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Barbara Weber

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Here’s a book to help us think about words. The Pig in the Spigot informs the reader that a pig in the spigot is no big problem; a little extra water will flush him out. An ox in the phlox is more worrisome. The elf in the belfry has a problem; a belfry is too gloomy for an elf. And the rat on Ararat has no problems at all; he should go make friends with the lady rat. In short verses, the poet Richard Wilbur invites the reader to find friendly little words inside big words, and then to imagine why they’re there.

The trick is addictive. Friendships have ends, your mother is other, there’s occasionally a bat in the bathroom, stewards sometimes serve stew, and gophers frequently go, but there’s no sin in sincere, thunder is over, not under, and balloons don’t have to be balls. The Pig in the Spigot sets up games to keep on playing, for parents and kids or kids alone – a useful benefit for a book, when the games are good games.

These games are very good -- for banishing the natural fear that culture arouses in beginners. Mysterious words are scary to everybody. When adults run into “eleemosynary” or “unprepossessing” or “reticulated,” they feel they have been found out, shown up as not smart enough. That happens more often than not to children. The culture keeps hammering at them: “There is so much you don’t know.” This book suggests instead: “Make a friend within the scary word, and then work together with that friend to figure out the place where it lives.” That’s good strategy for coming to terms with new words. Indeed, it’s pretty good strategy for coming to understand any complex thing: find some part you know about, and work outward from there.

These games also show up the hidden power of words. The feeling one has, coming off the book, is that words carry stories inside them. Words are not just passive tools. Words, on the view Wilbur evokes in this book, have all sorts of interesting relations with other words. One just has to listen to them, let the words tell their stories. That’s an attitude that is at least as accurate as the “words are shovels and hammers” attitude, and much more helpful for a beginning writer, or for a reader hungry for meaning.

When someone plays the game that The Pig in the Spigot starts, he or she will eventually come to make distinctions between fanciful presences of words in words and the deep ways that words are compound and complex and bearers of strange construction histories. This investigation is deep in the roots of philosophy; the many ways that words contain meaning in their internal relations is the theme of the first effort at linguistic understanding in Western philosophy, Plato’s Cratylus, a work as playful in its own way as this one, though largely inaccessible to those who don’t know Greek.

Someone might object: “Yes, words are serious business, and should be taken seriously. A child should learn about roots and prefixes and suffixes properly, in order, without all this misleading fanciful talk. There is no scientific way that ‘ant’ is a part of ‘pantry.’ Any educated adult knows that.” There are a couple of answers to that objection. First, kids who are forced to learn lists of prefixes and suffixes and Greek and Latin roots generally end up hating word work, despising dictionaries. They are given many answers before they have had the chance to ask any questions, and the possibility of word-geology as fun is stolen from them. I’d guess that, once children get started Wilbur’s way, finding words in words and wondering what they are doing there, they’ll take on information about prefixes and suffixes and roots as a way to make the game more fun, and they’ll develop a life-long habit of squinting at words to see what might be in them.

Also, as with many things that adults allegedly learned and now know, it turns out that mostly they didn’t and don’t. People usually have as little sense of how words work as of how computers work. The person who sets out to discover something seldom wonders what is covering it up: that might be a good question to start with. If I inform you of something, I seldom think about making a form in you (a sort of brain surgery). But I should think about that. When I want to understand something, a plausible strategy is to stand under it. And responsibility, that grand thing parents are always trying to drum into their kids, insists on being about response, not neatness and obedience. The old ways of teaching don’t make poetic adults.

We can learn from our words, if we listen to them and play with them and see what they contain. That’s a lesson from the outer limits of philosophy, from Heidegger and Wittgenstein and Ricoeur. But the journey of listening to our own words can’t begin with these venerable giants. It has to start with fine springboard books like The Pig in the Spigot and with good games, played for life.
Philosophizing with Children at Universities and Schools in Germany

Barbara Brüning

1. Introduction: The Status of Religious and Ethical Education in Germany

The Federal Republic of Germany consists of sixteen states with legislative competence. That means that the states each have a different curriculum for school subjects based on general standards for schools centralized by the Conference of the Federal Ministries of Education.

Germany accords special constitutional status to value-oriented education. Article 7 of the constitution considers religion as an obligatorily available subject for all students, although students are not required to take such classes if either they or their parents refuse.

The 1960’s saw a rift form in German and European lifestyles and value systems. European children no longer participated in religious education at schools, and as a consequence, many came home early from school. For that reason the German Protestant and Catholic churches called for ethical education at schools for those students who did not participate in religious education. The Bavaria and Rhineland-Palatinate states were the first to introduce ethics in schools in 1974.

2. Philosophizing with Children in Primary Schools in Germany

Ethical education is currently offered at the junior level (beginning at the age of 11 years) in all sixteen German states. This gives students the choice to study either religion or ethics. In the primary schools, only six states offer ethical education for those students not participating in religious education (see table below). In the other states there is no subject to choose for those children who do not accept religious education. Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania is the first state (not just in Germany, but in all of Europe) which offers philosophizing with children as an alternative school subject to religion. Over 70% of students choose this subject in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania in primary schools (Brüning 1999, 72).

Teachers have to pass a university examination for teaching ethics or philosophizing with children in the states mentioned in the table below.

The state of Brandenburg has a particular structure of value education in primary schools and on junior level. In this state and in the state of Berlin, primary schooling lasts 6 years (in the other states of Germany it is only 4 years). The life-ethics-religious studies course is offered in the fifth and sixth year. This subject is obligatory for all Brandenburg students. Those who want to take part in religious education can choose religion. This juristic solution was possible because Brandenburg (part of the former German Democratic Republic) was not part of Germany when the Constitution was created in 1949. Thus, this state was accorded special status in relation to article 7.

Philosophizing with children in primary schools is present in other areas apart from ethical education in Germany. It can also be found in the form of a comprehensive principle for other subjects, e.g. as a method in the humanities (society and nature). The states of Hamburg and North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, regard philosophizing...
with children as one of the main instructional methods in their curriculum for *humanities*.

Some schools in Hamburg offer the possibility of choosing philosophy as a creative project. As a result, an interdisciplinary work group at the University of Hamburg offers special university classes for teachers and students of all subjects. Here, such teachers and students can obtain supplementary qualification if they pass at least three classes and two practical courses in philosophizing with children.

The interdisciplinary research group in philosophizing with children consists of university teachers from different subjects, including didactics of philosophy and religion, didactics of humanities, as well as didactics of biology. This group mainly aims at developing cross-curricular methods in philosophizing with children, and is planning a project with South Africa.

This following table shows what subjects are taught at certain school levels in the different States:

### Table: Ethical Education in Primary Schools in Germany  
(latest research: June 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Name of the school subject</th>
<th>Year of introduction and latest curricular program</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Important topics of the curricular program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>c.: 2000 introduction: 1974</td>
<td>*Supplementary subject</td>
<td>Friendship, happiness, identity, labour and profession, family, religions of the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony</td>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>c.: 2004 introduction 1997</td>
<td>* Obligatory subject of choice</td>
<td>Rules of communities, family, death, time, elements of the world and development of the universe Methods*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuringia</td>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>c.: 2003 introduction: 1993</td>
<td>Obligatory subject of choice</td>
<td>Rules of communities, religions of the world, friendship, happiness Methods*</td>
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Additional explanations for the table:

* Supplementary subject means that religious education is the main subject; ethical education can only be offered in a school if there is also religious education; subject of choice means that the students have to choose either religion or ethics

** Methods of philosophizing with children are, among others: conceptual analysis, argumentation, Socratic dialogue and thinking experimentation with ideas (see further explication about methods)

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** Methods of philosophizing with children are, among others: conceptual analysis, argumentation, Socratic dialogue and thinking experimentation with ideas (see further explication about methods)
a) Conceptual analysis:

The curriculum recommends that children think about philosophical concepts that play a big role in stories or questions (e.g., students discuss the issue of how to deal with a problematic situation in which four children must try to share only three sweets. Discussions of this issue tend to arrive at the concept of fairness). To clarify what fairness means, they have to discover how fairness can be described in different situations. They practise language games such as: What is the counter-concept to fairness? With which other terms (concepts) can fairness be compared?

b) Argumentation:

Children are also asked to give reasons for their beliefs and opinions (e.g. why is it unfair if one child doesn’t get one of the sweets?). The curricular program at Saxony recommends that third and fourth grade children give more than one reason for their opinions (Saxony, 2004, p. 7).

c) Socratic dialogue:

Modern Socratic dialogue represents the main method of ethical education in Germany. Children form a community of inquiry in order to solve philosophical or ethical problems with the help of the teacher - who has the role of supporting and encouraging them to find a solution. The teacher asks questions or offers summaries. She doesn’t, however, deliver “the right answer” at the end of a lesson. That defines a new role for the teacher; she is no longer the one who knows everything in a thinking classroom community.

In line with the community of inquiry approach, Socratic dialogue doesn’t ask for a consensus at the end of the dialogue. This is quite distinct from other school subjects (e.g. in a discussion about whether plants can have feelings, some children believe that flowers can be happy, while others believe that they have no feelings whatsoever). It is possible to have more than one solution for a problem, and both answers can be backed up by good arguments. The problem might not be satisfactorily solved for all children. Therefore, at the end of a discussion the teacher should make clear whether or not a consensus has been reached (e.g. “We were looking for a good solution for our problem, but not all of you might be satisfied by it. Let us think once more about the various steps of our thinking process.”).

Techniques in leading a Socratic dialogue are among the main topics in advanced teacher training for ethical education (e.g. in Saxony and Thuringia).

d) Thought experiments with ideas:

Is a method which aims at developing the philosophical imagination of children (e.g. what would you do if there were no friends in the world?). The curriculum considers philosophical fantasy as a very important tool for encouraging children to develop their own ideas, as well as for situations which might not be real but could happen one day (see Brüning 2001).

Summary:

In Germany, philosophizing with children in primary schools is established in the ethical education subject – which is offered as an alternative to religious education. It also appears in other school subjects such as humanities projects like children’s university. The curricular programs aim at developing the thinking abilities of younger children by establishing a classroom community.

Recommended materials are children’s books, paintings, fairy tales, short novels and subjects of children’s daily life.

3. University Classes in Philosophizing with Children: the Hamburg example

Hamburg was the first university in Germany to offer special classes in philosophizing with children in all areas
In 1979, Prof. Dr. Ekkehard Martens organized the first class in philosophizing with children, based on the novel *Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery*. In 2005, a second working group for philosophizing with children and young adults was founded at the Department of Education in the field of the didactics of philosophy.

This group consists of representatives of university teachers, of the teacher’s association, the school administration as well as of representatives of teacher refresher courses in Hamburg. It aims at a theoretical, practical and institutional investigation of philosophizing with children and young people as well as it’s promotion, for example, in curriculum work, teaching experiences, empirical research and advanced training for teachers. This group is completing research on the “Hamburg-Model”, which is a student- and problem-oriented way of philosophizing with children and young people on a regional, national and international level. This model is particularly focused on philosophizing in primary schools. For example, Barbara Brüning supported the first curriculum program in philosophizing with children for primary schools in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and developed special school books for several states.

In October of 2005, Martens and Brüning gave a lecture in philosophizing with children at the University of Hamburg that focused on the question: Why can’t we buy happiness? The *children’s university* is a project which is being run by many German universities. They offer many different subjects, philosophy among them. At the University of Hamburg they offered special classes in philosophizing with children for the first time. Questions brought up in these classes included: Can animals think? (Ekkehard Martens); Must people be punished if they do evil things? (Barbara Brüning); How to come out of Plato’s cave? (Markus Tiedemann) and Who am I? (Martina Dege).

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Brüning, Barbara (2001) /Philosophieren in der Grundschule (Philosophizing in Elementary Schools: a manual for teachers)/ (Berlin: Cornelsen)

Ministry of education of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (2003) /Curricular Program on Philosophizing with Children/ (Edition of the ministry of Schwerin)

Ministry of Education of Saxony (2004) /Ethics:

Curricular Program for Elementary Schools/ (Dresden)

Ministry of Saxony-Anhalt (2005) /Ethical Education: Curricular Program for Elementary Schools/ (Magdeburg)

Ministry of Education of Thuringia (2003) /Ethics: Curricular Program for Primary Schools/ (Erfurt)
Philosophizing with Children in Germany; People, Projects and Pursuits

The following overview mentions established groups, recent projects and acknowledged persons who have been active in the field of philosophizing with children in the past and present. The people and/or groups in this network collaborate on one or more projects. Some of them are mostly praxis-oriented: they philosophize with children in schools, kindergartens, after-school care centers or at special events. Others have their focal point in university classes or in theoretical or empirical research. In addition to the names and groups mentioned here, there are also many other highly creative, idealistic and hard-working people. Although to mention all their names would exceed the scope of such an overview, we want to thank them and express our appreciation for the enthusiastic and brilliant work of everyone who has been philosophizing with children for so many years.

HAMBURG:

University of Hamburg
Workgroup for Didactics of Philosophy and Philosophizing with Children and Teenagers

This subject-specific didactical workgroup includes various representatives of the subject of philosophy from the university, the teachers’ federation, and the educational and teacher-training authorities in Hamburg. Its aim is to investigate the theoretical, practical and institutional aspects of the learning process, as well as to encourage interest in learning among children and teenagers. They have developed concepts, curricula, models of practice and learning material. They conduct empirical research, education and continuing education. This workgroup improves and refines Hamburg’s approved subject-specific didactical model and supports the current developments of philosophizing with children and teenagers on an educational and political level, regionally, nationally and internationally.

Barbara Brüning and Ekkehard Martens are the speakers of this workgroup in the Department of Education at the Faculty for Education, Psychology and the Science of Movement. Further members of this group are Martina Dege, Christian Gefert, Felix Lund and Markus Tiedemann. This workgroup is affiliated with the IAPC.

Contact: Universität Hamburg, Fakultät 4, Fachbereich Erziehungswissenschaft, Sektion 4, Von-Melle-Park 8, D-20146 Hamburg, Germany
Email: Prof. Dr. Ekkehard Martens: Martens@erzwiss.uni-hamburg.de. Prof. Dr. Barbara Brüning: Barbara@bruening-hamburg.de

University of Hamburg: Interdisciplinary Workgroup of Philosophizing with Children

This workgroup includes representatives of various disciplines who offer university classes within their subject about philosophizing with children. The students attain a certain certificate if – among other prerequisites – they attend three classes and write a paper with a practical application.

The members of this workgroup are:

Prof. Dr. Barbara Brüning (Didactics of Philosophy, Sekt. 4)
Prof. Dr. Ekkehard Martens (Didactics of Philosophy, Sekt. 4)
Prof. Dr. Kerstin Michalik (Didactics of General Knowledge, Sekt. 5)
Prof. Dr. Gordon Mitchell (Didactics of Religion, Sekt. 5)
Prof. Dr. Patricia Nevers (Didactics of Biology, Sekt. 5)
 Prof. Dr. Helmut Schreier (Didactics of General Knowledge, Sekt. 5)
 Prof. Dr. Ulrich Gebhard (Didactics of Biology, Sekt. 5)

This workgroup is planning an international project in the field of philosophizing with children in Africa. For this project, they are collaborating with the UNESCO Institute for Pedagogy in Hamburg.

The internet addresses of all the members can be found at: erzwiss.uni-hamburg.de/Personal

The “Philosophizing with Children” Association in Hamburg

This association was founded by Dr. Kristina Calvert. It primarily supports projects within the field of elective subjects in primary schools in Hamburg. It also supports scholarships for outstanding and highly gifted children in collaboration with the Karg Foundation and the Institute for School Development and Teacher Training in Hamburg.

More information is available at: www.Philosophieren-mit-Kindern-Hamburg.de

BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG:

University of Education Karlsruhe

Prof. Dr. Dipl. Psych. Eva Marsal of the University of Education Karlsruhe and Prof. Dr. Takara Dobashi of Hiroshima University understand philosophizing with children as “proto-play” (Urspiel) and “proto-science” (Urwissenschaft). They view P4C as a twofold research instrument: firstly, for the investigation of children’s concepts of self in a community of inquiry; and secondly, with regard to the content of concepts which children develop in a community of inquiry. Both qualitative and quantitative methods are used here.

Their research includes investigation into children’s concepts in German primary schools, along with cultural and gender comparisons.

They founded the German-Japanese Research Initiative of Philosophizing with Children (DIFPK) in 2005. Their P4C workgroup collaborates with the Institute of Philosophy and Theology, University of Education Karlsruhe and the Department of Learning Science, Graduate School of Education of Hiroshima University. Both cooperate with the University of Hamburg, the IAPC in Montclair, the Austrian Society for Philosophizing with Children in Graz (Dr. Daniela Camhy) and the University of Regensburg (Prof. Dr. Herb).

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Dr. Mechthild Ralla has been philosophizing with children since 1994. She organizes courses for parents, kindergarten teachers and schoolteachers. These courses take place at her own institution, “Spielforum Oberachern,” during local summer programs, in adult-education centers and as subject-specific classes for pedagogues. She is also a lecturer at the University of Education, Karlsruhe.

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Email: MechthildRalla@web.de
MEKLENBURG

University of Rostock

Prof. Dr. Heiner Hastedt is professor of philosophy at the University of Rostock, where, in addition to his other work, he also leads the “Philosophizing with Children” teacher-training program, which was introduced into all school forms in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in 1996. Dr. Silke Pfeiffer’s dissertation developed the theoretical foundations for philosophizing with children as a new school subject. She is presently working at the University of Oldenburg and philosophizes with children in the subject of Sachunterricht (i.e., studies of society and environment).

Contact: Prof. Dr. Heiner Hastedt, Universität Rostock, Institut für Philosophie, D-18051 Rostock, Germany

Email: Prof. Dr. Heiner Hastedt: Heiner.Hastedt@uni-rostock.de. Dr. Silke Pfeiffer: silke.pfeiffer@uni-oldenburg.de

BERLIN

Freie Universität Berlin

Prof. Dr. Hans-Ludwig Freese was a professor of education at the Freie Universität Berlin. He published textbooks with philosophical stories for teenagers. His research and articles address the ability of children to philosophize. Recently, he has been concentrating on philosophizing with teenagers and highly gifted children.

Contact: Prof. Dr. Hans-Ludwig Freese, Praxis für Pädagogisch-Psychologische Diagnostik und Beratung, Potsdamer Str.16, D-12205 Berlin, Germany

HANNOVER

University of Hannover

Prof. Dr. Detlef Horster holds a teaching chair in the philosophy of social sciences. His emphases are on ethics, law and essential philosophical questions of education. Prof. Horster is the leader of the “Contemplating Youth” (Jugend denkt) project of the “Kulturregion Hannover” Foundation. Prof. Horster has published numerous books and articles in the field of philosophizing with children. Among other interests, his main focus lies in the Socratic Method, which he also uses for adult education.

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BAVARIA

University of Regensburg

Roswitha Wiesheu from Munich and Prof. Dr. Karlfriedrich Herb of the University of Regensburg initiated the “Children philosophize” project in 2003. Prof. Dr. Herb holds a teaching chair in political philosophy and the history of ideas. His research team in Regensburg developed advanced training for teachers, pedagogues and kindergarten teachers, as well as university classes for the University of Philosophy in Munich and the University of Regensburg. This initiative seeks to foster life skills in children by establishing philosophy in kindergartens, schools and after-school care centers. A pilot program was conducted at 13 exemplary schools and kindergartens from January 2005 to December 2006. The initiative also organized various philosophical events in which several thousand children and adults participated.

The focal point of this initiative is to view philosophizing as an educational principle which links various subjects and institutions. The aim is to cultivate an open, critical and self-confident worldview in children.

The first phase of this pilot project was successfully completed at the end of 2006. The teaching chair of Prof. Dr. Karlfriedrich Herb continues with different research projects and university classes in the field of philosophizing with children. One of those research projects at the teaching chair of Prof. Dr. Karlfriedrich Herb is Dr. Barbara Weber’s postdoctoral research project about democratic education, human rights and caring thinking. Roswitha Wiesheu founded the “Children philosophize” Academy and continues to organize teacher-training programs.
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University of Würzburg

Prof. Dr. Andreas Nießeler is professor for didactics
in primary schools at the institute for pedagogy of
the University of Würzburg. He published a book on
philosophizing with children in Sachunterricht (i.e.
studies of society and environment). Prof. Dr. Nießeler’s
primary focal points include hermeneutics, the theories
of Cassirer and his symbolic idea of world assimilation.

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NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN

Dr. Gabriele Münnix is a lecturer at the continuing-
education center for teachers in Mühlheim (Ruhr). She
has published numerous articles about syllabuses of
instruction in the field of philosophizing with children.
She has also published textbooks and philosophical
stories for children.

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Dr. Brigitte Wiesen is a teacher trainer for
philosophy and practical philosophy at the study
seminar in Düsseldorf. She is also a member of the
“Practical Philosophy” workgroup at the national
institute of Soest in North Rhine-Westphalia. She
has published many textbooks in the fields of
philosophy, practical philosophy and ethics. Lately, she
committed herself to supporting the school subject of
“Philosophizing with Children.”

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AUSTRIA and SWITZERLAND

Although Austria and Switzerland are not part of this
special edition of “Thinking,” we would like to mention
two women who have been active in this field for many

years.

Dr. Daniela Camhy founded the Austrian Center of
Philosophy for Children and Youth many years ago. Her
activities include numerous international conferences,
as well as a wide range of research, projects and
publications.

For detailed information, see: www.
kinderphilosophie.at

Eva Zoller founded the Schweizer Dokumentationsstelle für Kinder- und
Alltagsphilosophie (Swiss Documentary Site for
Children’s and Everyday Philosophy), which,
among its other services, provides information about
philosophizing with children, and organizes projects,
training and philosophical journeys (e.g. philosophizing
about Exupéry’s “Petit Prince” in the desert).

For detailed information see: www.
kinderphilosophie.ch

Some of the above information can be found in:
Barbara Brüning (ed): Philosophieren mit Kindern –
internationale Übersicht über Literatur, Aktivitäten
Replication of a Philosophical Experiment Based on the Riddle of the Sphinx

A Comparison of the Anthropological Concepts of Japanese and German Primary School Children

Translated into English by Hope Hague

Introduction

In this study we have made some comparisons between the anthropological concepts of Japanese and German primary school children. For this purpose, we used the research methodology of expanding and replicating an experiment, which is used in psychology as well as in other areas for assessing quality criteria. Here an experiment is repeated at a different point in time or in another culture, under similar conditions or with controlled variations, in order to test the intercultural validity of the results. A famous example of this is Milgram’s experimental study of obedience to authority\(^1\). In our design we replicated Takeji Hayashi’s\(^2\) experiment in philosophy for children based on the Riddle of the Sphinx, as carried out on July 3, 1971, in the third grade of the Tsubonuma State Primary School in Sendai, Miyagi Prefecture.

Thirty five years later, on July 26, 2006, Hayashi’s pictorial material and questions were used again to stimulate philosophizing with the third grade of the Peter Hebel Primary School in Karlsruhe. The Sphinx’s riddle, “What goes on four legs in the morning, on two legs at noon, and on three legs in the evening?\(^3\)” refers on the one hand to diachronic identity, and on the other to mankind’s rational nature as homo faber (the one who makes tools; the technological animal).

Since the question about the nature of mankind is linked to human morphology, then the phylogenetic distinction between humans and animals and the ontogenetic development of human individuals can serve as orientation points for further reflection. For one thing, a discussion like this raises questions about how we deal with the last phase of life, which is a highly controversial topic in our aging society. Yet, it also raises questions about the place of human beings in the cosmos, and their relationship to intelligent animals capable of emotional experience. Today, such questions are of central importance in philosophical debates concerning human dignity. Eckehard Martens, too, philosophizes with children on the question “Can animals think?” In this context, it becomes evident that the Riddle of the Sphinx, which brings human morphology into an intimate connection with the essence of the human,\(^4\) is once again very relevant in our time, and has in no way been resolved.

In the following, we begin with a discussion of the Sphinx mythology, followed by an introduction to Hayashi’s philosophical experiment for children. Finally we compare the answers given by the German and Japanese children. Aspects of both culture and gender will be considered in the evaluation.

I. The Greek Sphinx and its Riddle

The female Sphinx of the Greeks was originally an archaic male Gestalt type that originated in ancient Egypt and, in the course of Egyptian cultural development, came to symbolize the sun god or the Pharaoh.

By way of Syria, the Sphinx came to Crete and spread from there throughout Greece.\(^5\)

The Riddle of the Sphinx has its literary home in the Oedipus myth.\(^6\) According to Sophocles, the demonic beast-woman threatened the city of Thebes, carrying off and devouring all passing youths who were unable to solve the riddle “What goes on four legs in the morning, on two legs at noon, and on three legs in the evening?”

A second version of the riddle asks, “What has one name that is four-footed, two-footed, and three-footed? Of all living things, it alone changes its shape [...] When it walks supported by the most feet it is the slowest.” In most versions, the provenance of the
riddle goes unmentioned, although it is identified in two sources. In one story, the riddle is attributed to the Delphic oracle, in another, to Apollo’s companions, the muses.8

While adults in our times are familiar with the symbolic representation of life phases as times of day, the Greeks of the 6th century before Christ were not yet accustomed to linear time, segmented into precise, physically normed units. They experienced the day’s passing as the divine order. In Homer, for example, there is no direct designation for morning. Homer speaks of “rosy-fingered Eos,” the goddess of dawn, “who announces the approach of the sun god Helios.” Morning, midday and evening represent constellations of sun and earth, of the sun god Helios and the earth goddess Gaia.

If one combines both versions of the riddle, the changing forms of human development from early childhood to old age, as imagined by Greeks of the 6th century B.C., follow the same motion as the sun in its daily semi-circular arc. “The principle of movement is the sun, Helios. The constant and immovable pole is the earth, Gaia. It is from her that humans separate themselves when they stand upright, and to her old age bends them down, and they enter into her again when they die.”9 For Homer, the first sight of sunlight is the symbol for birth.10 The loss of sunlight signifies death.11 “Morning is the place where contact still exists, but is simultaneously the beginning of separation between Helios and Gaia. Their separation allows the morning light to arise, whose power of distinction allows objects to arise out of obscuring darkness and receive the outlines of their shapes. In the morning of life, crawling on all fours, a human is still in close proximity to the earth, the mother. But—in analogy to the sun—the gradual separation from the earth begins as the body assumes an erect position and the head is raised. At midday, the time of brightest light, the sun has reached the position of greatest distance from earth. The noon of a human life is also the pinnacle of physical and mental power. Walking upright on two legs, one reaches the maximal separation from the earth, the mother. The second version of the riddle seems to emphasize this aspect of separation when it states that the still unnamed creature is quickest when supported by the fewest feet. Evening brings the reunion of Helios and Gaia, and for humans, the symbolic reunion with mother earth, or death.”12

It is significant that the question about humans is being posed by a figure in whom the sharp distinction between human and animal is still incomplete, and that the self destruction of this human-animal figure results from the riddle’s solution, which contains the recognition of this distinction, which is the awakening of human self-awareness. The play of the philosophical riddle thus reflects both perspectives, phylogenetic and ontogenetic, according to which each child in its own culture must answer the questions: What is human? Who am I as a human being?

2. The Reconstruction of Hayashi’s Sphinx-Unit

How then do the children deal with these beginnings of anthropological self-awareness? Are the differences between two cultures so distant from one another as the Japanese and the German? In order to make a comparison of the answers possible, we first reconstructed the sequence of related questions that Hayashi had explored with the Japanese children, and presented them to the German children in the same order. Once the potential for exploration within a given question complex had been exhausted by the children, the group discussion was moved forward with a new question. Hayashi divided the thinking process into three large areas.

I. The Riddle of the Sphinx
(photographs of the Sphinx – story of Oedipus)

II. Human History – Individual History
and the human races-questions about the children’s own memories and experiences among family and friends)

III. Human-Animal Differences
(consequences of having four vs. two feet – advantages of walking upright – tasks of legs, hands, head – special capabilities of animals)

3. Presentation of the Anthropological Concepts of Japanese and German Primary School Children as Revealed in a Selection of their Statements
3.1 The Anthropological Concept of the Japanese Children (July 3, 1971, grade 3 of Tsubonuma State Primary School in Sendai, Miyagi Prefecture)

The Sphinx’s riddle allows the children to take a wide view that includes all creatures with the attribute of legs. The children have a literal interpretation of evening, as they are not familiar with the time metaphor. They only find a solution by thinking that the creature they are looking for might be a monkey and then interpreting the monkey as a precursor of humans. Thus Mariko (95 J-Child 3) deduces: “Ah, the monkey becomes a chimpanzee, and that turns into a gorilla, and the gorilla turns into a human.” When Hayashi reminds them of their own experiences, the children are able to make the transfer from the times of day to the epochs of life. While Keiko (112J-Child 3) is able to give a general interpretation: “When people get older, they walk with a cane, little by little, bent forward,” Naoki, in response to Hayashi’s question (131 H) “What do you call the person with a cane?” shares a concrete observation (134 J-Child 3): “Excuse me, please! Next to my apartment […] in the next house […] the person is called Herr Watanabe.” Together the children now try to work out the difference between animals and humans using examples from the eating habits of dogs and people.

To illustrate this process, we will use an excerpt from the protocol. It should be noted in assessing Hayashi’s work that the Japanese instructional style has not in any way prepared the children for a reflective style of thinking.

**Protocol Excerpt: Japanese Children**

196 H[ayashi]: What do humans do with their hands when they stand on two legs? For example, what is the difference between the way a dog and a person eats?

201 J- Ch. 1: It eats rice with its mouth. It doesn’t need hands.

213 J- Ch. 2: It eats a bone by holding on to it with its front legs.

204 H: Yes. Is it then able to carry the bone somewhere?

205 J- Children: Yes, it can.

206 H: What does it use to carry it?


208 H: It carries it in its mouth without using hands. Can it also hide the bone somewhere?

209 J- Children: Yes, it can. That’s why it uses its mouth for carrying. People use their hands for carrying things.

211 H: When there is bean paste soup to eat in the wooden bowl, the dog drinks it by putting its muzzle into the bowl. How do people drink the soup? Do they stick their mouths into their bowls like dogs?

212 J- Ch. 5: Ha ha! No, they drink properly by holding the bowl in their hands and using chopsticks.

214 J-Ch. 3: Without hands we aren’t able to do it.

215 H: Since we stand on our two legs, we can use our hands in many ways. Now how does a dog behave when eating a really tough piece of meat?

216 J- Ch. 2: Yes, it pulls it close with its hands and holds it tight with its hands.

217 H: Yes. Not with its hands. With its front legs. It holds it tight and tears it apart with its mouth. How do humans behave when they are supposed to eat a big piece of meat?

218 J-Ch. 1 If they don’t cook it first, it isn’t possible.

219 H: They could also eat it raw. Now, which one of the two, human or dog, is better able to consume the big tough piece of meat?

220 J-Children: The dog. The dog.

221 H: Why?

222 J-Ch. 2: With a dog, the teeth stick out some.

226 J-Ch. 4: Because its teeth are sharp, and pointed.

228 J-Ch. 3: I’ve already been bitten once by a dog.

231 H: If a person would use his teeth to tear apart a tough piece of meat, the teeth could break. So what does he do? Instead of tearing apart the tough meat?

232 J-Ch. 5: He cooks it.

233 H: Yes, he cooks it. Cooking makes it tender. After cooking has made it tender, does he take a bite from the big piece of meat?

234 J-Ch. 4: No. He uses chopsticks.

235 H: He uses chopsticks? With such a large piece of meat?

236 J-Children: It has to be cut up.
The Japanese children conclude that the animal can use its natural attributes to satisfy its needs without any further means, whereas humans compensate for the missing attributes with tools, and form patterns of culture. As a further development beyond the level of chimpanzees and gorillas, the children note humans’ ability to produce weapons such as lances and swords, or firearms and bombs.

3.2 The Anthropological Concept of the German Children (July 26, 2006, Grade 3 of the Peter Hebel Primary School, Karlsruhe)

The German children also have no direct access to the metaphor of time. Only after looking at the dryopithecus do they arrive at the idea of connecting humanity’s development with individual development and solve the Riddle of the Sphinx: G-B 99 Miro.

“It’s a human. As a baby he crawls, when he’s grown he walks on two legs, and when he’s an old grandpa he uses a cane to help him walk.” Following one child’s assertion that, seen in this light, four-legged animals are at the same level as infants, the children go on to enumerate four-legged animals like the lions or tigers, among others, comparing them with two-legged animals like the stork or the penguin. Here, as with the Japanese children, our protocol excerpt begins with the stimulus “What is the difference between walking on four legs or two?”

Protocol Excerpt: German children

G-G 161 Lea: Maybe you get a better foothold from walking on four legs.

G-G 163 Julia: On four legs you can run faster.

G-G 167 Sophia: You can’t pick up anything in your hands.

G-G 173 Lea: Then you can’t eat with a knife and fork. Then you have to eat with your mouth.

G-B 175 Marc: Like a bear, for example, who can walk on two legs, but he doesn’t do it – then the animal he has caught could get away, because he couldn’t hold on to it.

G-G 177 Sophia: But the tiger, for example, he runs around on four legs, he stands on top of his prey and eats it.

G-G 179 Lea: Yes, (a) dog eats with its mouth and [...] well, we also eat with our mouths, but we can hold a knife and fork in our hands.

G-B 181 Linus: Dogs slobber with their tongues.

G-B 187 Johannes: The animals that have a lot of legs and can run fast with them have to tear the meat apart and we can cut it with the fork or something. And the animals have to tear it apart with their teeth.

G-B 217 Miro: forks, they haven’t been around for all that long.

G-B 219 Miro: Spoons already existed for the apes, they just took their hands. The knife was a pointed stone.

G-B 221 Johannes: With the fork you can, um [...] actually, there used to be forks, too, because they have a handle, that can be the arm, and the others were pointed and that can be the fingers, and with all that you can hold onto things.

In the anthropological concept of the German children, the connection between humans and animals is elaborated more fully than was the case with the Japanese children. For example, the eating tools are not seen as original human inventions. Apes are given credit for using the knife, and the dipping function of the spoon is derived from the natural use of an ape’s hand. The fork is seen as parallel to animal claws, or to the arm with the fingers. Nonetheless, the introduction of eating tools is viewed as progress, although not so much in the aesthetic sense of a refined eating culture, as with the Japanese children, but more from a pragmatic point of view.
Like the Japanese children, the German children also emphasize that other mammals, like bears or tigers, have highly developed capabilities suited to meeting their basic needs and enabling communication among them. But when the children focus on the additional capabilities humans gain from upright posture and the free use of arms and hands, they list many cultural activities that a wild animal in its natural environment would not be capable of, such as tying shoes (G-G 197), painting (G-B 203) or playing the guitar (G-G 209). In other words, humans can make interesting lives for themselves with plenty of variety. So it is only logical when Lea (G-G 271) states: “If there were no people in the world, it would really be boring; then there would only be animals.” The children explain this human openness to the world in terms of their freedom to determine how they will live. As Julia (G-G 259) says, “Animals always have something they need to do. For example, they have to lay eggs to reproduce, and there’s hardly anything people have to do.”

The German children criticize the fact that human cognitive superiority does not go hand in hand with moral superiority, in the sense of caring for nature. Here their focus is not so much on improving quality of life through cultural achievement per se, as in the example of a streetcar line that makes outlying areas accessible. The focus is more on the dark side of such technological achievements, in this case the destruction of animal habitat. They do emphasize, though, that humans can use the freedom of choice resulting from their “bigger brains” to support the ecological balance, as when Linus (G-B 287) says, “They grow plants, and flowers for the butterflies.”

4. Comparison of the Anthropological Concepts of Japanese and German Primary School Children Using a System of Categories for Content Analysis

Next we compare the anthropological concepts of the Japanese and German primary school children using a qualitatively structured system of categories. Here each of a child’s contributions is a unit for content-analytical encoding. In other words, everything each child said was integrated into the system of categories developed for this purpose. Since the amount of data was derived from only two classes, quantitative validation through statistical tests is not appropriate. But for the sake of better comparability, the raw figures have been converted into percentages.

The categorical system itself was derived inductively from the children’s responses. It reflects the cooperative process of worldview construction in the classroom. As the dialogue shows, the children begin with their own primary experience and acquired secondary knowledge, which they then develop further through argument in a group thinking process. The following sections will clarify the categories by citing some typical statements as examples.

4.1 Sample Statements and Explication of the Categories

What follows are isolated statements and not excerpts of dialogues.

Close Connection Between Humans and Animals

G-B 219 Miro: There were already spoons with the apes. They just used their hands. The knife was a pointed stone.

The close connection is first established by placing humans within the ranks of the mammals, through emphasizing their common ancestry with apes, and then by emphasizing that apes also have higher capabilities, for example in the use of tools.

Superiority of Humans

Intellectual competence

G-B 289 Miro: Humans can do research.
G-B 273 Johannes: Humans can talk and animals can’t.
G-G 259 Julia: Animals always have something they need to do. For example, they have to lay eggs to reproduce, and there’s hardly anything people have to do.

Moral competence

G-B 275 Jan: But people take away the living space from animals.

Emotional competence

G-G 281 Sophia: And then we take away the birds’ [...] for example, their nests, they can’t build their nests there any more [...] if there wouldn’t be so many trees any more, they couldn’t build their nests everywhere.

Physical competence

G-G 179 Lea: Yes, a dog eats with its mouth and [...] well, we also eat with our mouths, but we can hold a knife and fork in our hands.
G-G 197 Lea: Tying shoes.

Diachronic identity

G-B 99 Miro: It’s a human. As a baby he crawls, when he’s grown he walks on two legs, and when he’s an old grandpa, he uses a cane to help him walk.

The superiority of humans to animals is defined by intellectual, moral and emotional competence. Walking upright gives humans the free and wide-ranging use of their hands resulting in physical competence. This is seen as the prerequisite for the gains realized from human mental capacities. But humans aren’t superior to animals in all phases of their lives. They must make an effort to compensate for constitutional deficiencies related to slow development and other causes.

Humans as Beings with Deficits

G-G 121 Julia: My sister could stand up when she was one year and two months old, and she could walk at 16 months.
218 J: It’s impossible for a human to eat a big piece of meat without cooking it first.

In contrast to animals, remarkable for their highly skilled physical functionality and the special physical adaptations that enable them to master life within a certain habitat, humans are characterized by a long developmental phase and nonspecific natural competencies.

Culture and Customs

212 J: Ha ha! No, they drink properly by holding the bowl in their hands and using chopsticks.
G-B 227 Marc: Maybe a few people reached into the soup to eat and burnt their hands and then they thought, let’s invent something and they invented the fork.

Humans, through their (primarily intellectual) superiority and their morphology, can compensate for deficiencies by developing a culture adequate to their needs, and the customs to refine it.

Technological Progress

G-G 261 Sophia: It’s possible for us to build a house. If we had only feet instead of hands, we couldn’t build a house, and we couldn’t eat with a knife and fork, either.

The first tools needed, such as sticks or stone knives, are further developed as weapons. Other personal and social needs also present technological challenges that humans, given their attributes, are able to overcome.

Ecological Consciousness / Stewardship of Nature

G-B 277 Marc: People also build houses, pre-schools and stores and this way they destroy the animals’ living space.
G-B 279 Linus: Near our house on Erzberger Street they just finished building a streetcar line, and they had to cut down a whole lot of trees.
G-B 287 Linus: They grow plants, and flowers for the butterflies.

Expansion of the civilized world pushes back the natural habitat of animals and destroys the ecological balance. But because of their moral competence, humans are capable of creating new habitats for the preservation of nature.

4.2 Analysis of the System of Categories

The content analysis resulted in a frequency distribution, reflecting the cooperative process of worldview construction in the primary school classroom. (See Table 1)

The most striking category for all the children is the superiority of humans, with the Japanese children at 48%, and the German children at 55%. At the same time, though, they see that humans have deficits. This attitude is a primary indicator of the great respect and affection for animals that they revealed in conversation. In this, though, the Japanese children score higher with 24%, the second highest value in the table, compared to the German children with 9%. This discrepancy may be related to differing understandings of nature. Michael Gebauer and Nobuyuki Harada, in a large comparative cultural study of Japanese and German primary school children, were able to demonstrate that the Buddhist influence in Japanese moral education had provided the Japanese children with an understanding of the cosmos marked by belief in the interdependence and principle equality of all living beings.13 Such views might lead Japanese children to value the species-specific talents of the animals accordingly and, though recognizing the superiority of humans, to still place animals in a balanced relationship to them.

In apparent contradiction to this is the exceedingly low value of 1% in the category “close connection between humans and animals,” as opposed to 9% for the German children. But this result can also be explained using Gebauer and Harada’s study, which indicates that only the German children have access to the natural concept “knowledge,” which emphasizes the acquisition of information about nature. And in fact, some of the children revealed expertise concerning some aspects of living nature. In this context, the time that elapsed between the two instructional presentations is also significant. For many years now, philosophy and also popular science have been debating the relative position of apes and other sentient, emotionally capable, intelligent animals in the larger scheme of things. There have been television films demonstrating the ability of great apes to think, and films about human ancestry and the precursors of the human species. Likewise, there are ever more children’s books, fiction and non-fiction, that inform about the development of life on earth. As a result, there is a considerable difference between the German and Japanese children studied here with regard to their likely knowledge about science and their attitudes toward nature. The category “ecological consciousness” reflects something similar. The German children have a differentiated awareness of

Table 1.

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<th>Connections</th>
<th>Superiority</th>
<th>Deficits</th>
<th>Culture</th>
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J C are Japanese Primary School Children
G C are German Primary School Children
Connection = Connection Between Humans and Animals
Superiority = Superiority of Humans
Deficits = Humans as Beings with Deficits
Culture = Culture/Customs
Technological = Technological Advancement
Nature = Ecological Awareness

13 Such views might lead Japanese children to value the species-specific talents of the animals accordingly and, though recognizing the superiority of humans, to still place animals in a balanced relationship to them.
advancing technology’s ecological consequences. In the case of today’s Japanese children, environmental consciousness and activism revolve especially around aspects of animal or species protection, “whereby empathy and sympathy are clearly recognizable as primary motivations.”

Taken together with the religious-moral consciousness formed by the conventional 6-year primary school curriculum, which encourages nature experience and downplays scientific knowledge, this results in close emotional attachments to living creatures. As an example of this, the Japanese children expressed feelings of sadness while planting sunflowers, because these would be exposed to stormy wind and rain, and they requested that huts and protective walls be built for the flowers.

While the children had nearly equal scores (9% vs. 8%) in the category “technological advancement,” the Japanese children (18% vs. the German children’s 10%) emphasized the cultural aspect of refinement in advancement.

Thus, in both cultures the question about what is human leads to questions about the place of humans in the cosmos, and about a resulting human responsibility for the world, the environment, and all fellow creatures. Cultural differences, especially in ways of approaching nature, reveal themselves in the discussions surrounding this question.

5. The Gender Aspect

Since boys in Germany, according to national averages, don’t do as well as girls, we expected that these findings would be reflected by our experiment in philosophizing with children. But the opposite was true: the boys showed themselves to be very engaged in the discussions. Their participation score was 64%.

In terms of the content categories (see above), the distribution profile is similar. But there are a few differences. For the boys, humans are somewhat more closely connected to animals than for the girls, and as a result the boys place less emphasis on human superiority or inferiority. In this sample there may even be a statistically significant difference between boys and girls in the category “humans as beings with deficits,” with values of 6% and 15% respectively. The same holds true for the category “ecological awareness.” Here the frequency of environmentally critical statements is 13% for boys and 4% for girls. The boys also score higher in the category “technological advancement.” (See Table 2)

The quality of argumentation also shows similarities in distribution. In general, the children remain on the descriptive level, with values of 59% for both genders. It is interesting that for the boys, the remaining share of argumentation is more or less equally distributed between analytical-explanatory statements and the production of new ideas (22% vs. 19%), whereas the girls were more likely to make their views and opinions transparent through explanation, and less likely to engage in free association (29% vs. 12%).

As a result of a preference for the descriptive level, most statements are simple sentences (68% for both genders). The girls, because of their readiness to explain themselves, most often form three-part sentences, adding two subordinate clauses. The boys, wanting to support for their views more precisely, express themselves extensively, with 9% even making sentences with 6 clauses.

These gender observations can’t be generalized, since the small sample (N=158) is not representative. Yet it does make clear that philosophizing with children is not only beneficial for the girls. The boys see in it an opportunity to develop their thoughts freely and with imagination. Both boys and girls engaged seriously and also with playful energy in the process of group exploration.

Since Takeji Hayashi’s protocols do not note the children’s gender, we are not able to make a cultural comparison. But it is possible to draw some conclusions about gender issues using the children’s responses given after the lesson based on the Sphinx-riddle, which was presented by Hayashi approximately 600 times throughout Japan. A tendency is evident that Japanese boys in the third and fourth grades were less able than the girls to understand the meaning of the question behind the Sphinx riddle, and they were more frequently unable to grasp and feel the underlying implications. The boys were more likely to focus their interest on single facts, on historical knowledge about the Sphinx. To demonstrate this, here are a few examples:

-Naoki Matsuda (Grade 3): B
“I’ve been informed by the lesson that the Sphinx also exists in Greece, but I believe you can’t see the Sphinx in Greece. (N, 109)

-Seiya Sasaki (Grade 4): B
When teacher Hayashi said, “I’ve traveled to Egypt,” I thought “What a lie!” When he asked the question, I thought, “What is it?” and when I heard that the answer was “a human” I was surprised. (N, 113)

-Yoshiro Sugama (Grade 4): B
“For the first time I learned that the Sphinx was not only in Egypt, but also in Greece. And that the female Sphinx from Greece also has wings. (N, 134)

-Tadasu Sasaki, (Grade 4): B
Was there really such a Sphinx? I was surprised. [...] (N, 137)

In contrast, most of the girls were able to grasp the numinous quality of the story, as in the examples of Toshimi Ikeda (Grade 4), “horrible story,” or Mami Sasaki (Grade 3), “very fun, interesting.” The Riddle of the Sphinx led many girls to start philosophizing about humans. For them the lesson was stimulating:
- Mariko Yamakawa (Grade 4): G
  “Teacher Hayashi, what we studied today was ‘Bravo!’ And it was even a really good story. When I listened to the story, I gradually was very amused. With the infant it was 4 legs, with the adult it turned into 2 legs, and in old age 3 legs. I didn’t know that at all before. [...] For me that was enough, since I studied a lot that was interesting and fun.” (N, 106)

- Tomomi Mizuguchi (Grade 4): G
  The Riddle of the Sphinx, the imagined riddle that we don’t study in the general Japanese language subject, was really interesting. I’ve understood that we should behave in a very dignified way, since we are now living in the life phase of adults. (N, 133)

- Yukari Nishimura (Grade 4): G
  Teacher Hayashi’s question was; “What kind of animal is it that has 4 legs in the morning, 2 legs at midday, and 3 legs at night [...]” I thought that the animal could be a human. And after we had discussed it a lot, in the end we were supposed to conclude that the correct answer was a human. Maybe the reason why the travelers in the mountains couldn’t answer had something to do with the words “morning,” “midday,” and “night.” Between the morning, noon and night of one whole day and in a long lifetime, time, as the Sphinx hinted, could mean an entire lifetime. Afterward I thought carefully about why our study with teacher Hayashi was interesting [...] and I understood very well the true value of a human being. (N, 158)

Since the gender-specific information conveyed here is already 35 years old, the picture in today’s Japan may look different.

### Conclusion

The Riddle of the Sphinx is one fundamental approach to the question, “What is a human being?” Hayashi chose this riddle to emphasize the question’s importance and to present it to the children of his time as a primary human question that was posed in a game “of life and death.” Human existence and personhood is made possible by the ability to reflect, to have insight into cosmological connections, to understand the structure of time and the course of development, and to perceive distinct units. This process of cognition has to be realized both phylogenetically and ontogenetically; thus it stands at the beginning of an archaic process leading to the formation of consciousness. For this reason, it is associated with the game that, according to Johan Huizinga, marks the beginning of culture. For Huizinga, the origin of culture is to be found in play. Seriousness and play come together in life-preserving questions, sacred life questions posed as ritual riddles. Through the elevation of mere self-preservation in consciousness-raising play, life’s activities are imbued with meaning and culture is created. This game that poses the question about being human marks the beginning of human self-awareness, and its answer separates being from not-being. Hayashi recognized the unifying potential of this riddle, and he internationalized it for the children by starting out with the Sphinx in Egypt. After considerable time had passed, we replicated his Japanese lesson philosophizing on the Riddle of the Sphinx for children in Germany, and demonstrated in practice the perspectives that transcend culture and time. Today,

### Table 2

| System of Categories: Anthropological Concepts by German Primary School Children |
| Comparison of the frequencies in percentages |

![Graph showing comparison of categories]

- G means girls and B means boys (German Primary School Children)

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### Quality of Argumentation

![Graph showing quality of arguments]

- descriptive |
- explicative |
- creative/speculative

### Sentence Structure of Argumentation

![Graph showing sentence structure]

- one-part |
- two-part |
- three-part |
- four-part |
- five-part |
- six-part
in an era defined by the population’s aging (which poses the question of diachronic identity) or by globalization and redefinition of contemporary environments (as exemplified by the challenge of expanding membership in the “circle of the morally equal” to include not only humans, but all intelligent creatures with rich and multi-layered social and emotional lives) the Riddle of the Sphinx takes on a new importance.

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Notes

1Koch 1998.
2Dobashi 2006.
3Huf 1994, 11.
4Scheler 1975, 11.
Didactic Implementation of Ekkehard Martens’ Five Finger Model

Example: The Unit “Who am I? Dealing with Capabilities”
Translated into English by Hope Hague

In this lesson we want the children to gain competence in understanding identity as an expression of their own distinct individuality, while also seeing themselves as a part of the entire human family. This focus on the self increases sensitivity in identifying and presenting one’s own capabilities, and in understanding how others assess them.

The Five Finger Model of Ekkehard Martens

1. Identifying the Concept

In order to identify the concept, the children take an imaginary journey in which children from another culture ask, “Who are you?” This question, asked from a foreign perspective, encourages self-reflection. Which parameters will the philosophizing children choose? Natural-culture? Family ties and the forms they take? Personal capabilities? Wishful thinking?

The children put their chairs in a circle.

Getting started:

“Today we’ll start with an imaginary journey. Everyone please close your eyes.” (While the children keep their eyes closed, the teacher secretly places three identical photos of a group of children from another country in the center of the circle, so that each child, opening his or her eyes after the journey, will look directly at the foreign children.)

“You’ve been looking forward to this vacation for a long time. Finally you are here in this beautiful, warm country and are digging your toes into the sand. Yesterday you spent hours in the airplane with your parents, but now you are here on the beach. The ocean, wide and blue, extends to the horizon. Your parents are feeling lazy, lying on their beach towels, but you want to finally have a look around. You leave the sandy beach and cross the stony ground to the road. You walk further and further along the road. In the distance you see children sitting on a wall beside the road. You like the way they look, so you take a picture of them. The oldest child, about your size, is looking at you and asks, ‘Who are you?’”

“Now please open your eyes, look at the photo, and answer the child’s question: ‘Who are you?’ “What would you say to this child?”

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Guiding questions (phenomenological level):

- What do you think is important about yourself?
- What do you have in common with the children asking you this question, and with your friends?
- What makes you different from the children asking this question? (climate, food, culture, world view, attitudes, etc.)
- What makes you different from your friends? (family background, temperament, character, capabilities, world view, attitudes, etc.)

2. Deepening the concept and developing values

How we see ourselves and our capabilities is the decisive variable shaping our lives. This perception is divided into two parts: the self-awareness that makes us able to use our capabilities, and evaluation of our capabilities by ourselves and others.

A wish list should help the children identify and evaluate their own capabilities; two stories raise the question of evaluation by others:

“The Competition” by Marion Parsch
(People close to a child show their preference for the capabilities of siblings)

“Piggy Rhymes takes a Trip” by Babette Dieterich
(favorite capabilities are rejected by others)

2.1 The Wish List

“A magician comes along and gives you a wish list and three wishes to choose from that list. Each of you may choose three of the capabilities on the wish list, and then you will be perfect at them.”

Each child is given a laminated wish list:

a. Phenomenological Question:

“Which 3 capabilities have you chosen? Tell us the number, too.”

b. Hermeneutical Questions:

“Why did you choose these capabilities?”
“Why didn’t you choose the other capabilities?”
“What do you associate with the capabilities you chose?”
“What do other people associate with the capabilities you chose?”

c. Analytical Questions:

“What do all capabilities have in common?
“What can you achieve through practicing and training these capabilities?”

d. Dialectical Questions:

“Are capabilities always seen as positive?”
“Are there situations where capabilities that are actually positive can be seen as negative?”

e. Speculative Question:

“What are other capabilities you wish you had?”

The people around us judge our capabilities in a great variety of ways. I’ll read you a story about it:

2.2. “The Competition” by Marion Parsch

“The Competition

“Mama, Mama, I won!” called Sven, dashing into the kitchen. “Wonderful, Sven! What did you win?” asked Mother, draining the water from the spaghetti she was cooking for lunch. There was a smell in the air of tasty pasta with meat sauce. “But Mama, today we had our reading competition. I’ve told you that a thousand times already!” “Oh, right,” said Mother, “I’m happy for you. Go wash your hands and tell Kai it’s time to eat. He’s still in his room practicing for his music lesson!” Sven walked slowly and sadly out of the kitchen. How could Mama have forgotten about the reading competition? And she hadn’t even asked about the prize. But just last week she’d really been excited about Kai’s music prize. Why can’t I play the piano too, thought Sven sorrowfully.

a. Phenomenological Question

“What happened in the story?”

b. Hermeneutic Questions:

“Why does Sven look disappointed when he leaves the kitchen?”

“Why does Sven’s mother pay so little attention to what Sven tells her?”

c. Analytical Questions:

“Can a person concentrate on doing several things at the same time?”

“Is it possible to value all capabilities equally?”

d. Dialectical Questions:

“Does a mother always need to pay attention to everything right away?”

“Is it possible that a mother might have too much to do?”

“Is it possible for a mother to be fair to all her children without favoring any of them? What are the problems with this?”

e. Speculative Question:

“How do you respond to the differing capabilities of your friends?”

If time remains, the group can discuss how to deal with a situation in which others reject a favorite capability.

2.3 “Piggy Rhymes Takes a Trip” by Babette Dietrich

Once there was a little pig, and all the other pigs just called him Piggy Rhymes. And do you know why? Just listen to how Piggy Rhymes talks to his mother at the breakfast table. Mother is just setting the table when Piggy Rhymes comes in, sits down and says:

Good grief, mother,
Where’s the butter?!
And I really have no use
For this cranberry juice!
No cinnamon toast?
That’s what I like the most!!

As you might imagine, this gets under his mother’s skin, and she gets snappy and says: “Give it a rest!!” “But rhyming’s the best!,” answers Piggy Rhymes, who always has to have the last word. This irritates his mother even more. She bangs his plate down on the table, and then his father shows up. “What’s this racket?” he growls sleepily. He’s unshaven and has little squinty piggy eyes. Piggy Rhymes looks at him sympathetically and says: “Dad, dear Dad, your hangover looks bad! If you’re feeling so ill, better go take a pill!”

Bang! Dad slams his fist on the table and gives Piggy Rhymes an evil look, and Piggy finally keeps his mouth shut. Do you know now why they call him Piggy Rhymes? That’s clear as a sunny day in the month of May, right?

a. Phenomenological Question:

“How do things go at breakfast?”

b. Hermeneutic Questions:

“Why is Mother so annoyed?”

“Why does Dad glare at Piggy Rhymes?”

“What does breakfast mean for each of the family members?”

c. Analytical Questions:

“What do you associate with concept X (any concept important to the children in the discussion, for example
“stress” or “being irritated.”)?
“What is the result when we use our capabilities thoughtlessly?”

d. Dialectical Questions:

When should you use your capabilities, and when shouldn’t you?”
“Are there times when it is important to use your capabilities, even though people around you don’t like it?”

e. Speculative Question:

“How would you like to use your capabilities?”

In conclusion, the children can once again summarize what they have learned about dealing with capabilities and self-conceptions.

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Acting: http://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/?%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA (30.11.07)

Writing: http://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Hope Instead of Cognition?

The Community of Philosophical Inquiry as a Culture for Human Rights based on Richard Rorty’s Understanding of Philosophy

Introduction

Has Kant’s categorical imperative made us better people? Does the convincing logical structure of an argument also make it true? Or is reason only relevant in the realms of power over people and the suppression of cultures?

Richard Rorty’s critical and provocative questions undermine the dominance of philosophy and Western reason. He abandons the belief in eternal truth and leads us to the idea of philosophy as ingenious storytelling and the creation of metaphors. In his Dewey-influenced understanding of pragmatism, he says: “I have interpreted this supremacy as the priority of the need to create new ways of being human, and a new heaven, a new earth for these new humans to inhabit, over the desire for stability, security and order.” (Rorty 1999, 88). Abandoning Kant’s attempt to find non-historical conditions, he says: In the course of those years, we have gradually substituted the making of a better future, constructing a utopian democratic society, for the attempt to see ourselves from outside of time and history. Anti-essentialism is one expression of that shift. The willingness to see philosophy as an aid to creating ourselves rather than to knowing ourselves is another.” (Rorty 1999, 68-69).

The story we tell creates the future we’ll experience. The willingness to see philosophy as an aid to creating ourselves rather than to knowing ourselves is another.” (Rorty 1999, 68-69). The story we tell creates the future we’ll experience.

To support the inclusion of more creative and compassionate modes of thinking into philosophizing with children, I’d like to ask: How might our understanding of philosophy change if we were to do so? And what theoretical foundation could support this inclusion? In answering these questions, I’ll refer to Richard Rorty as someone who sees philosophy as a dialogue with the history of philosophy, as someone who generates a space for the creation of new interpretations and ideas which could lead to a more caring future. Rorty thus connects ideas from Pragmatism (esp. in a sense of J. Dewey) with the theory of philosophical hermeneutics (especially the German philosopher H.-G. Gadamer). Taking Rorty as a theoretical base, such a philosophical dialogue with children would draw a line connecting America’s p4c tradition with Gadamer’s notion of Gespräch (conversation).

I’ll begin my article by describing the community of inquiry as the ideal discourse situation in Habermas’ Diskurstheorie and show how it mainly fosters critical thinking. Coming from Habermas, I’ll outline the main aspects of Rorty’s understanding of philosophy as an alternative concept to the Diskurstheorie. The focal points here will be Rorty’s idea of philosophy as dialogue, the exchange of terminology such as “steadiness” versus “brittleness” with terminology such as “past” versus “future/hope,” and Rorty’s distinction between systematic and edifying philosophy.

The willingness to see philosophy as an aid to creating ourselves rather than to knowing ourselves is another.” (Rorty 1999, 68-69).

That being said, it’s not hard to see how Rorty’s philosophy can be linked to the Habermasian idea of the community of inquiry. For Habermas, the main goal of a community of inquiry is to foster mutual understanding and consensus through “communicative action” (kommunikatives Handeln). Goodness and truth result from free and open discussions. Communicative competence for Habermas is the condition of the possibility that human beings are able to reason. By transcending the solipsistic venture of the categorical imperative, he argues for inter-subjective reason and communicative rationality. Habermas wants to create an ideal situation for discourse in which the better argument is heard and understood. He says: “But actually we...
can only use sentences in utterances if we first rely on pragmatic universalities to create the conditions of a potential communication and a situation of discourse: i.e. the level of inter-subjectivity, on which people enter into dialogical relationships and thus appear as persons capable of speaking and acting; and the level of objects, on which reality can be depicted as the subject of possible statements. We can therefore also talk about dialogically constitutive universalities (Habermas 1995, 110).

A number of conditions constitute such an ideal discursive situation, the first two being that each person has an equal opportunity to participate and that all participants have the necessary communicative and cognitive abilities. All members may contribute interpretations, claims, advice, explanations and justifications; they may doubt claims, ask questions and rebut arguments. Every claim must be defended when called into question, i.e. we have to give reasons for what we say. We may generalize a certain action or norm as being true only if all members affirm and agree with the statement. Reasoning in common therefore leads toward understanding and consensus. Habermas’ concept of truth is ultimately a consensus theory of truth. It leads toward a pragmatic understanding of language, i.e. every statement is simultaneously also a communicative action.

This theory is connected to Habermas’ view of a democratic culture. The task of democracy is not only to create a system of rights, but also a system of language in which the society is understood as an association of free individuals endowed with equal rights (see Habermas 1994, 83). Given this background, we can now understand why Habermas views human rights as the condition of such a communicative society. He says: “The inner relationship that we seek between human rights and the sovereignty of people is that human rights constitute and institutionalize the conditions of communication which are essential for a reasonable political decision-making process” (Habermas 1998, 175). Human rights are essential for creating an ideal discursive situation in a democratic community where truth and ethical norms are generated by reasonable dialogue.

Based on this brief sketch of Habermas’ main thoughts, we can intuit the parallel between his ideal discursive situation and a community of inquiry. However, his call for fostering a better, more convincing and more logical argument poses the danger of focusing on critical thinking alone while seeing compassion as a threat to this process. (Rorty 1989, 21). It is impossible to put ourselves outside of all the vocabularies we use and to invent a vocabulary that would include all possible ways of thinking and making judgments. Rather, we invent vocabularies to structure, control and make predictions about our world. This is also why truth cannot be discovered, but only constructed through the use of a particular vocabulary.

Rorty doesn’t doubt the world’s existence, but he does believe that truth exists only in sentences, i.e., in language. “It is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which determine most of our philosophical convictions.” (Rorty 1979, 12). For Rorty, the history of thoughts is the history of the metaphor. Theories are particular descriptions of the world which were useful for a certain epoch and society. New scientific inventions are new metaphorical descriptions of the world (see Rorty 1989, 16f). “Let us think of the term ‘consciousness’ or ‘language’ not as the name of a medium between the self and reality, but simply as a flag
which signals that it is preferable to use a particular vocabulary if we want to coexist peaceably with organisms of a particular species" (Rorty 1989, 15). He makes us aware that beliefs are relative because they’re primarily based on the use of certain vocabularies which try to absorb everything into their little world of words. But such vocabularies ossify after a while; they tend to mutate into a totalitarian structure that tries to suppress whatever does not fit into its pattern.

Abandoning the belief that some eternal truth can be discovered in the present or the past, Rorty makes the use of our vocabulary more fluid and transparent. This continual transformation and openness to new views and metaphors impacts on social justice by reconstructing stereotypes, disclosing the suppression of minorities, and stimulating our creativity to envision a more compassionate future. Poetry has an important role to play in this process.

Poetry, in contradistinction to some philosophies, illuminates a particular aspect of the world. It invents a vocabulary for this situation, but only for this one: a metaphor, an image, a line in a rhyme. Poetry stalks ideas without pouncing on them. Poetic “descriptions” are never complete or cloistered, but are always open to other opinions in an ongoing dialogue with the recipient. Poetry doesn’t demand absolute truth. The power of the word and the relativity of possible perspectives generate a movement of the mind, an impulse that can anchor itself in our world or remain unmanifest as a potential journey for our thoughts, which nonetheless impact distinctly our way of being in the world. Language moves our sensation; sentences create meaning and give structure to our world. Thinking and speaking form an arcade leading us toward the future we imagine.

The Creation of the Future in Opposition to the Discovery of the Past

Rorty doesn’t believe in truth as a hidden essence awaiting discovery. He therefore sees vocabularies and concepts not as true or false, but as more or less useful for the practical improvement of our life. Deconstructing our past concepts, he unwinds dichotomies that lead to stagnation. He says: “I want to show how this doctrine fits into a more general program: that of replacing Greek and Kantian dualisms between permanent structure and transitory content with the distinction between past and future. I shall try to show how the things which James and Dewey said about truth were a way of replacing the task of justifying past customs and traditions by reference to unchanging structures with the task of replacing an unsatisfactory present with a more satisfactory future, thus replacing certainty with hope.” (Rorty 1996, 31f). Philosophy in this sense has a strong healing or even therapeutic aim.

This, of course, leads to a different way of asking philosophical questions. Rather than asking what is true, Rorty might ask: What is better to believe, what leaves more space for hope or makes us more compassionate people? His understanding of pragmatism orients our questions towards transforming the future rather than investigating the past. He therefore asks: Have we already found a method to structure the world in a way that is most convenient for the accomplishment of our desires? Or can we do better? Can we create a better future? (see Rorty 1994, 68). Building on his interpretation of pragmatism, Rorty doesn’t see philosophy as an instrument of conservation, but as a tool for effecting change and creation (see Rorty 1994, 19). “If there is anything distinctive about pragmatism it is that it substitutes the notion of a better human future for the notions of ‘reality’, ‘reason’ and ‘nature’. On may say of pragmatism what Novalis said of romanticism: that it is the apotheosis of the future” (Rorty 1999, 27).

Systematic Philosophy versus Edifying Philosophy

“I want to enlarge this suggestion that edifying philosophy aims at continuing a conversation rather than at discovering truth …” (Rorty 1979, 373)

Gadamer laments: “One has truly abandoned the expectation of finding, in the legacy of the text, a truth that is valid and comprehensible for oneself” (Gadamer 1990, 309). He complains that we see past philosophical theories as self-enclosed entities which are safely dead so that they no longer concern us. In opposition to this view, Gadamer sees history as Wirkungsgeschichte, i.e. a force that impacts on who we are or who we become. Similar to Gadamer, Rorty sees philosophy as a dialogue. Building on this idea, he distinguishes between edifying philosophy and systematic philosophy. Such dialogue might deepen our self-understanding. Yet, unlike Gadamer’s understanding of Wirkungsgeschichte, Rorty claims that we not only deepen our self-understanding in the merging of horizons with the past, but also shatter the constraints of past beliefs by embarking toward a better future.

When Rorty distinguishes between systematic and edifying philosophers, he is placing Kant in opposition to Dewey, Kierkegaard, and the later writings of Wittgenstein or Heidegger. Such philosophers have been accused of relativism, cynicism or worse: of not being real philosophers. Yet for Rorty, these philosophers saw that the great triumphs of reason in the past century went on to form this century’s biggest prejudices and superstitions (see Rorty 1979, 367). Rorty suggest that “… the latest vocabulary, borrowed from the latest scientific achievement, may not express privileged representations of essences, but be just another of the potential
infinity of vocabularies in which the world can be described.” (Rorty 1979, 367).

Of course, this too is based on Rorty’s argument that vocabularies construct truth rather than discover it. He therefore says that the edifying philosophers “… hammer away the holistic point that words take their meanings from other words rather than by virtue of their representative character, and the corollary that vocabularies acquire their privileges from the men who use them rather than from their transparency to the real.” (Rorty 1979, 368). Accordingly, whereas a systematic philosopher tries to construct a consistent eternal system through which to reveal an external and static truth, an edifying philosopher deconstructs this system so that something new can arise. Systematic philosophers see philosophy as a scientific subject, whereas edifying philosophers simply wonder about things and ponder the miracle that there is indeed something new under the sun. A novelty “…which is not an accurate representation of what was already there, something which (at least for the moment) cannot be explained and can barely be described.” (Rorty 1979, 370).

Edifying philosophers do not regard themselves as people who describe objective external truths, nor do they view philosophy as a precise representation of reality through language. They do not aspire toward providing a self-enclosed system or theory of anything. And “…they do not think that when we say something we must necessarily be expressing a view about a subject. We might just be saying something – participating in a conversation rather than contributing to an inquiry. Perhaps saying things is not always saying how things are. Perhaps saying that is itself not a case of saying how things are. … To see edifying philosophers as conversational partners is an alternative to seeing them as holding views on subjects of common concern.” (Rorty 1979, 371f).

Unlike Gadamer, who sees the goal of such dialogues with past philosophers as the opportunity to gain a better understanding of ourselves in the context of the Wirkungsgeschichte, Rorty opens the further possibility of actively creating new vocabularies and preserving the fluidity of our interpretations of our world.

If we understand philosophizing with children as an example of edifying philosophy, then this might make us more aware of what we are able to accomplish. This doesn’t mean that every kind of dialogue is at the same time philosophical or that we should let go of philosophical methods and techniques. Yet it might free us from the preconception that a statement, in order to be an example of “real philosophy,” must necessarily deliver a consistent theory. Instead, it might free our thoughts to be more creative and more compassionate. Edifying philosophy is a love for wisdom that tries to prevent philosophical dialogues from degenerating into a mere academic process (see Rorty 1979, 372). It regards wisdom not so much as the love of argument, but as practical sagacity and the capacity to participate in a dialogue. Philosophizing with children offers the possibility of cultivating these virtues and skills outside the confines of academic discourse.

We walk through the wall, permeate it by making ourselves lighter than it is.
Suddenly, our attention wavers. We become nervous, stuck, heavy.
We gesture to each other to abandon this state of density immediately.
The moment we agree, we have already gone over to the other side.

Tamara Ralis

Conclusion

Rorty’s understanding of philosophy gives us a theoretical foundation on which to justify the inclusion of creative methods such as storytelling, poetry, creative writing in what we call philosophizing. “As I imagine it, a historical nominalistic culture would focus instead on a kind of storytelling that connects the present to the past on the one hand and to futuristic utopias on the other” (Rorty 1989, XVI). Being open to such a description of the world, he encourages us to deconstruct our prejudices by using children’s new vocabulary and metaphors in dialogues about meaning as also described by D. Kennedy (see Kennedy 1998). Last but not least, Rorty makes us more acutely aware of the power of words and of the immense impact that the creation of new metaphors has on our society. To foster fantasy and imagination is therefore a core task for political education.

The community of inquiry not only discovers and gives new meaning to past questions (being an ongoing dialogue with the past), but also creates new meanings and asks new questions that raise the possibility of a more hopeful and more compassionate future. In my view, the most exciting goal we can have when philosophizing with children is to encourage them to become aware of their own creative power, potentials and responsibilities.

Practical Application

The Community of Inquiry as a Culture of Human Rights

For Rorty, there are basically three ways in which humans are excluded from being really human. The first is when a person is seen as a human beast - like an animal or a Jew in a concentration camp. The second is when a person is seen as either stupid or childish. And the last one is to be born as a woman. (see Rorty 1993, 146f.)

The irony and radicalism of Rorty’s thoughts might have scared away many people. Pedagogues in particular, who understand themselves as being responsible for teaching universal values to children, might fear that Rorty’s ideas lead to relativism and perspectivism. In the following paragraphs, I’d like to explain that for Rorty the disbelief in an eternal truth or universal human rights doesn’t lead to indifference toward cruelty or suffering. Quite the contrary: “Moral progress is a matter of wider and wider sympathy. It is not a matter of rising above the sentimental to the rational… (The pragmatists) substitute the idea of a maximally warm, sensitive and sympathetic human being for the Kantian idea of a Good Will” (Rorty 1999, 82f) Solidarity is thus not necessarily linked to the belief in objectivity.

With regard to the current discussion about universal human rights, Rorty concludes that the problem is not a disagreement about the precise contents of the agenda. The real question is whether we consider the Muslim in our community, the Jew in the grocery
store, the woman in our office or the Nigerian across the street as a full-fledged human being. Much emphasis and intensity has been devoted to the question of whether all humans are endowed with a certain essence that makes them human. But seeing other humans as potentially intelligent or sensitive still doesn’t necessarily prevent us from believing that children, blacks and women have no sense for logic.

Rorty is therefore arguing against installing an agenda of universal human rights. Instead, with reference to the philosopher Eduardo Rabossi, he suggests the creation of a “culture of human rights.” He believes that the question “Do humans have certain rights?” is an irrelevant question. His pragmatic view of things leads to the idea that what creates a culture of human rights is not an increase in ethical knowledge, but rather the terrible stories we hear about the suffering of people in Somalia, Iraq or Albania (see Rorty 1993). It was not the categorical imperative that made us better people, but stories such as Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which showed us that blacks do in fact have feelings, that they suffer, and that they belong to what we include in the realm of “us.”

Rather than clinging to an inflexible agenda, we ought to engage in an ongoing discussion devoted to people’s existential needs, e.g. food, a healthy environment, love, etc. vocabularies are fluid. Similarly, human rights are not rigid, but evolve in dialogues where truths are negotiated inter-subjectively. The goal of such dialogues is not only to negotiate the contents of human rights, but also to cultivate compassion and to expand our capacity to care for all living beings. In this first idea, Rorty is still close to Habermas’ ideal discursive situation, but in the second notion Rorty moves toward the idea of a community which recognizes not only the most convincing argument, but also the most innovative and most caring thoughts for a better future.

People can be very intelligent, in this sense, without having wide sympathies. But their compassion can have a narrow scope… So it is best to think of moral progress as a matter of increasing sensitivity, increasing responsiveness to the needs of a larger and larger variety of people and things.” (Rorty 1999, 81).

Rorty’s core argument for the cultivation of compassion is that we don’t necessarily need a reason to care for one another. It is enough that we share the same feelings, for example, the love of a mother for her newborn baby or the pain that a girl might feel about the loss of her father who has been killed by a bomb in the war in Iraq. Rather than searching for the essence of human nature, we should become aware of how we use a certain vocabulary to draw arbitrary lines between humans and nonhumans – because our view of the world is structured by our use of a particular vocabulary. Therefore Rorty tries to invent a vocabulary that makes us more aware of how the cruelties of language can lead to the suffering of nations.

If philosophizing also means recreating vocabulary and inventing new metaphors, then it behooves us simultaneously to ask: Which story do we have to tell about the world in order to transform us into people who are more compassionate and more caring? Perhaps we should ask ourselves how we can include everyone in this dream of a free and happy planet, not only we Americans or we Europeans, but also the little girl in a Brazilian slum? And along with asking for a reason to help others, we might also fruitfully ask what it was that prompted people to help others in the past? Why did some Christians accept the risk of concealing their Jewish neighbors, whom the Nazis would otherwise have deported to Auschwitz?

**How to Cultivate Human Rights in a Community of Inquiry**

Rorty agrees with Habermas that cognition is inter-subjectively mediated, but he adds that compassion and creative, hopeful thinking have a key role to play in philosophical discussions, especially with regard to the cultivation of human rights.

Sharp and others have discussed some of the ways in which caring thinking contributes to a philosophical dialogue. Especially Sharp developed core aspects of caring thinking, e.g. to see from another person’s view, to feel empathy and compassion, and to experience emotional intensity and profound sensitivity (see Sharp 2007). Caring thinking expresses itself through prizing, esteeming, cherishing, healing, consoling, taking care of, nurturing, empathizing, sympathizing, valuing, appreciating, celebrating, responding to the other, etc. (see Sharp 2007).

Yet in a community of inquiry understood as an ideal discourse situation in Habermas’ sense, the fostering of caring thinking would be seen as a pedagogical “extra” - even as something harmful for the logical structure of the arguments.

In the following chapters, I’d like to link Rorty’s idea of a culture of human rights to the community of inquiry. I’ll do that by building on Rorty’s understanding of philosophy to show how such a culture might foster compassion and provide a platform on which to share creative ideas and learn about existential human needs. This could serve as a theoretical basis for the inclusion of critical, creative and caring thinking as mutually supportive skills of equal importance and validity. My main point is to show how our common understanding of philosophy changes radically if we regard creativity and the education of the emotions as a task of inquiry.

Again: by introducing these thoughts to the community of inquiry, my intention is not to pit emotion and creativity against cognition. Rather, it seems to me that mutual understanding involves critical, creative and caring thinking as mutually supportive skills of equal importance and validity. My main point is to show how our common understanding of philosophy changes radically if we regard creativity and the education of the emotions as a task of inquiry.
being touched by a life story told by a member of our community may strengthen our capacity to feel compassion and to care about another person’s wellbeing. This skill might help to expand our vision of what we regard as a human, because we have learned to understand how differently other people might feel and think. We might come to appreciate the dignity of such differences, while simultaneously feeling how deeply and fundamentally we are all connected through universal feelings such as love for our parents or the pain of losing a loved one. Including compassion in philosophical discourse might help us to become aware of our responsibility for creating a more compassionate vocabulary. It might cultivate an awareness of how all sentient beings deserve to be treated, without the need for setting an agenda. Such an understanding of philosophy is based on Rorty’s idea of “edifying philosophy” in the sense that, though it might not necessarily deliver a self-contained system, it could nonetheless contribute toward mutual understanding, sharing, and the dilation of our caring to include all peoples and nations.

**Philosophical Contents, Methods and Attitudes in a Culture of Human Rights**

The definition of philosophizing with children by the distinction in contents, methods and attitudes is based on Martens (1999). I have already begun to rely on this structure to develop philosophical curricula in university classes for several semesters. I usually combine it with the structure of the philosophical process, which was developed in collaboration with the Projektteam Regensburg for the Children philosophize initiative. The process leads from pondering to questioning, from thinking to talking, and from valuing to acting. The first activities in each pair (pondering, thinking and valuing) are understood as being more introverted, whereas their counterparts (questioning, talking and acting) are more outgoing. I’ll follow these two structures for the practical ideas, and the chart at the end will hopefully clarify and subsume my main ideas and thoughts.

**Contents**

For Rorty, novels and stories are the basis for the development of compassion and caring for others. In this view, prose narratives are no longer viewed as mere pedagogical appendices to mollify the austerity of core philosophical tomes. Quite the contrary: Rorty asserts that novels such as *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* actually change people’s attitudes. Not self-contained philosophical systems, Rorty opines, but novels and stories are more likely to prompt us to reconstruct our beliefs. He therefore argues in favor of including such materials in the sphere of philosophical discussions.

Sharp’s touching and critical stories about racism and human rights ably play this role in the p4c tradition. Additionally, I would encourage all practitioners of p4c to prepare such traditional stories and novels as *Die Brüder Löwenherz* (“Richard the Lion-hearted”), newspapers stories or fairytales for use in philosophical teaching units.

Rorty also introduces poetry to the philosophical discussion, because poetry creates new vocabularies and invents new metaphors. I would suggest adding other creative media, e.g. movies, dance, theater, or visits to anthropological museums as sources of input for philosophical inquiry. Finally, I would urge teachers to encourage children to write their own stories (especially in classrooms with children from different cultures). Another possibility would be to tell only the first half of a story and then invite the children to finish the story together, either individually or in small groups. These ideas are not new, but Rorty articulates the theoretical background which explains why such material deserves to be included in philosophical dialogue.

I view all these options as philosophical contents that stimulate us to ponder inside ourselves and question outside ourselves. This pondering and questioning prevents us from remaining stuck in old problems and habitual ruts of thought. It inspires us to see things differently.

On the level of creative thinking, such contents make us aware of how we use vocabulary and how vocabulary structures our view of reality. They stimulate our imagination and broaden our notion of what might be possible. By thinking critically about the past and by venturing beyond boundaries, we open up the potential for allowing something completely new and surprising to arise.

On the level of caring thinking, being exposed to emotionally touching content helps us to cultivate compassion and expand the definition of what we regard as belonging to “us.” The task of such asking would not be to search for truth, but to invent a vocabulary and use it to tell a story that leads to a better and more compassionate future.
**Methods**

Martens in particular has defined and transformed philosophical methods for use in philosophizing with children. We find five methods in his “toolbox”: phenomenology, analysis, dialectic, hermeneutics and speculation (Martens 2003).77 Coming from Rorty, I’d like to focus on the methods of hermeneutics with regard to caring thinking, and on speculation in relation to creative thinking. I’d also suggest Rorty’s sense of irony as an additional rhetorical method which could potentially be seen as a dialectical method. I regard these philosophical methods as the core of a philosophical process which encourages us think on the inside and talk on the outside.18

**Philosophical Hermeneutics**

Based on Rorty’s concept of an edifying philosophy, I understand the community of inquiry as a continuation of the Occidental dialogue about philosophical questions. Viewing the history of philosophy as a dialogue (see Weber 2007) provides a theoretical foundation and a source for such dialogues. At the heart of these dialogues is the fostering of mutual understanding and the merging of horizons (see Gadamer 1990) with past thinkers, adults and children, instead of merely criticizing their ideas. The aim of such dialogues is to consider all new perspectives and ideas, rather than immediately devising a counterargument. The members of the inquiring community try to make each argument as strong as possible in order to discover whether or not it might be a promising path to pursue.

The main difference between the hermeneutical and the reason-oriented community of inquiry is that the participants in the first group seek to deepen their understanding of one another, whereas the members of the second group merely look for the most convincing argument. This isn’t so much a distinct method as it is a particular attitude.

Let me give an example of this. Most conversations expose us to a situation in which the participants do not really intend to listen. Very often we may feel so enthusiastic about our new ideas that the urge to immediately share them far outweighs our willingness to listen to other people’s views. Gadamer says that such an attitude is human, “…but it is even more human if one can listen attentively, thereby opening a space in which to be reached by the other”19 (Gadamer 1996, 324). If this space is nonexistent, ignored or closed, it becomes almost impossible to really understand what another person is saying. When we try to express a complex and difficult thought, we are seldom able to find words with which render it in its wholeness and precision. Our efforts could be likened to two friends gazing at the starry sky. One of them discerns a constellation and tries to show it to her companion, so that her friend might discover and enjoy it too. But she can never put the constellation in its wholeness that his neighbor will shiver in his presence. One must be a little warmer if one wants others to feel solidarity, to feel that one is speaking to them, and that one is genuinely interested in them”20 (Gadamer 1996, 322).

Such dialogue might be more likely to lead to mutual understanding on the levels of critical and caring thinking. By explaining our beliefs, and by listening and helping each other to express our beliefs, we can learn to understand other cultures more deeply and carefully. We can dilate our compassion by hearing stories about foreign cultures and by empathizing with the complexity of their concerns, anxieties and hopes. We can also learn to understand ourselves within the contingency of our historical context. This widens our horizon of understanding, not only on a cognitive level, but also on a caring and compassionate level.

**Speculation**

Rorty encourages us to invent new vocabulary and to conceive innovative metaphors to describe the world. This gives us the theoretical underpinnings for introducing methods such as creative writing to the community of inquiry. What I have in mind here is the writing of a collaborative poem or story, as occurs so entertainingly in the classic Dada parlor game “The Exquisite Corpse.” One promising “move” would be to ask more often for a metaphor to clarify ideas. When stuck in a problem, we might encourage the community’s members to deconstruct complementary terms (such as man or women, true or false, etc.) and to think of different ways of describing the situation (e.g. using “both” and “as well as”). I would also suggest topics for writing stories such as: What would the world be like if we had three sexes and/or genders? How would we live if there weren’t day and night? What would be different if we never died? Leading questions and writing prompts of this sort might make it easier to overcome dualisms, stereotypes and ingrained habits of thinking.

**Irony**

In a dialogue, we can use irony as a rhetorical method to unseat our expectations. Socrates masterfully showed that this is an extraordinarily effective way to unhouse a prejudice and deconstruct an opinion (doxa). We should use this method carefully in p4c, however, because very young children often find it difficult to understand irony.

Speculation and irony are two methods that focus less on the discovery of the past or the revelation of a hidden truth, but emphasize instead new possibilities in the future and nourish the hope for positive change.

**Attitudes**

Defining a “philosophical attitude” is by far the most challenging task – and one which has not yet been accomplished. The idea originally comes from Martens (1999, 9-16) and I tried to specify it a little more in my article on ‘Der Weise als Waise’ published in 2006. For the following paragraph, I’d like to view these attitudes as both “intellectual virtues”. With this idea I obliquely refer to an idea articulated by Ohlssen, who expounded intellectual virtues as the goal of a philosophical discourse (Ohlssen 2007) in addition to
critical thinking. These virtues, however, are not seen as universal, but as properties that help us to think and act more creatively and caringly, and which finally become attitudes in daily life. I see these attitudes within the philosophical process as the idealistic outcome of an ongoing culture of human rights. We experience them on the inside as valuing and on the outside as actions.

With regard to fostering our ability to think creatively, we might try to create an atmosphere in which children develop the courage to think beyond boundaries. Postmodern thought abolishes the security of universal values or truths, which are often used as Ar- chimedes would have liked to use a “firm spot on which to stand” so that he would be able to “move the Earth.” Thinking without this handrail is frightening because we cannot simply return to “the good” or “the just.” Instead, we must look misery squarely in the face, without the hope that everything will somehow turn out all right in the end. This makes us responsible for cruelty and suffering, but it also urges us onward and gives us the power to invent and to hope for a world where we can do better. Instead of expounding the problems, we ought to encourage one another to stay hopeful and to think of alternative possibilities, especially when there seems to be no escape. The aim of such a community would be to create an atmosphere that does justice to all possible ideas and makes us more aware of the existential needs of all people.

**Summary**

Rorty’s understanding of philosophy invites us to engage in an ongoing dialogue with past philosophers. The questions may change, and the vocabulary or interpretation of reality may change, but we continue the conversation and enhance the awareness of contemporary problems and concerns. In the end, we might not be able to deliver a complete system, but we will perhaps contribute to the ongoing dialogue through time. Especially because of children’s ingenious use of words and language, and because of their ability to invent new metaphors, we might consider their contribution to the new interpretation more seriously.

“The only point on which I would insist is that philosophers’ moral concern should be with continuing the conversation of the West, rather than with insisting upon a place for the traditional problems of modern philosophy within that conversation.” (Rorty 1979, 394).

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Endnotes:
1 The German word Gespräche can be translated as “conversation” or “discussion.”
2 “Sprache ist nur im Gespräch” (Gadamer 1996, 322).
3 The structure of defining philosophizing with children through its content, method and attitude comes from E. Martens (see Martens 1999, 9-16).
4 Original German text: “Tatsächlich können wir aber Sätze in Äußerungen nur verwenden, indem wir mit Hilfe der pragmatischen Universalien die Bedingungen möglicher Kommunikation und damit die Sprechsituation erst hervorbringen; nämlich die Ebene der Intersubjektivität, auf der Personen Dialogbeziehungen eingehen und somit als sprach- und handlungsfähige Subjekte auftreten können, und die Ebene der Gegenstände, auf der Reales als Gegenstand möglicher Aussagen abgebildet werden kann. Wir können deshalb auch von dialogkonstituierenden Universalien sprechen.” This basic idea resembles Peirce’s community of scientific inquiry.
5 German: “Der gesuchte interne Zusammenhang zwischen Menschenrechten und Volkssouveränität besteht dann darin, dass die Menschenrechte die Kommunikationsbedingungen für eine vernünftige politische Willensbildung institutionalisieren.”
6 I know that the p4c-program strongly emphasizes the encouragement of creative and caring thinking. For now, however, I would ask my readers to be patient and to follow the discussion between Habermas and Rorty. Later I will gladly refer to and interweave the wonderful thoughts and methods of Sharp and many others.
7 See Lyotard’s critique of ossified and totalitarian vocabularies and systems.
8 These thoughts are based on an email dialogue with the poet Tamara Ralis.
9 “In Wahrheit hat man den Anspruch grundsätzlich aufgegeben, in der Überlieferung für einen selber gültige und verständliche Wahrheit zu finden.”
10 With reference to Gadamer, in another article I asked how a community of inquiry might look if it were based on Gadamer’s theory of a philosophical hermeneutic. In that article the main point was to reanimate the ideas and questions of past philosophers and allow them to speak to us in a way that is relevant and meaningful for the existential questions facing us today. I suggested seeing the history of philosophy as a dialogue, which also means introducing and discussing original philosophical texts in a community of inquiry. I therefore view philosophical texts in such contexts not as objects to be analyzed, but as persons who can be encountered. Philosophical texts cease to be mere relics from the past, but become ineluctable imperatives for a future from which we cannot withdraw. The main idea of that article was to include children in this ongoing philosophical dialogue. When we do so, we not only have a dialogue between the past (the history of philosophy) and the present (people nowadays), but also a dialogue with the potential future (the children). I showed how a philosophical dialogue can deepen our historical understanding by merging the horizons between the past, the present and the future. (See: Weber 2007.)
11 Of course, Rorty’s claim raises many questions. E.g. we might ask how the contents of Human Rights we agreed on can be applied in all countries. What happens if we fail to make everybody agree that also women have Human Rights? Let them suffer?
12 A very famous example is to use the word “man” for humans and, by so doing, to exclude women from what we regard as humans.
13 Of course, Rorty is also aware of the limits of such emotional education when he admits that “… sentimental education only works on people who can relax long enough to listen” (Rorty 1999, 128).
14 Sharp also connects caring thinking to the ability of making good judgments and to the development of a relational consciousness (see Sharp 2007).
15 Ann M. Sharp very convincingly pointed this out in a soon-to-be-published article about H. Arendt’s idea of Going Visiting.
16 Thus far, I’ve developed curricula with my students based on the theoretical foundations of Plato, Kant, Kierkegaard and Habermas.
17 Also see Martens’ article in this edition of Thinking.
18 To develop these methods in greater detail would go beyond the frame of this article, so I’ll only sketch the various possibilities.
19 In the original German: “… doch ist es noch menschlicher, wenn man auch zuhören kann und dem Anderen Raum gibt, einen zu erreichen.”
20 In the original German: “… wer mit seinem lieben Nächsten nur nach den Gesetzen der Logik verfährt und um jeden Preis Widerspruchsfreiheit vermeiden will, von dem wird eine Kälte ausgehen, bei der es den Anderen friert. Man muss schon ein bisschen wärmer sein, wenn man Menschen Solidarität fühlt, machen will und dem Anderen das Bewusstsein gibt, dass man ihn meint und auf ihn eingehen will.”
Who all can philosophize? Even Children?

Philosophizing with children was popularized about thirty years ago, primarily through the work of the American philosopher Matthew Lipman, a logician, and Gareth Matthews, a scholar of classical philosophy. Since then, this practice has been adopted around the world, as well as in Germany (Martens 1999, Brüning 2001). However, the notion that children are even capable of philosophizing has often been disputed among scholars of philosophy.

So who all can philosophize? Even children? The search for an answer to this question begins with two irreconcilable camps. The first camp, including most philosophy professors and their students, asserts that philosophy is much too difficult and abstract, and thus completely inaccessible to ordinary mortals. According to this way of thinking, philosophizing with children is nothing more than cute kiddie-babble. The second camp, on the other hand, asserts that philosophizing is the most natural thing in the world for all people. Thus in early dialogues of Plato such as “Lysis” and “Charmides,” Socrates is already philosophizing with twelve-year-olds on questions such as friendship or prudence. The existential philosopher Karl Jaspers also speaks for a “children’s philosophy” (a concept he first introduced) since children, being new to the world and having not yet found a firm place in it corresponding to adult norms, are especially likely to engage in serious reflection about it. The one camp could be called philosophy for specialists, the other, philosophy for everyone.

Natural, Academic and Elementary Philosophizing

But is there really a contradiction between the two camps? At first glance, it should be easy to settle the argument, since in principle it is hard to deny that children and young people should not primarily be learning philosophy as a set of teachings: philosophizing as an activity, i.e., not philosophical knowledge, but philosophical competence. Yet, since it is not possible to have philosophical competence without philosophical knowledge, both belong together and are not in contradiction. Here a new point of contention arises: What kind of philosophical knowledge and how much of it is required for philosophizing? A closer look at the concept philosophy in all its ambiguity offers an answer to this question:

1. Seen from one angle, philosophy is understood as natural philosophizing; in the course of our development, each of us learns to use language, to express feelings and make observations, to make use of concepts and logical particles, to ask probing questions, to contradict others and to exercise imagination. At the same time, each of us begins to put together ideas about the familiar “childhood questions” concerning friendship, happiness, good and evil, the beginning and end of the world, eternity, and many other things.

2. Seen from another angle, philosophy is academic philosophy, which in the traditional discipline uses a process of inquiry to put forth general theories about individual questions. Both of these, though they differ, are indeed “genuine” philosophy. And both kinds of practitioners, specialists as well as children or lay-people in general, can philosophize in their own way. But if we want to refine the natural, sometimes clumsy or confused philosophizing of children, a third approach results:

3. philosophy as elementary philosophizing, in which a process of education leads children and young people to reflect seriously about their inherent natural philosophy, to enlighten themselves theoretically in thinking, and to

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come to practical conclusions through thinking.

These three manifestations of philosophy should not be seen as a progression from a lower to a higher level in the historical/genetic sense of Piaget, but instead in a systematic and a didactic sense. For when seen systematically, as the Dresden philosopher Thomas Rentsch has also emphasized, the methods and systems or special disciplines of academic philosophy, such as the phenomenological, hermeneutic-analytical or dialectical schools of thought, all originate, in the final analysis, in the natural forms of philosophizing. From a didactic point of view, the three forms of philosophy replicate themselves within the learning process of philosophizing, since elementary philosophy begins with natural philosophy, and in the process of philosophizing with children at least implicitly makes reference to academic philosophizing, and with older children and adolescents does so even more explicitly, culminating then in the academic study of philosophy.

The Integrative Method as Modeled by Socrates

If the primary goal of philosophizing with children is the promotion of philosophical competence, then it is apparent that the methodological side of philosophy gains special meaning. It is true that in general children or lay people can pose the basic philosophical questions about happiness, justice, or the beginning of the world, and they can try to find answers within an attitude of questioning wonderment. But what is lacking, as a rule, is the capacity for pursuing such questions and their possible answers while increasing understanding, in order not to arrive at an opinion just somehow, but to make it as comprehensive, clear, and well founded as possible. What they should and can primarily learn from this is a competence in philosophical methods. But this embroils us in yet another meta-philosophical argument. For although method plays a central role in philosophy, within the spectrum extending from the analytical through the hermeneutic to the existen
tialist school there is much controversy about what even counts as a method, and which method should primarily be used. Positions range from inattention or even hostility toward method through methodical monism and pluralism (Rohbeck 2000, Steenblock 2003) to method integration (Martens 2003).

But just as with the disagreement about the concept of philosophy, we can also resolve the method dispute. In the beginnings of our cultural history, in the methodological practice of Socratic philosophizing in Plato’s early dialogues, we find elementary methods capable of mediating between conversational and academic methods. But even more importantly, Socratic philosophizing can also serve as the model of a methodically integrative philosophizing, since it goes far beyond the mere conceptual-argumentative analysis or oral dialogue of truth-seeking frequently and reductively ascribed to Socrates. On closer examination, the five methods listed below can be found in my books (see Martens 2003, p. 43ff, Martens 2004). They can also be more or less clearly found, in spite of their strong accentuation of an analytical concept and argumentation methodology, in Lipman’s novels and manuals:

1. The Socratic dialogues begin with concrete problems or phenomena, for example, in “Laches,” with experiences of bravery. With regard to the method question, this means describing precisely and thoroughly, but with as little interpretation as possible, a situation, problem or object—whatever I myself perceive and observe about it that causes me to be astonished or ask questions (phenomenological method in the elementary sense).

2. Socrates raises the dialogue partners’ awareness of their implicit and problematic preconceptions about bravery, for example with regard to the Homeric heroes. Or in a methodological turn, they make themselves aware of their own and others’ preconceptions in the process of working out interpretative differences and agreements (hermeneutic method in the elementary sense).

3. In the course of the dialogue, central concepts and arguments used in interpretation are examined in order to resolve problems of linguistic comprehension (analytical method in the elementary sense).

4. The analytical unraveling does not occur in an expository monologue, but in the back and forth of dialogue, in the search for the very best grounded solution still capable of revision (dialectic method in the elementary sense).

5. Fantasies and ideas in the form of comparisons, myths or thought experiments are permitted and tested in the dialogues in order to create space for new and unusual thoughts (speculative method in the elementary sense).

Tool Kit and Treasure Chest

A few explanations regarding the methods are required.

- The five methods are not derived deductively from the corresponding scholarly schools of philosophy, but reconstructed inductively from an elementary methodological practice.
- They are not meant to be restrictively complete models, but to a great extent they can be considered plausible and productive of consensus, as for example in the newest teacher-education plan in
North Rhine/Westphalia for teachers of philosophy or practical philosophy.

- Furthermore, in a lively philosophical conversation, the methods can hardly be clearly separated from one another, but belong together by their nature and should be understood in an integrative way, even though they can be used with differing accents. For example, it is possible to describe a certain situation involving warlike actions or civil courage with quite different details, and to interpret the actions even more differently with words like brave, cowardly, or reckless; one can argue about the correct or meaningful concept of bravery, try to narrow the definition, and in the process draw on hypothetical borderline cases in a playful way.

- One further point: It is precisely through their integrative use that the philosophical methods of describing, understanding, explaining, contradicting, or supposing differ from the similar everyday or scientific methods of understanding, and can overcome the possible one-sidedness of the latter methods.

- Finally, the philosophical methods in their detail are also more finely developed than in everyday or scientific usage.

However, it is not just the methodological, formal capability that should be improved in the classroom, but also, with the help of insights or considerations derived from tradition and philosophical studies, perhaps in the form of texts, we should improve the content of understanding and reflection – we philosophize about something, about certain themes or problems. For this reason, teachers, and through them learners, should not only have access to a methodological tool kit, but also to a treasure chest filled with content. Neither is meant to replace the thinking of children and young people, but both should and can provide them with help in thinking independently. From a practical point of view, one can begin with a simple “tool kit for clever thinkers,” augmenting it then as instruction continues with more differentiated tools. Similarly, one can continually enrich the content of the treasure chest, possibly organizing it according to the oft-cited four Kantian questions: “What can I know?,” “What should I do?,” “For what may I hope?” and “What is a human being?”

Sample Lesson: “Can Animals Think?”

I will use the example “Can animals think?” to sketch out the way elementary philosophizing can engage with the natural philosophizing of primary school children and develop it further with the aid of academic philosophy. The example should also show how, with the help of general instructional methods, the thinking methods can be realized in their philosophical specificity, and how, in spite of their integrative character, they can have a variety of accents in various phases. This example comes from a series of four two-hour lessons with a group of twenty children aged 10-12 in the framework of the Children’s University of Hamburg (2005), organized by Barbara Brüning and Markus Tiedemann, among others. The theme “Can animals think?” is as interesting for specialists as it is for children, though for different reasons.

First, for some time this has been a special area of the “Theory of Mind,” and has given rise to controversial disputes among well known philosophers such as Davidson, Dennett or Searle (Perler & Wild 2005). With reference to biological experiments and observations of behavioral scientists, the concept of “mind,” or “thinking,” is investigated and associated with the observed behaviors of various animal species. But beginning already with the analysis of the concepts, the philosophers disagree about whether the three chief markers they name - awareness, intentionality, and use of signs - are complete, and whether all must be present in each case. They disagree even more about how the corresponding behaviors of various animal species should be interpreted and conceptually subsumed.

Second, it is generally true that children, due to their everyday dealings with animals, are very interested in this
theme, also because of television programs, animal books or visits to the zoo. So on the basis of their experiences they are inclined to treat animals as friends and to speak with them, since, as they believe, animals can understand them.

Just as in the professional cooperation between behavioral science and philosophy, I began with the elementary understood phenomenological method (1.). But to avoid getting bogged down in too much detail, I began only indirectly with the children’s own observations, and in the short time available, individual experiments were not possible. Instead, I read the children a short story I had written about Fred, who tells his dog Rolf all his troubles, but also his good experiences, and has long conversations with him. Fred’s sister Alice laughs and makes fun of him. So which of the two is right? Can animals think?

First, the children were allowed to express their preconceptions in free discussion, in the sense of the hermeneutic method (2.), in order to find their personal connection to the topic under discussion. The children had a broad range of opinions, which were illustrated by the examples of their own pets, or from their reading or television experiences. However, it didn’t independently occur to any of the children to ask about a definition of “thinking.” Of course, that is not so easy for the participants in Socratic dialogues, either, or for adults without philosophical training, in most cases.

To prepare the children for the definition question, I asked them to create a list, in the sense of the analytical method (3), of the ways they thought dogs could think and the ways they could not. Here the children expressed the following ideas: dogs can’t do arithmetic, think about the next day, think about their death or the meaning of life. But dogs can think about how to get food, they can recognize their owners, and they can communicate through tail wagging, barking, or with their eyes. After one child asked whether bacteria could also think, the children themselves discovered an important conceptual pair that allowed them to narrow down the concept “thinking.” After we had used the Internet to inform ourselves about bacteria, the children, in small groups, discussed whether it is automatic when bacteria attack hostile bacteria and merge together, or whether it is intentional, based on thought processes. One child summarized his group’s conclusion with indisputable logic: “For thinking you need a brain, and a brain has many cells. Bacteria are made of one cell, so bacteria can’t think.” From the angle of brain physiology, the question about whether bacteria can think can thus be answered unambiguously. But in disputed cases, such as the list of pros and cons in the dog example, one really needs to take the semantic side into account and consider more precisely what one really means by “thinking.” So I asked the children to think about what is needed for thinking, or in philosophical language, to name the necessary qualities of the concept. They were quick to name three things: awareness, weighing alternatives, and having ideas – all of these being, in my view, astonishing analytical insights of the children into their practice of using the concept “thinking”.

Building on the definition they had found, I asked the children to discuss in small groups a variety of self-selected examples (whales, dolphins, cats) in the sense of the dialectic method (4.), and to ask whether and to what extent these animals could or could not think. Here it is hardly surprising that the children had widely differing opinions.

Finally they used a short text from Descartes to consider in the sense of the speculative method (5) what it would mean if animals, as Descartes assumes, were nothing more than “irrational machines.” This is a thinking experiment that can be undertaken also without hermeneutical work on the text. I wanted to let the children experience how far they could come in a virtual dialogue with a great philosopher. On the basis of their own experiences with animals, but also as a result of their group deliberations, the children were outraged and drew the ethical consequences from their own epistemological considerations: “He really doesn’t know anything about animals! Then you could do whatever you wanted with animals. And even if animals were ‘irrational’ — they can still feel pain and happiness!” Obviously the children were able to contradict even an authority like Descartes with good arguments.

As a conclusion to the session, I read to the children a continuation of the story with Alice and Fred – and what they heard was a transcript of their own deliberations.

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Learning to Philosophize: Positive Impacts and Conditions for Implementation

Marie-France Daniel

Why do we send our children to school? What is the purpose of education? How should we teach to young generations? These are questions that become increasingly critical as the 21st century continues to present new and complex challenges to our younger generations (Delors, 1996; Galichet, 2006).

On one hand, institutions and employers suggest that future employees should be able to solve problems in collaboration with their peers (Murnane and Levy, 1996). On the other hand, a number of training programs increasingly emphasize the need for youngsters to develop skills linked to autonomous and critical thinking (among others: Haynes, 2001), as early as preschool:

It is essential that the learning experiences offered (to children in kindergarten) foster the development of reasoning, creative thinking, and open-mindedness through exploration and manipulation. Experiences that call upon problem solving and critical interest are at the very core of the development of these abilities, as well as practical experiences with concrete material that prepares children to understand abstract concepts. The activities that are suggested should encourage children to explore, create, ask questions, predict, undertake tasks, analyse and think. (Ontario Ministry of Education, 1998/2004)

Bruner (1996) maintains that a training program is effective to the extent that it values cooperation between pupils and gives them the means to construct rather than receive meanings. He adds that education is meaningful if it provides youngsters with the opportunity to assume responsibilities and if it stimulates their minds.

In my opinion, and in accordance with this contemporary perspective, educating consists in preparing youngsters to become involved, autonomously and responsibly, in the social, ethical and political debates on which democratic societies are based. Educating consists in providing youngsters with the tools (intellectual, language and social) they need to construct or reconstruct, together with their peers, the principles and values of their society. This construction or reconstruction should not be anchored in a quest for homogeneity (which could interfere with the development of individuality) or a quest for absolute truth (which could lead to dogmatism); instead, it should be rooted in a process of “reflexive thinking”.

According to Dewey, thinking evolves through four hierarchical levels, from the most simple to the most complex. At the first level, thinking is spontaneous and automatic. At the last level, thinking is reflexive and presupposes that the person gets involved with her/his peers in a process of scientific inquiry that includes five steps: doubt or awareness of a problem, clear definition of this problem, suggestion of a number of alternate solutions to the problem, choice of the most viable and valid alternative, concrete experimentation with the chosen solution, and the awareness that this choice is temporary and will eventually have to be reconsidered (Dewey, 1925, 1960). Reflexive thinking amounts to what Lipman (2003) refers to as “critical thinking” or “complex thinking” and to what we refer to as “dialogical critical thinking” (Daniel et al., 2005).

In sum, educating is not a matter of memorizing and inculcating a particular system of knowledge and values; it is a question of fostering skills and attitudes related to the development of critical thinking and of critical dialogue among peers in order to provide youngsters with the means to solve future problems together.

To our knowledge, few or no training programs oppose this educational pursuit. However, its actualization varies with perspective, and there are at least three such perspectives: 1) Critical thinking is considered a product and its development occurs through learning thinking skills by means of techniques. 2) Critical thinking is considered a practice; it develops through comprehension of the world and the pupil’s personal interpretation of this comprehension; this perspective places an emphasis on intra-subjectivity. 3) Critical thinking is considered a praxis; it evolves through the development of a critical awareness that operates in a context of Social good; here, the emphasis is placed on social, political and ethical aspects; the dominant epistemology is inter-subjectivity.

We believe that the latter perspective is the best foundation for authentic education, and that philosophy is the most appropriate means for its actualization. Philosophy has frequently been closely associated with complex thinking. From pre-Socrates to contemporary philosophers (see Daniel, 1997), philosophy has been considered an intellectual activity that requires systematic and continuous learning that is oriented toward the development of complex cognitive skills (to elucidate, examine, review, discriminate, distinguish, evaluate, criticize, etc.) and complex attitudes (curiosity, open-mindedness toward others, thoroughness, acceptance of criticism, etc.): “The art of philosophising is not limited to producing ideas, but requires dissecting, verifying, showcasing and prioritizing ideas. Anyone can produce ideas regarding anything, but the art of producing beautiful ideas and learning to recognize
them is another matter.” (Brenifier, 2004)

From an educational perspective, the Philosophy for Children approach appears as a fitting compromise, in that it combines traditional philosophizing rigour with the limits of children’s skills. In this perspective, philosophy is understood as a process (rather than a product) that becomes refined as praxis occurs (Lipman, 2003), in which pupils become “philosophizers” (Marcil-Lacoste, 1990); to learn philosophy presupposes an interactive, cooperative and critical dialogue with peers (Daniel, 1997; Lipman et al., 1980).

Hence, the following questions: Are preschool and elementary school children able to think critically or philosophically? Are they able to engage in a dialogue with their peers in order to solve a problem in a cooperative manner? If so, according to which processes are these competencies acquired, and what are their incidences on the representations and on the judgment of children? Finally, what social and educational conditions are necessary to maximize pupils’ competencies? Since 1995, we have gradually obtained answers to these questions by conducting research projects with pupils in Quebec, France, Australia and Mexico.

In this paper, we begin by presenting Lipman’s Philosophy for Children (P4C) approach. We then present analysis results from three research projects conducted with groups of pupils aged 10 to 12 years and with 5 year-old preschool children. Finally, we discuss the requirements for P4C.

The Philosophy for Children (P4C) Approach

P4C was conceived by American philosopher Matthew Lipman at the beginning of the 1970s. It is now being used in 50 countries, and its material has been translated into 20 languages. Following on Dewey’s works, the aims of Lipman’s approach follow the orientations of pragmatism and socio-constructivism (Daniel, 2005b). The approach aims to stimulate, within our young generations, skills and attitudes related to complex thinking (Lipman, 2003) through philosophical dialogue with peers.

The curriculum conceived by Lipman and the subsequent material developed in the Lipmanian tradition are said to be “philosophical” in that they question “open” concepts (friendship, the person, rights, justice, belonging, etc.) for which there are no single answers and upon which the children are invited to reflect together with their peers.

To facilitate philosophical sessions, Lipman and his colleagues (Lipman et al., 1980) recommend following these three steps: reading; questioning; holding a dialogue within a community of inquiry.

Reading

From the age of six years, pupils generally enjoy reading on their own. Therefore, the pupils are invited to read a chapter from a philosophical novel, out loud and in turns (a sentence or a paragraph per child, according to their age). These two aspects are important to mark “co-operation” among peers. Indeed, sometimes shy pupils only express themselves through reading (they participate little or not at all in the following steps), however this act already constitutes a first commitment toward learning, in that the pupil is no longer a receptacle that receives narrative data, but becomes an active participant in reading. Reading out loud is also a first-level verbal exchange with peers – an exchange that will eventually turn into a sharing of ideas.

Why use a philosophical novel as the basic tool? A number of teachers, particularly in Europe, do not use philosophical novels (such as those of Lipman); instead, they use material derived from children’s literature. Based on our experience, we consider that this type of support can be relevant to the development of language and cognitive skills, to the extent that it respects the two following conditions:

- It must not contain an explicit or even implicit moral, toward which the youngsters are directed. Indeed, this type of work too often contains messages relating to “proper” behaviours. Pupils rapidly detect these messages and adjust their reflection accordingly – undoubtedly judging that if they share the author’s point of view, they will not risk being poorly graded by the teacher. Nevertheless, as Dewey would say, thinking within an author’s perspective is not thinking, since thinking is thinking by oneself.

- The support used (if it is not philosophical) must be centered on a dilemma, containing ambiguities or paradoxes. In short, it must encourage youngsters to question, to feed doubt; it must create a cognitive conflict in their minds, that being the only way to generate a process of inquiry (Dewey, 1960). Without dilemma, without ambiguity and without paradox, the mind is not aware, or is scarcely aware, of problems, and therefore is not easily oriented toward construction of meaning or problem-solving.

Questioning

The second step in the Lipmanian approach is collecting questions. After reading the chapter, the pupils are invited to formulate questions that intrigue them and which they would like to discuss. The second step presupposes that they invest sufficient effort into comprehending the text so that they question the situations narrated. Comprehension not only requires knowledge of words, but also a global understanding of the text and of the context. This step encourages the child to embark on a process of inquiry, which is at the root of critical thinking.

According to most pedagogical research, while self-questioning and formulating questions belong to childhood, they are no longer spontaneous mental acts for children in grade three and beyond. The pedagogy of stimulating pupils to question differs from traditional teaching approaches in which the power and the right to ask questions belong to teachers. However, (re)learning to question is fundamental, in that it stimulates autonomous and critical thinking in youngsters.

Furthermore, this second step in P4C gives pupils a sense of responsibility and places them at the forefront of their learning experience since, through questions, the pupils contribute to the discussion agenda. In so doing, question-collection ensures philosophical sessions that are rooted in intrinsic motivation.
This second step presupposes that pupils learn not only to formulate questions, but to formulate “philosophical” questions. In general, a question carries philosophical meaning when it: concerns the why rather than the how; questions concepts; develops around the origin, cause, consequences; draws relationships between concepts and situations; questions traditions, prejudices, etc.

In sum, learning to formulate a philosophical question stimulates pupils’ critical thinking, creativity and autonomy.

**Philosophical Dialogue within a Community of Inquiry**

The next step is dialogue among peers, which aims to provide youngsters with elements of answers to the questions they formulated during the previous step. An exchange is considered philosophical to the extent that it develops as a “pyramidal construction” built with criticism. This type of exchange is not spontaneous, as conversation is (Splitter and Sharp, 1995); it requires regular and rigorous learning.

One of the fundamental conditions for critical dialogue to occur is found in a climate of cooperation. In Dewey’s (1960, 1969, 1980) wake, Lipman considers that the class-group must transform into a “community of inquiry” (CI). A true CI is manifested when dialogue among peers is characterized by confidence, pluralism, reciprocity and tolerance (2003).

Notions of dialogue and CI, which are at the root of the Lipmanian approach, are discussed further in the following section, where we synthesize some research results that relate to these notions.

**Research Results**

Qualitative analysis was used in all of the research projects we have conducted, although certain quantitative-type analyses were sometimes used to complete interpretative results. Between two and three video recordings of the youngsters’ exchanges during a school year were performed in each classroom, then transcribed and analyzed according to the Grounded Theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Huberman and Miles, 1991). Participants in the first two studies were pupils aged 10 to 12 years; those of the last study were aged 5 to 6 years. Philosophical praxis lasted one hour per week, during an entire school year (October to May). For youngsters in the final grades of elementary school, the material used was *The Mathematical Adventures of Matilda and David* (Daniel et al., 1996a, 1996b) and for preschool children, it was *The Tales of Audrey-Anne* (Daniel, 2002, 2003).

**Types of Interventions and Dynamics of Exchanges among Pupils**

In a first study, the team of researchers analyzed, among other things, the dynamics of pupils’ exchanges, as well as the types of interventions manifested within the philosophical exchanges.

Three types of interventions used by the pupils emerged from the analysis: 1) answers, 2) statements that implied lower-order thinking (LOT) skills and 3) statements that implied complex or higher-order thinking (HOT) skills. By answers, we mean one or two word interventions (e.g.: yes/no; I don’t know). By statements implying LOT skills, we mean interventions characterized by cognitive skills that spontaneously emerge from the pupils’ speech (e.g.: a statement of fact, a question of comprehension to obtain a specific answer, a concrete description of a particular object, a simple explanation (rather than a more abstract justification), an illustration based on a particular example (rather than a generalization), etc.). By statements implying HOT skills, we mean pupil interventions characterized by cognitive skills that were manifested subsequent to praxis (e.g.: a critical question; an abstract definition, justifying viewpoints, nuance, a logical relationship, use of criteria, suggesting possible solutions, criticism and self-criticism, etc.).

Analyses of the interventions compiled at the beginning and at the end of the year showed progress made by pupils that used P4C. During the first exchange among pupils, in October (before the philosophical praxis), the type of intervention that dominated was answers, whereas analysis of the pupil’s last exchange of the year (mid-May), showed significant progress regarding the percentage of interventions implying LOT and HOT skills. The number of answers (in one or two words) dropped from 61% to 26%, giving way, among others, to a number of pupil interventions implying HOT skills, which experienced a significant increase between the first and the last recording, from 9% to 35% (see Table 1). This progress is fundamental if we consider that the increasing complexity of language is interrelated with the increasing complexity of thinking.

From the socio-constructivist perspective, in which our works are situated, it became essential to study pupils’ autonomy of speech. We therefore analyzed the dynamics of exchanges that the pupils constructed, as the weeks went by, with the help of P4C. At the beginning of the school year, this dynamic was rather conventional; the teacher asked questions and pupils answered. On the other hand, analysis of the last transcript revealed that pupils questioned each other, asked each other for explanations, nuanced peer statements and criticized each other. In so doing, pupil interventions were mostly directed at their peers. If we compare the first and last transcripts, we note an undeniable progress regarding pupils’ dialogical communication (see Table 2). This progress illustrates the effect of P4C on the development of pupils’ speech autonomy.

Subsequently, with regard to what Lipman and Sharp refer to as a community of inquiry (CI), our analyses enabled us to note that underlying values were closely linked to the development of thinking skills in youngsters, and that the CI was a process manifested in the medium or long term. The results we obtained indicated that, in certain groups, it took up to 7 months for the CI to come about (Daniel et al., 2000). Indeed, although the teacher implemented a new learning method (P4C), the group did not spontaneously change its behaviour or its representations of the respective roles of teacher and pupils. For the class-group (aggregation of individuals) to transform itself into a philosophical CI, pupils must first learn to manage the new rights they are given, and that are part of philosophizing (questioning, thinking autonomously, expressing themselves, etc.). Then, the pupils must elaborate and assume social rules. At this stage, the work of the pupils manifests itself mainly at the level of personal autonomy.
Then we observed that the pupils become aware of new social responsibilities (such as involvement in solving a common problem, mutual help, respect for divergent points of view, etc.). Parallel to this, the classroom climate evolves and the group becomes a micro-society; the pupils become more confident in their judgments and more certain of their viewpoints. As a consequence, the thinking skills become more complex and pupils develop self-esteem (see Lago-Bernstein, 1990).

Finally, the development of personal, social and emotional aspects gives the pupils the necessary impulse to transform the micro-society into a true philosophical CI. Instead of seeing critical dialogue as a rhetorical means to ensure personal victory, pupils view it as an instrument to help them solve their common questions. Inter-subjectivity is then considered as superior to intra-subjectivity.

In short, according to our research results, forming a philosophical CI is a rather long process, but it stimulates fundamental values such as equality of rights and opportunities among members, individual and social responsibility, active participation in solving a common problem, and critical reflection with regard to the common good.

The first study issued in the following conclusions: pupils were able to cooperate with their peers to solve a common problem, the means they used to do this was dialogue, and the acquisition of communication skills evolved in parallel with the development of complex thinking skills. However, one question remained: How did the pupils acquire these skills?

A Critical Dialogue Learning Process

In a second research project, we worked with a team of researchers to analyze two learning processes in pupils aged 10 to 12 years: a) the process related to critical dialogue, and b) the process related to the development of critical thinking. Eight groups of 30 pupils participated in the experiment: two groups in Australia, three groups in Mexico and three groups in Quebec. Sample diversity consisted of pupils that originated from three cultures and spoke three languages (English, Spanish and French).

An end-of-the-year analysis of the transcripts of exchanges among pupils throughout the P4C experiment turned up five types of exchanges. We refer to them as: anecdotal, monological, non-critical dialogical, semi-critical dialogical and critical dialogical.

Anecdotal principally refers to an account of specific and personal experiences with little or no consideration for the common question being addressed by the group. Monological refers to an interesting discussion, related to the common question addressed by the group, but that follows its own course, without being influenced by the divergent points of view expressed by peers. A monological exchange, due to its intra-subjective nature, may lead to a certain “negative relativism”. Non-critical dialogical refers to an inter-subjective type of exchange that is constructed in a pyramidal manner, based on peer interventions, where each point of view contributes, in different degrees, to enriching the group’s perspective. A non-critical dialogue remains simple; there is no evaluation of viewpoints. As a result, at the end of the exchange, the initial idea is not modified. Semi-critical dialogical characterizes an exchange that contains certain criticisms directed at peers, but these criticisms have little to no influence on the pupils that receive them. Therefore, at the end of the exchange, the initial perspective is enriched but not modified. Finally, critical dialogue is a type of exchange that is transformed and evolves according to the criticism directed at peers and integrated by them. As a result, the initial perspective of the exchange is modified (see Appendix A for criteria that illustrate each type of exchange).

For novices in philosophy, the evolution process was the same in every group, no matter what their culture or language. At the beginning of the school year (before philosophical praxis), pupils in each country discussed in a simple manner, one that presupposes an egocentric epistemology - a type of exchange which we refer to as monological.

| Table 1 – Types of Interventions - Comparison between the first and the last transcript |
|---------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                                             | Simple Answers  | Statements LOT  | Statements HOT  |
| **First transcript (October)**              | 61%             | 30%             | 9%              |
| **Last transcript (May)**                   | 26%             | 39%             | 35%             |

| Table 2 – Dynamics of Exchanges - Comparison between the first and the last transcript |
|---------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                                            | The teacher     | Another pupil   |
| **First transcript (October)**              | 87.15%          | 12.84%          |
| **Last transcript (May)**                   | 28.57%          | 71.42%          |
By mid-year (after four months of philosophical praxis), these novices had a more complex discourse, which became dialogical. However, although there was interdependence between the pupils’ interventions, the discourse did not include an evaluation of proposals; the objective of the pupils seemed to be the accumulation of juxtaposed points of view. This type of exchange was situated in intra-subjectivity. We refer to this as non-critical dialogical.

At the end of the school year, the novices in each country exchanged in a semi-critical dialogical manner. In other words, some of them were sufficiently critical to evaluate the proposals of their peers, but the latter were not sufficiently critical to adjust their proposal.

As for pupils who had two years or more of experience with philosophical praxis, our analyses revealed that, by mid-year, their exchanges had become what could be considered “philosophical” (in the sense of outcome), in that they were dialogical, critical, and were situated in inter-subjectivity (for details of the analysis, see Daniel et al., 2002).

**A Critical Thinking Learning Process**

A second phase of the study consisted in analyzing the cognitive evolution of these eight groups of pupils, as manifested in each type of exchange. The objective was to bring to light the process of learning critical thinking, i.e., the process of learning to philosophize.

**Elements of the Process**

To begin, coding each pupil intervention revealed the thinking skills (i.e.: example, definition, justification, comparison, etc.) they put into effect during the exchanges. Subsequently, categorization of these codes (or thinking skills) uncovered the presence of four thinking modes in the discourse: logical, creative, responsible and metacognitive. We noted some pupil interventions that were related to a search for coherence, to informal logic, to order, to convergence, and to uniformity in the discourse; we grouped these in the logical mode. We also observed that some other pupil interventions were related to a search for meaning, to contextualizing points of view, and to transforming meanings; these were grouped in the creative mode, as were interventions that presupposed original, different or divergent relationships. We also noted interventions in the transcript analysis that established a relationship between behaviour and moral rules or ethical principles, with the intent of improving the personal and social experience. We grouped these in the responsible mode. Finally, we noted interventions that were related to the ability to think about the tasks carried out, points of view and perspectives put forward (by peers or self) – we grouped these in the metacognitive mode.

The analysis showed that each of these four thinking modes evolved within its own field. It also showed that for philosophical or critical thinking to occur, it was not enough for these four thinking modes to be manifested in the pupils’ discourse. The thinking modes needed to be grounded in an epistemological complexity. Analysis of the transcripts of exchanges among pupils highlighted three epistemological perspectives – which we refer to, respectively, as egocentricity, relativism, and inter-subjectivity – and which were placed within a hierarchy from spontaneous to reflexive, from simple to complex, from specific to general, and from self to community.

Thus, we observed that in certain exchanges (anecdotal and monological) the pupils’ thinking was essentially oriented toward self and needed a concrete support (e.g. sensorial experience) to manifest itself. Furthermore, these pupils were unable to justify their points of view, even when encouraged by the teacher, and criticism was nonexistent in their exchanges. We refer to this perspective as egocentrism. Then we observed that in certain types of exchanges (non-critical dialogical and semi-critical dialogical), pupils started justifying their statements, displaying reflection, and were able to de-focus from their personal experience and be influenced by their peers’ points of view. Such pupil interventions were characterized by tolerance toward divergent opinions and by the will to understand the meaning of other people’s remarks. The objective seemed to be accumulation and juxtaposition of opinions, as a result of which the pupils found themselves, at the end of the exchange, with a collection of viewpoints from which they were unable to choose the most adequate or the most meaningful – they all seemed relevant. We refer to this perspective as relativism. It is within this epistemology that the majority of pupils (and teachers) seemed to feel more at ease. Finally, in other exchanges (critical dialogical), we observed that an authentic community of inquiry was formed, insofar as the pupils showed tolerance and open-mindedness, valued critical evaluation by peers, presented points of view as hypotheses (rather than conclusions), and used justifications that were complete and that spontaneously accompanied their statements. The pupils’ cognitive efforts were oriented toward co-construction (personal and social) of meaning. We refer to this perspective as inter-subjectivity. It is within this third epistemological perspective that we placed philosophizing, since HOT skills related to philosophizing (see Appendix B) such as conceptualization, transformation, categorization and correction (on the level of content), and doubt, evaluation and questioning (on the level of form) are manifested in inter-subjectivity.

In summary, analysis of transcripts of the exchanges revealed two essential criteria for the manifestation of philosophizing or dialogical critical thinking, namely: 1) multimodality, that is, the manifestation of four modes of thinking (logical, creative, responsible and metacognitive), and 2) epistemological complexity or, more specifically, an epistemology related to inter-subjectivity which is manifested in conceptualization, transformation, categorization and correction (for details, see Daniel et al., 2005).

**Sequence of the Process**

The process of learning dialogical critical thinking, because of its multi-modality and its epistemological complexity, takes place over a period of several months, or even several years. The learning sequence described in the following paragraphs reflects this process as it manifested itself in all our P4C beginner groups, independently of the cultural context.

At the very beginning of the school year, analysis of the first
transcript revealed that the pupils’ discourse showed preponderant use of two thinking modes, namely logical and creative, each one being situated in an epistemological perspective linked to egocentricity. This first step of the learning process reflected a thinking process that was part of an anecdotal or monological type of exchange, which was spontaneous for all pupils observed.

Analysis of the second transcript (which was recorded after some four months of praxis with P4C) revealed that the pupils’ discourse reflected the use of three thinking modes, namely logical, creative and metacognitive. The first two had evolved toward an epistemology linked to relativism; the third (the last one to appear) was grounded in egocentricity. This second step of the learning process reflected a thinking process that was part of a non-critical dialogical type of exchange.

Analysis of the third transcript (which was recorded at the end of the school year) revealed that the discourse of beginners with P4C regularly reflected four thinking modes, namely logical, creative, metacognitive and responsible. The logical and metacognitive modes were situated in an epistemology linked to inter-subjectivity, whereas the creative and responsible modes remained in the epistemology of the previous level, that is to say relativism. This third step of the learning process reflected a thinking process that was part of a semi-critical dialogical type of exchange.

Furthermore, with pupils who were experienced in P4C, analysis of the second and third transcripts, recorded at mid-year and at the end of the school year, revealed that their discourse regularly reflected four thinking modes that were part of an epistemology linked to inter-subjectivity. The pupils’ exchanges were of a critical dialogical type.

We therefore note that within the framework of philosophical praxis, a process of learning critical thinking gradually takes place. In other words, it begins with the overlapping of epistemological perspectives and ends with a definitive grounding in a more complex perspective. Thus, at the end of the year, in P4C beginner groups, we observed a thinking process which had surpassed egocentricity to oscillate between relativism and inter-subjectivity. The discourse, among groups experienced in P4C, was well-grounded in an epistemology linked to inter-subjectivity.

In sum, the results of the two studies we have just presented enable us to answer, in a positive manner, some of the questions mentioned at the beginning of the text, namely: Are elementary school children able to think philosophically, to partake in a dialogue and to ensure cooperation with their peers? Pupils do not spontaneously develop the inherent abilities for these skills; they follow a complex learning process that develops gradually over a period of several months or years of praxis.

Whether or not P4C stimulated the same social, language and intellectual skills in younger pupils, in particular 5 year-old preschoollers, remained to be studied.

Can Preschool Children Learn to Philosophize?

The purpose of the third research-project’, which took place between 2001 and 2004, and was situated in a context of violence prevention, was to study, among other objectives: a) children’s capacity to “philosophize”; b) the impact of P4C on five-year-old children’s development of judgment; c) their social representations of emotions; d) their social representation of violence. To obtain insight into the first objective, we analyzed the first and the last exchange of the school year, based on the previously described typology of exchanges (see Appendix A).

In the majority of the classes studied, analysis of the first transcript indicated that, at the beginning of the experimentation (October), five-year-old children exchanged in an anecdotal manner. They were unable to formulate a question based on a tale; they expressed themselves with only one or two words; they did not speak with each other, but were content with answering the teacher’s questions; the exchange lasted only a few minutes, after which the children lost their concentration and their motivation; only two or three children expressed themselves, whereas the majority listened in silence; even when stimulated by the teacher, they were unable to justify their opinions; the cognitive skills which characterized their discourse were LOT (statements and personal examples). Following is an example:

Adult: What is the difference between a doll and a person?
Pupil 1: The other day, my friend had a doll. It walked. It even had a little fork and it could eat... (…) You pushed on a button on the bowl and lots of glop came out. (…) Then her dog went into her room, it took the doll and threw it on the floor and broke it.
Pupil 2: My doll talks.
Pupil 3: I’ve seen a doll that could pee.

Analysis of the last transcript of the year (end of April) indicated that, in spite of a certain epistemological egocentricity characteristic of this age group, the children’s exchanges had increased in complexity, going from anecdotal to non-critical dialogical in certain groups, and to semi-critical dialogical in others. Following is an example of a semi-critical dialogical exchange:

Adult: Let’s do another game to think about our solutions. Here is the situation: Jojo doesn’t like the candy her aunt gave her, but she eats it anyway because she doesn’t want to disappoint her aunt. According to you, is this a good solution?
Pupil 1: I think it’s a good idea (…) because she won’t be sad.
Adult: Does anyone agree or disagree with Pupil 1?
Pupil 2: I don’t agree (…) I would take the candy and drop it in the garbage and say I finished the candy. (…) because I don’t want to eat mints I don’t like. (…) This way, she won’t know I didn’t eat them.
Adult: Do you agree with the ideas that were just said?
Pupil 3: I don’t agree with Pupil 2 because if my aunt gave me some candy I don’t like and I threw it away, when she throws something away, she will look in the garbage and see the candy and she would be angry with me.

Pupil 2: If we put them way, way, way down in the bottom of the garbage, you can get your hands dirty.
Adult: What would you do?
Pupil 4: Well, I would eat them even if I don’t like them. If I really, really, don’t like them, I’ll give them back to my aunt without telling her I don’t like them.

We must recognize that, in this last excerpt, pupil interventions are centered on a common question they must solve, and interventions are constantly interdependent. With regard to attitudes and complex thinking skills, the children justify their points of view, they listen to the points of view of their peers, and they are able to evaluate these points of view in order to improve the initial point of view, even though those receiving this criticism are not influenced by the proposed evaluation. Furthermore, an analysis of the exchange in its entirety reveals the presence of multimodality in the children’s discourse (logical, creative, metacognitive and responsible thinking). With regard to epistemology, we noted that these five-year-old children had gone beyond egocentrism, in which each person is isolated in an interior monologue and is not influenced by peer opinions, and beyond negative relativism in which each opinion is juxtaposed to the previous ones in order to accumulate the greatest number of ideas without recognizing a hierarchy among these points of view, and that some of the children tended toward intersubjectivity. In short, the excerpt illustrates that five-year-old children, when adequately stimulated by an adult, are able to hold a semi-critical dialogue (for more information, see Daniel and Desol, 2005).

**Impact of P4C on the Development of Judgment**

To confirm the impact of philosophical dialogue on pupils’ judgment, at the beginning of October and at the end of April, we interviewed the children in the six kindergarten (experimental and control) classes who participated in our project.

Children were shown four series of drawings and were asked: “Among these drawings, which is different? Can you explain why?” The content of the drawings focused on distinguishing the similarities and differences, in three situations, regarding what is animated and what is inanimate (for example, a hammer, a butterfly, a frog and a ladybug) and, in one situation, regarding manifestations of violence (for example, a situation where two people have taken up a karate position, another where they are boxing, and a third where one person was hitting the other). Judgment was measured using a test developed by Schleifer in 1992.

Analysis results for the first three items showed a significant change between pre-testing and post-testing among all of the experimental and control group children. Furthermore, item no. 4, relative to situations related to human combat (karate, boxing, violence), showed a highly-significant interaction impact among children who used P4C. In the pre-test, 5% of the children in experimental groups and 5% of the children in the control groups suggested an appropriate answer with this item. In the post-test, that is, after engaging in philosophical praxis for an entire school year, 18% of the children in the control groups gave the expected answer, compared to 93% of the children in the groups that were experimenting with P4C (Schleifer et al., 2003). These results show the impact of P4C on five-year-old children’s judgment with regard to the manifestations of violence.

**Impact of P4C on Children’s Representations of Emotions**

Within the framework of the same research-project, we studied the evolution of children’s representations of four basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger and fear) following weekly use of P4C. Although there is no consensus among researchers concerning the internal causes of violence, many agree in linking it to mismanaged or misunderstood emotions (Erkohen-Marküüs and Doudin, 2000), whereas others relate it to the quality of an individual’s social representations (SR) or, more exactly, to their limits, such that when SR are distorted, they may bias judgment (Libersan, 2003; Jodelet, 1993).

As a world view developed by social agents, SR function as an organized and prioritized social data system of interpretation. They enable individuals to understand the expectations and anticipations...
of other members, and they are interdependent with regard to the actions of others (Abric, 1994). SR and social practice are correlative and co-constituent. Indeed, representation guides and determines practice, while practice creates or transforms representation. Representation corresponds to opinions, beliefs and attitudes linked to an object or a situation (Jodelet, 1989). The theoretical foundation of social representations (SR) is socio-constructorivist, according to which objective reality does not exist, as it is always represented or, in other words, appropriated by an individual or group, reconstructed in their symbolic universe and integrated into their value system (Abric, 1994).

SR are generally studied through discourse analysis, and especially through word-association analysis (Doise, 1992). To conduct this study, we interviewed pupils from the six experimental and control groups individually (9 children per classroom for a total of 54 children). The interviews were held at the end of September and at the end of April, and the children were asked: “What does happiness mean to you?”; “What does fear mean to you?”, “What does anger mean to you?”; and “What does sadness mean to you?”.

Analysis of the children’s answers brought to light concepts that were systematized in three main categories: non-representation of an emotion; egocentric or concrete representation of an emotion; and socializing representation of an emotion (Daniel et al., 2005). Non-representation of an emotion refers to not knowing the emotion, and indicates that the child does not know the inductive word (when the child answers: I don’t know). Ego-centric representation of emotion indicates that the child represents emotion through sensory experiences (e.g.: happiness is eating a piece of chocolate cake) or through concrete and observable manifestations (e.g.: happiness is smiling). Socializing representation of emotion brings into play taking others into account; it illustrates an interpersonal relationship that is built and based on reciprocity (e.g.: having fun with my friends).

It emerged from the analysis of individual interviews that, over a full school year, in all the groups (experimental and control), the children modified their representations of emotions. These representations generally evolved from non-representation to egocentric representation. But, starting from the beginning of the year, a few pupils from both groups (experimental and control) were situated in the socializing representation of emotions. We noted, in the control group children, that progress toward the socializing category decreased slightly during the year for three of the four emotions being studied, whereas it increased for all four emotions in the experimental groups (see Tables 3 to 6). For children in the control groups, the regressive phenomena in the socializing category can be explained in view of the fact that the “traditional” class, through its rules and educational goals, implicitly values performance, individualism and competition between individuals. On the other hand, in that the essence of the Lipmanian approach is based on dialogue within a community of inquiry, developing experimental group children’s social skills is a desired and expected effect.

Although we cannot assert that the profiles of the experimental groups result exclusively from philosophical praxis, we can nevertheless recognize, in the results of the experimental groups, an impact of the cognitive and social stimulation of P4C.

### Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Representation</th>
<th>Self-Centered Representation of Emotion</th>
<th>Socializing Representation of Emotion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Test Experimental Groups</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6

<table>
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</tr>
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</table>

**Effect of P4C on Children’s Representations of Violence**

We also studied the same five-year-old children’s SR of violence, particularly their representations of the causes and consequences of violence, and of the means with which to regulate it. We therefore asked five-year-old children to draw children playing in a school yard – the drawing being a pretext. Then we asked them: In your drawing, are children fighting? Why are the children fighting? What will happen after the fight? How can a child stop a fight?

The children’s answers in individual interviews (September and April) enabled us to uncover four categories of SR, which we named: non-representation, egocentric representation of violence, pluralistic or socializing representation, and reflexive (or well-considered) representation of violence (see Daniel et al., 2006). Non-representation of causes, consequences and means of regulating
violence indicate that the child is unable to verbalize them (e.g.: I don’t know). Egocentric representation is situated in a behaviourist perspective in which the causes are found in material property (e.g.: There are two of us and there’s only one ball[10]), consequences are found in punishment or in reciprocal physical violence (e.g.: I’ll kick him), and means of regulating violence are related to an authority figure (e.g.: I’ll tell the teacher and she’ll have him face the wall). Pluralistic or socializing representations of violence are part of a perspective that transcends what is observable and physical, to focus on more subtle elements of violence and on empathic attitudes. Here, causes of violence are found in intellectual property (e.g.: When you don’t agree with your friend’s opinion) and in emotion (e.g.: When you’re jealous); consequences are found in others’ ill-being (e.g.: others will be sad); and means of regulating violence require bilateral efforts (e.g.: You raise your hand as in the Wings of Peace and the other will understand). As for reflexive (or well-considered) representations of violence, they call on an ability to question, to recognize nuance and to contextualize situations of violence. Causes of violence emphasize exterior influences (e.g.: Boys like violence more because they often listen to action films and girls are older (more mature) than boys, which means they’re calmer); consequences of violence denote comprehension of a relationship (e.g.: His friend isn’t (won’t be) his friend anymore); and means of regulating violence are found in the interaction between both parties (e.g.: He says would you please stop and the other asks if he wants to be his friend, he says yes and the fight stops).

Results of the analysis are interesting, given that the SR of children in the groups experimenting with P4C became more refined in each of the three dimensions over the course of the experiment, although perspective 2, egocentricity, remained predominant on the whole.

Indeed, at the end of the year, the salient nucleus is found in egocentric SR, followed by socializing SR and a few answers were manifested in the reflexive perspective of SR. Differently, in the control groups, the children’s SR of violence did not change between the pre-test and the post-test, as the salient nucleus remained in the egocentric perspective, followed by the non-represented perspective. Few answers were categorized in perspective 3 at the beginning of the year, and none in perspective 4 (see Tables 7 to 9).

The impact of P4C on children’s SR of violence is not insignificant in terms of prevention. If the SR of a majority of children fell within the scope of egocentricity at the beginning of the school year, this means they were aware only of the physical (perceptual) causes of violence, that consequences of violence were determined and managed by the adult, and that means of regulating violence were found in resorting to authority. In other words, in this category of SR, children have no control over the world and their existence; they suffer violence in themselves and in others. On the other hand, the pluralistic or socializing perspective, which characterized several children in the experimental groups at the end of the year, presupposes a finer comprehension of the causes and consequences of violence, and gives the children a certain degree of power regarding means of regulation. We are inclined to consider that, to the extent that SR are oriented toward plurality, children’s behaviour will become increasingly inclusive, as they become aware of the other as a different being. As to the few children whose SR were, at the end of the philosophical praxis, marked by reflection, they illustrate the fact that at age five, when stimulated by an educational method that emphasizes inter-subjectivity, children are able to replace blows with reflection, and a search for truth by the co-construction of a temporarily satisfactory reality. Children then have sufficient confidence in themselves and in the world to choose negotiation over confrontation, dialogue over blows.

### Discussion of Research Results

As indicated by the previous data, which showed a distinction between the results from the experimental groups and those from the control groups, the children’s development is not only a result
of age or experience; stimulation at social, discursive, cognitive and epistemological levels is required. Neither is it sufficient to create a space-time in the classroom that allows the children to “speak” in order to acquire complex skills; a philosophical praxis is needed. In the following paragraphs, we present some conditions of application which we consider fundamental to ensure children’s progress—first on a pedagogical level, then on a social level.

Conditions of Implementation on a Pedagogical Level

Some of our observations in Australia, France, Mexico and Quebec prompt us to state that a widespread tendency to “let the pupils speak” is becoming apparent. Now if, as confirmed by our research-projects, establishing philosophical dialogue among youngsters is not spontaneous and the use of criticism confirmed by our research-projects, establishing philosophical tendency to “let the pupils speak” is becoming apparent. Now if, France, Mexico and Quebec prompt us to state that a widespread interest on a diversity of specific goals that were linked to their personal interests; their exchange was linear, since it was scarcely or not at all argumentative. Finally, instead of forming a community of inquiry, the class continued as an agglomeration of individuals.

Our observations also enabled us to note that when the teacher (unlike the previous situation) asked all the questions or, in other words, when she locked herself into a traditional role, then, despite the use of a philosophical support, the pupils’ goal was to properly understand instructions and to answer the teacher’s questions correctly, instead of attempting to construct meanings with their peers. Furthermore, they waited for the teacher’s questions to state their points of view, instead of beginning an autonomous search.

We also observed that when the teacher actually guided and encouraged pupils in their reflections without, however, stimulating their critical skills and attitudes, then the pupils learned to think autonomously but did not learn to argue. At times they showed opposition, but more in a perspective of confrontation than negotiation. They rarely managed to completely justify their points of view, and were inclined to use personal examples to demonstrate their points of view.

Finally, we observed that when the teacher encouraged the pupils to reflect, favoured interaction among pupils, asked for justifications, stimulated pupils to contribute criticism, etc. with questions such as: What criteria do you use to assert that…? Do you agree with the previous statements? Can you find a counter-example? Can you define the terms in your question? Does the whole classroom agree with the point of view of …? In what way does this criticism enrich our perspective? and so on, then the pupils learned to respect divergent points of view, to justify their opinions, to become critical toward their statements and the statements of their peers, to become aware of the validity of criticism to enrich and modify perspectives…in sum, they learned to philosophize.

One of the challenges facing teachers who use P4C with preschool and elementary school pupils consists in becoming aware of the difference between conversation (monological exchange) and dialogue; between non-critical dialogue and critical dialogue; and between thinking and critical thinking. In other words, teachers that attempt to lead pupils to philosophize must keep in mind the “philosophical aim” of the exchange. This is because, without an awareness of this goal, teaching philosophy in schools could stagnate into simple conversation and, in so doing, fall within the framework of “negative relativism”, where all perspectives are accepted and acceptable, and where proposals are neither evaluated, nor prioritized. Young generations, too often influenced by neo-liberal values and illusions, end up considering power, money, sex, over-consumption, and so on, as sources of happiness; there...
ultimately attaining socialization or even reflective representa-
tion and their representations of emotions and of violence that
transcended the egocentricity characteristic of this age group,
inter-subjectivity).
archized epistemological perspectives (egocentricity, relativism,
and responsible), which developed according to three hier-
archy had an impact on the dialogical and cognitive competencies
in pupils along with transmission of knowledge.

Implementation Conditions on the Social Level

As school is a reflection of society itself, we maintain that, to
begin with, society should value questioning, doubt, co-constructed
reflection and responsible criticism, rather than passive acceptance
in the name of tolerance, rapidity and performance at all costs, or
the illusion of certainty which can lead to dogmatism.

Furthermore, we maintain that the society of rights in which we
presently live should not forget at the same time to prioritize the
individual and social responsibilities that each citizen must assume
in order to feel free and autonomous.

We also maintain that society should further stimulate social
commitment, instead of being pulled in the wake of individualism,
and hence of negative relativism, which is increasing in scale.

We maintain that teacher education programs in universities
or IUFMs should further stimulate critical thinking among future
teachers so that they develop a “philosophical sense” and the skills
to guide young generations toward critical reflection.

Finally, we maintain that school programs should also include
the development of autonomous, critical, and responsible reflection
in pupils along with transmission of knowledge.

Conclusion

To conclude, results of research carried out since 1995 indicate
that pupils aged five to twelve years who regularly (1 hour per
week) and continuously (at least during an entire school-year) use
the Philosophy for Children approach, acquire the ability to work
within a community of inquiry with their peers and, in so doing,
develop, as months go by, social skills and attitudes related to rights,
responsibilities and social commitment.

Involvement in establishing a philosophical community of in-
quiry had an impact on the dialogical and cognitive competencies
of pupils who succeeded in surpassing the anecdotal and monologi-
cal exchange in which they were situated at the beginning of the
school-year, helping to reach a semi-critical or critical dialogical
type of exchange by the end of the year. At the same time, the
community of inquiry stimulated an apprenticeship process related
to critical dialogical thinking that presupposed the pupils’ gradual
exploitation of four thinking modes (logical, creative, metacogni-
tive, and responsible), which developed according to three hier-
archized epistemological perspectives (egocentricity, relativism,
inter-subjectivity).

Finally, our results showed that the philosophical community
of inquiry had an impact on the development of children’s judg-
ment and their representations of emotions and of violence that
transcended the egocentricity characteristic of this age group,
ultimately attaining socialization or even reflective representa-
tions, for some.

These apprenticeships could be seen in pupils to the extent that
they were rigorously guided by a Socratic maieutic. When P4C
goes beyond mere conversation, it proves to be a very significant
instrument for educating citizens who are autonomous, responsible
and critically committed to democracy.

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UNESCO of the International Commission on Education for the twenty-first

Notes
1 This paper is the long version of the opening conference that I delivered at UNESCO (November, 15 2006).
2 In French : des philosophants.
3 The following section is taken from: Daniel, 2005 a.
4 The team, which was headed by Marie-France Daniel, included researchers Louise Lafontaine (UQTR), Richard Pallascio (UQAM), and Michael Schleifer (UQAM). The research was subsidized by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada, between 1995 and 1998. The research was headed by M.-F. Daniel, in collaboration with six researchers: L. Lafontaine, R. Pallascio and P. Mongeau (from Quebec), L. Splitter and C. Slade (from Australia), and T. de la Garza (from Mexico). It was made possible thanks to a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada, between 1998 and 2001.
5 A dialogical type of exchange not being philosophical (critical) per se, the analysis enabled us to elucidate three types of dialogical exchanges among pupils: non-critical, semi-critical and critical.
6 This research-project, subsidized by the SSHRC, was headed by M.-F. Daniel. Her co-researchers were Michael Schleifer and Catherine Garner (from Quebec) and Emmanuelle Auriac (from France).
7 In other classes, in which children came from families where communication and questioning were particularly valued, analyses indicated that the children, from the beginning of the school year, exchanged in a monological manner.
8 Examples were taken from transcripts of the children’s interviews.
9 Examples are taken from transcripts of the children’s interviews.
10 In French (from J.-C. Pettier) : discussion à visée philosophique.

APPENDIX A: Typology of Exchanges that Emerged from a Study in Three Cultural Contexts

Anecdotal Exchange – Criteria
- Exchanges with a plurality of subjective objectives (no common goal)
- Exchange that amounts to a series of personal anecdotes
- These anecdotes are essentially directed toward the teacher
- Discourse highlights concrete thinking based on perceptual experience
- Youngsters are incapable of justifying their statements, even when stimulated by the teacher
- Incomprehension of abstract concepts when the teacher introduces them in the exchange
- Limited interest in peer perspectives; questions are not asked
- The classroom amounts to a group of isolated individuals (rather than a micro-society or a community of inquiry)

Monological Exchange – Criteria
- Pupils answers are brief (a few words rather than a complete sentence)
- Answers are independent of each other as though each person pursued an interior monologue
- Statements are not spontaneously justified. They are justified only under teacher stimulation
- Solving problems amounts to searching for the correct answer
- According to the pupil, the teacher knows all the correct answers
- Pupil satisfaction resides in teacher approval

Non-Critical Dialogical Exchange – Criteria
- Beginning of a community of inquiry amongst pupils
- Respect FOR differences in points of view
- Construction of ideas based on peer ideas
- Statements are justified when the teacher guides them in this direction
- Points of view are more complex
- Quantity (rather than quality) of statements seems to be the children’s goal
- Validity of viewpoints is neither evaluated nor questioned
**Semi-Critical Dialogical Exchange – Criteria**
- Common question to be solved (the common goal serves to bring reflections together)
- Links between pupil interventions (interdependence of points of view)
- Critical questions, however they do not influence peers
- Statements that are not always completely justified
- Listening to others and respecting them are not completely integrated
- The result is that the initial idea is improved but not modified

**Critical Dialogical Exchange – Criteria**
- Explicit interdependence between interventions
- Process of inquiry is established
- Search centered on the construction of meaning (vs. truth)
- Search for divergence
- Uncertainty does not create uneasiness
- Evaluation of statements and criteria
- Open-mindedness to new alternatives
- Spontaneous and complete justifications
- Moral preoccupations
- Statements in the form of hypotheses to be verified (vs. closed conclusions)
- Modification of the initial idea

### APPENDIX B

**Critical Thinking Learning Process with regard to Content and Form**

#### Content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modes</th>
<th>Logical</th>
<th>Creative</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Metacognitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Persp.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Logical</strong></td>
<td><strong>Creative</strong></td>
<td><strong>Responsible</strong></td>
<td><strong>Metacognitive</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Egocentricity</td>
<td><strong>Statement based on the perceptual experience of a particular event</strong></td>
<td><strong>Statement that gives meaning to a personal point of view</strong></td>
<td><strong>Answer related to a personal and particular behaviour</strong></td>
<td><strong>Statement related to a task, a point of view that is personal and particular</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Relativism</td>
<td><strong>Statement based on a generalization that results from senses and reason</strong></td>
<td><strong>Statement that gives meaning to the point of view of a peer</strong></td>
<td><strong>Answer related to the particular behaviour of a peer</strong></td>
<td><strong>Statement related to the point of view, to the task of a peer</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Inter-subjectivity</td>
<td><strong>Statement based on simple reasoning (conceptualization)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Statement that offers a divergent meaning (transformation)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Answer related to moral rules (categorization)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Statement that expresses a change in the group’s perspective (correction)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Form

<table>
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<td><strong>Metacognitive</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Egocentricity</td>
<td><strong>Unjustified statement</strong></td>
<td><strong>Statement of meaning (units)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Statement linked to behaviour, rules, principles</strong></td>
<td><strong>Statement linked to the task, the activity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Relativism</td>
<td><strong>Justification (incomplete or concrete) prompted by the adult</strong></td>
<td><strong>Contextualization of meaning (simple relationships)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Desire to understand behaviours, rules, principles</strong></td>
<td><strong>Description of the task of the activity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Inter-subjectivity</td>
<td><strong>Simple spontaneous justification (... because...)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Evaluation of meaning (critical relationships)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Manifestation of doubt cf. behaviours, rules, principles</strong></td>
<td><strong>Explanation/evaluation of the task, the activity, the ability</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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