sequence of disparate and unrelated experiences" (para. 4). In short, it is necessary to:

(a) develop children's reasoning skills;

(b) encourage autonomy;

(c) provide an underlying sense of unity of what is taught.

But little is said about how exactly this should be done. However, the importance of pupil discussion is emphasized:

> ...talk [has] tended to be squeezed out [of the curriculum] especially that type of talk which helps young people to handle new ideas, to develop a reasoned argument, to internalize experiences and to find personal expression for them (para. 18);

and similar points are made in *Education 8 to 12*...(HMI Survey, 1985, paras. 2.37, 2.48, 2.86). Thus the need to give children the chance to develop reasoning skills and autonomy through discussion is acknowledged.

In *The Curriculum from 5 to 16* it is stated that the curriculum of all schools should involve the following areas of learning and experience: (HMI Series, 1985, para. 33)

> aesthetic and cognitive, human and social, linguistic and literary, mathematical, moral, physical, scientific, spiritual, technological.

Each area, which is not considered to be equated with any particular subject, is claimed to "assist in the development of knowledge, concepts, skills and attitudes which can be learnt, practiced and applied in many parts of the curriculum" (para. 34). And it is thought that activities within each subject contribute to these areas of learning. For example:

> ...scientific learning introduces the practical experiment as a means of investigating observed phenomena, while offering valuable opportunities to develop more general skills such as approaching tasks in a logical manner, communicating information and ideas, and observing and recording. A single activity can contribute to several areas of learning. (para. 34)

There seems to be an assumption that reasoning skills will automatically develop during the activities of the separate discipline areas. However, this view would contradict their earlier claim that conceptualizing and reason, and the

discussion activity required to facilitate these processes, tend to be 'squeezed out' of the usual subject activities of the curriculum. The fact is that children are often expected to grasp and articulate aesthetic, mathematical, moral, scientific concept/skills etc. (i.e. the concepts involved in the different 'areas of learning and experience') without first being helped to develop the tools of rational/critical thought. Rational thinking in any 'area of learning', whether we are dealing with moral concepts, scientific concepts or whatever, is governed by the same basic rules of logic. An ability to apply these rules leads to an increase in the understanding of, and confidence in dealing with, the various concepts, and provides an underlying unity to the different 'areas of learning'. There is therefore much need to incorporate into the curriculum a clear and definite teaching strategy for developing reasoning skills in children.

Lipman's Philosophy for Children Program

The Philosophy for Children program designed by Professor Matthew Lipman at the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC) in the United States has been devised with this in mind. Lipman's program is based on the assumption that discussion skills and listening skills are effective foundations for thinking/reasoning skills. It points to the value of enquiry, encourages the development of alternative modes of thought and imagination, and suggests how children are able to learn profitably from one another. It is based first on a series of novels of children which illustrate different 'philosophical' problems and modes of reasoning which the teacher uses as the basis for stimulus and discussion, and secondly on instructional manuals for the teacher (Lipman, 1982, 1981, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1979). The novels offer a model of dialogue both of children with their peers and of children with adults. In this form it is able to provide the basic reasoning tools, the techniques of critical thinking and the formal and informal logic which children can apply to many areas of the school curriculum.

The program uses a teaching model that is both non-authoritarian and anti-

doctrinal. It is this which is deemed to be of central importance for the success of the program. A teacher-centered approach in which the teacher imposes his or her ideas and views on the discussion rather than allowing the children to develop their own is considered to inhibit the development of reasoning skills. The teaching manuals, therefore, advise that the tendency to impose any particular order or limitations on the content of the discussion, or any particular ideas, solutions or doctrines on the pupils, is strictly to be avoided. Although in this respect the teacher will be taking the role of a neutral chairman (cf. the approach prescribed by Stenhouse in the Humanities Curriculum Project (Schools Council 1970), Lipman's program requires the teacher, albeit in a subtle manner, (relentlessly) to 'feed' rationality into the discussion. Thus, the teaching manual accompanying the novel *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* suggests that the teacher should, within the framework of neutrality, "encourage children to build

on one another's ideas"; "try to get students to see the implications of what they say"; "try to get students to become aware of their own assumptions"; try to "encourage students to find reasons to justify their own beliefs", etc. (see teaching manual for Lipman, 1974, p. i).

This particular part of the IAPC program in Philosophy for Children (i.e., *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery*) was subjected to extensive evaluation between September 1976 and June 1978 (Lipman & Shipman, 1979). The results indicated a significant improvement in formal reasoning and in creative reasoning (the capacity to generate new ideas, to discover feasible alternatives, and to provide reasons. The overall impact of the program on improving reading and mathematics was also found to be statistically significant. The teachers' appraisal was that children were markedly more curious, better orientated towards their work, more considerate of one another, better able to reason, and that their communication skills increased.

The program was shown to be very effective for children identified as slow readers.

The length of exposure to the program was of critical importance as pupils performed better the longer they were involved with it. The results also suggested that logical reasoning and intellectual creativity are not mutually inhibitive and can be stimulated by the same program.

There has been further evidence that the program can lead to improvements in formal and informal logic, critical thinking, fluency and flexibility of thought, reading, interpersonal relationships and social skills (Burnes, 1981; Curtis, 1980; Haas, 1976; Higa, 1980; Karras, 1980; Shipman, 1982; Yeazell, 1981); and learning in learning disabled and emotionally handicapped children (Simon, 1979). The most positive result seems to have been in terms of the children's view of themselves as thinkers who ought to be taken seriously by adults as well as other children (Curtis, 1980).

Rationality, Self-Esteem and Autonomy

There seems a close parallel here with some of the results of group counselling programs on children. For example, Cant & Spackman (1985), after the work of Lawrence (1973), found that group counselling techniques resulted in distinctive gains in reading ability and English quotient scores, as well as behavioural improvements. This was related to the considerable gains in pupil self-esteem which resulted from the 'counselling' approach. The counselling may be summarized as:

(1) non-evaluative and non-censorious;

(2) consisting of the teacher encouraging the pupils to talk about their experiences, behavior and emotions, and

(3) encouraging, guiding and responding as an equal to their talk.

Something significant like this 'counselling' core is contained in Lipman's teaching method. Thus, in the suggestions he makes to teachers on how to organize effectively pupil discussions (including a list of 25 things to avoid) (see

teaching manual for Lipman, 1974, pp. i, ii), the following three recommendations may be discerned:

(1) adopt a non-judgmental, non-authoritarian and anti-doctrinal approach;

(2) encourage the pupils to express their views on what they are interested in rather than impose your views on them;

(3) indicate to the pupils that what they say makes you think [i.e. give importance to what they say, treat them as equals].

The way a pupil feels has been demonstrated to be related to the manner in which he/she performs in the classroom, which in turn is related to academic achievement (Bloom, 1976; Horne, 1980). The positive effect of a counselling approach is due to the positive effect (increase in self-esteem/confidence) it has on pupils' feelings. The effect is not restricted to young children or people with behavioral/mental problems, but seems relevant in any teacher-learner situation. For example, Stones (1984) includes a counselling component in his model of teaching practice supervision which he bases on the clinical supervision developed in Harvard in the 1950s (see Boydell, in press). Here again the core of the component consists in the teacher (supervisor) taking, primarily, a non-evaluative approach which is on an equal footing with the student. This method, although not comprehensively tested, has been shown to have success in achieving its aims.

No test has been carried out to see whether the counselling approach alone would improve reasoning ability, but as Simon claims:

> As educators, it is too precarious an assumption that [school] students will realize their potential through purely natural-cultural forces; there simply is not that much opportunity to develop critical thinking skills informally. (Simon, 1979, p. 33)

It is unlikely therefore that a counselling approach alone would be sufficient to improve reasoning skills. Without a 'rationality' component it is quite possible for a counselling program to produce irrational "...selfish, self-directed persons (Bandura, 1969). However, from the

reported success of Lipman's program, a 'counselling' component would seem to be a crucial factor in the teaching technique required to encourage the development of reasoning skills in children.

There is then the question of whether a counselling program combined with a formal course in logic would be as effective as Lipman's method in teaching reasoning skills, where the 'rationality/logic' element is integrated with the 'counseling' element. Again this has not been specifically tested, but given the beneficial effects on self-esteem of a counseling program in the curriculum over just having a purely traditional cognitive/subject based curriculum, and the link between self-esteem and educational achievement, one would expect (by a logical progression) that inclusion of the 'rational' component run alongside a 'counselling' component would be the more effective way of developing children's rational thinking skills. Furthermore, the idea of Lipman's program is not merely to develop children's formal reasoning ability, but, through discussion, to develop the broader characteristics of critical awareness and autonomy, i.e. to develop independent and rational decision-making capabilities in a moral, social and political context. Thus Lipman, in discussing the criteria necessary for evaluating programs for improving reasoning skills concludes that there are two, one quantitative and the other qualitative. Concerning these he writes:

> The first relates to cognitive skill improvement as measured by valid and reliable test instruments. The second relates to the educational significance of the approach—how it helps the child become a reasonable, imaginative and self-critical individual in a democratic society. . . .if the first is accomplished without the second, the child will have become little more than a piece of reasoning equipment in search of a programmer. (1985, p. 34)

And then there is the question of whether a counselling program alone might be just as effective as Lipman's (counselling/rationality) program in improving achievements in other areas of the curriculum (reading, mathematics, etc). However, only by encouraging and developing in children a method of en-

quiry which is fundamental to all areas of learning as Lipman's program does, it is possible to develop effectively in pupils not only general reasoning ability, but also, through this, their understanding and confidence within the different discipline areas and to provide an underlying unity to all areas of knowledge. In any case, although it has been useful for the purposes of this discussion, the distinction between 'counselling' and 'rational' components is somewhat unrealistic. For example, under the counselling approach prescribed by Cant and Spackman (1985) they include the need for the teacher to 'guide' the pupils' talk. We cannot be sure exactly what they intend here, but significantly other researchers in the field have extended the group counselling approach to include the teacher (a) encouraging the pupils to identify and discuss which actions lead to particular outcomes, and (b) asking pupils to suggest, and demonstrate, alternative behaviors which might promote successful outcomes in particular settings (Charlton, 1985). This, however, is included under the kinds of inferential thinking which Lipman's program aims to develop, and here therefore the teaching strategy prescribed by Lipman to encourage such reasoning in children would be relevant. The 'counselling' and 'rational' elements then would seem inextricably linked. This is further demonstrated whe (again using the dichotomy for convenience) we consider that not only does the 'counselling' aspect incorporate a 'rationality' factor as just considered, but also the 'rationality' aspect incorporates a 'counselling' or 'affective' factor. Thus, an acquaintance with the basic rules of rational/critical thought leads, amongst other things, to an increase in pupils' confidence in dealing with concepts and their inter-relationships.

And indeed, how else are we to nurture critical awareness in 'the learner' if not by providing him or her with the tools of rational thought ('rationality' component) *in an environment which promotes their use?*—In other words, by 'the teacher' embarking on a method of inquiry *with* 'the learner' as an equal ('counselling' component) who can also

be mistaken and learn anew through inquiry. Otherwise, without this genuineness, 'the teacher' will be unconvincing and, consequently, ineffective in nurturing the learner's self-esteem, critical awareness and autonomy.

There are increasing calls amongst educationists working from different perspectives, such as moral and political education, personal and social education, meida studies, health education, etc., for the common goals of making children become "more socially and politically aware" (David, 1983,p. 23); giving them "the capacity to come to reasoned judgment"; giving them "independence in making moral judgments" (Schools Council, 1981); encouraging "an attitude to authority and to 'taken for granted rules' that . . . becomes increasingly questioning of the principles behind the rules" (Pring, 1984, pp. 74, 75); equipping them "with knowledge, skills, values and attitudes which help them cope successfully with their present and future lives" (Schools Council, 1977, p. 1); encouraging "him [the pupil] to posit alternatives [demonstrating] the importance and strength of group experience; and [considering] the wide range of social, aesthetic, industrial, political and philosophical issues. . ." (Masterman, 1980, p. 12), etc. It has long been recognized that the autocratic didactic/lecture approach of imparting knowledge is basically ineffective in influencing people's habits, values and attitudes, and that more democratic group discussion-participating mehtods have greater success in this area (see, for example, Lewin, 1947, 1953; White & Lippitt, 1960). Blumberg, although talking in the context of industrial democracy, makes the following claim which has relevance to all social relations:

> It is necessar, if we are to encourage democratic action, that schools be bolder in encouraging the greater pupil participation in the school and the community that may be endangered by discussion on vlaues linked with freedom, personal autonomy, participation and tolerance of alternative views. (1983, p. 27)

Why then have a number of attempts (such as Stenhouse's admirable Humanities Curriculum Project, Schools Coun-

cil, 1970) to introduce a more democratic approach into the education system as a means of fostering critical awareness and autonomy, largely fallen by the wayside? There would appear to be four major factors which have contributed to the failure of such attempts:

    (1) an inadequate balance of the 'rationality: counselling' components of the approach used;

    (2) inadequate or no provision for training teachers in the strategy required;

    (3) too late an introduction into the school system;

    (4) external socio-economic pressure on attempts to increase democratic participation beyond that existing in society in general.

We shall deal with the points in reverse order.

Point 4

The socio-economic pressure we refer to "manifests itself in the opposition of parents, teachers, school governors, LEAs etc., and the pupils themselves" (Lane, Lane & Pritchard, 1986). To this list should be added the school organization (Sockett, 1975, p. 43; White, 1983, p. 92 ff.). This point, of course, is applicable in all cases and it would seem, therefore, that any attempt at increasing children's critical awareness by introducing a more participatory, democratic approach is doomed from the start. However, if the introduction of a more democratic approach in schools were to go hand in hand with an effective training scheme for teachers, there is more likelihood that the teachers will become more socially and politically aware, and thus more likelihood of their becoming involved in attempts to change existing authoritarian social structures. As Pat White claims in support of introducing training schemes for head teachers in democratic theory and practice:

> Providing. . . .training programs *now* is one way of introducing heads and their colleagues to the possibility of extending democracy and getting some of the problems involved in its extension considered. (1983, p. 135)

So there do seem grounds for such attempts, rather than, through inactivity, supporting the *status quo* with all its inefficiencies and injustices (Lane, Lane & Pritchard, 1986). The failure of attempts up to now, therefore, would not seem to rest on point (4) alone.

Point 3

This is related to point (4). The attitudes of children are strongly influenced by the existing socio-economic structures and "these [social] attitudes remain firmly embedded in pupils' minds so that attempts at systematic [social] education in early adolescence have little noticeable effect on them" (White, 1983, p. 111). Referring to research which illustrates the futility of later attempts at trying to help pupils to become more critically aware, White asks "why not try at an earlier stage to marry knowledge and attitudes more rationally. . .[rather] than leaving young pupils to form strong attitudes in a conceptual vacuum?" (p. 111). It seems essential, therefore, that if 'democratic' teaching strategies are to be effectively implemented in schools they need to be introduced at the primary level.

Point 2

Teachers are ill-prepared to deal with an approach which does not rely on the traditional authority/knowledge-based teaching strategy. *Although there* is much lip-service paid to democratic relationships between teachers and pupils, most teachers do not fulfill this ideal. Training in the 'collaborative' or 'democratic' technique is essential if what teachers *say* they are doing is to match what they are *in fact* doing (c.f. David, 1983, p. 31; Sockett, 1975, p. 43; White, 1983, p. 93).

Point 1

Although it is essential for a 'collaborative' approach to have an effective 'counselling' component *(i.e.,* it must be non-authoritarian, non-judgmental, empathetic, etc.) in order to nurture self-esteem in 'the learner', this is not to advocate the kind of progressive approach which allows the pupil's thoughts to wander completely without bounds. As

we have already considered, true 'counselling' and 'rationality' components will be inextricably linked, and if either component is stressed at the expense of the other (c.f. teaching manual for Lipman, 1974, p.i) the approach will be ineffective and thus fail to nurture 'the learner's' critical awareness and autonomy. It is the combination of the 'rationality' component within a framework which encourages democratic, participatory group relationships which is necessary to promote these characteristics. Furthermore, it seems that this kind of collaborative situation is more likely to develop the "considerate way of life" (Tones, 1981, p. 11) or "fraternal" (White, 1983, p. 72) attitude than is a more autocratic situation. Thus Lipman, in describing the use of his program with children, comments:

> As time goes on, they learn to cooperate with one another by building on one another's ideas, by questioning each other's underlying assumptions, . . .and by listening carefully and respectfully to the ways in which other people express how things appear to them from other perspectives. It is through such disciplined dialogue that a community of inquiry begins to develop in the classroom. (1985, p. 37)

An important lesson can be learned concerning the future of 'collaborative' approaches to enquiry in schools if we consider the reasons for the failure of Stenhouse's Humanities Curriculum Project (Schools Council, 1970) in the light of the above four points. We have already alluded to the resemblance of Stenhouse's approach with Lipman's in advocating the 'neutral' chairman role of the teacher. Concerning this Elliott comments:

> It is certainly not to be equated with *complete passivity* or negative neutrality. It involves passivity toward some aspects of an issue for the sake of exerting positive 'influence' and 'guidance' with respect to other aspects.

And earlier he states:

> Thus, the deliberate withholding of certain kinds of 'influences' or 'guidance' is a necessary condition of being able to exercise those influences which facilitate understanding and place students in a position to make rational decisions in the area of work.

(1975, p. 51)

In fundamental respects there is a close resemblance with Lipman's program where the 'rationality' and 'counselling' components are balanced, and therefore we do not believe there are grounds to say that Stenhouse's project failed on this count. However, there are grounds to say that it failed regarding points (2) and (3). It was used with secondary school children, and concerning point (3) Tones writes:

> Of particular significance was the observation that these objectively measured benefits [increase in intelligence, conscientiousness, adventurousness, self-sufficiency, comprehension, vocabulary, reduced hostility, awareness of social problems, self-esteem] were only noticeable in schools in which teachers had been trained in the proper use of the group approach; where untrained teachers employed the materials, the results were no different from those of the control schools. (1981, p. 33)

The message is, therefore, unless 'collaborative' approaches such as Lipman's Philosophy for Children program are introduced at the primary level, and in particular, unless adequate provision is made for the effective training of teachers in the teaching strategy required, such approaches are likely to 'fail' as they have done in the past.

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INCLUSION OF INSTRUCTION IN LIPMAN'S TECHNIQUES IN INITIAL AND INSET TEACHER EDUCATION COURSES

Cummings refers to the possible central importance of the teacher's skill for the success of Lipman's program (1980), and the report of the 1975 experimental research undertaken by Rutgers University at Newark, New Jersey and Denton, Texas, suggests that the results in Newark where teachers were given some training, were better than in Denton where they were not (Hass, 1976). Similarly, although other factors were involved, a difference in training may have been the major cause of the difference in the quantitative results of Jenkins and Winstanley in the UK (Jenkins, 1986; Winstanley, 1986)[1]

Because of the skill necessary for the teacher adequately to employ 'collaborative' group discussion methods such as that prescribed by Lipman's program, the teacher education couse employed would need to be effective. Lipman *et al.* believe, referring to American teacher training, that "existing teacher training programs completely fail to prepare the teacher" to teach philosophy (reasoning skills) in the school, and that courses in academic philosophy are also of little value (Lipman *et al.*, 1980,

p. 46). In this country also there is grow-ing evidence to show that traditional ap-proaches to initial and in-service train-ing are lacking in many important re-spects (Boydell, in press). In the present case the particular training approach which would seem most appropriate is that suggested by Joyce & Showers (1980). They found, from a consideration of 200 in-service courses, that teachers could be most effectively taught new skills by strategies which included the following basic elements:

(1) initial theoretical input—presentation of theory or description of skill or strategy;

(2) practical demonstration in a real situation to follow immediately (1);

(3) opportunity for students/teachers to practice in a classroom setting;

(4) constructive feedback to (3) with coaching.

If we apply this scheme to the present issue and modify the diagramatic adap-tation of Terrell & Gillies (1986), we ob-tain the following training program outline for students/teachers:

The point is that where questions of skill are involved, merely telling the teachers (students) about a course/strategy which can be used with pupils (as is the case with most education courses) is largely ineffective. It is unlikely to change their practice in the classroom. With the above training sequence, however, the stu-dent/teacher is not just *told* things, but *shown* the relevant approach and also given a chance to *practice* it in a classroom situation with feedback and coaching from the lecturer. Furthermore, Lipman *et al..* believes that:

> Unless teachers are trained by means of the identical instructional ap-proaches as those that they will be ex-pected to utilize in their own classrooms, their preparation will be a failure . . . If teachers are expected to teach children how to reason, then they must be given practice in reason-ing such as they will expect from their students. (1980, p. 47)

Accordingly, we would recommend that the first 'theory' phase of the above sug-gested scheme should center on an experience-related approach—that is, with the students, both initial and in-

service, experiencing the program in much the same way as the pupils for whom it is designed. They would there-fore read sections of a novel and then discuss the various issues and points as they arise under the non-authoritarian guidance of the tutor. This would serve three purposes. First, the students would become familiar with the texts involved as a basis for future use with children; secondly, they would experience first-hand the particular kind of 'collaborative' pedagogic style which is necessary to facilitate children's verbal interaction as a basis for developing their ra-tional/critical thinking skills; and thirdly, and perhaps most importantly of all, their involvement in the program would lead to improvements in their own critical reasoning abilities. This would serve the purpose of challenging existing prejudices, thus helping to change the at-titudes and behavior of teachers themselves.

In the case of in-service students the use of this scheme might consist of week-ly workshops, involving experience-related instruction and practical demonstration, running concurrently with weekly practice with selected groups of children in their own schools. In the case of initial teacher education pro-grams there would probably be a time-lag before the students had the oppor-tunity for application during their teaching practice experience.

The use of experience-related instruc-tion in the first stage would not only be to give teachers "practice in reasoning such as they will expect from their students [pupils]" as Lipman prescribes (Lipman, 1980, p. 47), but would be a logical requirements of the claim that such a 'collaborative, enquiry-based' ap-proach to learning, such a 'non-evaluative, equal-footing' approach, is more effective than the traditional 'evaluative, authority-based' model—the model which still largely dominates educational practice, despite attempts at so called child-centered education.

On this basis, therefore, the 'col-laborative, enquiry-based' strategy would need to be adopted, not only in the first stage of the above scheme, but in all subsequent lecturer-teacher/student interactions in the scheme, particularly

the feedback/coaching interaction in the 'practice' phase. Thus, the lecturer-teacher/student interaction involved would contrast with the traditional apprenticeship style of teaching practice supervision, and there have been a number of attempts by educational researches to redefine the supervisor's role along similar lines to that suggested above (Boydell, in press). Such a changed role would require effective training for supervisors and significantly, whilst acknowledging that there are "formidable problems" for those who "wish to persuade teaching practice supervisors to reconceptualise their role" Boydell concludes generally that, of the large choice of instructional models available:

> a collaborative inquiry-based approach involving supervisors, students and teachers, and a shift towards diagnostic evaluation, seems most promising.

And currently the training scheme suggested by Joyce and Showers (adapted above for student training) is being examined by Terrell *et al.* (1985) for the training of teaching practice supervisors.

The 'concurrent' experience of the three stages of the scheme suggested above for in-service students would be a more desirable approach than the separate, disjointed experience of the stages (perhaps with protracted time-lags) necessitated by the traditional initial teacher education courses. This problem could be overcome by an IT-INSET approach (Ashton *et al.*, 1983), where tutors regularly work with small groups of students and teachers in their own classrooms. Such an approach would be an appropriate vehicle for effecting "[self-evaluative] communities of enquiry" (Lipman *et al.*, 1980, p. 45), simultaneously involving all the participants (pupils, students, teachers, lecturers) in the educational process. This closely parallels the goals of those involved in critical action research who, amongst other things, aim to establish:

> . . . .self-critical communities of people participating and collaborating in all phases of the research process:. . .it aims to build communities of people committed to *enlightening* themselves about the relationship between circumstance, action and consequence in their own situation, and emancipating themselves from the institutional and

personal constraints which limit their power to live their own legitimate educational and social values. (Kemmis & Henry, 1982, p. 11 ff.)

CONCLUSION

Elsewhere we have supported the view that a change in socio-economic structures to ones which involve more egalitarian, participatory relations is a necessary concomitant of achieving an educational system which develops human potential to the full (incorporating critical awareness and autonomy). On that basis we concluded that it is:

> incumbent on those in education (who support the liberal ideology) to become at least seriously aware, of, if not actively involved in, the need for social transformation. (Lane, Lane & Pritchard, 1986)

It would seem that an effective move to introduce 'collaborative' enquiry into schools, and especially the training this would require, would go some way to achieving this end as teachers become more democratically involved in school structures and so, hopefully as a result, wider social structures. Unfortunately initiatives such as Stenhouse's and Lipman's and proposals to broaden political education such as that by White (1979, 1983) tend to be viewed as separate 'subjects' battling for a position in an already crowded curriculum. Their value, however, lies in the fact that they represent a distinct pedagogic strategy which, we believe, should underpin the approach to learning in all areas of the curriculum. It is not a matter of adding to the existing structure, but of radically changing the nature of that structure. With a shift in outlook from the dominant 'authority/knowledge-based' paradigm and adequate training programs for teachers, the introduction of co-operative, collaborative communities of enquiry in schools need not be the isolated transitory affairs that they have been. Instead, they would begin to form the base structure of our educational system, and we would move closer to realizing the liberal ideal of developing human potential to the full; a goal which, despite many good intentions and beliefs to the contrary, has essentially not been achieved in the history of education.

NOTES

(1) Jenkins undertook a month's intensive training at the IAPC whereas Winstanley had no such training. In the Jenkins case the study was also conducted over one year with 12 year olds, whereas Winstanley used *Kio and Gus* for one term with 6 year olds.

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It Helps Also to
## Understand *the Catechism*

"Faith is absolute silence, therefore it cannot be 'explained'. This is the first difficulty one encounters when one has to catechize. On the other hand, the shortcoming of pedagogy has always been its paying more attention to the teaching of reading and writing, and not enough to speaking."

Father Mario Cattoretti, of the Dominican Order, who for ten years has been *Sacra Dottrina* director as well as editorial coordinator of the *Bulletin* of the Italian Philosophical Society, is enthusiastic regarding the arrival in Italy of philosophy for children. "Finally," he says, "we too are beginning to discuss it. It is clear that it poses questions to us theologians as well. We know that Cardinal Ratzinger, on more than one occasion, has insisted on the need to go back and learn some formulas of the doctrine by heart. We agree that one must know the Credo, but it is above all necessary to answer the questions that children may ask. It is necessary to help them understand the *content* of the doctrine and not repeat it according to a didactic system whose defects we have now verified.

"The fact that, in America and in other countries, there have been numerous Catholic scholars who have been interested in applying philosophy to children should make us reflect on this situation. The effort of the pastoral catechesis should really be to lead the child to understand what can be understood of the word of God, not simply in an idealistic or narrative manner, but in a form that permits the Word to become the reality of life."

—from *Famiglia Christiana*, December 23, 1987 (Italy)

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