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Credits

Long ago there was no color in the world - only grey, black, and white. It was the time of The Great Greyness. "Something is wrong with the world," exclaimed a Wizard. Down in the dark, grey cellar of his house the Wizard mixed up something in a pot and went out with it to paint the thatched roof of his house.

"What is that?" asked the neighbors.

"I call it blue," explained the Wizard.

"Please give us some," begged the neighbors, and the Wizard did. Soon the whole world was blue. It became the time of The Great Blueness.

Unfortunately, having blueness everywhere made people sad. So the Wizard went back down into his dark, blue cellar and eventually came out with something new, something with which he painted his fence.

"What is that?" asked the neighbors.

"I call it yellow," explained the Wizard.

"Please give us some," begged the neighbors, and the Wizard did. Soon the whole world was yellow.

Unfortunately, having the whole world yellow made people headaches. So the Wizard went back down into his dark, yellow cellar and eventually returned with something new. It was something which which he painted his flowers.

"What is that?" asked the neighbors.

"I call it red," explained the Wizard.

"Please give us some," begged the neighbors, and he did. Soon the whole world was red.

Unfortunately, having the whole world red made people angry. So the Wizard went back down into his dark, red cellar. But this time all he could make was more blue, more yellow, and more red - until the contents of the now overflowing pots began to run together and make purple, green, orange, and brown. The people gleefully took all these colors and soon the world was a many-colored thing. The happy neighbors brought the Wizard red apples, green leaves, yellow bananas, purple grapes, and blue flowers. At last the world was too beautiful ever to be changed again.

* * *

This delightful tale, brightly illustrated by the author himself, invites us to reflect on the coloredness of the world - the bright blueness of the sky when the sun comes out after rain, the new greenness of the leaves in spring, and the deep red of a fully ripe strawberry. Sometimes we need a time of Great Greyness to appreciate the vividness of our technicolor world.

Still, there have been plenty of philosophers and scientists who have wanted to tell us that colors are not real. It began with Democritus, the ancient atomist, who thought that only atoms and their shapes and sizes, plus the empty space that separates them, are real. So-called secondary qualities, including color, are a sort of dependable illusion, that the wizardry of our minds produces. In reality the world is colorless.

Recently the tables have been turned. If physics can't explain the emergence of the experience of color, this reasoning goes, then we should conclude that consciousness eludes natural science and so science does not grasp all of reality. So some philosophers today happily speak of "the mystery of consciousness" and count the wizardry of color perception as a prime component of this mystery.

Earlier in our century problems about understanding the "logic" of statements about color upset the philosophy of logical atomism, a program in philosophy developed by Bertram Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. According to this view, all the truths about the world should be reducible to combinations of totally simple truths, such as "This is red" and "That is blue." But logically simple statements cannot rule out each other. Wittgenstein reasoned; and "This is red" rules out "This is blue," though it does not rule out "This is maroon." Wittgenstein concluded that even the simplest color statements he could think of can be shown in this way to have some logical "structure" and so the world cannot be understood to be made up of atomistic facts expressible by logically simple statements.

One way colors could be said to have structure would be for some colors to be made up of others. But are some colors made up of other colors? Well, we certainly get paint of a different color, as the Wizard found out, by, say, mixing blue paint and yellow paint. Suppose we get green paint. Does that mean that the color green is made up of blue and yellow? Many philosophers have thought not. What do you think?
What Can Philosophy and Children Offer Each Other?

Walter Kohan

We accept in children what we accept in ourselves;
we hate in children what we hate in ourselves.

-Ashis Nandy

In our experience of the social world, we cannot help but notice dominant and hegemonic orders of discourse, practice, and interpretation. We also see flaws or discontinuities in those orders, for whatever its pretensions, no social domain is ever complete or fully self-sufficient. One of the functions of philosophy is to problematize those orders, or at least the ideas, beliefs and values that underlie them. Wonder, suffering, and perplexity are unique human feelings that emerge from the experience of the social world, and philosophical inquiry emerges from emotions like these. In this sense philosophy might be considered to be an attempt to overcome the immobility and the implicit totalitarianism of the dominant social orders.

This attempt takes two complementary forms. First, as critique, philosophy questions the beliefs, values and ideas that permeate socially dominant practices. The dispositions and methods of philosophy act to deconstruct the ordinary, routine or daily character of taken-for-granted practices. For philosophy there is no natural need, there is nothing normal or obvious in the human experience of the world. Every norm, value, belief and form of knowledge can be understood as a historical product, an arrangement arrived at through conflict, imposition and negotiation, and therefore is understood to be contingent and controversial. Secondly, as creative task, philosophy sets conditions in order to propose other, alternative norms, values, beliefs and practices. It is the path to creativity in that it explores the conditions which make it possible to think new states of things. In that double movement of questioning and establishing conditions to propose alternatives for certain dimensions of reality, philosophy unfolds into a varied group of "philosophies": of mind, language, culture, religion, education, sport, technology, and so on—although the ones just listed count among the dimensions most valorized in the contemporary world.

Critical and creative philosophies of the childhood

For at least the last 25 years, philosophers like Matthew Lipman (1993b) and Gareth Matthews (1994) have been promoting and defending the legitimacy of childhood as an area worthy of philosophical inquiry. Lipman not only first offered some rudimentary theoretical foundations for this field (1993b), but also created and carried into the schools an innovative, pioneering program and methodology that reconstructs the history of philosophy in a such way that it can be practiced by children. Other philosophers have objected to the relegation of childhood to a single domain of philosophy. Martin Benjamin (1993, passim) gives two reasons for hesitating. First, he claims that an area like "philosophy of childhood" would end, as have so many other "philosophies of," in discursive isolation, characterized by insider language and technique, and ignored both by the public and by other philosophers. Second, the existence of a separate area called "philosophy of childhood" would violate the integrity of human life by fragmenting and compartmentalizing the study of lived experience and of the life cycle.

I consider both these arguments to be inadequate. It is not the philosophical inquiry into childhood that compromises the integrity of human life, but the practices of colonization, subjectification and exclusion—and those practices exist whether philosophy reflects on them or not. The philosophy of childhood does not create, but emerges from the recognition of these atomizing forces. Were the historically mediated
character of the relationship adulthood/childhood less of an issue, perhaps a philosophy of childhood would have little meaning or sense. But such is not the case. Phenomena like child abuse, child prostitution, child labor, and street-children demand more than just policy analysis or platitudes about lost childhoods. Not only does philosophy not necessarily lead to the atomization of the human life-world, but it can overcome that atomization—or at least rethink it in terms of its assumptions, implications, and consequences. As for the concern about isolation of the new discipline, that is hardly a necessary character of any discipline, but depends on the way it is developed. Benjamin is probably thinking of other "philosophies of" which have proliferated a technical language that only a chosen few are able to follow; but the philosophy of childhood need not barricade itself within an enclave of academic jargon—nor, for that matter, need any other "philosophy of ."

If we accept the characterization of philosophy offered in the first paragraph of this paper, the development of a philosophy of childhood would unfold on at least two dimensions. The first I will call the critical. It is based on the need to recognize, understand and question the values, knowledge and ideas that underlie and sustain the social productivity of the idea of "childhood." In other words, what social devices in the contemporary world make the actual idea of childhood historically possible (its conditions of possibility); what conditions make it understandable as a historical phenomenon (its historical place); what assumptions ground the idea of childhood (its theoretical support); and what are the effects and consequences of the idea of childhood for the social life of our time (its social productivity). The second dimension, which emerges from the critical, I will call the creative. Its project is to set up conditions which allow us to re-think the idea of childhood, to imagine and practice other social forms of the adult-child relation, and to inform these relations with other values than those of the dominant order.

In our daily life, words like "child" or "adult" are used as if they were the simplest, most normal of terms. It appears natural and obvious to us that some people are children and others are adults, and that certain activities and forms of relation are specific to children and others to adults. Expressions like "these are not issues that children should know about," "you're already 12 years old—you shouldn't be so childish," or "you're always playing—you're not a child any more," arise from this kind of attitude. Early on, children learn to understand themselves as part of a specific class, which they feel compelled to leave behind them soon as they can if they want to become adults. Inversely, when children are excluded from or forbidden things, it is argued that the latter belong exclusively to the adult universe. They are told "you can't do that—such things are only appropriate for mature people."

Nevertheless, as we have already suggested, the role of philosophy is precisely to put in question the normality or "naturalness" of the human experience of the world. It recognizes no necessary law or order in human societies. Philosophy always says, "It might not necessarily be like that." So the first element of a philosophy of childhood is the problematization of "natural" ideas concerning childhood and adulthood. These ideas might, in fact, be as unnatural to, say, the Greeks, the Egyptians or to contemporary Muslims as their "natural" ideas might be to Western culture. Who is considered to be a child, what is expected or not expected of children, what is allowed and forbidden, rewarded or punished—these notions change across culture and across historical epoch. The social roles attributed to children differ significantly through time and space. In the years following Philippe Aries' pioneering work Centuries of Childhood (1973[1960]) a growing literature in the field of social history allows us to locate the modern genesis of the contemporary dominant idea of childhood (Baqueror-Narodowski (1994), p. 65). We can identify its emergence as an element of a more general process that occurred from the 15th to the 18th centuries, during which time a series of social devices and techniques of psychological individualization and political totalization were progressively established. Their effect was to normalize and discipline individuals, to turn them into subjects—in Michel Foucault's double meaning of the term—that is someone who is "subject to someone else through control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by conscience or self-knowledge" (1983, p. 212). In this case, children have been exposed to
social practices and techniques that subjectivize them in the space of otherness—as the undervalued or wrongly valued, the incapable, the excluded and the objectified through science. This subjectivization is expressed in multiple spheres of social life—the cultural, the economic, the epistemic, the aesthetic, the ethical, the juridical, the political (cf. Kennedy, 1998, *passim*).

As soon as we start to recognize the arbitrary in the natural, the contingent in the necessary, the extraordinary in the ordinary, philosophy finds its place. Our own thinking is transformed—things can no longer be looked at the way they were. Once this shift has occurred, we often come to understand the need for social change to be, not only desirable, but an imperative. In particular, the so-called naturalness that circumscribes the idea of childhood loses its strength, and we begin to encounter questions like, "what are the presuppositions that lead to the separation of human beings into adults and children, and what are the implications of this separation?" and "how is the boundary between the two categories determined?" and "what are the broad consequences—cultural, economic epistemic, ethical, aesthetic, juridical and political—of being considered a child compared to those of being considered an adult?"

There are no children by nature, nor are there adults by nature. These two social categories are linked to knowledge, values and practices that constitute identities, give shape to interpersonal relationships, and structure ways of life. As has already been pointed out, the critical dimension of a philosophy of childhood begins with the recognition and problematization of those practices, values and knowledge-forms—above all in the recognition that they operate in a vicious circle: first they constitute the adult-child division, and then, once reified in the institution of childhood itself, are drawn or inferred from it, i.e. they seem "natural." The creative dimension of a philosophy of childhood lies in re-thinking those categories, and in establishing conditions which allow for other practices, values, and forms of knowledge.

This double task of the critical and the creative can be divided into several domains, each corresponding to a different area of philosophy. David Kennedy has traced the first lines of a pathway through the theory of knowledge as it applies to children, identifying what he calls the "epistemological egocentrism" of adults (1995, p. 42). He argues that, though we might recognize the need to recuperate children's excluded voices, that purpose will not be furthered by attempting to show that they can think as well as adults. On the contrary, the first step should be to recognize that what he calls "the hegemonic theory of knowledge of the day" or the "rationalistic ideal of reason," systematically excludes children's thought and experience. Only after the deconstruction of that dominant theory of knowledge will it be possible to reintegrate those elements of the child's *episteme* that have been silenced by adult rationality.

We might look for movements similar to the one suggested by Kennedy in other fields of philosophy. Once we start to place in question what adulthood has been infusing into philosophy, various domains which lend themselves to the development of critical and creative philosophies of childhood begin to emerge. First we must recognize the colonizing effects of an adult aesthetics, ethics, metaphysics and politics that subjectivizes the child as the inferior other, as someone who is not a complete being, for whom to be herself means to be what others have thought her to be, for whom the appropriate conditions to choose herself are not present. As Kennedy has suggested, this critical task has most typically not been undertaken by academic philosophers. A recent book by Gareth Matthews—a philosopher of some academic prestige—is a case in point. In a text that intends to ground this emergent field, Matthews refers to the philosophically problematic character of the concept of childhood (1994, p. 8) and affirms that "the difficulties which are genuinely philosophical appear only in the way of saying what type of difference is the difference between children and adults." Matthews tries to show how, in different fields (literature, art and philosophy itself), children are not so epistemologically far from adults as is commonly believed. In all of those cases, according to Matthews, the differences between children and adults are insignificant, and children could very well enter and share the adult's world. Children, he concludes, are not so far from the paradigm of adult rationality as we take them to be.

As I have already pointed out, our philosophical task concerning childhood as I understand it is not only to see what type of difference divides children
and adults, but even more importantly, how that difference is valued, what presuppositions sustain that valorization, and what consequences follow from it. Matthew proposes—by implication anyway—to include children in the rational world of adults without questioning its hegemonic knowledge, values and practices. This approach tends to legitimate the actual dominant form of rationality, and to close off space for any eventual alternative world. Thus, what appears to be an inclusive attitude toward children in that it actually suggests the further integration of children into the world of the adults, remains unaware of the social devices of exclusion and subjection which have separated the two worlds, and dismantles the appearance of any different rationality among children. What might children expect from this "generous" inclusion in adult's rationality? Their adaptation as outsiders to the center? A non-recognition of their otherness? A silencing of their voices as children?

Philosophy and children—an encounter

The forms of encounter between philosophy and children should not be reduced to philosophies of childhood. As a Western discipline, philosophy has historically been practiced by men, usually older men. It has only been late in this century that women have found a way into this world, and increasingly through the development of feminist philosophies. But although feminist philosophy is decades old, and though feminist philosophers have effected changes in the language and themes of the field, they are still struggling to be heard by traditional, dominant philosophy. Feminist philosophy promises to introduce structural changes in the enterprise—in its theory of the knowledge, its ethics, its politics, and in other domains of the discipline (MacColl, 1994, p. 6-7), but those changes are still emerging. The history of the relationship between children and philosophy is shorter still. About thirty years ago, Matthew Lipman inaugurated a movement—philosophy for children—dedicated to incorporating children into the world of philosophy. What might children and philosophy expect to emerge from this encounter?

What philosophy can give to children is one of the major topics of Lipman's theoretical work. He understands the contribution of philosophy to children to be multiple. On the one hand, it is a practice of thinking in, among, and about other school disciplines that enriches the meaning of children's educational experience (1991, p. 264; 1993b, p. 148). On the other hand, philosophy is a tool that provides children with direct, meaningful access to the resources of higher order thinking, which leads to an improved capacity in children to think for themselves, which leads in turn to an improvement in the capacity to deliberate and make considered judgments (1991, p. 262-3). As such, philosophy promotes education for democracy. It generates political understanding through reflection on concepts which affect children's daily experience like justice, freedom, and the nature of persons, and it does this by creating a community of philosophical inquiry—a space for dialogical and rational deliberation on such themes—in classrooms (1991, p. 244). Taught in such a way, philosophy offers children an educational practice based on values like democracy, dialogue, inquiry, thinking, and reasonableness, i.e. rationality tempered by judgment.

How children contribute to philosophy is not so fully explored by Lipman, but he has identified at least four areas of philosophy that might profit by an encounter with children: the philosophy of law is enriched by the current discussion of children's rights; recognizing children's capacity to engage in ethical inquiry could have important repercussions in the sphere of ethics; the actual formation of children's communities can illuminate social philosophy; and finally, the question "what is a child?" can help clarify the question "what is a person?" in the area of philosophical anthropology (1993b, p. 144). Lipman also mentions a fifth sphere, philosophy of education, but he does not consider its benefits explicitly. The main purpose of his argument is to secure and legitimate a place for children and childhood in philosophy. He claims that encountering children philosophically would also have significant social repercussions, in that it might mitigate what he calls "the ignorance, irresponsibility and mediocrity that now prevails among adults" (1993b, p. 148). He suggests that "to treat children as people can be a small price to pay, long term, for some more substantial social achievements" (ibid.). Lipman provides pragmatic, social and political reasons for recognizing children as
persons—i.e. human beings endowed with full rationality. He argues that, if philosophy treats childhood and children as equals, positive results will follow, not only for children but for philosophy itself, as well as for the broad forms of social life.

Although his proposal is inspiring, Lipman does not exhaust the possible consequences of a sustained encounter between children and philosophy. As of this moment, thousands of children world-wide are engaged in philosophy through the program he created. Children as young as 3 years old, in places as distant from each other as Buenos Aires, Melbourne, Budapest, Montclair or Belo Horizonte, are practicing philosophy in school. Not only that, but they are engaged in a form of philosophical practice which allows them to appreciate it from the inside—which makes of them philosophical subjects. In spite of this, like women, their entry into philosophy has only been as individuals or groups in the context of the adult male tradition. One may well wonder if there couldn’t develop a distinctive set of questions and themes—i.e. philosophies of children—an emergent discourse of another nature than traditional philosophy, at some point in the future.

We dare entertain this possibility because those of us who talk philosophically with children on a regular basis find that, as a result of their philosophical practice, many children are improving their capacity to recognize, understand and value the different dimension of living a life as a child. They are learning to problematize notions of what it means to be considered a child in their own time and place. In some cases, their philosophical practice has actually been producing critical philosophies of childhood.

An experience in Brasilia

Students and faculty members at the University of Brasilia are in the process of developing a program in philosophy in the public schools of the Federal District of Brazil, designed for pre-kindergarten through sixth grade. In a recent session at one of those schools, a group of seven-year-olds was discussing with their teacher how they could contribute to the solution of problems they were experiencing at school. After a thorough debate, during which various alternatives were considered, the children evaluated their discussion. When the teacher asked them what they had learned, one of the children, Luiz Felipe, said: "I learned that not only adults decide but children also decide."

What did Luiz Felipe learn from understanding that children "also decide"? Note that he does not say "children have the right to decide" or "children can decide." He says "children decide"; he is reflecting on an actual capacity that has been exercised during philosophy class. He has learned that children can decide because children have actually been deciding during class. Luis realizes that not only adults decide in this world. He verbalizes a dominant order ("adults decide"), challenges it ("not only adults decide") and conceives an alternative one ("children also decide").

What Luiz Felipe expressed shows the kind of empowerment philosophy offers to children by enabling them to enrich their understanding of their position in their social world. It also increases their appreciation of the presuppositions and consequences of being regarded—even by themselves—as imperfect or incomplete versions of adults. Philosophy for children as it is practiced in schools helps children acquire a better understanding of that form of gnose-
ological, aesthetic, ethical, social and political form of domination called "ageism." Philosophy for children not only opens the realm of philosophy to children—it also produces a clear rupture with the adultocentrism that has dominated philosophy for over twenty-five centuries. For the first time, children have frank and open access to the practice of philosophy. For the first time, philosophy says to children, "Come, you are welcome here, feel at home, there is something we can work out together."

The incorporation of children into the universe of philosophy, facilitated in the form it is by Philosophy for Children, re-creates the conditions necessary to think questions like "What is a child?" and "What is an adult?" Now we can understand these questions as historically and socially posed, and we can address them from the point of view of an aesthetics, an ethics, a politics, and a rationality which are no longer monopolized by adults. Moreover, because of its radical openness to children's thinking, Philosophy for Children fosters conditions whereby children themselves are capable of producing creative philosophies of childhood. And as children develop their own philosophies of childhood, the adult hegemony of the field of philosophy is eroded. Children themselves will build their own philosophies, in their own manner. We will not correct the exclusion of children's philosophical voices by showing that they can think like adults; on the contrary, that would be yet another way of silencing them. It would be more appropriate to prepare ourselves to listen to a different voice—to a different form of reason, a different theory of knowledge, a different ethics and a different politics—to a voice which has been historically silenced, due to the simple fact that it emanates from a people stigmatized through being forced into a "non-adult" social space.

The eventual appearance of children's philosophies can be expected to have consequences that reach beyond the practice of philosophy per se. Children's emergent philosophies will recognize, understand and problematize those forms of knowledge, practices, and values that operate across and between the worlds of children and adults—that construct identities and define relationships. Thus, they will constitute a force whose implicit direction is towards change—much of it impossible to predict—in the most diverse social domains.

**Philosophy of childhood and children's philosophies**

We have been using at least three expressions to describe the relations between children and philosophy—"philosophy for children," "philosophy of childhood," and "children's philosophies." The first is typically associated with Lipman's pioneering initiative in carrying philosophy, with its classical themes, tools and methods, to schoolchildren. Philosophy for Children is a way of reconstructing the history of Western philosophy in a form available to the young. Lipman's Pre-K through 12 curriculum has been practiced in more than 30 countries for the last 30 years. Philosophy for children has led in turn to "philosophizing with children"—the shift in preposition indicating that children are not just recipients but co-participants in a practice based on philosophical questioning and inquiry. Philosophy with children does not define itself on the basis of its dependence on or independence from the curriculum developed by Lipman. Its distinguishing mark is the value it places on the potential it recognizes in children for contributing to the transformation of the whole practice of philosophy. As such, it touches on the realm of the philosophy of childhood, and in turn offers itself as a vehicle for the appearance of children's philosophies.

"Philosophy of childhood" means philosophy applied to a given phenomenon, concept, or set of practices, historically and socially constituted and located—in this case, childhood. The historical conditions for the appearance of this discipline are related to what has been called the modern "invention" of childhood as a prolonged state of the human life cycle, understood as separate from adult maturity. I have already proposed that the normative characteristics of a philosophy of childhood must be both critical and creative. Finally, "children's philosophies" designates a movement that allows for the emergence of children's voices in different philosophical dimensions—in aesthetics, ethics, metaphysics, and in social and political philosophy—especially the latter, which is today so conspicuously absent among dominant philosophical discourses.

Either philosophers will listen to those voices, or they will continue participating in a discriminative and exclusionary practice. In the first case, they will realize that the differences between children and adults—like the differences between women and men, blacks and whites, and so many others—are irrelevant in terms of values, and cannot support any form of exclusion. In so doing, they will pass from a paternalistic, condescending, and hierarchical relationship to a reciprocal and equal one, based on the realization that age cannot legitimate relationships of exclusion and dominance.

We won't do children a great favor by inviting them to paint in the watercolors of philosophy if we don't allow them to do so with their own paper, colors, and brushes—above all with their own way of painting and of conceiving the art of painting. It may very well be that they enjoy working with our brushes and our colors. They might even become specialists in our tools, and come to feel that they do not need to find their own. Even so, it might be that those instruments are a little strange to them, that those tools confine them to the creations of others, and that they are not capable of finding their own styles and approaches. We need to create conditions for children
which allow them to reflect on what sort of art they conceive philosophy to be. What children need from us—teachers, professors of philosophy, philosophers—is a space for them to think, and therefore to create. To impose our creations and our manner of creating on them is to impose our experience of the world, and thereby to impede them from reflection on their own experience. To generate conditions so that children can paint their own watercolors of philosophy and of the world is one of the largest challenges for those us who share an idea whose time has come—of bringing children and philosophy closer.

References


Both Plato (427-437 B.C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) considered *wondering* to be the original impulse and basis of philosophy. The historical circumstances that made possible this "free deliberation" about matters—and thereby the birth of Western philosophy in ancient Greece some 2600 years ago—were, according to Aristotle himself, due to the increased leisure (*skole*) that people had. Since they no longer needed to spend all their efforts satisfying the necessary practical needs of everyday life, they had time for philosophizing—for seeking knowledge for the sake of knowledge itself, as distinct from its direct practical utility. Plato's excursive dialogues also demonstrate this atmosphere of leisure that was typical of ancient philosophical practice.

The philosophical thinking of Plato and Aristotle concerned itself with the problems of education—or *paideia*—from the perspectives both of educational philosophy and practical pedagogy. These two perspectives, which are closely interwoven, are evident in their broader reflections on the goodness of human beings and society on the one hand, and on the other, in the conclusions they derived from these reflections about the social significance and role of philosophy itself in concrete pedagogical arrangements. Plato in *the Republic* and Aristotle in his *Politics*, constructed a system based on class division, which they justified with arguments about how to realize the "good life." Aristotle, whose philosophy was built largely on the foundation provided by Plato,
considered virtue (*arete*) and happiness (*eudaimonia*) to be the greatest goals of man. The realization of the good life presupposes social structures that support it, and thus it was the goal of the state to be the structure which guarantees "the highest and most complete good." Despite the present day, the goal of the state is realized when children are brought up to be adults capable of virtuous lives.\(^5\) As an educational arm of the state, and thus it was the goal of the state to be the structure which guarantees "the highest and most complete good."\(^6\) The goal of the state is realized when children are brought up to be adults capable of virtuous lives.\(^5\) As an educational arm of the state, philosophy in its original Greek context became a political project, in which "the one who has been freed from the shadows of the cave" as a result of philosophical education is under an obligation "to descend to the dusk again and unchain the others as well."\(^6\)

We are all aware that the ancient metaphysics with its "first principles" has met with serious difficulties during the last few centuries. Yet in spite of the conflicting elements it contains, classic philosophical thinking has not been obliterated. Although each era and each culture introduce—due to its unique historical conditions—their own special questions, many themes introduced by Plato and Aristotle have been repeated in the history of Western philosophy.

Questions surrounding human action, being and knowledge are the legacies of antiquity, and have challenged Western thought over and over again. In the last few centuries, these various ethical, metaphysical and epistemological patterns of thought have sought their contemporary shape, and undergone the crises of modern and postmodern science and philosophy. In fact the whole crisis of modernity could be said to be an instantiation of the internal tensions present in the ancient philosophers. I think that certain "second principles" deriving from Socrates and from Aristotle's criticism of Plato still have importance from the viewpoint of education as well.

This essay is about the appearance of these classical aspects in some of the basic ideas of Philosophy for Children. For this purpose I will explore the program from two interpenetrating and complementary perspectives. The first is related to the question of whether Plato considered that philosophy should—or could—be taught to or practiced with children. According to Matthew Lipman, philosophy has long been denied to children due to misinterpretations of Plato's ideas in the seventh book of the *Republic*\(^7\). Although Lipman's argument is highly relevant, it still leaves room for further elaboration. I will show the problems connected with this question of Plato's influence. One of them has to do with the concept of "philosophy" adopted by Plato, and the second with the concepts of childhood and of education characteristic of his historical period. It can be argued that Plato's general metaphilosophical positions, and certain ambiguous themes in the dialogues, should encourage us to re-examine his position. In order to do so, I will make use of the distinction—introduced by Alven Neiman—between the "pragmatic" and the "Platonic" Socrates,\(^8\) although neither interpretation of this great teacher is unproblematic from the point of view of Philosophy for Children.

Although the alliance between philosophy and the child in the contemporary educational context is constructed upon very different meanings than those of the ancient *paideia*, it seems to me that a certain, immensely interesting classical idea is still present today. In particular, I see a strong connection between Philosophy for Children and Aristotle's idea of practical wisdom, or *frônesis*. I will provide a brief sketch of Aristotle's theory of virtue, and then show its significance for Lipman's deliberations on the terms "judgment" and "reasonableness."

**THE SHIFTING MEANINGS OF "PHILOSOPHY" AND "CHILD"
Sophists' *elenchus*, Plato's *dialegesthei* and Socrates' negative wisdom**

Who were those people who spent their free time in discussion in the shady parks of the Greek polis? According to Plato's early dialogues, it is quite clear that they were men—only one woman is recorded—and quite often young boys.\(^9\) Callicles' and Socrates' debate over the practical versus the contemplative life in *Gorgias* implies that philosophy was thought to be a natural and respectable pastime for young men.\(^10\) For grown men, as Callicles bluntly argues, it is destructive and ridiculous. It will make them losers in practical life, in which the only thing that matters is power.\(^11\) Socrates opposes this point of view, and after a scrupulous inquiry into the nature of virtue, they finally come to the question: what is good for the soul? Here Socrates rejects Callicles' hedonistic
ideas, and identifies the soul's good as the ability to separate good from bad, justice from injustice—and the strength to act on those distinctions. Socrates then characterizes two forms of rhetoric and their pedagogical implications—one represented by Callicles, which is random and seeks only to please public opinion—and the other which is always understood as an instrument for attaining goodness and justice in the community. It is not hard to see which one of the two positions Socrates favors as the task of philosophy. Moreover, during the entire dialogue he never returns to the question of the age at which one might start philosophizing. When arguing on behalf of the philosophical life in general, Socrates seems to take for granted that it also belongs to the young. This inference is supported by the fact that Socrates was tried for corrupting and misleading just because dialectic for those who are "too young." This is understood as an instrument for attaining goodness and justice in the community. It is not hard to see which one of the two positions Socrates favors as the task of philosophy. Moreover, during the entire dialogue he never returns to the question of the age at which one might start philosophizing. When arguing on behalf of the philosophical life in general, Socrates seems to take for granted that it also belongs to the young. This inference is supported by the fact that Socrates was tried for corrupting and misleading just that age group.

Then suddenly, in the seventh book of the Republic, Plato appears to make a dramatic shift. When discussing with Glaukon about the education of philosophers, Socrates clearly rejects the use of the dialectic for those who are "too young." This is because

...when they get their first taste of it, they treat argument as a form of sport solely for purposes of contradiction. When someone has proved them wrong, they copy his methods to confute others, delighting like puppies in tugging and tearing at anyone who comes near them. And so, after a long course of proving others wrong and being proved wrong themselves, they rush to the conclusion that all they once believed is false; and the result is that in the eyes of the world they discredit, not only themselves, but the whole business of philosophy. Here Plato appears to be proposing that philosophy (dialectic) and young people should be protected from each other. If the "too young" are allowed to philosophize, their deliberations will appear unworthy of adult discourse. In addition it will subvert them, corrupt them and infect them with lawlessness. Lipman argues that it is just this notion in the Republic which has, backed by Plato's authority, denied children philosophy for over a millenium. Lipman qualifies this judgment by pointing out that Plato's statement should be considered in light of the turbulence of the times in Athens, and above all the way in which dialectic was taught by the sophists—as eristic procedures and techniques, in the spirit of an intellectual battle. The eristic method of teaching was based on the idea of winning a debate through attack and defense, and by fostering conceptual confusions—or elenchus—without any consideration of the students' own ideas and interests. According to Lipman this is what Plato, echoing Socrates, is refusing the young—not the practice of philosophy as a form of life. In Philosophy Goes to School, he concludes that

...what Plato was condemning in the seventh book of the Republic was not the practice of philosophy by children as such but the reduction of philosophy to sophistical exercises in dialectic or rhetoric; the effects of which on children would be particularly devastating and demoralizing. How better to guarantee the amoralism of the adult than by teaching the child that any belief is as defensible as any other and that what right there is must be the product of argumentative might? If this is how philosophy is to be made available to children, Plato may be supposed to have been saying, then it is better that they have none at all. According to Lipman, Socrates considered philosophy, when reduced to mere sophist rhetoric, to be inappropriate for the young, because it separated technique from conviction. It was good enough for the preparation of lawyers, but not for those who were seeking guidance from philosophy in order to lead a good life. Here Plato's distinction between two kinds of rhetoric, mentioned earlier in Gorgias, becomes more pronounced. But there is room here for further elaboration. In interpreting Plato's position on the question "Should or could philosophy be taught to or practiced with children?" we must realize that in Plato's time, there was a different understanding of the basic concepts "philosophy" and "child." When Lipman suggests that Plato never drew the line anywhere when it came to Socrates doing philosophy with people of different ages, he seems to be interpreting him pragmatically and not Platonically. Following Rorty, Neiman suggests that the distinction between two quite different visions of Socrates leads to two different views of philosophy and education.

One of these views sees Socrates as his student Plato tended to see him, as a thinker whose life and work was essentially
incomplete and unsatisfying until it was perfected through metaphysics. The second, pragmatic view of Socrates finds its earliest expression in the writings of the Greek skeptics. On this view, Socrates becomes the paradigmatic experimentalist, willing to call all dogmas into question and wary of any easy attainment of certainty.11

It seems to me that in the seventh Book of the Republic Socrates' denial of dialectics for the young is consistent with Plato's metaphysical quest—i.e., with the Platonic Socrates. After all, for Plato philosophical dialectic was the highest form of inquiry, providing as it did an exclusive access to absolute certainty. In order to be able to understand the True Reality, people have to understand the Ideal (eide) which, once grasped, offers an a priori starting point for understanding all of life. It is the task of philosophy to understand the general nature of human beings and society—and that, finally, is why the ideal ruler is a philosopher. In order to gain this philosophical wisdom (sophia), any contingent good or bad action is not enough, but only the ability to identify criteria for judgment, and to subject them to the test of critical discussion. The method peculiar to this was what Plato called dialegesthai.18 Compared to the art of elenctic disputation taught by sophists like Protagoras, Hippias or Gorgias, the participants in Plato's dialectic searched for the Truth.19 However, this common effort was undergirded by the metaphysical assumption that there is such a Truth, which contradicts the pragmatic interpretation of Socrates. Later in the Republic, we find this Platonic Socrates giving exact advice on how to pick the best of the youth to be tested in dialectic at the age of twenty and thirty, and after that, chosen to reach the ultimate reality with the help of dialectic.20 Understood in the context of his own metaphysical quest, it was quite natural for Plato to abandon the subjectivist ideas of the sophists as immoral.21

Although "philosophy" is often translated literally as "love of wisdom," its etymological meaning is broader, referring to the exercise of curiosity and intellect without any specific limitations as to its object.22 According to Martens, classical antiquity anticipated the project of the Enlightenment and its rationalistic "method," which led to the collapse of the earlier, mythical way of thinking and living.23 The transition to a philosophical approach to reality meant a radical break with earlier forms of life. Philosophy called for individual reflection as the director of our thoughts and actions. Certainty and necessity were now valued above myth, tradition, and the conventional customs and everyday habits of the past. According to Dewey, this escape from peril was basically emotional. It was based, he claims, on a personal and a cultural search for a psychological certainty that could not be offered by practical life.24 Ancient philosophy is thus credited for creating the Western dualistic world picture, which proposes a higher kingdom of eternally unchanging reality that can only be striven for by true science, set in contrast to the trivial, changeable world of experience and practical matters. According to Dewey, these two different worlds imply two different kinds of knowledge. One of them—episteme—is knowledge in the true sense of the word, i.e., rational, necessary and unchanging. It is certain. The other type of knowledge—doxa—is related to the changeable world of appearances—it is experiential, particular and random, and knows only probabilities, not certainties. The division between these two kinds of knowledge corresponds to the division of action into pure, rational action on the one hand, and action based on the needs of the inferior kingdom of physical change on the other. In this way, claims Dewey, the Greeks bequeathed to Western philosophy the notion that the task of knowledge is to reveal what is originally real, and not to apply itself to problems of practical judgment. And it is in the sphere of education that the Greek idea of philosophy as a paradigmatic notion of knowing constitutes itself as a superscience capable of revealing Absolute Reality.

The aporetic dialogues of Plato reveal the dilemma in his thinking: universal ideas conflict with the impossibility of gaining Euclidean certainty in practical issues. According to Neiman, this very ambiguity in the relation between the two realms offers the pragmatic Socrates an alternative. The disjunction between the two allows him to react to everyday problems with a common sense view of the world—not through the use of metaphysics, but through the attainment of irony, for an ironist is, in Rorty's formulation, a person who deliberately undergoes the contingency of his or her beliefs and hopes.25 On the other hand Kennedy seems to suggest the same kind of interpretation of Socrates faced with the aporia as is apparent in Plato's dialogues.26 The height of "negative wisdom"—a concept introduced by Kennedy as the opposite of the Platonic "positive wisdom"—is epitomized in Socrates' famous statement that he is only wise because he knows that he knows nothing (Apology 21d). For this Socrates, no one can be wise in the Platonic sense. For this Socrates, "philosophy is his lover,"227 and cannot be reduced to knowing or applying, but only practiced as passionate inquiry—not in order to achieve the "god's eye view," but in order to examine life and be able to cope with the world. This seems also to be Lipman's Socrates—acknowledging philosophy as a deed, as a form of life which is dedicated to looking for reasons and for meaning, a practice which any one of us can emulate.28

It is just this interpretation of the pragmatic Socrates which confronts Philosophy for Children with one of its most challenging questions—a question which also confronts philosophy per se. What are Lipman's assumptions concerning the prerequisites for the possibility of doing philosophy? Can we, through philosophizing in a community of inquiry,
navigate the Scylla and Charibdis of metaphysical reason and postmetaphysical relativism? Or should we question this sort of question itself as a product of our conventional, modern epistemology, as did Wittgenstein and the early pragmatists? In the Philosophy for Children community these dilemmas—which are also current in the contemporary modern versus postmodern debate—are currently being more explicitly formulated.29 I think that when he emphasizes the role of philosophy as dialogical inquiry, and thus necessarily assumes the possibility of a search for criteria, Lipman is at least partly in conflict with Neiman’s pragmatic Socrates. This is so particularly in the latter’s concept of “irony” as a source of edification, and in the denial of all systematicity. If, as Rorty claims, all vocabularies are incommensurable, then all options are equal, and as a consequence, that form of philosophy practiced in Philosophy for Children’s community of inquiry has come to an end. One way to overcome this dilemma might be to legitimate philosophical argumentation from the standpoint of certain transformational perspectives.30 Charles Taylor’s ideas concerning unavoidable fields of vision for instance, or Steven Toulmin’s “cult of systematicity” or “absolutistic presuppositions” might be profitable possibilities.31 Understood in these frameworks, the practice of philosophical inquiry could avoid both the assumption of an ahistorical reason and truth and the fruitless adoption of a postmodern jargon.

Discovering the child

Another implicit assumption of Lipman’s argumentation in the passage quoted above from Philosophy Goes to School is connected with the idea of "childhood." Our modern understanding of childhood is based to a large extent on Philippe Aries’s (1914-1984) cultural-historical analysis in his L’enfant et la vie familiale sous l’Ancien Régime.32 Aries’ central argument in this highly influential book acts to reduce childhood to a socially and historically determined phenomenon. He claims that the germ of the modern idea of childhood originated in the ancient paideia, was lost when the Roman Empire was destroyed, reemerged in the Renaissance, then gradually acquired its present shape among the European middle classes after the Reformation of the 16th and 17th centuries.33

The invention of this "modern" notion of childhood was inextricably intertwined with a corresponding idea of education. According to Aries, medieval civilization had forgotten the ancient paideia, and had no notion of the classical aims of education. As it made no distinction between the worlds of children and adults, neither could it have any idea of their mutual reconciliation.34 It was a consciousness of the child’s special nature—a nature different from that of adults—which inspired in religiously oriented parents the felt need to protect the souls and bodies of their innocent and weak children with a form discipline that was considered morally and spiritually necessary and valuable. This form of discipline, in turn, lies at the origins of institutional education in the modern form of the school. Formal education was now seen as an essential condition for the process of civilization (Bildung), and children were no longer considered capable of moving into the world of adults without it. Correspondingly, the institution of the family gradually assumed as its central task the moral and spiritual training of children. The new importance of caring for children gave rise to a new emotional attitude toward them and everything connected with them, resulting in the modern concept of the family and of the role and function of pedagogical institutions. The commitment to discipline, shared by the family and the school, increasingly distinguished the child from the adult, thereby altering and delineating the concept of childhood.35

Very little is known about attitudes towards children in antiquity, for childhood was not distinguished as a clearly separate age class. What references there are to children are ambiguous—nor did the Greeks have any words distinguishing child and adolescent. The word pais referred either to boys who were not of age yet (those under 17 or 18 years old) or girls who were not yet married.36 We do know, however, that there were no moral or legal restrictions on infanticide in Greece in Plato’s and Aristotle’s time, and that physical punishment of children was considered normal. It has been suggested that the high level of infant mortality of the period was related to an absence of the psychic mechanisms that make unrestrained empathy, tenderness and a sense of responsibility toward children possible. Referring to research done by deMause, Postman argues that these attitudes developed much later—between 1850 and 1950—as a result of the emergence of the modern family.37 Golden has criticized this position, based on recent studies.38 Indications of a different sort of emotional orientation to children can also be found in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. In a discussion of the father-child relation, for example, Aristotle presents the germ of an idea which later became central to the pedagogical relationship: the father’s power over his children, he asserts, is "royal," based as it is on love and greater age. Love as a special form of friendship (filia) is in the case of this relation a desire to serve the child—to nurture and edify her for her own sake.39 Aristotle’s filia, understood in its in educational context, implies a complex, reciprocal relationship between teacher and student, and anticipates notions of pedagogical "tact" which developed in the German pedagogical literature of the early 19th century.40

However, the idea of the child’s "nature" in both Plato and Aristotle, as well as among other contemporaries, appears to be quite negative. According to Golden, it is either neutral, which would imply little distinction between children and adults; positive,
which seems to be related to some kind of special freedom or spiritual openness among children; or negative, i.e., seeing children only in terms of the talents and characteristics they lack compared to adults. Golden's sources, which are mostly literary, usually portray the negative idea. Physical weakness and moral and spiritual ineptitude are mentioned most often. Plato's dialogues tend to portray children as unthinking, gullible beings who talk nonsense and whose judgment is deficient. According to Aristotle, children cannot be happy or moral, because they lack the ability to choose and therefore lack determination (prohairesis). Children, he claims, are too unstable to absorb knowledge, and they are not capable of sound deliberation. For both Plato and Aristotle, they are grouped with women, slaves and animals. Aristotle even groups children with the sick, drunkards, and the mentally disturbed. 

In Plato and Aristotle, the negative difference of children in relation to adults would appear to identify them as a group of their own. From the point of view of their political thinking, this meant protection of children from bad influences. For Plato, it is hardly a matter of indifference what kind of stories are told to children, what plays they watch, what kind of music they listen to, or with whom they are involved. Yet, apart from the writings of Plato and Aristotle, there is good reason to ask how children and adults were distinguished in everyday life. To what extent was antiquity really different from the Middle Ages, for instance, in relation to how soon children moved into the adults' world, and participated in the common work and the collective life of all age groups?

Although the Platonic-Aristototelian idea of the child certainly appears questionable by recent standards of judgment, it is directly related to the modern idea of the child to the extent that both construe children as fundamentally in need of education. The similarities do not, however, extend to the invention of similar forms of schooling. The aim of classic education was not so much to overcome existing forms of life in the interest of a more civilized world as it is today, but to represent, maintain and restore cultural traditions. In spite of this, the kind of schooling implicit in Plato's and Aristotle's proposals represents a historical moment in which a symbolic system that had previously been held in common was breaking apart. The worlds of children and adults were indeed being separated, and for the ancients schooling represented an attempt at their reconciliation. Plato's and Aristotle's notions of the need for censorship is one of the manifestations of this dialectical movement of separation and reconciliation. Issues centering on the conjunction or disjunction of the worlds of adults and children have played a major role in the historical development of the idea of childhood in the West.

Those who invoke Plato's authority to deny philosophy to children in our day seem to be identifying children with the pais of classical antiquity. As I have already pointed out, this interpretation is problematic, because it does not take into account the extent to which the core concepts in question are historically conditioned. It seems justifiable to assume that it was hardly within the realm of possibility that Plato would call for doing philosophy with children in educational settings in the same sense of the word as now, two thousand years later. But Philosophy for Children is also challenging modern education's notion of the child in demanding the dialectical reconstruction of the child-adult relation. In fact I would argue that it has not been possible for the great majority of adults even to become conscious of children's capacity—and right—to do philosophy as a dialogical, educational practice before the more recent crisis of the Platonic philosophical agenda. Only since then has it become possible to start to imagine the reconstruction of modern children from marginalized others to knowing subjects.

The main difference between the Greek paideia and the educational ideas of Philosophy for Children revolves around the assumptions that adults carry about children, and therefore about the nature and task of education in general. In the ancient discourse,
pais could not be personified, i.e., child could not be person in the full sense of the word. This made it impossible to even inquire into children’s ability to reflect on their own actions, or to think independently about issues of importance to them, and thereby to themselves be involved in a process of social reconstruction through reflective education. The paradigmatic changes in how adults construct childhood—together with changes in the adult construction of philosophy—offered Lipman the possibility of demanding nothing less than a redefinition of education. However, in light of his “pedagogy of judgment,” his demand for reconstruction seems—at least in some of its most essential features—to lead back to the ideas discussed by Aristotle in his theory of virtue.

EDUCATION FOR REASONABLENESS
Aristotle’s theory of virtue
Aristotle began his studies at Plato’s Academy when he was 17 years old, and remained there for twenty years, until Plato’s death in 347 B.C., so it is understandable that he adopted much of his teacher’s metaphysical thinking. One of its major elements was the idea of philosophy as something separate from practical needs—“as the only free science, for it alone exists for itself.” Aristotle did, however, differ from Plato in one very important issue, namely the doctrine of the forms, or ideas. Plato sought invariance in ideal models existing outside the variable, sensible world, which for him promised the conceptual mastery of phenomena. Without questioning the existence of such invariance as such, Aristotle reduced it to nature itself, expressed in the forms by which the individuals of each species are similar to each other. Aristotle thus assumed, with Plato, the essence of each species, but unlike Plato, did not distinguish that essence from the sensible world. This led him to search for the essential nature of each species teleologically—i.e., by always examining phenomena in the context of their goals or end states. All creatures aim at the best possible realization of the essential nature of their species. This movement from potentiality to actuality, from the imperfect to the perfect, is ultimately caused by the unmoved mover, or god. The perfection of god makes everything else in the world strive for its own perfection.

Reasoning within this ontological framework, Aristotle also claimed that the manifest essence of the invariable and objectively knowable human being is a “good life.” “Good life” means the best possible realization of the essential characteristics of the human. This realization is the duty of humans, and in seeking it humans demonstrate their particular virtue—i.e., the activity which is in accordance with their essential nature. Human good means the action of the soul in accordance with virtue. Realization of the human essence in the good life leads, in turn, to the realization of the ideal state.

Aristotle does not, however, extend the requirement for certainty and necessity to virtue itself, nor to those areas of knowledge—such as politics, rhetoric, and ethics—which belong to the realm of the probable. In his *Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics* he problematizes Plato’s idea of the universal good, and of an insensible, eternal substance. In his own metaphysics, he does not reduce goodness to a single common idea, but analyzes its meaning from the viewpoint of the various uses of the concept. Aristotle’s assumption that the human essence is goodness is therefore case-specific. Even if goodness has something in common across contexts, its applications still cannot be derived from a single, basic meaning—and even if that were so, Aristotle does not think it humanly attainable. Human existence thus essentially involves the aspiration for a good and useful outcome, the greatest and most important of which is happiness (*eudaimonia*). Happiness is not, however, connected with the contingencies of life—power, property, etc.—but with virtues emerging from practical action. One can only become just and reasonable by doing just and reasonable deeds. According to Aristotle, nobody can become good without doing good.
Aristotle divides the virtues into the intellectual virtues of the rational part of the soul, and the virtues of character of the irrational part of the soul. The development of the former are based mainly on teaching, and require time and experience. The virtues of character are neither natural nor unnatural, but are based on habit—although we are by nature capable of accepting them, habituation makes them perfect. The virtues of character are behavioral dispositions (hekxis), which can only arrive at human good through action. As a starting point for human ethics, the virtues of character do not alone provide a sufficient condition for practical knowledge. Only when they are connected to practical reason—or fronesis—can persons achieve a good life. Fronesis is an intellectual virtue, for it implies a broad evaluative ability. It tells us what and what not to do. Other intellectual virtues are understanding (synesis), which is based on the ability to consider one’s own actions in each particular situation that calls for our consider-

ation, and deliberation (bouleusis) which means for Aristotle "a certain kind of research" that requires plenty of time, and involves reasoning. Aristotle’s reasonable person knows how to consider well, which means a certain impeccable clarity of deliberation, which leads in turn to a form of goodness which shows itself in terms of its usefulness, its goals, and its methods. In matters of action, practical reason thus combines both general and particular aspects. As a result, persons evolve in their capacity for judgment (gnome), which in turn leads to the ability to identify the "equitable" (epieikeia). A human being who can identify the equitable is sympathetic (syngnome).

For Aristotle, human goodness is impossible without fronesis—which, in turn, is impossible without the virtues of character, for fronesis arises from action. The virtues of character and fronesis combine in practical knowledge, and provide the basis for the ethical action of human beings. But this is not enough, for the Platonic Aristotle, for persons to achieve the highest goal, or happiness. Only the highest form of intellectual virtue i.e., wisdom, or sophia, can guarantee the full happiness of a human being. The object of wisdom or metaphysical knowledge is nothing less than the independent foundation of all that exists, upon which the practical world is also based. This ultimate, "divine" perspective on all that exists exceeds practical knowledge, and makes perfect happiness possible in the form of theoretical meditation upon it. The life of the gods is, according to Aristotle, pure meditation, and the happiest human action is that which is most closely related to it. Those who cannot meditate theoretically, such as animals, cannot be happy.

The ideals of the Greek Enlightenment are realized in Aristotle when he affords humans the possibility of directing their own development toward perfection through the power and capacity of their own reason. But this requires involvement in politics, in that the goal of the state is to provide a form of social justice that affords individuals the opportunity to be virtuous. General education based on law has a great deal of importance in the formation of Aristotle’s good life, as the irrational part of the soul is accustomed through it to act under the direction of reason and to

learn to desire the good.

But what did Aristotle think about education as it relates to the virtues of the rational part of the soul? Can children be educated in the intellectual virtues? He has been generally interpreted to consider the discussion of ethical problems, for instance, to be possible only in middle age, after one has mastered the processes of reasoning. This is congruent with his thinking about the development of practical reason, which he also considers to be the result of long human experience. But it would appear that his final stand on this issue remains obscure, due at least partly to the differing meanings of the concept of childhood between the ancient world and ours. In the Nicomachean Ethics he says that the young cannot control the expression of emotions, and therefore cannot acquire the intellectual virtues. Fronesis requires the ability to choose, which in turn can only be based on deliberation. A choice concerns an action, not a proposition, and it is about adhering to one thing above others. According to Aristotle, this is something that children cannot do. The development of the virtues that allow us to choose come about mainly through teaching, and therefore require time and experience—unlike the virtues of character, to
which children can be accustomed at quite a young age, since they are based on habituation. In the *Politics*, written after the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle returns to this question. The special status of the child—and of the slave and woman as well—clearly occupied his mind more here, where he does not appear to be as categorical as before. In the first book (Chapter 13), he discusses how children actually differ in this respect from free adult males. Do they have virtues? Is a child sometimes intemperate and sometimes temperate, or not? He concludes by claiming that, even though there are differences in virtue between the rulers and the ones ruled, yet they must still "share in virtue," for otherwise both good rulership and being ruled would be impossible. Furthermore, Aristotle proposes that children, women and slaves have both a rational and an irrational part to their souls, but in different ways. The difference is connected with their capacity for deliberation. Slaves have none (*to bouleutikon*), women have it but lack the authority to control their irrational desires (*akyron*), and, finally, children have it, but it is still undeveloped (*ateles*).

It would thus appear that Aristotle considered children to have intellectual virtues as potentialities which are actualized only through the education of the virtues of character. This potentiality, and the "share in virtue" between adults and children, are key prerequisites for instruction leading to *fronesis*. So the question about Aristotle's position concerning the relationship between education and the intellectual virtues has to be examined in the context of his thinking in its entirety. The objective of philosophy for Aristotle—the search for wisdom—is a gradual process, unfolding in stages each of which is valuable in itself, and in each of which presupposes the others, and is included in the others. It is the responsibility of the educator to make it possible for this potentiality to begin unfolding and move toward actualization.

*Fronesis and the "pedagogy of judgment"

Despite radical metaphilosophical differences, and differences in the concepts childhood and of education, Philosophy for Children is clearly influenced by the Aristotelian ingredients described above. The notion of *reasonable judgment* which informs Aristotle's concept of *fronesis* provides the essential background and goal of Matthew Lipman's pedagogical thinking. He states that "...the greatest disappointment of traditional education has been its failure to produce people approximating the ideal of reasonableness." For Lipman, the cultivation of reasonableness is the goal of education for democracy. This entails an effort to develop higher-order thinking, which includes a combination of critical, creative and caring thinking. Reasonableness, says Lipman, cannot be reduced to pure rationality, but "...reasonableness is rationality tempered by self-criticism, deliberation and judgment." It is...

Furthermore, reasonableness, Lipman claims, can be internalized only by experiencing it through reasoning together in a community of inquiry. As such, philosophy as an educational discipline has both individual, consummatorial value, and instrumental value for the pursuit of a normative form of democratic citizenship. Philosophy itself contains characteristics through which the process of democracy is equipped and enhanced: philosophy deals directly with highly general but controversial notions (e.g. truth, justice, freedom) which are essential to democratic practice; it directly fosters higher-order thinking; and its logical character contributes to the skills and processes of democratic deliberation. By identifying these characteristics, Lipman is identifying democracy itself as a form of philosophical inquiry, committed to fallibilistic principles.

Like Aristotle, Lipman emphasizes the educational dimension of philosophy, but in a different way. For Aristotle, the goal of education was the good life,
which led to happiness in the form of philosophical contemplation, in a just and stable society secured by law. For Lipman, the follower of Dewey, education means the fostering of democratic reconstruction through praxis. I think, however, that Lipman's concept of "pedagogy of judgment" includes Aristotle's bouleusis (deliberation), synesis (understanding), gnome (judgment), epieikeia (equitability) and syngnome (sympathy), all combined in frounesis, or practical reasonableness. Lipman adds critical thinking, which he considers to be learned only by reflective practice. His definition of critical thinking—reliant on criteria, self-correcting and sensitive to context—is fully consonant with Aristotle's ideas of learning virtue by habituation, and of contextualizing philosophy by identifying it with the ability to judge wisely pros ton kairon—i.e., considering the circumstances.

Finally, what is Philosophy for Children's position vis a vis contemporary moral and philosophical discourse? In his concept of reasonableness, Lipman is clearly contradicting the Platonic idea of a rationality grounded only in logical systematicity. According to Toulmin, the ideal of frounesis, or reasonableness, was lost to Western philosophy with the advent of modernity, an era which was ushered in in a religious-political context of strife and intolerance, thus robbing the notion of practical wisdom of its usefulness or legitimacy. Europe's religious wars led to a social order based on universalistic and foundationalist pretensions, leaving no room for a culture of philosophical fallibilism. It was in this atmosphere that the core ideas of Plato's philosophy were reborn in the rationality of modern cosmopolitanism—in its abstract, totalizing, universal and context-free forms of thinking, which abandoned the humanistic, Aristotelian ambitions of the Renaissance.76

Now, hundreds of years later, modernity has reached a phase in which the consequences of its ways of thinking are increasingly threatening. Modern science, with its quest for certainty and efficiency, has been unable to stop the massive development of weapons of mass destruction, or to care effectively for earth's ecosystem. On the other hand, it seems that it is not until we meet these consequences face to face that we will be able to challenge our conventional patterns of thinking—which includes our ways of thinking about education. Toulmin adds that to humanize modernity in the face of these threats requires both expanding our notion of philosophy, and returning it to Aristotle's emphasis on practical wisdom. We must extend practical philosophy into the particulars of our time and place, while conserving its historically mediated tradition of rational and ethical discussion. And Philosophy for Children, in its redefinition of philosophy as critical practice oriented to reasonableness, embraces this neo-Aristotelian spirit.

NOTES
2. Arist. Met I. 982b 23; see also Pl. Th. 155a; 172c-d
3. Politics by Aristotle was based to a large extent on an examination of real Greek city states, as Aristotle thought that it was necessary not just to examine the ideal state but also the realistic and easily accessible state that was suitable for everyone (see Pol IV-VI; see also EN 118b 13-23, in which Aristotle summarizes the contents of his forthcoming work called Politics). Although Plato's point of view was different from that of Aristotle when he constructed his utopian view of the state it is likely that even his idea reflects some kind of a realistic basis. It is essential to notice that education, in addition to law, has an important meaning in the political thinking of both of them. Plato discusses education in e.g. Laws and Book VII of the Republic. Aristotle's educational thinking is described especially in Nicomacheon Ethics and in VII and VIII of Politics.
5. Pol. VIII, 1337a 12-33.
9. For example the boys of Lysis (Lysis and Menexenos) have been estimated to be around 11-12 years old. See also Lakkes 181a.
11. Gorg. 185a-d; see also Theait. I 72c-177c.
12. Gorg 502e-503a; see also Dodds, 1979, p.325-326.
13. Resp. VII.539b-539c.
15. Here Lipman is referring to Gilbert Ryle's attempt to paint the picture of intellectual Athens in "Plato" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ed. Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan, 1967. Eristic was elenctic disputation based on creating conceptual confusions in the opponent. Eristicos and dialekhtos can be found for example in Menon and Euthydemos. See also Republic VII 535c and Republic V 454a where Socrates discusses with Glaucion the peculiar might of eristic. In this dilemma the basic idea of the sophists was due to their severe reaction against the former philosophy of reason and dogmatic moral education coming up in Protagoras' well-known homo mensura. In its most extreme form this led to ethical nihilism and hedonism where the questions of good and bad, right and wrong, justice and injustice were replaced by egoism and lust for power.
19. Theait. 167e; Gorg. 505c; 526d.
20. Resp. 537b-537d. Plato's conception of dialectic and dialectical method is linked to his cave metaphor, see Resp. 532a-534d.
21. It seems to me that, the options we currently have regarding this issue as a result of the "linguistic turn" were available neither to Plato nor the sophists, both of whom unconsciously assumed the idea of language as a "transparent medium." According to this notion language is understood as capable—if gradually—to represent reality precisely. See Rorty, R. 1989.
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27. See Gorg. 482a.


32. This book was published in 1960. Hereafter I refer to its English translation, Centuries of Childhood (1986) Harmonds-
41. Golden 1990, pp. 5-9, 16, 51, 105. See also notes on p.184.
42. Pol. VII.17.1336a 3 - 1337a 6.
51. *EN* 1098a 16-18.
53. When William James says in *Pragmatism* that "Aristotle used it methodically," he seems to be referring just to this pragmatic way to look for meaning, which in this case means inquiring into the goodness of some particular action by exploring its practical consequences.
54. *EN* 1094a 1-1103a 10; 1105b 5-11.
55. *EN* 1103a 25-26.
56. According to Knuuttila (1981, p.140, 158), the term *frônesis* has a technical meaning if it is translated as "practical rationality," where it means the intellectual virtue that is manifested by finding the right way to behave in each situation. Aristotle, however, also uses the same term or its relative forms in a broad sense, meaning reasonableness or wisdom in general (e.g. 1096b 17, 24; 1095b 28).
57. *EN* 1140a 24-1140b 30; 1141b 8-23; 1143a 1-18; 1144a 7-11; 1144b 31-33.
58. *EN* 1142a 31-1142b35.
60. *EN* 1141a 9-1141b 8; 1176a 30 - 1179a 31; 1178b 29-31.
61. *EN* 1102a 5-1103b 25; 1179b 20-1180a 20.
62. See for example Lipman 1988, p. 94.
63. *EN* 1095a 1-9; 1142a 11-22.
64. *EN* 1111b 4 - 1112a 17; 1112a 18 - 1113a 14. According to Knuuttila (1981, p. 148) "choice" is a sort of a black box in Aristotle’s theory of doing, inside of which thought is changed into action. It should also be noted that "choice" for Aristotle does not mean selection between alternatives as it does for moderns—but rather we choose what is unambiguously favored by calculating reason.
66. According to Knuuttila (1981, 5) the origin and timing of Aristotle’s works are highly problematic. It is obvious, though, that both the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics* belong to the late production of Aristotle and were written when he was leading the Lyceum in Athens in 335-323. It can also be concluded on the basis of the last chapter of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that the *Politics* was written after it.
69. In this interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of the virtues I draw from Uuritmo (Uuritmo, Y. "Käytännön elämä ja kaikkeus Aristoteleeilla" in *niin & näin*, 1997, 2, pp. 59-64), who attempts to overcome the problem often connected with Aristotle’s thinking about the separation between practical action and contemplation.
70. Lipman has not specifically acknowledged in the influence of Aristotle on his own thinking—for instance in terms of the theory of virtues—but he does give quite clear indications of it in many places in *Philosophy goes to School* (see for example p. 51), *Thinking in Education* (see for example pp. 62-63, 75, 78, 81, 111, 129, 136, 199) and *Natalsha - Vygotskian Dialogues* (1996, New York: Teachers College Press; see for example pp. 16, 37-38) as well as in many of his articles (see for example the recent "The Contribution of Philosophy to Deliberative Democracy" in *Teaching Philosophy on the Eve of the 21st Century*, edited by Evans, D. & Kucuradi, I. 1998. Anchora: Federation of Philosophical Societies, pp. 6-29). In the IAPC materials Aristotle’s logical ideas can most clearly be identified in *Elsie and Harry Stottlemeyer’s Discovery*. On the other hand, it would appear that Aristotle has influenced Lipman through Dewey’s thought (see for example *Thinking in Education* p. 106); For Dewey’s relation to Aristotle see for example Chambless, J.J 1993. "Common Ground in Aristotle’s and Dewey’s Theory of Conduct," *Educational Theory*, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 249-260.
72. See Lipman 1998, where he suggests how the triad of critical, creative and caring thinking break down into their component values. It is evident that Lipman has inherited the idea of thinking as a core of democratic education mainly from Dewey and elaborated it further. By caring thinking Lipman means the ability to value what has value. One way of responding to values is to have feelings or to express emotions. When discussing about the emotions in relation to judgments Lipman seems to approach Aristotle’s argumentation in the second book of *Rhetoric* (see Lipman, M. 1995. "Using Philosophy to Educate Emotions," *Analytic Teaching*, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 3-10).
75. See Lipman 1998.
A School for Freedom

We are living in a period which, more than any other, is a time of great dangers and great hopes. Whether you live in the North or the South, whether you are young or old, you know that we are, all of us together; confronted by major planetary risks in a number of basic areas. Never has humanity held such means of destruction, and never has it had at its disposal such means of construction. This is why we encounter new difficulties every day, and see new initiatives aimed at making the world a more human place.

In this time of change, does philosophy have a role to play? The answer is, resoundingly, yes. I believe the contribution of philosophers to be essential for understanding our present and building the societies of tomorrow. That is why I have decided to see to it personally that UNESCO will develop its activities in the area of philosophy. There are two main reasons for this conviction, which I would like to explain briefly.

First of all, the vast heritage of world philosophy provides a number of intellectual tools which can help us to better understand the changes taking place before our eyes. This of course does not mean we can simply turn to past or present philosophers for ready-made answers. Nevertheless, it is important to consult this extraordinary stock of ideas and concepts offered by philosophical doctrines. Tools can be found there to help us develop the new analyses we need. It should not be forgotten that in all cultures the oldest and deepest source of interdisciplinary thinking stems from the philosophers. For them, the need to remove the barriers around fields of knowledge, to compare different theoretical approaches, to broaden as far as possible the scope of thought, is no recent requirement, it is the natural horizon of their spiritual quest.

In this sense, philosophy is a school for freedom. It encourages the constant renewal of thought. Its remedy against intellectual routine is the creation of new
concepts. "Dare to have new ideas! Ideas that no one has ever had before."

That is the main thrust of philosophy. It is why we must invite philosophers to analyze the major problems facing humanity today, in all areas. UNESCO’s mission is to incite philosophers to participate actively in international thinking on the world's problems, through writing, public meetings, recorded interviews and media-related action.

The second reason why I believe that philosophy is crucial to the building of our future is doubtless even more compelling. It concerns education. The widely diffused, accessible and relevant teaching of philosophy contributes in an essential way to the development of free citizens. It encourages one to judge for oneself, to confront all sorts of arguments, to respect what others have to say, and to submit only to the authority of reason. In this way, too, it is undoubtedly a school for freedom.

This practical training in basic rights also leads to the discovery of the universal. It enlarges our capacity for reflection, and the scope of our thinking, by helping us to understand unaccustomed points of view. It allows us to comprehend, beyond the diversity of the answers, the degree to which the basic questions of life actually make humans look more alike rather than more different from one another. For example, the questions about the foundations of knowledge, the values that should guide our acts, the respect or others, and our responsibility towards future generations, are truly universal.

Such an initiation to philosophical reflection, open and accessible to all, is a concrete embodiment of the "society of minds" that Paul Valery called for in the thirties... In this sense, everything that enhances possibilities for teaching philosophy contributes to building "defenses of peace in the minds of men", one of UNESCO’s founding tasks. This organization has thus always had as a mission to support the development of philosophy teaching to the young as well as to adults.

Between the middle of the twentieth century and its close, there have been major political and cultural transformations. In a way, we no longer live on quite the same planet as the men and women of the 1950's. Philosophy and its teaching have doubtless also changed. But above all, new forms of democratic life have arisen in Africa, in Asia, in post-communist Europe, in a Latin America freeing itself from military dictatorships, and in certain Arab countries....

We have observed that the teaching of philosophy develops and spreads concomitantly with democracy. Dictatorships and totalitarian systems forbid it or pervert it from its vocation as a force for freedom. The Paris declaration for philosophy adopted by the participants during the International Study Days of "Philosophy and Democracy in the World" organized by UNESCO in 1995, rightly emphasizes that "philosophy education, by training independently-minded, thoughtful people, capable of resisting various forms of propaganda, fanaticism, exclusion and intolerance, contributes to peace and prepares everyone to shoulder their responsibilities in regard to the great questions of the contemporary world, particularly in the field of ethics." This important text, which deserves to be widely distributed, also recalls, quite appropriately, that "the development of philosophical reflection, in education and in cultural life, makes a major contribution to the training of citizens, by exercising their capacity for judgement, which is fundamental in any democracy."

I wish, here, to forestall a possible confusion. It would be a mistake to see philosophy and democracy as totally equivalent. It would be wrong to believe that philosophy is necessarily, and by its very nature, on the side of democracy. We would be victims of an illusion if we wanted to develop the teaching of philosophy from a conviction that it would serve, automatically and conveniently, the diffusion of democratic values. While there is a fundamental relation between philosophy’s freedom of thought and speech, on the one hand, and the equality and pluralism characteristic of democracy, on the other, it cannot be inferred from this that all philosophers are of necessity democratic.

History provides numerous examples of the close links between philosophical reflection and democracy. For example, Athens in the fifth century B. C., France in the eighteenth century, Western Europe in 1848, Eastern Europe since 1989. However, throughout history, there have been great philosophers who were not politically what we would call democrats. Does this mean that we should omit Plato, Nietzsche, or Heidegger from the study of philosophy? That would be absurd. We should rather conclude that philosophy is autonomous. As a school for freedom, it cannot be forced to support any political regime or ideology. It endlessly submits everything to critical scrutiny, including its own existence, and its methods.

It is no doubt this that makes philosophy most similar to democracy: they have the same capacity for self-criticism.

Philosophy continuously questions itself. It believes in the fecundity of doubt. This is not so with dogma. Democracy also questions itself, not hesitating to underline its own weaknesses, as is obviously not the case with dictatorships and totalitarianisms. The link between philosophy and democracy is, then, not on the surface, in the play of opinions and the multiplicity of dissonant speech. It lies in the basic fact that both encourage criticism that respects the dignity of others. They urge each of us to exercise our capacity for judgement, to choose for ourselves the best form of political and social organization, to find our own values, in short, to become fully what each of us is, a free being. Among so many dangers, we have no other hope.

—from Frederico Mayor’s foreword to Roger-Pol Droit, Philosophy and Democracy in the World.
Most philosophers have struggled unsuccessfully to give a satisfactory definition of what they do. There are no necessary and sufficient conditions which can be formulated for calling something "philosophy." According to Ludwig Wittgenstein, this is because philosophy is a "form of life"—that is, a way of doing things.

In deciding whether children can do philosophy, the implicit relativism in the Wittgensteinian notion of form of life is significant—there is not one (ideal) form of life. Forms of life differ, depending on factors such as language, standard practices, ways of thinking, place and time. So the everyday practice of adult philosophers in academic settings should not, without further argument, be used as a paradigm for how philosophy should be practised with children.

It could be argued that children have a different form of life than adults. This would introduce a social dimension to what it means to think and to know, together with a criticism of understanding cognitive development merely as a linear biological progression of stages (Lipman & Sharp, 1978, p. 56). Christopher Olsen also uses the Wittgensteinian notion of a form of life when comparing young children's understanding of the world with that of adults. He warns against using adults' knowledge as the norm, and urges concentration on children's knowledge manifesting itself when they deal practically with their environment. For example, when tying shoelaces, children will have to understand a great deal about their culture in order to make the "right" knot (Olsen, 1978, p. 115). The notion of a form of life renders objective knowledge impossible, and, consequently, makes it impossible to set an absolute standard of what it means to know. This is because, according to Olsen,

...forms of life constitute the background against which all objective understanding of the world must be reflected, in the sense that the system of concepts by which we make the world intelligible to ourselves and which we invoke in communicating with others about the world has its roots in, and thus derives its sense from, forms of life (Olsen, 1978, p. 111).

Challenging adults' claim to the "right" way of knowing the world could constitute a major step towards acknowledging and respecting children's own way of doing things. Childhood should not be understood as an immature stage leading to something cognitively better, but as a time with its own perfection, and therefore it should be appreciated as an end in itself. Kieran Egan calls young children's thinking "mythical"—that is, at least similar to a kind of thinking which was dominant in human culture prior to the internalization of literacy. The thinking of oral, pre-literate cultures focuses on memorization, and the kind of knowledge involved is "embodied"—embedded in the lifeworld. The ideal of "disembodied rationality" associated with literate culture makes it possible to discuss the meaning of a word-as-such, outside the particular context in which it is used. This form of rationality is still an ideal for many philosophers, and is used as an argument against the idea that children can do philosophy. Richard Kitchener claims, for example, that children can do only "concrete" and not "abstract" philosophy, while John White
(1992) holds "real" philosophers are not interested in concepts such as "cats," "rivers," or "computers."

If young children's thinking differs from that of adults, then educators engaged in research should try to see the world as the child sees it—as transfigured by fantasy, for children make sense of their world, of themselves and of others through fantasy. Literacy enables and encourages children to think abstractly and in a disembodied way, in a manner dissociated from their lifeworld. But in fact pre-literate children also think in an abstract manner—not only do they use abstract concepts like as "brave," "fairness," "good," and "friend" meaningfully, but they are more liable to think abstractly through metaphor (Egan, 1998, pp. 67, 83).³

If children's form of life is so different from that of adults, then is it possible for the latter to understand them? Wittgenstein said: "If lions could talk we would not be able to understand them." Similarly, would it be possible for grown-ups to re-appreciate fantasy as a sense-making ability for the kind of thinking peculiar to orality that helps children to establish meaning in their experience? This problem of communication across differences, i.e., the problem of linguistic, cultural and logical relativism is addressed by Christina Slade in a clear overview of the different positions (Slade, 1996). The problem with strong logical relativism, Slade argues, is that "logical practices are relative to a culture—or possibly to a linguistic community." She recommends adoption of a "very weak logical relativism - which directs us to be wary of too rapid a judgment that others are irrational" (Slade, 1996, pp. 19, 20). Slade acknowledges the fact that the model of a community of inquiry with its criteria of rationality has been criticized as being gender, race, and culture-biased, but concludes, "...the community of inquiry ... does have a resource for dealing with the suggestion that difference is excluded. For ... [this approach] takes the process of discussion as fundamental, rather than the product... [T]here exist[s] the procedures of reasoned debate through which the conception of rationality itself can be debated" (Slade, 1996, p. 24).

Surprisingly, Slade does not mention age bias—the assumption that adult rationality is the ideal. I believe this is significant. For cultural-historical and social reasons, it may be more difficult for women to be informed, articulate and competent debaters in the public domain in comparison with men; but can we really expect children as young as five to question the fact that certain types of questions and procedures in a community of inquiry presuppose a certain type of rationality (for example, the giving of good reasons and search for logical consistency)? I believe that Slade and many others in PwC underestimate the extent to which children's unique voices are excluded—even in communities of philosophical inquiry. This I will try to demonstrate below.

One possible way of bridging the differences between children's and adults' forms of life would be to explore the limitations of the above-mentioned analogy between lions and children. I have never been a lion, and it is also physically impossible for me to ever be one. But I have been, and, in a certain way, still am a child, and my memories of my childhood give me access to children's particular ways of thinking. Bernard Groethuysen would disagree. He argues that what we remember from when we were little is always mixed up with later experiences, and we cannot bring back our original awareness (Groethuysen, 1978). This issue deserves extensive research, especially because recognition of young children's distinctive way of thinking would have significant consequences for teaching philosophy to nursery children and infants. In practical terms there would be more emphasis on metaphorical understanding and less focus on logical explanations. At the same time, it could have consequences for what adults understand the discipline of philosophy to be. Only when we adopt a narrow meaning of rationality is mythical thinking excluded from philosophical thinking; it could well include the kind of playful imaginative responses Piaget dismissed as "mere romancing."

More Than Thinking Skills

The need to provide evidence that philosophy is more than just teaching thinking skills is critical in a world dominated by academic philosophers on the one hand, and narrow-gaoleled educators on the other. As Michael Bonnett points out, the appeal of such an instrumental, materialistic (in the philosophical sense) approach to thinking is obvious in "a society that likes to see itself in an up-beat, thrusting, entrepreneurial mode" (Bonnett, 1995, p. 296). It is motivated, he claims, by "a desire to turn the environment (including the world of meanings) into a resource" (Bonnett, 1995, p. 304). He speaks of "deep dualism," characterized by a certain disconnection between thinker and world, thinker and truth. It expresses thinking as a form of mastery, domination, manipulation of a content—the things to be thought—and truth as something to be manufactured. Truth is viewed as the product of such thinking (Bonnett, 1995, p. 308).

The overriding metaphor of the deep dualism paradigm is that of the mind as conceived as an agent. As R K Elliott puts it, "This view of mind regards thinking, imagining, etc. as quite like a person's doing or publicly performing something of which, at every stage, he, the monolithic person, is entirely the author..." (Elliott quoted in Bonnett, 1995, p. 304). What the metaphor hides is the extent to which intuition, and our "incipient sense of the unknown" (Bonnett, 1995, p. 305) provokes thinking. Bonnett argues for "real" thinking, that is a seeking of what-is-not-yet (for that individual), an awareness of that which is withdrawn or concealed, but whose presence
at times can somehow be more sharply felt by us than that which seemingly is already immediately present before us. And it is this, our sense of the withdrawn, that provokes thinking—that, as it were, draws thinking on through its withdrawing and thus constantly sets the direction and motion of thought. In this Heideggerian sense such withdrawing may be thought of as 'way-making'. The draught (drawing) it creates exerts a pull, makes a call upon us. The pull of this draught, the demand of this call, cannot be felt by those preoccupied with imposing a system on thinking, or any recipe for the structuring of thinking or determining its direction in advance (Bonnett, 1995, p. 305).

As Heidegger himself says, we can only learn to think by "giving our mind to what there is to think about" (Heidegger, 1968, p. 4; my emphasis).

Understanding thinking as "an open engagement imbued with a sense of the unknown" has significant consequences for the role of the teacher. Teachers should not instruct pupils to use strategies or skills, but as Bonnett points out,

the role of the teacher is to act as a guide and support in helping the learner cope with and flourish within the openness of the call of the withdrawn. That is to say it will be concerned with supporting the experience of thinking: the courses or careers of affective-cognitive response involved in full engagement with content" (Bonnett, 1995, p. 306).

The emotions accompanying this highly demanding kind of thinking are extreme—ranging between enjoyment, and satisfaction, but also frustration and pain. Such teaching can take place only when the teacher has experienced this kind of thinking herself:

Informed by her own experience of such engagement the teacher can empathize with the causes of such emotions and encourage the learner to accept that, for example, confusion can be a necessary step towards understanding; that what currently feels dead can become enlivened, that which currently frustrates can become a source of enlightenment, that mystery and paradox may portend some greater truth, and that all such features are constitutive of the experience of thinking as it carries us in and out of them in ways that may on occasion astonish and mystify (Bonnett, 1995, p. 306).

I conclude that separating form and content when teaching thinking assumes a dualistic, instrumental view of the mind. It overlooks the role of the "unknown"—the creative sparkle that gives us our ideas, the restless searching for answers to questions we cannot find satisfactory answers to, and makes us develop further questions. The mind is always already "in" the world—it cannot be artificially separated from it, or worse, be made an object itself. A classroom in which this kind of thinking occurs is full of excitement, but also of frustration. When philosophy is taught in this way, what will be taught is "epistemological modesty," but also reverence, that is, an awareness that the world (including ourselves) is very mysterious indeed, and that "real" thinking takes place only when we let the unknown press upon us. To bring about such thinking is a heavy burden for a teacher, and requires a particular kind of training in philosophical inquiry.

Bear Hunt

Young children's "unexpected responses"—the kind of playful, imaginative responses which Piaget dismissed as "mere romancing" are often the most telling indicators of how young children think. Robert Louis Stevenson remembers himself passionately wondering when he was a child: "Why can we not all be happy and devote ourselves to play?". He believed that when children philosophize, they do this usually to very much the same purpose (Stevenson, 1993, p.
272). To understand philosophy as a form of play makes facilitation of philosophical inquiry with young children an often difficult, but fascinating enterprise. The difficulty may lie in the difference of emphasis in the way pre-literate children seem to make sense of what they know, what they learn, and what they experience.

What follows is a complete transcript of a whole class of four to six year olds engaged in philosophical inquiry. In my comments, I try to focus on what might be peculiar to the thinking of very young children. In contrast to most other PwC literature on the subject, my aim is to focus on the differences rather than the similarities between the thinking of adults and that of very young children. Researchers (e.g., McCall, 1990) painstakingly analyze transcripts to point at the rational and logical way very young children argue their case, in order to show that children can and do think the way adults do. It may be significant that there are few transcripts of children as young as five published as evidence that children can think as philosophically as adults. I suspect the reason may be that young children's thinking—moves are, in a certain respect, different from those of older children or adults.

In a recent paper on young children's thinking, David Kennedy shows how five-year-olds make distinctions, build logical arguments, exemplify, speculate, build on each other's ideas, hypothesize, and self-correct when engaged in discussions of this kind (Kennedy, 1996, pp. 35-37). But several of his comments regarding the thinking of these five year olds are especially relevant to this discussion. For example, Kennedy claims that one boy speculates "in story form," but in a "context of causally chained events." The child "has a way of thinking out loud, or letting his thinking unfold and watching it ironically," a sort of "wild logic" (Kennedy, 1996, pp. 35-37; my emphasis). That is exactly what young children still like to do: to let their thinking occur in the Heideggerian sense of the word, that is, "an open engagement imbued with a sense of the unknown." They are less inhibited and less self-conscious than older children and adults, and thus characteristically playful with
ideas. Kennedy calls it "a sort of dramatic play," that is, they act out what it is like to know everything (and that is how they view adults, as knowing everything) (Kennedy, 1996, p. 37). They do this by fitting events, people, etc., into coherent wholes (stories). This narrative quality gives their dialogue "systemic identity," i.e., the group argument proceeds systematically, despite its apparent chaos and non-direction. Despite its non-linear character, philosophical dialogue is a system, in that each thinking move is in some way related to what came before, and what will follow (Kennedy, 1996, p. 28).

The need and capacity for narrative coherence is confirmed by Kennedy's observation that young children make hypotheses in the form of propositional statements, as if they were facts... This kind of thinking is characteristic of young children...it is a kind of abductive proliferation; getting together everything everyone has ever heard, read, etc. about witches and fairies. Empirical validity is not so much the issue (although it sometimes is, and could be at any moment, if a child raises it) as making an argument that ties together the pieces nicely.

Kennedy also notes young children's tendency to assume that whatever you can think of can be true, just because you can think of it, which is characteristic of the "transitional" quality of the psychological play space of the young child, in which the boundaries between fantasy and reality, inner and outer, are not yet sharply defined... Truth value has to do as much with overall coherence—a sense of moral and aesthetic rightness—as it does with any empirical verifiability. Truth, that is, is a story about something that makes sense" (Kennedy, 1996, pp. 37, 38).

The thinking of older children and adults is less of an open engagement, and more instrumental and closed down; although they still employ playful speculation to make, for example, a hypothesis fit. But this becomes rarer the older the children get. With the increase of factual knowledge, playful, open-ended speculation diminishes. If we accept the notion that doing philosophy properly involves an "unlearning what we have learned," or a Husserlian "putting between brackets"—a doubting of everything we believe we have certain knowledge of—then young children are in an advantageous position. They already know very little, and so the kind of thinking encouraged in communities of philosophical inquiry—open engagement imbued with a sense of the unknown—comes naturally to them.

There are also many similarities between the
thinking of young children and adults in the way they argue together. For example, sometimes a child can speculate in the most imaginative way, but another child will "contest such wild statements"; at other times other children will "build on them." This and countless other similarities make sense if we consider that the young child shares with the adult—although usually less competently—the same language, and this language is rooted in certain logical relationships.

In the following transcript, I first comment on the logical structure of the dialogue. I will point at some general thinking skills the children are displaying, but I will also be looking for evidence that shows a possible difference between young children's thinking-moves and those of older children and adults.

The story the whole class of infants were discussing was Anthony Browne's *Bear Hunt*. They had philosophy once a week for one hour. During the first session, I had allowed plenty of time in between showing the "solutions" to the problems posed in the text, by encouraging the children to imagine what possible solutions Bear could draw with his pencil. The story line is as follows.

Two hunters are trying to catch Bear. First, they use a net, but Bear quickly draws with his magic pencil two pegs with a string in between, and one of the hunters trips over it. The other hunter throws a lasso, but before it has caught Bear, a rhinoceros has been drawn, and the lasso ends up on its horn. The first hunter is back, and points his rifle at Bear. Bear changes the barrel of the rifle with his pencil to make it point at the hunter's face. The second hunter tries again, and captures Bear in a cage. Again, Bear solves the problem with his pencil: he draws a saw and releases himself. Then Bear falls in a deep hole in the ground. He draws a beautiful white dove, and he flies away. (Amanda, 6)

We watched the filmstrip of the picture book twice. The first time through we paused so that we had a chance to look at each picture in great detail. The second time we moved quickly through, and I began the one-hour session by asking whether there was anything they would like to ask or say about the story. I hope to move the inquiry forward by pushing for clarification. Here, Owen gives a reason for disagreeing with the others. It is the first argument against Phillip's Thesis—bears can be dangerous, so that is a good reason for killing them.

By picking up the apparent logical contradiction, and asking for their comments, I hope to move the inquiry forward by pushing for clarification.

**There appears to be a logical contradiction here. The hunters are not chasing bear, but protecting him. They will kill him, though, but later! However, what Phillip is arguing does make sense, if we interpret his explanation of the story as being closely related to his own personal fears, i.e., walking past bushes, and not knowing what or who could pounce on him from out of the bushes (see illustration page 27). So, Phillip challenges Amanda's explanation of the story by setting up a speculative causal chain in story form. The hunters are walking behind Bear to protect him. Bear needs protection, because there might be an animal in the bushes that could hurt him (e.g., an eagle). It is not clear why bear would not need protection later. Perhaps Phillip was more concerned with integrating Amanda's position into his own, perhaps wanting to do justice to both possible explanations? I believe Phillip is making up a story (by connecting it closely to his own life) within the story, and his explanation will become the issue the children will inquire into during this session. I will refer to it as Phillip's Thesis. Also, how much is his position really a logical contradiction? After all, we do temporarily keep animals alive for human consumption or pharmaceutical experiments.**

*By picking up the apparent logical contradiction, and asking for their comments, I hope to move the inquiry forward by pushing for clarification.*

**Here, Owen gives a reason for disagreeing with the others. It is the first argument against Phillip's Thesis—bears can be dangerous, so that is a good reason for killing them.**

**An indication of sensitivity to context, and the second argument against Phillip's Thesis. By referring to the book, Paul questions the empirical validity of Phillip's interpretation.**

**Paul gives a reason for his argument against Phillip's**
I agree with Owen, because they do scratch people sometimes.

Thesis.

Phillip (6) I agree with Owen, because they do scratch people sometimes.

Phillip is seeking evidence to support his view. He agrees with Owen's argument against his own thesis (it is all right to kill animals when they are endangering humans) by giving a reason, but it has not changed his original position (see his next remark below).

KM: What do you think of what Paul just said, because he didn't agree with you?

I clarify: there are two points of view.

Phillip (6) They don't kill him for about a year.

Fine discriminations are necessary, for the situation is complex. Bears can be dangerous, but they are still not going to kill him for a year.

KM: Why a year?
Phillip (6) Because then he will have a bit more chance to draw all these things...

A creative solution in support of his view; he offers a reason to support his thesis.

KM: Do you think hunters are allowed to kill animals?

I ask this question to try to make the inquiry more abstract, and to help them think about the ethical issues involved.

Some: Yes.
Some: No.
Charlotte (5): He drew a rhino and the rhino had mean eyes.
KM: And when an animal has mean eyes, you kill it?

I ask this question to make them aware of the logical and ethical implications of what Charlotte is saying.

Charlotte (5): Yeah.
Louise P (6): No, because that would be cruel.

She picks up on the ethical dimension of Charlotte's remark.

KM: Why would it be cruel?
Louise P: If they kill us, we'll die and that's cruel.

Louise is defining the concept "cruel" in relation to killing and death. She is also turning the argument around, from considering killing Bear to considering being killed by him. This may be a form of empathic exemplification.

Ben G (6): If they die, we won't, 'cause that's cruel... 'cause if we die, they have to die... the animals.
KM: Why?
Ben G (6): 'Cause... they die first, and when you die it's not fun... going round... playing ghost.

Ben agrees with Louise, but takes it a step further. Killing is cruel because dying is cruel, because it is no fun playing (?) ghosts. Therefore, killing is cruel.

Gregory (6): I don't agree, because it's not cruel, because the animals that we eat, they can be killed.

Gregory points out a logical inconsistency, which is also a reason in support of Phillip's Thesis. As a matter of fact, we do kill animals to eat them, therefore it could not be cruel. Of course, just because people do something in a particular way, it does not follow that it is morally justifiable. This is a mistake some adults make in their reasoning too. Take, for example, the not uncommon argument: "My parents always hit me, and I have turned out okay (so, I can hit my children)." However, Gregory's reasoning is logically sound (despite the fact that the original premises is, perhaps, false, i.e., that killing animals for food is not cruel). He points out the logical inconsistency of believing, on one hand, that it is cruel to kill animals, and at the same time eat animals that
have been killed.

Some: It's cruel!
Some: It's not cruel!
Gregory (6): After they've had babies, then there are more.

Gregory is refining his point of view. He qualifies his argument by saying that they must have had babies before killing them. He seems not to be addressing the issue of cruelty, but simply of practicality.

KM: Are you saying that when an animal has had babies then you can kill the animal?
Paul (6): If the animal gets babies and dies then it can't live with the animals anymore.

Paul is inferring consequences.

Phillip (6): If they actually die, when they haven't had their babies, if you put a sharp something in it [stomach], it will go right through the baby.

Voicing the risks which might be implied by a certain view, Phillip points out the risk of the baby dying in the stomach. He seems less concerned with the abstract question whether it is morally right to kill animals than with making sense of his idea that it is all right to kill later. He is resisting at this point Gregory's condition that they should have had babies first.

Gregory (6): Well, if they get killed and the baby isn't, when it is just about to come out that's OK, because
you can get it out then.

Gregory makes an empirical hypothesis/prediction: you could save the baby if you killed the mother at the last moment before birth.

KM: Does that count for a rabbit in a hutch as well?

I introduce the distinction between pets and other animals in order to encourage the children to think about the ethical question of whether it is right to kill animals at all.

Timothy (4): I have a rabbit.
Gregory (6): She's a lady.
KM: So she can have babies, can she?
Gregory (6): But we haven't got a man.
KM: Imagine that your rabbit had babies...I go to your house kill your rabbit and eat it...is that all right?
All: No!
KM: Why not?
Gregory (6): Because it's our pet.
KM: Is there a difference between pet animals and wild animals?

As the rest of the inquiry shows, they more or less ignore the dilemma I have posed them.

Ben G (6): No, because you get another animal when they baby...you get exactly the same animal. When the babies grow up and you are the animal that has already grown up, and it looked the same to the other one, the other one would grow up and it would look exactly the same, so Gregory didn't have to worry.

Jason (5): If you had two rabbits and the man gets a baby, then you've got three. [He counts them on his fingers.]
KM: Because there are three instead of two, it's all right to kill one?
Gregory (6): We can let one go free.
Amanda (6): If you had a baby rabbit, the baby rabbit will be the baby...the daddy rabbit will be the daddy...the sister be the sister...
KM: But does the amount of animals you have matters whether you eat one?
Amanda (6): No, that's not right, because you are not allowed to eat animals, because when you eat animals, that's not right.
KM: Why not?
Amanda (6): I said it is all right to eat one animal.
Timothy (4): We've got only one rabbit, but if we get a daddy-one then we have babies...if somebody said "Yeah, let's go and kill one", well, that's not all right, because you've got to ask them first if you can kill one.

Timothy argues that you have to ask permission first. This often happens in ethical inquiries, but not only with children. There is a confusion between what you're allowed to do, and with what is morally right to do. Adults, too, often confuse what is legal with what is ethical. Just because something is permissible by law (e.g., abortion), it does not follow that it is a morally right action. The rest of the dialogue is a good example of how the children are building on each other's ideas. Timothy argues that killing is okay with permission... from the owner (Paul)... otherwise it is cruel (Owen)... but you have to say "Please" (Phillip).

KM: Who do you have to ask?
Timothy (4): The people, who live in the houses.
Paul (6): The people who own it.
KM: So it is different for animals that belong to someone, is it?
Owen (6): Our friend used to have some guinea-pigs, and they died 'cause of the hot summer, and we got some guinea-pigs that hasn't died, and it will be cruel to eat them without asking.
KM: If I would ask your Dad if I could eat your guinea-pigs, and he would say "Yes," and I would eat them... that wouldn't be cruel?
Phillip (6): It is cruel.
KM: Why?
Phillip (6): If someone would eat your things...
Paul (6): . . . guinea-pigs . . .
Phillip (6): . . . guinea-pigs, then you have to say "Please, may I have your guinea-pig?" and if they say "No," you just go to another house. [laughter]

The hour is finished.

An expanded notion of rationality

The issues raised by this class took me by surprise, as is so often is the case when I work with young children. Their questions and remarks were much more unexpected than when using the same story with their older peers in the school, or with adults (in teacher training, for example). This would confirm Kieran Egan's theory that young children's imagination differs from that of older children and from that of adults. However, my reading is speculative, and further empirical evidence is required to substantiate my claim that pre-literate children's thinking has a different emphasis.

This dialogue demonstrated what Kennedy calls "systemic identity" (see above). The children were building on each other's ideas logically. They were giving reasons, making fine discriminations, finding evidence, etc. They were also experimenting playfully with their own ideas and those of others. Kennedy refers to this phenomenon as "combinatorial play," i.e., hypothetically varying the situation and seeing what happens by counterfactual talk (Kennedy, 1996, p. 31). Using Phillip's hypothesis as starting point, the children were exploring the issues of killing and cruelty by refining the original hypothesis—for example, by Gregory who put forward the necessary condition of having had babies before being killed. Paul inferred the logical consequence: "If the animal gets babies...etc.". Then Phillip continued to speculate counterfactually: "If they actually died..." Gregory varied the situation hypothetically in order to solve the problem (raised by themselves) of how to ensure the baby is not killed when the mother gets killed. Phillip accepted that oviparous reproduction would be advantageous here, especially because eggs are (he believes) situated at the back and not at the front of the body. Mentioning the physical location of the eggs seemed to move the dialogue in a more empiri-
logical direction. Owen, for example, showed concern for the empirical validity of the hypothesis: whether it is an egg or a foetus, when the mother is killed, the baby will die. Gregory continued to live out the little story this hypothesis had become for them: if the baby is about to come out, then even if the mother is killed, you can still save the baby.

Their concern seems to have been for synthesis building—for trying to fit individual pieces of the argument into a sturdy whole. They were constructing and reconstructing (parts of) stories that make sense to them. This imaginative process of creating and living out hypotheses—i.e., (parts of) stories—is, I would argue, the creative origin of the sciences. Finding more evidence to substantiate a claim is one of the reasons justifying further research in an area of inquiry. Jerome Bruner has argued that

We all know by now that many scientific and mathematical hypotheses start their lives as little stories or metaphors, but they reach their scientific maturity by a process of conversion into verifiability, formal or empirical, and their power at maturity does not rest upon their dramatic origins. Hypothesis creation (in contrast to hypothesis testing) remains a tantalizing mystery—so much so that sober philosophers of science, like Karl Popper, characterize science as consisting principally of the falsification of hypotheses, no matter the source whence the hypothesis has come (Bruner, 1986, p. 12).

Bruner's distinction between two modes of thought is particularly relevant to evaluating philosophical inquiry with children. He distinguishes between "logico-scientific" thinking, dealing with general causes and universal truths, using criteria such as consistency and non-contradiction; and "narrative thinking", which concerns itself more with specific events, attributing meaning to particular experiences (Bruner, 1986, pp. 12, 13). Despite the fact that a large part of philosophical and scientific thinking, with its emphasis on truth-value and the testing of hypotheses, is logico-scientific, narrative thinking is essential for the creation of hypotheses. The causality of logico-scientific thinking is of a strict logical kind (if p, then q); the causality of narrative thinking, however, leaves space for interpretation and speculation.

One may be tempted to interpret the above dialogue as fantastical, or fanciful, and see it as an example of young children's lack of rational thinking—an expression of the common belief that imagination is not just different, but also inferior to rational thought. How transcripts like these are interpreted very much depends on how seriously we take children as thinkers. According to Bruner, "...we characterizeistically assume that what somebody says must make sense, and we will, when in doubt about what sense it makes, search for or invent an interpretation of the utterance to give it sense" (Bruner, 1986, p. 28). PWC presupposes high expectations of children as thinkers. In the evaluation of transcripts, researchers should do their utmost to include in Bruner's "somebody" very young children, concentrating on both modes of thinking, and not merely the logical.

Apart from thinking imaginatively and playfully, the children in the dialogue were also actively listening to one another, putting ideas forward, and tentatively building on those of others. They clearly had internalized the ethos and the procedures of a community of philosophical inquiry, or, as Mary Midgley (1996) would put it, picked up the "general spirit" of philosophy. The children took Phillip's Thesis as far as they could—revising it, adding to it—as if they were making up a story together, although at times they did show concern about empirical validity (e.g., Owen's reminder that when the mother gets killed the baby gets killed, or, Paul's referral to the book when interpreting the story). This makes it very difficult for the facilitator to know how and when to intervene, because it is so hard to understand exactly what they mean—what sort of story they are creating within the story. The temptation is to intervene a great deal as a facilitator in an attempt to, for example, further explore certain abstract concepts they are using (e.g., "cruel"), or to focus on certain philosophical questions (e.g., "is it morally right to kill animals"). But unless the facilitator creates their story with them, she will not understand them.

I realize now that in my previous research I have been too concerned with interpreting inquiries with this age group like those of older children and adults, in order to show that young children can indeed do philosophy. There are similarities (e.g., the giving of reasons, the pointing out of logical inconsistencies), but there also seem to be differences (the larger role fantasy plays in meaning-making, and the embeddedness of inquiries in their lifeworld). Fantasy very much gives shape to the way young children make sense of stories. They connect them directly to their own lifeworld in a way that often takes us adults by surprise. In retrospect, I have severe doubts that my attempt as a facilitator to encourage them to think more abstractly was the right thing to do. Perhaps I should have gone along in their fantastical exploration, although I am not sure how this might have been done. One way of finding out might have been to intervene much less, in order to have more time to reflect upon what each child is saying (and to avoid as much as possible misinterpretation), and to encourage silences—that is, time for reflection at regular intervals in an inquiry.

Another suggestion would be to use Socratic Method with this age group, because it might slow down the inquiry process, and thus enable the whole group to reflect longer on each statement. This would be especially beneficial in helping the facilitator to feel her way into their story. Another advantage of using Socratic Method for this age group would be the lesser role the facilitator plays in the content of the discussion. In Socratic dialogue, the facilitator does not ask philosophical questions, and in that
sense stays more outside of the content of the inquiry. However, I envisage that the major difficulties in using Socratic Method would be that the children cannot read (so how would you record each step in the discussion if you cannot write it on flipcharts?), and all children would need to participate actively, regularly and voluntarily (how can this be enforced when children do not choose to go to school?). In conclusion, a possible reading of the above transcript suggests that the thinking of children between four and six differs in degree, but not kind, from that of older children, and that if this is true, a different kind of emphasis is desirable when facilitating an inquiry.

During a philosophical inquiry very young children seem more keen than older children to embed their ideas in their own lifeworld, and to use fantasy when thinking about stories, themselves, or their world. In addition, a great deal of research centered around PWC is concerned to evaluate children’s thinking by comparing it with that of adults. The focus is predominantly on children's abstract and logical thinking, and not on their metaphorical and imaginative way of making meaning. Research focusing on the differences as much as the similarities is urgently needed.

Of course, this kind of meaning-making is not reserved for pre-literate children. Older children and adults have the capacity too, but the psychodynamics of literacy enable them to examine concepts out of the context in which they are used, and to think about them abstractly. This kind of de-contextualized thinking—or disembodied rationality—is clearly expressed in Descartes "I think, therefore I am," and has been reinforced by our modernist society to such an extent that the "other side" of our mind—the imaginative, the metaphorical, the poetical—has been undervalued in its role in rationality. An expanded notion of rationality—one that includes people's imaginative side—coincides with an urge within philosophy itself to embed our thinking in our everyday lifeworld. Such a move will not only change philosophy, but also one's everyday life as a thinking and feeling being, and it will result in a more holistic way of teaching and learning for all age groups. It would be a move welcomed by postmodern and feminist philosophers.

Understanding very young children's thinking is hard, but not impossible. I agree with Burbules and Rice, that one of the conditions put on structured talk to make dialogue across differences possible, is sensitivity to the various kinds of diversity one may encounter (Burbules & Rice, 1991, p. 407). Rather than trying to eliminate it, maintaining difference can be the aim of a dialogue, but in order to understand young children's thinking, one has to be aware of the reasons why and how they make sense of their experience. My reading of the dialogue transcribed here renders it impossible to dismiss their meaning-making as "irrational," "immature," or "mere romancing."

ENDNOTES

1. My position presumes understanding the transition from childhood to adolescence as a continuum; as one of constituting differences in degree rather than kind between child and adult.
2. Mike Lake pointed out to me the relevance of Jerome Bruner's distinction between two modes of thinking.
3. For a comparison between community of inquiry pedagogy and Socratic Method in the in the Leonard Nelson and Gustav Heckmann tradition see Murris 1997.

REFERENCES


Philosophy Goes to the School of Education

Juan Carlos Lago-Bornstein and Lourdes Salcedo-Tavira

Mark looked at Maria, then at Harry, then at Maria again. "Do we have to learn to solve problems, or to ask questions?" he asked, at last, with an inquisitive air.

"We have to learn to think," he said.

"Yes, we learn how to think," answered Mark, "but we never learn to think for ourselves."

(Matthew Lipman, Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery)

One chronic impediment to the implementation of Philosophy for Children in schools is the preparation of classroom teachers to implement the program. No matter how well-prepared, the curriculum is relatively inert or trivialized in the hands of a teaching staff which has not learned the very skill it is expected to deliver to children—the capacity to raise philosophical questions, to reflect upon their own thinking, and to think for themselves. It has been at least twenty years since Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan wrote, "the teaching of philosophy requires teachers who are willing to examine ideas, to inquire through discussions, and to respect the minds of the children before them." Little progress has been made in devising a system or methodology for the preparation of those teachers in schools of education.

Pre-service teachers sometimes take courses in the philosophy of education or in ethics, but these courses tend to be useless for teaching teachers to encourage children to think philosophically. A course in philosophy at the university level does nothing to prepare teachers to translate the philosophical concepts and terminology they are encountering into language that children can understand. It is common knowledge among Philosophy for Children practitioners that any training will be a failure which does not prepare teachers through the same didactic approach which they will be expected to use with children. If teachers are expected to moderate philosophical discussion, they must be given the chance to involve themselves in philosophical discussion, and presented with models and heuristics for facilitation of communal dialogue. If we are serious about introducing philosophy in community of inquiry format into elementary education, we must consider ways to make philosophical training as essential to teacher preparation programs as is training in language arts or mathematics.

What follows is an account of the introduction of Philosophy for Children as an optional course in the Teacher Training School in Guadalajara, Spain, and of the development of the course over time. When, some years ago, academics were preparing the Reform of Studies plans in universities all over Spain, I, Juan Carlos—a teacher of history and philosophy at the University of Alcalá, and appointed to a position in the School of Education—had the opportunity to offer several elective courses. I received approval for a course that for practical reasons I called
"Thinking Skills." In fact the course was designed to focus reflection on the question "what is thinking?" and to introduce conventional thinking skills only in that context. I intended from the beginning to use the curriculum of Philosophy for Children as a basic text. The plan of the course as proposed was the following:

THINKING SKILLS (45 hours)

ABSTRACT:
Analysis and practice of various thinking and reasoning skills needed in the process of educational development. This course, based on Matthew Lipman's Philosophy for Children program, will have both a theoretical and practical nature.

PROGRAM:

TOPIC 1. INTRODUCTION:
- Training teachers to teach students to think.

TOPIC 2. THINKING AND THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM
- What is Thinking?
- Thinking skills and basic skills.
- Thinking skills and other academic disciplines.
- The relationship between thinking and discussion.
- Three different kinds of thinking: critical, creative, and ethical.

TOPIC 3. THINKING AND PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN:
- Philosophy and the longing for learning.
- Astonishment, wisdom and the search for meaning: from scientific to philosophical explanation.

TOPIC 4. THE PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN CURRICULUM:
- Basic aims.
- The community of inquiry.
- The novels and their manuals.

TOPIC 5. PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION AND THE COMMUNITY OF INQUIRY:
- Philosophy and discussion strategies
- Leading a discussion in the classroom.
- How to instigate a philosophical discussion.
- Thinking for oneself and the pluralism of viewpoints

TOPIC 6. THINKING SKILLS AND BASIC TECHNIQUES OF PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION:
- The search for coherence
- Definitions, reasons and arguments
- Dealing with multiple opinions, points of view, and alternatives.
- Self-correction and self-evaluation

ACTIVITIES:
Beginning with the materials included in the Philosophy for Children curriculum and others, we will discuss the following concepts:
- Thinking and reasoning
- Alternative forms of thinking
- Developing questions and identifying topics
- Good reasons and bad reasons
- The role of dialogue in philosophical discussion

As is evident from the prospectus, the course has a major theoretical component, devoted to the basic issues related to the thinking and to the development of thinking skills. When I came to design methodological strategies, however, I found myself asking how I could teach a program whose pedagogical base is mostly practical, in a theoretical manner? My aim was to teach future teachers in the same way as I expected them to be teaching, and to learn to teach philosophy by doing philosophy themselves, for I had taken Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyan's words to heart:

Rarely do they [teacher educators] try to educate teachers in the same language that they will be forced to use when educating children. By falling in this, they leave all the weight of the translation to the teacher, who, on the other hand, receives little help in realizing it. Teachers are doing their best: they put into practice
those things for which they've been trained, and they teach as they've been taught... The only way to avoid this useless exercise is that educational teachers translate the contents of their topics to the classroom language, and, then, by using that language, educate the candidates to the title of teacher in the same terms and by using the same pedagogical methods that the latter will use later on with the children.

It was clear that I needed to adopt the same methodology for teaching the program as the program itself used, so I decided to move to the "practice" side of the theory practice divide, and utilize the latter as a vehicle for theoretical reflection and for introducing my students to the conceptual universe of philosophy. To this end, my students and I agreed together to adopt the standard pedagogy of Philosophy for Children. We intended to focus initially on reading and discussing the novels, and to use that as an entree for reflection on the theoretical dimensions of the program. To this end, my students began by following the traditional community of philosophical inquiry methodology: first we read a chapter from one of the novels—usually from either Harry and Pixie—which promised to raise issues related to the program's theoretical orientation. We then drew out the most relevant topics for discussion, and engaged in communal dialogue on those topics either on the same day or during the following class. Because the course was also intended to familiarize students with the basic skills of thinking, we also devoted time during each class to the formal aspects of the discussion. It was this process—the reflection on and formal analysis of the discussions themselves—which was most important from a pedagogical point of view.

The aim of this process was not reflection on the philosophical content of the discussion, or clarification of the positions taken on that content, but rather to clarify the form of the discussion, to analyze the interventions, or "moves," in terms of coherence, relevance and meaning, and to identify the various thinking skills which were used. This was our index to its philosophical quality. From there, we moved to identify the theoretical bases of the program. In order to make that evaluation productive and profitable for the students, we established, as the course progressed, a set of criteria to determine whether we had indeed utilized specific cognitive skills and dispositions. We used three general criteria, under which we grouped more specific ones:

1) Concepts: Acquired and New
2) Translating and Questioning Abilities
3) Reasoning Skills and Abilities

**Acquired concepts and new concepts**
We called a concept "acquired" when it had already appeared in one or more sessions, and therefore became the subject of comment, reflection, or simply mention when it appeared again. When we encountered them, we asked ourselves whether we were using them clearly and correctly, and whether we were using them in the same sense as we had previously, or whether there had been an evolution of the way we were formulating them—in their form, their use, or our understanding of them. We called a concept "new" when it appeared for the first time, and became part of the group's conceptual background. We asked ourselves whether we had understood correctly, whether we knew how and when to use it, whether we had identified and defined it correctly, and whether we could categorize it as philosophical, ethical, or some other.

**Translating abilities and questioning or inquiry abilities**
These are skills and abilities necessary for dialogical discussion and group inquiry—such as "Why are you stating X?" "If you say that X is A, and also that X is B, then, does it imply that A is B?" "What are you presupposing when you state that . . . ?" "When you use the word or concept X, what do you really mean?" "What does X mean to you?" "What are your reasons for stating this, given that . . . ?" "How would you justify . . . ?" "How do you support that proposition or argument?" "What can you say to support your reasoning?" All are questions that indicate that the inquiring community is using thinking skills and abilities in the dialogue. We noted their use during the sessions, then called attention to them during the reflection and evaluation that followed. This helped us to identify them, and to understand their value and function as critical elements in successful philosophical dialogue.

**Reasoning skills and abilities**
Here are included all those skills, abilities, strategies, and techniques essential for good reasoning—
whether logical, ethical, or aesthetic. They are the basic instruments without which philosophical inquiry is impossible, and are the elements of critical and autonomous thinking. As foundational skills of the community of inquiry, not only must they be "learned" (e.g., specific moves in formal logic), but must above all be assimilated in such a way that they are transferred to the problems, issues and situations of our daily lives. As we reflected on our discussions, we paid special attention to both the form and the quality of our reasoning, and asked ourselves continually whether we were improving in concept definition, whether we were applying rules of inference correctly, whether we were better at formulating hypotheses, at building on concepts, at discovering alternatives, at drawing correct inferences from hypothetical syllogisms, at acknowledging the differences in each others' points of view, and so on.

One last but very important element of our practice was for each individual to keep a class journal, both as an instrument for self-evaluation and for an informational resource and model for other members of the community. The journals helped us to reflect on the sessions, and to evaluate our own development in dialogical reasoning skills and dispositions as the year progressed. Given the difficulty of representing in a paper the atmosphere of our classroom community, its educational style, and the birth of community of philosophical inquiry that we glimpsed together, I have taken the liberty of including one of our journals here, by my student Lourdes Salcedo Tavira. It is a more faithful narrative—both richer and more creative—than any generalized explanation or description could be, and reflects both the depths we reached, and the galvanizing effect of philosophical community of inquiry on these future teachers.

MY JOURNAL
(A LONG SCHOOL YEAR IN...) THINKING SKILLS

LOURDES SALCEDO TAVIRA
Incredible though it may seem, I've found it really hard starting these pages. I've never been good at telling the story of my life experiences.

In order to get off to a good start, we should introduce ourselves to each other, since it will be you, and just you who will know—through these lines that will remain forever under lock and key—what happened during a year in my life.

My name is Lourdes, and yours will be THIN. Do you like it?

The whole story took place at the Guadalajara Teachers College in 1996. One day I was standing in front of a bulletin board with an application form in my hand and a look of distress in my face. I was being forced to choose a non-compulsory subject which, to make matters worse, must not conflict in meeting-time with the optional subjects I had already signed up for.

Finally, in a fit of rage and despair, I read the words Thinking Skills. "What's that?" I thought... then quickly inferred: 'Well, this surely must be related to philosophy, and that's one of my favorite subjects." Without thinking twice, I quickly wrote it down, and headed towards the secretary's office to hand in my form. It was the most successful choice I could ever imagine making. That is, THIN, you will understand it at the end of this story, when we—you and I—have finished discovering what happened.

Monday came, and while I was taking a look at my schedule, I saw: Thinking Skills. That was my first day in that class. Surely there were many days ahead of me, and the subject would have nothing to do with philosophy, and no doubt it would be the most boring thing I ever could have taken. When class time arrived, I think I searched every nook and cranny of the College, but I couldn't find the room. Finally, I went up to the second floor and—I'll never forget it—I overheard some kid asking, "Does anybody know where the Thinking Skills class is?" At that moment I thought, "Well, at least I'm not the only one who's lost—in fact I'm saved!" and I went along with him. At last we got to the lecture hall—the kid's name, by the way, is Raul. (THIN, I'm telling you his name because I now realize you have to call every person by their name, especially if, in a given moment, you talk about them, like in this story. If you don't understand this now, you will later on).

When I sat down, the first thing I did was to look around me and study the rest of the people. What struck me most was the place, and the way people were acting. Most of them were older than me. They were seated on the stage, some of them were
eating, and the teacher was nowhere to be seen. At last he showed up and he, too, climbed onto the stage. So far, so good, although it seemed to me a rather strange situation.

The problem arose, THIN, when they started to "debate" about some questions that had been written on a movable board that was also on the stage. I think that, through the two hours I spent in that classroom, I did not understand a single word they said; when I thought I had grasped something, and while I was trying to think a bit about it, some other people would throw themselves into the discussion, talking at the same time, and giving forth with a whole bunch of new ideas impossible to analyze all at once. I had no idea what they were talking about—it was as though I was a foreigner and couldn't understand their language.

At the end of the lesson I went to the teacher; and before I had even told him it was my first day in class and asked him to please explain me what the subject was about, he must have seen my foolish and idiotic look, because he said, "You are a new student, aren't you? So I gather you'll want to know what this is about, and how it works...". He gave me a brief explanation, and what a joy it was when I heard him say, "Well, it used to be called Philosophy for Children." Right then I discovered why I hadn't understood a single word—philosophy is a really complicated thing!

Another very nice kid named Jorge lent me all the notes that had been given out on previous days (don't ask me why, but it seemed to me that soon I'd know everybody—I could feel an atmosphere of warmth and comradeship in that class). When I got out of the room at last, the ideas that had been shared filled my head, and were about to explode. What had I gotten into? Apparently I had started the class late, so I was kind of afraid of not catching up with the rest of the group.

As you will see in time, THIN, this was not easy at all—not in the beginning nor after many a week—but, well, let's not cross our bridges before we come to them. I think I've told you enough for today. Tomorrow I'll tell you more. Do you feel like hearing some more? I hope so, because there are still plenty of things that happened during this year to be told, and a lot of discoveries, both good and bad.

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Hi, THIN! I guess it's about time I continued telling you my story, isn't it? So, let's begin, then. As I told you yesterday, on the movable board that had been placed on the stage you could see a lot of questions about which people were supposed to "debate." As time went by, I discovered that those questions were based on a book named Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery, which I bought later. The questions were as follows:

1. Why do they tend to generalize from specific cases or data? pp.89-35, Silvia, Gemma, Eva and Laura.
2. Why do we feel resentment when we are held up or opposed? p.7, 33-35, Sergio.
3. What is Ms.Olson's statement based on? p.89, Almudena, Silvia and Jorge.
4. Why is it that when we don't know something we look for the answer by using some acquired theory or knowledge, although it has nothing to do with what's being dealt

5. Why is it that when we don't know something we don't simply say that we don't know it? p.5-14, Joaquín, Alfredo and Miguel.

6. Why does the class laugh when Harry doesn't answer? p.5-6, José.

As you can see, these are not fantasies of mine, and you see that they are not common everyday questions either. You've also observed that at the end of every question I have written the name of the person that asked it, and the page from the text which gave rise to it. Why? Well, I'll answer this and other questions later on.

As I said, some of these questions were "debated" during the first day of class, and things like this were said:

We were discussing question number 4, and someone said that when we were looking for an answer to any question or issue, we would only find that answer in experience, since all the knowledge we get during our lifetimes lies there.

Afterwards, someone said that, sometimes, the answer has nothing to do with the question itself: since we feel the need to respond, we are as happy as the next one, even though we know deep-down that our answer is rubbish. This makes me wonder—why do we find it necessary to answer every question, or have something to say about every issue? I guess it's necessary because it makes us feel safe. If I go beyond my experience I meet the unknown, the mystery, my ignorance, and it would make me so small that my safety would vanish, and I'd get lost.

THIN, once I was confident enough about this to say it, a classmate tore it apart. Although the rest of the group agreed with me, he made me think a lot because I guess he was right to some extent. That kid's name is Alberto, and he said, "Is it that knowledge comes from experience, and once I've put all my knowledge together I can know the answer—or is it that there is a kind of knowledge which, in a given moment, simply appears, and so we call it innate knowledge?" Then he said that plenty of times he says the first thing that comes into his mind, and it's not based on any previous experience; he could even ask himself, "Why did I say that?"

The rest of the group argued a lot with him, and told him that it was not possible— that the origin of any answer is always inside himself, and, therefore, is based on his previous experiences. But I ask myself...if it's true that there are innate things, isn't it possible, too, that there is innate knowledge? Many times little kids give you answers that puzzle you. Where do kids get their answers from, since they're not old enough yet to possess the knowledge that would lead them to that answer? Earlier on I said that Alberto was right to some extent, but not entirely, because we could reply that the kid's answer comes from his/her strongly developed intellectual capacity. It is a proven fact that human beings use very little of their brains, and, if they did use it, everybody would surrender to them. I think, THIN, that I could go on like this forever, and I wouldn't get to any conclusion; but I don't mind, since I've learned that reaching conclusions isn't fundamental, and things may stay floating in the air so that everybody reads them their own way.

We also answered question 5, which was quite easy. There were several reasons suggested for not admitting our lack of knowledge: out of pride, to avoid coming off badly, out of necessity (as in an exam), etc... In the end, everybody was satisfied. The discussion ended with the following questions: How do we get to know? How do we acquire knowledge? There are two positions: We know in an innate way, or we know by acquisition. As I was going nuts trying to find an answer, I felt the need to reach some conclusion, since this is what we are used to, but I must say I couldn't find any. As you've seen, THIN, this is crazy, but what kept nurturing my strength was that these ideas were always present in my thoughts, I was absolutely absorbed, and, incredible though it may seem, I even dreamed about it, thinking over and over about the problems asked in class. I didn't know why, because I was really lost, but when my friends asked me "What's this skills thing about?" I used to reply that it was a superinteresting subject, and that, the minute they could take it, they shouldn't hesitate. And THIN, something I want to make clear is that what we did there were not debates. I guess a better word would be discussions, where you start with some topic, you can express yourself, and you end up talking about something else.

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THIN, the following school day was even more puzzling than the previous ones, and you'll see why.

That day we didn't talk about any topic, because it was the day that I learned more about teaching, and about how to lead a group, something that is not as easy as it looks. As you've seen, I say "group": here we are not individual students inside a room, but it is all of us, as a whole, who develop the discussions, and it is we who make them richer and more evolving. If any one of us fails, the group may be endangered. As I said, THIN, we talked about how the group was working, the role the teacher played, the value of reading out loud... . .

It seems unbelievable to me that we can talk about ourselves this way in a class, and see the good things and the bad things that come out of our discussions—not to mention the chance to comment on what we feel the teacher is doing or should be doing. Someone said that the group wasn't working well because we didn't wait our turn to speak (some people found it difficult to discuss because many of them hadn't done it before). For me that wasn't a problem, for since being in a confirmation group in my parish, I find it easier to wait my turn, difficult though it may
be, especially if you are a very effusive person, and you can't keep your mouth shut because what's being said affects you directly. Afterwards someone said that the teacher's task was to be the moderator in cases like this, and it should be he or she who made sure that everyone had their turn.

We also talked about reading out loud, and we agreed that it was very important in order to promote attention and participation, since it was a group activity in which we became integrated into something that was being shared (the reading). Here I must say that both Pepe—one of my classmates—and I get lost and don't understand anything when reading out loud. Later on we talked about why it was interesting to ask certain questions. Many of them were already written on the board, and I understood that what they had done was to read the book out loud, and then ask questions about it. From that moment on, I began to feel less lost in class, and I understood a bit more what they intended—it would be ourselves, as a group, who would be leading, developing and creating our own course. THERE WOULD BE NO BOOK!! The teacher wouldn't talk like a clown, and we wouldn't be listening to him like dumb people!! It was the perfect class!

Besides that, THIN, a very important thing is that we could use it as a didactic subject. I mean I've learned lots of things that I'll be able to put into practice when teaching—the importance of reading out loud, the importance of learning my students' names, the importance of those well-developed and enlightening questions... and many, many more things you won't find in books, but only in daily practice.

The questions posed in a class are very important, since they are the beginning of a discussion, so they are the basis for philosophical inquiry. These questions must be clear; it may seem silly, but do you realize that most times we don't know how to ask? We just tend to ask silly questions, questions whose answers are implicit in themselves, questions with which we have stated something beforehand; and this is due to our questioning without thinking. Every question should be as well-structured and well-composed as the answer we expect to find.

THIN, I had never thought about this fact before, but as you'll see later on, our skills will be developing, and our questions will be richer and more philosophical. Do you remember, THIN, when I told you that at the end of every question you could read the name, the age and the line from the text which gave rise to the question? Well, that very same day my doubt was allayed, and I could see the importance of the people's names. First, the name's there so you can know who you should be addressing yourself to, thus making them feel more important. No doubt about this: whenever your teacher or any classmate says your name before talking to you, you feel more important—at least they know you exist, and not as just any student or classmate, but as YOURSELF. If the teacher remembers your name, and s/he knows that it was you who asked that specific question, you can see that s/he thinks you're interesting, and this affects the whole process.
in such a way that you become interested in what you're doing too. Both the page and the line help to identify the context more easily—if a kid doesn't remember why she asked some question, and you take her to the page and line from where she took it, you'll help her remember why she asked it, and you'll help the rest of the class too. This has been helpful—at least for me—in order to learn my classmates' names, and to give them the credit they deserve.

Well, THIN, I hope you'll learn today as much as I learned in just one day. I won't keep talking on and on, because I must go to sleep. Kisses.

* * *

Good morning! Willing to learn something new? I hope so. From now on, we'll be able to locate ourselves exactly, because I remember perfectly the days when we approached the following topics. Today I'm going to talk about hypotheses—some interesting issue, isn't it? Well, very interesting but super-intricate, since so many things were said that, in the end, I didn't even know who I was or if the following day I would see the light of day.

All this happened on the 21st of October, with an initial question—what's a hypothesis? If I have a problem, and I come up with an idea to solve it, this idea is an *hypothesis*. It's more reliable than a thought, since it takes all the available evidence into consideration—that is, it's not a matter of guessing but of having a well-based idea. After reaching a clear definition of hypothesis, we did some exercises in order to better understand it, which I didn't. The exercise consisted of two tales—one concerning Private Eye Pérez, and the other one about Ms. Edna Hanson. After hearing both stories we were presented with several questions in order to start the discussion. After some rough questions, the statements I found the most interesting were the following:

First we observe; then we develop our hypothesis (since, as I told you before, when we get puzzled and unable to explain something, we try to find just one hypothesis which might help us understand it), maybe because we need it in order to feel reassured. From this we can deduce that our hypotheses arise from experience, and it is through our experience that they can be tested.

Another relevant statement was Arancha's: any hypothesis that gets verified is no longer a hypothesis, but a theory.

Finally, after we develop and elaborate our hypothesis, we must verify it, and this requires a lot of proofs, clues, chains of reasoning, etc...

According to Arancha, if the hypothesis is verified it becomes a theory—it would have more reliability, and must be one way and no other. So far so good, but I got lost when someone said that hypotheses can't be verified: there's just a probability that it might be the case, and it's only because it's just probable that we call it a hypothesis. I think, THIN, that this was the most interesting thing that was said that day, and the one that got nearest to the target, since the rest of the discussion slipped slightly away from the main idea—What is a hypothesis? Instead, we began to give examples of hypotheses such as "What if tomorrow the sun didn't rise? What if . . . ?" beating about the bush and leaving the class with many more doubts than before. This is one of the main problems with dealing with philosophical issues that don't affect us directly, issues about which we scarcely have any information, and no empirical experience at all. But even so, THIN, I believe it was a very constructive lesson.

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Today is a new day, THIN—the 22nd of October to be exact—the day when we review what happened the day before. I'm pretty sure that, if this were another subject, we would've been cramming textbooks devoted to hypotheses, and maybe we would've been more reassured about what hypotheses were, but . . . how long would this have lasted? I've studied what hypotheses were before, but I don't remember anything. But I'm pretty sure that I'll never forget what was said in that class.

We did a complete and exhaustive review of what we discussed yesterday, and the most important thing turned out to be how could we improve it. We felt rather lost (at least I wasn't the only one), and decided that this was because of the vocabulary we were using, our talking about something that we don't really know very well, and our "looping the loop," or circling back again and again. We could use several methods to avoid this, such as asking when you don't understand something; this seems easy and logical, however we rarely do it. You'd rather shut up than ask, and I used to do it out of shame. I didn't really know what I was ashamed of nor why, since I had no reason to feel that way, but talking was quite hard for me, although as time went by the shame began to vanish, and I took part whenever I felt comfortable. We could also avoid this if the moderator took part by interrupting when appropriate, summing up, or returning us to the main point, as Nacho said. But there was no need to make things more confused than they already were, or to say the very same things in a different way over and over again. Those were mistakes that we should correct, but talking about them was something super-constructive both for the group and particularly for me.

A funny thing was that, as you answered one question, the teacher always managed to take you to another one, and then to another, which was very confusing (first you said something, but when reading another question, you noticed that what you had said in the first place didn't make much sense). Maybe this helped us to see that we were focusing on just one hypothesis, and not seeing other possibilities. During the exercise, a lot of beliefs did surface, both scientific
and vitalistic. All the laws were based in the principle of chance-cause-effect, and the most important thing was that the hypotheses couldn't be given as verified, but as proved. I don't agree with this, since if we measured them according to the degree of probability, there would always be some doubt, and therefore it could never be a theory, and it is true that theories do exist.

Something quite important that the teacher said at the end was that the exercises are very useful, since they help us to visualize a topic, and to understand it better. I agree totally with their being beneficial, but as proved. I don't agree with this, since if we measured them according to the degree of probability, there would always be some doubt, and therefore it could never be a theory, and it is true that theories do exist.

Something quite important that the teacher said at the end was that the exercises are very useful, since they help us to visualize a topic, and to understand it better. I agree totally with their being beneficial, but only if we know how to deal with them, because if the exercise is confusing or involves a very broad field of knowledge, it can make you more confused than you already are. Besides this, they also help us to participate in the group, and to make it more dynamic.

We usually sit in a circle in this class, and that's something that startled me at first. But this circle thing is very important, since it makes you talk to the whole group, and not only to the teacher. Language is also very important, since kids get leads—both verbal and gestural—and the latter affect them a great deal.

Another really useful way to avoid getting lost in a discussion is to ask for some examples. These are useful for answering doubts, and particularly useful for the other person—if he can offer a good example, that's a sign of his grasp of the subject, and that he knows what he's talking about. This way of conducting a lesson is very important, as I told you, THIN, since you're not only looking at what the textbook says, or at the ideas the teacher elaborates on, but with the group's help you begin to grasp some ideas from which you can go further.

Among the questions we answered was number 2, which was about resentment—I hope you remember it. We spent the whole class on it. If we elaborate some theory and somebody ruins it, we feel resentful. This is because we think we've discovered something important, and someone makes us see we've failed. I think that the failure is in ourselves. If we noticed the failure ourselves, we would have no reaction, but since it is someone else who points it out, it makes us feel resentful. The one who corrects us is very important too, since it's not the same thing as being corrected by our mother, a close friend, or some stranger. It also has to do with the way we're corrected, and in front of whom. I think that the main reason for our feeling resentful is pride, and when pride is attacked, watch out!! However, it may also be related to envy.

THIN, that day I went home with my mind glued to that issue, thinking about how different the discussion had been compared to the one the day before. I reached the conclusion that this was because it is one thing is to talk about hypotheses, but another talk about something so close to us as resentment. Time was relevant too, because if a discussion gets too long, people tend to beat about the bush and to lose the main idea. But we are learning more every day to respect each other's turn to speak, to get more centered, to give more examples. In general, I think the group is evolving quite a lot these days, and getting more and more mature.

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Are you there? Really? Well, I was kidding with that time thing, because that's something I'm not very good at, but I think today is the 28th of October, and there were some new questions on the board:

1. What is "thought"? *p.16, Gemma.*
2. Are there different kinds of ideas? *p.17, Nacho.*
3. Is there any rule by which to classify our concepts? *Raúl.*
4. Do we need to have different materials in order to think about something? *Alfredo.*
5. Is there any difference between the reality of our thoughts and that of the objects we think about? *p.17, Rubén.*
6. Are there any differences between thoughts and ideas? If so, what are they? *Miguel.*
7. How is it possible that the thought of something gives us the same feeling as that very same some thing? *Joaquín.*
8. How does imagination affect thought? *p.16, José.*
9. Does any external reality exist and/or have meaning independent of our perception? *Raúl.*

Before I forget, THIN, I'd like to say that, during the lessons, some very interesting questions didn't get addressed—that is, we asked some nine questions of which only one or two got answered. This may suggest a problem, because if one person takes part in the posing of questions, and none of hers ever get addressed, she might eventually get tired or upset. My guess is that, in our class, this was due to the lack of time, and to the fact that we spent a whole day answering one question—that is, we weren't yet mature enough to synthesize and see in a clear and quick way its answer.

It may seem silly, but in my confirmation group's meetings I do nothing but read too much into any question that gets asked. I tell my classmates that their questions aren't well formulated, that they are including unexamined assumptions in them. I'm pretty sure they think I'm nuts, or that I'm a bore, but I hope I'm helping them to see the importance of asking a good question.

I also have to tell you, THIN, that a very important thing happened that day, which surprised me quite a lot, although it has nothing to do with the topic. My teacher had dinner with a foreign teacher—a woman—and during that dinner he showed her the questions we had formulated. Do you see what I mean? That made me feel important, because I've seen that, for our teacher, we are not simply students, but we are important enough to talk about during a night out with some friends.
Well, THIN, let's get back to the point. Our main problem was—what question should we begin with? We solved the problem by picking the most concrete one as a starting point, and moved from there toward the most general. That's why we began with number 6, asked by Miguel. One of the responses—Raúl's—was that an idea is an elaborate thought, and that there were different kinds of ideas. That was the main topic of discussion for the whole day, since other people thought that first we had the idea, and from there we got the thought—that is, the idea is an object which gives rise to the thought, which in turn is the mechanism through which the idea gets structured. I was probably closer to this latter opinion, but I wasn't that sure, because it's a rather difficult issue, besides being quite philosophical.

Later, we addressed the question "Are there different kinds of ideas?" and if yes, what are the differences? We discovered that we could find ideas which are concrete or abstract, fictitious or real, complex or simple, implying movement. Maybe we were a bit confused until someone asked a good question: What is an idea? We had been talking about ideas and thoughts and, in truth, we didn't know what an idea is. That's a clear example of how our group works. Someone said that ideas are impressions or perceptions of things. What's a thought then? It's the act of thinking ideas. Are ideas inside or outside things? Ideas are separate from the objects. So far we all agreed, THIN. Then, someone offered an odd proposition: an idea is a general concept, that we can apply to different situations. If we experience the same reaction every time—for example in the case of fear—it works like a label. For me, that's one of the best definitions I've heard. But what happened to the first question? Is the thought the origin of the idea? I thought the best thing that was said about it was that "an idea never ends, it can't disappear; it would only die if we stopped thinking about it, therefore the idea is always the true thought."

I'm sure, THIN, that after all this, you'll have a clearer vision of everything...? But what if I said that, in truth, thought and idea are the same thing? You would surely go nuts, and you'd hate the subject; so let's leave it as before without looping the loop again. You've had enough for today, and besides, it's pretty hard to think this late in the evening.

Good night THIN, and sweet dreams. Kisses.

* * *

Good morning! How are you? Today I'm going to tell you about the 29th of October, when we kept on talking about thoughts and ideas, but don't worry, I won't drive you nuts, OK?

First I'll tell you a good example somebody gave: "Usually, we say 'I'm thinking of an idea', and not 'I'm devising a thought'." THIN, this makes me see that people are still unable to make up their minds about what comes first, the idea, the thought—or both at the same time. I've got the feeling that we do nothing but beat about the bush, without reaching any conclusion, which is the opposite effect of what we wanted. So finally, THIN, we gave up on the topic and did something very nice. We played a quite interesting game where the main problem was—as always—time. In truth, we didn't finish it, and we didn't fully understand its purpose, although I'm pretty sure it was a game designed to help us understand other people's personalities. In the game, the teacher wrote a sentence on the board:

Where could he be today,
chasing dragonflies that fly,
my little son that died?

This sentence was read out loud by a girl, while the rest of us closed our eyes and let ourselves be carried away by our imaginations. Afterwards, we had to say what had come to our mind. The experience was rather fun, since a lot of things came up (some saw it in color, some in black and white; some listened to it, some thought the boy had died...). The only problem I saw, THIN, was that, as I already said, the game didn't go any further, and we didn't know how to fulfill its aim, although, if I'm right and it's from the imagination that the personality can be observed, then my teacher becomes my psychoanalyst, right? Well, THIN, I've got to say goodbye because I'm being called—let's say shouted—to lunch. Kisses.

* * *

THIN, today we talked in group about the exercise I told you about the other day. By the way, today is the 4th of November.

Some people said that the exercise had offered a good chance to participate, although sometimes it didn't make it easy to talk, and, according to José, it was very creative, something with which I totally agree. We also talked today about question number 8, and we agreed that what imagination does to us is to produce new thoughts and ideas which affect a great deal our thinking, make us live some memories again, and feel emotions. We also talked about the difference between remembering and evoking memory. Remembering is imagining situations we can no longer see, and evocation is the reason why we remember—it makes us feel real sensations, it is something external to us, it implies an emotional motivation. A good example given in class was that, when we did the exercise, most people—or I should say everybody—imagined a mother, not a father, and this was due to the fact that, in our memory we find the feeling of mothers' sweetness.

THIN, we also did one of those exercises I really like. The teacher made us think about the word "freedom." There were different results—some people thought about freedom, some others about the word itself, some just listened to it. What could this diversi-
ty of thoughts mean? What aim do these exercises have?

THIN, it seems unreal, but this is the first time since being a kid that I hate being sick and unable to go to class. What will they be doing? Surely I'm missing an interesting topic or some entertaining game. But it doesn't matter, this Thursday I'll talk to Pepe and have him tell me everything in detail.

* * *

Today is the 14th of November, and as I told you, I've missed two days, so there are new questions on the board. Would you like to know them? Here they go!

1. Why is it that, when people think, they tend to consider theirs to be the only valid point of view? Miguel, Joaquín, p.31
2. Why do we doubt something more when we don't know it by experience? Raúl, p.31
3. Why do we take some people's ideas as true? Jorge
4. If something exists, is it possible that its contrary also exists? Almudena and Susana, p.30-31
5. Must the school be at the government's service? Luis, p.33
6. How does experience affect our imagination? Silvia and Javi, p.35
7. Why is it that an interesting subject is presented in a boring way? Jorge

We found question number 7 the most interesting—no pun intended—but what does "interesting" mean to us? Something interesting may be something attractive and also something useful that educates you at the same time. In the first place, a topic won't be interesting to you if it doesn't attract you. Which things are interesting? A movie, some events, some boys... According to Jorge, you don't necessarily have to like a subject in order to find it interesting, and he's quite right, THIN, because I find history quite interesting, although I neither like it nor feel attracted to it. All this, THIN, is due to the fact that subjects aren't interesting in and of themselves—it is the person herself who can make them interesting or boring, and pass on to the students—depending on their interests—some motivation.

* * *

Hi, THIN!

The topic I'm bringing today is quite difficult, and very hot these days. I'm talking about question number 5. First, we started trying to make clear our idea of school. The school should create individuals, educating them and adapting them to society. We also said that there shouldn't exist such a thing as the DCB, and, to tell you the truth, THIN, I have no idea what that could be. Anyway, let me show you some of the answers we offered:
Someone said that if education depends on the government, things will go wrong, since it shouldn't be influenced by anything. Teachers shouldn't follow the guidelines imposed by the government, since it is up to them to decide what to teach.

But can you imagine, THIN, if each person taught his/her own curriculum? So in the end we concluded that some guidelines should exist, some principal rules which would be the starting point from which everyone could go further.

The problem was also discussed the following day—that is, the 19th of November—when for the first time ever, we reached a conclusion: it is the government which should be at the service of education, and education at the service of society. As you can clearly see, we went deeper with the question; we took our experiences as a starting point, and went further from there.

After all this, the problem was: should there exist some minimal guidelines and/or rules? If so, who should impose those rules? Well, only a group of experienced educators would be the appropriate ones to impose them—with some flexible criteria, of course. Before jumping into this, THIN, I'd like to tell you that in a paper for Teaching Methods that I wrote, I interviewed Salvadora, and asked her that very same question—to which she answered: "I don't think the word 'service' is the most accurate, but there's no doubt that it is the government which designs an educational model and publicizes it just to guarantee their being voted in, while in fact they don't provide us with enough materials, centers, or teachers, something that in Spain is far from a good situation."

Well, THIN, could you say it any better?

Continuing on with our previous topic—What do we understand by an "expert"? An expert is a person who's supposed to have the knowledge you don't have, and thus be more capable of good judgment on a topic, and as a teacher, able to give kids the resources for development. Rubén gave an example which had to do with an elevator and a technician. But it didn't stop there, since I had, finally, to put the icing on the cake, saying: "Why is somebody an expert? How come parents aren't considered experts?" As always, the rang bell just then, so the question remained in the air. Maybe that's better, since it gives us time enough to think about it. See you tomorrow.

* * *

THIN, today is the 25th of November, and we are getting more and more aware of our progress on the issues, of the fact that we respond more quickly to the questions, and that we are setting more and more difficult goals for ourselves. We went back to the topic we were dealing with, which seemed easy, since "expert" is a word we use everyday. But it was giving us quite a headache.
We talked a great deal about whether parents should be considered experts or not. I think they shouldn't. You may say that some of them are more experienced than others, but they are not experts, since they know only about their sons and daughters, and about themselves when they were sons and daughters, but they don't know other things; whereas an expert must embrace children in general, study them, live with them, and never stop inquiring. Parents' legitimacy is given by society, not because of expertise.

But if we don't consider our parents to be experts, why do we obey them? Lots of answers were offered—out of love, for financial reasons, or because they were more expert—but I believe they are wrong: rather they should say because they were more experienced, don't you agree, THIN? Well, we finally left the topic, and went further in the book, where new questions came up:

1. Do you feel bad if you don't follow society's rules? Arancha.
2. To what extent can society make you act in a certain way? Eva.

THIN, I guess we’ll answer these questions tomorrow, that's it for today. Kisses.

* * *

Today is the 26th of November, and we have started the day in a most interesting way. For the first time ever, I heard a teacher admit that he hadn't prepared the lesson. Actually he was right not to have done so, because, in case you didn't notice, THIN, we really didn't talk that much about parents yesterday, and what we said wasn't that relevant. We simply discussed why we obey our parents, and nothing more. So we set ourselves the task of discussing the questions from the day before, and we used another question as a starting point: How do we decide that some reasons (either religious or political) must be accepted? A reason must be accepted if it is logically reasoned. We accept as normal what the majority do. But, to what extent is what the majority does normal? It is society which imposes the rules that work for the majority, and according to Raul that's OK, since otherwise, society would hurt itself.

Do you know something, THIN? I have right here in front of me something my teacher said, and since I didn't write it down very well I have no idea what it means. He said that the sentence "live and let live" implies a contradiction in terms. Do you get it? Well, maybe some day I'll remember what it means, and I'll be able to explain it to you. Now I must leave you. Kisses, and see you tomorrow.

* * *

THIN, today is the 28th of November, and, as time goes by, we've got fewer lessons left. Are you learning as much as I predicted you would? I hope so, and I hope it helps you in some way, as I expect it will help me.

Today we did quite a nice exercise, which taught me more things. The topic of the exercise was "What is a right?" Nice question, isn't it? But also difficult, since it embraces so many fields. The exercise dealt with the right of a group of students to have some books, so we were asked 14 questions about rights. We answered almost all of them, but when we got to the last one it opened a huge topic for discussion, which lasted for the rest of the class. The question was: Is it possible that some people's rights might override those of other people? Some students said yes, although others didn't agree. I don't think it's hard to see that the right to be fed is above the right to own. THIN, someone asked if a man had the right to violate a baker's private property in order to satisfy his right to a bit of bread. I am truly convinced that there are times when you must disregard some rights in order to satisfy another more relevant right, which would mean that there indeed is a hierarchy of rights.

Where do rights come from? Some rights depend on the society in which you're living, while other rights depend on you—and it was here that the problem of euthanasia came up, and the issue of someone's right to die. Before this session, THIN, I was totally convinced that people had the right to do whatever they wanted with their lives, as long as they didn't interfere with other people's rights, but now I've discovered that nobody has the right to die because, in truth, the only thing we have the right to is to live. This is a right given by birth—therefore if I have the right to live, how could I have the right to its opposite, that is, to die? What do you think?

We also talked about the difference between rights and privileges. A privilege is having something that others don't, while a right affects everyone. Every right implies a duty—an obligation—and I think it is clear that I have neither the obligation nor the right to kill anybody, nor to let them to violate their right to live, so nobody has the right to die. Do you get it now? THIN, I think this is a very important issue, and I'm glad I changed my mind. I've nothing else to tell you, so I'll say goodbye. Kisses.

* * *

Today is the 2nd of December and Christmas Holidays are getting closer and closer. Don't ask me why, THIN, but this is the only class I would keep on attending if I could. Today we're reading a new book, and the problem is that there are not enough books for everybody, so I'm not understanding a single word... Haven't I got the right to get a book? Ha, ha...just kidding. Well, as always, new questions came up, some of them rather interesting.

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could it be solved? How does it affect the peasants? What does "drug" means to you? Would it help giving money for drugs?

2. Do animals have rights? Must they be used for testing in experiments?

3. What's beauty? Who is to decide the canons of beauty? What is the relation between attraction and beauty?

I was in class on the 9th of December, but had been absent the day before, when they had discussed question number 1—that is, drugs. In truth, THIN, I can't tell you much about it, because I didn't understand anything—well, I got something, but it serves me right for missing a lesson. It's not a nice thing to say, THIN, but I don't really care about that, because drugs are a very common conversational topic, and I'm bored with it.

On the other hand, I would surely have learned a lot, since I always find things that startle me and get my attention in these sessions.

There's something I must say. Someone said that drugs are not bad in themselves, but what's bad is the way they are used. THIN, maybe this makes some sense, since human beings have been using drugs moderately for ages, and people say that a joint is healthier than a cigarette, and that some wine during meals is very good. I acknowledge these statements, but I don't share them—for me, a joint will always be a joint.

What do drugs mean to you? I say, any substance that may create dependency. You know what? I can't wait for tomorrow to arrive, when we talk about beauty, since I think it's a supernice issue, and besides it will surely be lots of fun. Goodbye.

** * **

At last! Hi THIN, today is the 12th of December, and we discussed the topic of beauty. As I told you, today's lesson has been lots of fun, and we had quite a laugh. Although it may not seem so, it is quite a difficult issue to deal with. Do you know what the difference is between beauty and attraction? The topic was very fruitful; I kept on discussing it with my mates from Music Ed. after I left the room, and we spent two hours talking about it. Here are some of the things that were said:

—Beauty is something general, whereas attraction is something individual.

—Beauty is very influenced by the media, most of all by TV, but ... why does the ideal of beauty change through time? Why doesn't it do so in an evolutionary way? The only solution to the changing standards is that, at the moment you're living in, you have the socially-stipulated body—or simply be happy with the one you've got, because if you don't do it, nobody will do it for you.

—Sometimes, beauty has nothing to do with what you like, but with what you're forced to accept.

The final conclusion was that the ideal of beauty is something held individually. Somehow, one individualization becomes universalized in society, and out of it we get a canon of beauty with, in turn, which individuals may agree or disagree.

THIN, this was our last day, at least until the day after Christmas Holidays. What do you think about the course? Surely you must be as happy as I am with it, and you will miss hearing about the sessions during these days, although you can take comfort in the fact that we still have got some days left after Christmas, when you'll be able to learn something more. Well, let me say goodbye until the 9th of January. Lots of kisses and Merry Christmas.

** * **

Happy 1997! How are you? Did you miss me? By the way... How many kilos did you gain? You probably stuffed yourself with nougat, and you don't fit in my diary anymore. Forget it! You've got to lose weight, because we still have some days left to our story, as well as some interesting things. I really want to tell you about today. I think it was one of those days where I almost died laughing. Of course I'm much more familiar with my classmates now, and so far I'm getting along quite well with them, so our lessons are even funnier, if that's possible.

Well, let me tell you, on the 9th of January, 1997, we read from Pixie, which has more fantasy, more depth, and more complexity than Harry. Something odd, which I didn't notice (although Gemma did) is that it is written in the first person, which gets the reader more involved—and as always, new questions arose.

1. To whom does each person's body belong? Néstor.
2. To what extent is a secret important? Arancha.
4. Why do we want other people to feel respected? Raúl.
5. Why have we lost confidence in words? Jorge.
7. What's so nice about going to the zoo? Alberto.
8. Why is it that, as we get older, our way of stating things changes? Miguel.
10. Do I belong to my body in the same way it belongs to me? Mónica.
11. What's the relevance of altering you body—so that others can identify you? Olga.

You must see, THIN, how interesting these questions are. The one we discussed that day was Pepe's, that is, number 9. I'm sure you can't even imagine where that question led us, it was superinteresting...
and lots of fun. Most people, at least once in their lives, have identified themselves with an animal. Maybe the problem is that many people don't see the difference between identifying with an animal and wanting to be like one. If you identify yourself with an animal it's because it has qualities that you also have, and sometimes even just because of the animal's physical appearance.

For instance, Raúl identified Pepe with a bear, and it's funny that Pepe had told me before that he saw himself as a bear. This implies that Raúl knows Pepe's personality well. Lots of people, among them Gemma, identified themselves with a cat, because of its liveliness, and its dual personality. Raúl identified himself with a lynx, and Sandra with a black panther. But the funniest one was the boy who saw himself as a bull, because of its horns, its nobility, and the fact that it's particularly Spanish.

I liked this activity a lot, because I got to know some people's personalities (of which I didn't know very much) through their identification with animals. Néstor was quite funny too—he identified himself with a centaur. He posed an odd question: Is it better to identify oneself with a person than with an animal? Néstor said it was better to identify oneself with a person, but I, as well as many others, didn't agree, since animals have some values which human beings have lost, and also because if you identify yourself with another person, you would stop being yourself, you'd get depersonalized.

Alberto, as always, solved everything by saying that it didn't matter whether it was a person or an animal—sometimes we've done it with the former and sometimes with the latter. THIN, the truth is that Alberto is a very funny boy, he asks superoriginal questions, for instance number 7, or questions about mushrooms—are they minerals or vegetables?

Going back to our previous issue, I've got a question: why do we identify ourselves with animals? Could it be that we have some animal instinct? I guess that, in some cases, we need to identify ourselves with something. Well, THIN, it's too late to think now. See you soon.

* * *

Good afternoon. How are you? I've got some bad news: I couldn't attend class on January 13th, and, do you know what question they talked about? Yes, THIN, the one about the zoo. Ain't that a pity, that I missed it? because according to what Pepe told me it was superinteresting. As my teacher says, it doesn't matter how silly a question is as long as it is well posed, since it can take you to a topic of philosophical discussion. He told us that once in a meeting when they were really tired, one of his classmates asked a question that had nothing to do with the topic at hand, I guess he simply posed it to be funny, or to let the others know he was tired. The question was: Should we pick up the phone when it's ringing? Well, in the end the question turned out to be a most interesting one, and it led to a long philosophical discussion.

Apparently, THIN, the day I was absent they talked about the people who cheat on exams, and someone told me that the more involved they got the more difficult it was to discuss, since they went from rejecting ideas to rejecting people, and you have to be very careful with this.

Today we also talked about the body; it was quite a sparkling day, since we were dealing with a religious topic—bodies and souls. Someone said that the body does really belong to you in a material way, although it is conditioned by your parents and by society. I don't agree, because if my body were conditioned by anybody, I as a person would be conditioned too, since my body belongs to me. Can we separate the body from the person? As you'll see, this is a very spiritual question, and Eva's sister gave a good example to argue that the answer is yes: it happens to transsexuals. But I don't know, maybe we mistook the question, and equated property with circumstances.

* * *

Well, THIN, I hope you had a good time with this story, and that you learned a lot. I don't know if you know that I don't like good-byes, and that, although I won't study this subject anymore, I'm sure next year—or some other year—I'll have another class in which I'll be able to tell you another story as interesting, or more, than this one. At least I hope it'll be useful for my classmates who study it next year, and experience the same things I did.

Well, THIN, once again: lots of kisses, and see you soon. SEE YOU REAL SOON!!

NOTES
2. ibid., p. 102.
Stages of Wonder: 
A Lesson in Physics

Since being trained in Philosophy for Children, I have been teaching physics at the college level with community of inquiry methods. Most recently, in a course which included the study of rigid bodies, I determined to teach the relevant concepts through comparing the difference between translational motion and the rotation of a rigid body around a fixed axis.

I began by showing my students two eggs, one boiled and the other raw. Before setting the eggs in motion around an axis, I asked them which would rotate faster. After some discussion, all the students gave a similar answer: the boiled egg. They based their judgment on the fact that, although the shells of the two eggs had the same angular velocity \( \omega' \), their \( \omega' \) inside were different, because one was solid and the other liquid. The friction caused by the liquid would consume part of the rotational kinetic energy, and the raw egg would slow down quickly.

A perfect answer! I performed the experiment, and it was indeed the case that the boiled egg rotated faster than the raw one.

It appeared simple, but in fact I had designed the first experiment as a trap. Through previous discussion, I was already aware of the existing schema in the students' minds, and was interested in throwing it into disorder, in the interests of expanding and refining it. I followed immediately by arranging an incline with several books and a wooden board. I held up the eggs again, and asked which one would reach the bottom of the incline first, given that they were released from the same height, at the same initial velocities, and at the same moment. My students answered loudly and with no hesitation: "The boiled egg!" It seemed easy—same eggs, same rotation, surely the same result! My students were explaining the new situation in terms of an existing schema which had proven correct.

I performed the demonstration with the eggs and the incline: the raw egg rolled faster, and reached the bottom of the incline first! "Ah!" the room was full of wonderment. My students were thrown into doubt, they could not explain the conflict. There was lively discussion. After allowing ample discussion time, I asked my students to offer questions about the phenomenon. Why had the raw egg reached the bottom first? What was the difference between the two experiments? This was followed by more discussion. They were aware that their existing schema was faulty, but were not sure why. What limits had their concept reached? What were they leaving out of the account? In fact they had knowledge only of pure rotational motion, and were not aware that the second experiment involved translation, and that they need to consider the two concepts—rotation and translation—together.

At this point I offered an explanation in the form of a formula: according to the principle of the conservation of mechanical energy, the total kinetic energy of a body which rotates around a fixed axis is made up of translational kinetic energy + Rotational Energy, or

\[ E = E_t + E_r. \]

If the \( E_r \) is larger, the \( E_t \) will be smaller. Therefore, the boiled egg, which had larger \( E_r \), will reach the bottom later than the raw. I seemed to have dispelled my students' wonder with this explanation, but there still remained the crucial matter of them internalizing the new schema, and being able to use it in new situations.

This particular lesson unfolded in what I will call five stages of wonder. The first, represented by presenting the eggs-in-rotation problem, I call stimulating wonder. The second, represented by the demonstration which contradicted their schema, I call the stage of doubt or perplexity, a state in which the existing schema cannot explain the phenomenon. The third stage was represented by their heated conversation, and I call it analyzing wonder. Finally, my introduction of new information in order to solve the discrepancy I call the elimination of wonder. When they had the new information—in this case introduced by myself rather than arrived at themselves, but either could be the case—my students were capable, not only of explaining the motion of the two eggs, but also of solving general energy problems related to relational and translational motion. My next job was to find another experiment which would repeat the same sequence of wonder, this time starting with their present, expanded schema.