Table of Contents

Thinking in Stories

Gareth Matthews: The Turnaround Wind, by Arnold Lobel.......................... 1

Acquiring the Craft of Thinking

Allan Collins, John Seeley Brown and Susan E. Newman:
Cognitive Apprenticeship: Teaching the Craft of Reading, Writing
and Mathematics................................................................................................... 2

Doing Philosophy with Children

James Palermo and Kate D’Erasmo: Logic, Language and Dewey:
a student-teacher dialectic.................................................................................. 11

Terry Allen, I Think, Therefore I Can: Attribution and Philosophy
for Children........................................................................................................... 14

Patrick J.M. Costello, Akraisia and animal rights: Philosophy in the British
primary school ................................................................................................. 19

Children Around the World

Photographs by Paul Strand ............................................................................ 28

Applying the Craft of Teaching

Gustav Heckmann, Socratic Dialogue............................................................... 34

Joseph Malanga, The Study of Teaching and Curriculum............................... 38

Acquiring Personhood

Florence M. Hetzler, The Person and The Little Prince of St. Exupéry...... 44

Book Review

Mark Weinstein and Beatrice Banu, editors, The Fieldston Ethics Reader,
by Tom Hodgson.................................................................................................. 46

Reflections ........................................................................................................... 48

Credits

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One afternoon in summer the landscape was filled with happy beings: an organ grinder and his monkey, a stout man and his slender wife, a nurse wheeling a baby in a carriage, a maiden and a soldier—and many more, including their royal majesties, the King and Queen. Suddenly a dark and ominous cloud appeared and "seemed to turn the whole world around and around and upside down."

The story of this upside-down world is shown to us in a remarkable sequence of ambiguous pictures. We are given, one by one, a picture of each of the characters introduced at the beginning, but now combined in such a way that one person is portrayed when we look at the picture with the book rightside up, but then when we turn the book upside down to read the inverted writing at the top of the page, the picture becomes that of another person, or even an animal. Thus the organ grinder (straight up) becomes, when inverted, the sailor’s parrot; the stout man becomes his slender wife, etc.

After we have been re-introduced to each character, we learn that the storm was quickly over and the previous order has been restored. "Everyone dusted themselves off and walked serenely in the sunshine of a lovely afternoon."

The story’s ending is unsettling. The thief, unlike all the good citizens of the community, stays out in the dark to look for things to steal. Will this ending upset child readers?

Children are widely thought to want their stories to have neat and moral conclusions. But it is hard to be clear about what children really want, as opposed to what we, their parents and teachers, want for them. And it is even harder to know what we should try to protect them from.

Perhaps, even without turning upside down the thief’s picture on the last page of the story, we are meant to see ourselves in his face, or at least to recognize in his mischief that part of ourselves that rebels against peace and order. If, in fact, we do this, we have been encouraged by Arnold Lobel’s wonderfully provocative book to take another step toward self-knowledge.
Cognitive Apprenticeship: Teaching the Craft of Reading, Writing and Mathematics

TECHNICAL REPORT (Abridged)

Allan Collins, John Seely Brown and Susan E. Newman

It is only in the last century, and only in industrialized nations, that formal schooling has emerged as a widespread method of educating the young. Before schools, apprenticeship was the most common means of learning, used to transmit the knowledge required for expert practice in fields from painting and sculpting to medicine and law. Even today, many complex and important skills, such as those required for language use and social interaction, are learned informally through apprenticeship-like methods—i.e., methods involving not didactic teaching, but observation, coaching, and successive approximation while carrying out a variety of tasks and activities.

The difference between formal schooling and apprenticeship methods are many, but for our purposes, one is most important. Perhaps as a by-product of the specialization of learning in schools, skills and knowledge taught in schools have become abstracted from their uses in the world. In apprenticeship learning, on the other hand, target skills are not only continually in use by skilled practitioners, but are instrumental to the accomplishment of meaningful tasks. Said differently, apprenticeship embeds the learning of skills and knowledge in the social and functional context of their use. This difference is not academic, but has serious implications for the nature of the knowledge that students acquire. This paper attempts to elucidate some of those implications through a proposal for the retooling of apprenticeship methods for the teaching and learning of cognitive skills. Specifically, we propose the development of a new cognitive apprenticeship to teach students the thinking and problem-solving skills involved in school subjects such as reading, writing, and mathematics.

The organization of the paper is as follows: In the first section, we discuss briefly what we believe to be key shortcomings in current curricular and pedagogical practices. We then present some of the structural features of traditional apprenticeship and discuss, in general, what would be required to adapt these characteristics to the teaching and learn-
In the second session we consider in detail three recently developed pedagogical "success models," which we believe exemplify aspects of apprenticeship methods in teaching the thinking and reasoning skills involved in reading, writing, and mathematics. We attempt to show how and why these methods are successful, with regard to the development of not only the cognitive, but also the metacognitive skills required for true expertise.

In the final section, we organize our ideas on the purposes and characteristics of successful teaching into a general framework for the design of learning environments, where "environment" includes the content being taught, the pedagogical methods employed, the sequencing of learning activities, and the sociology of learning. This framework emphasizes how cognitive apprenticeship goes beyond the techniques of traditional apprenticeship. We hope it will be useful to the field in designing, evaluating, and doing research on pedagogical methods, materials, and technologies.

1. Toward a Synthesis of Schooling and Apprenticeship

Schooling and the Acquisition of Expert Practice: While schools have been relatively successful in organizing and conveying large bodies of conceptual and factual knowledge, standard pedagogical practices render key aspects of expertise invisible to students. In particular, too little attention is paid to the processes that experts engage in to use or acquire knowledge in carrying out complex or realistic tasks. Where processes are addressed, the emphasis is on formulaic methods for solving "textbook" problems, or on the development of low-level subskills in relative isolation. Few resources are devoted to higher-order problemsolving activities that require students to actively integrate and appropriately apply subskills and conceptual knowledge.

As a result, conceptual and problem-solving knowledge acquired in school remains largely unintegrated or inert for many students. In some cases, knowledge remains bound to surface features of problems as they appear in textbooks and class presentations. For example, Schoenfeld (1985) has found that students rely on their knowledge of standard textbook patterns of problem presentation, rather than on their knowledge of problem-solving strategies or intrinsic properties of the problems themselves, for help in solving mathematics problems. Problems that fall outside these patterns do not invoke the appropriate problem-solving methods and relevant conceptual knowledge. In other cases, students fail to use resources available to them to improve their skills because they lack models of the processes required for doing so. For example, in the domain of writing, students are unable to make use of potential models of good writing acquired through reading because they have no understanding of the strategies and processes required to produce such text. Stuck with what Bereiter and Scardamalia (1985) call "knowledge-telling strategies," they are unaware that expert writing involves organizing one's ideas about a topic, elaborating goals to be achieved in the writing, thinking about what the audience is likely to know or believe about the subject, and so on.

In order to make real differences in students' skill, we need both to understand the nature of expert practice and to devise methods that are appropriate to learning that practice. Thus, we must first recognize that cognitive and metacognitive strategies and processes, more centrally than low-level subskills or abstract conceptual and factual knowledge, are the organizing principles of expertise, particularly in domains such as reading, writing, and basic mathematics. Further, because expert practice in these domains rests crucially on the integration of cognitive and metacognitive processes, we believe that it can best be taught through methods that emphasize what Lave (in preparation) calls successive approximation of mature practice, methods that have traditionally been employed in apprenticeship to transmit complex physical processes and skills. We propose that these methods of apprenticeship be adapted to the teaching and learning of
complex cognitive skills.

Traditional Apprenticeship: In order to get an idea of what these methods may look like and why they are likely to be effective, let us first consider some of the crucial features of traditional apprenticeship. We have relied on Lave's (in preparation) careful description of apprenticeship as practiced in a West African tailoring shop for many of our insights into the nature of apprenticeship.

First and foremost, apprenticeship highlights methods for carrying out tasks in a domain. Apprentices learn these methods through a combination of what Lave calls observation, coaching and practice, or what we from the teacher's point of view, call modeling, coaching, and fading. In this sequence of activities, the apprentice repeatedly observes the master executing (or modeling) the target process, which usually involves a number of different but interrelated sub-skills. The apprentice then attempts to execute the process with guidance and help from the master (coaching). A key aspect of coaching is the provision of scaffolding, which is the support, in the form of reminders and help, that the apprentice requires to approximate the execution of the entire composite of skills. Once the learner has a grasp of the target skill, the master reduces his participation (fades), providing only limited hints, refinements, and feedback to the learner, who practices by successively approximating smooth execution of the whole skill.

Several points are worth emphasizing here. The interplay between observation, scaffolding, and increasingly independent practice aids apprentices both in developing self-monitoring and correction skills, and in integrating the skills and conceptual knowledge needed to advance toward expertise. Observation plays a surprisingly key role; Lave hypothesizes that it aids learners in developing a conceptual model of the target task or process prior to attempting to execute it. Having a conceptual model is an important factor in apprenticeship's success in teaching complex skills without resorting to lengthy practice of isolated subskills, for three related reasons. First, it provides learners with an advanced organizer for their initial attempts to execute a complex skill, thus allowing them to concentrate more of their attention on execution than would otherwise be possible. Second, a conceptual model provides an interpretative structure for making sense of the feedback, hints, and corrections from the master during interactive coaching sessions. And third, it provides an internalized guide for the period of relatively independent practice by successive approximation. Moreover, development of a conceptual model, which can be continually updated through further observation and feedback, encourages autonomy in what we call reflection (Collins & Brown, in press). Reflection is the process that underlies the ability of learners to compare their own performance, at both micro and macro levels, to the performance of an expert. Such comparisons aid learners in diagnosing difficulties and incrementally adjusting their performance until they reach competence. A conceptual model serves as an internal model of expert performance, and thus as a basis for development of self-monitoring and correction skills.

A second key observation about apprenticeship in general concerns the embedding social context in which learning takes place. Apprenticeship derives many (cognitively important) characteristics from its embedding in a subculture in which most, if not all, members are visible participants in the target skills. As a result, learners have continual access to models of expertise-in-use against which to refine their understanding of complex skills. Moreover, it is not uncommon for apprentices to have access to several masters and thus to a variety of models...
of expertise. Such richness and variety helps apprentices to understand that there may be multiple ways of carrying out a task and to recognize that no one individual embodies all knowledge or expertise. And finally, in the tailoring shop described by Lave, learners have the opportunity to observe other learners at varying degrees of skill; among other things, this encourages them to view learning as an incrementally staged process, while providing them with concrete benchmarks for their own progress.

First, cognitive apprenticeship encourages reflection on differences between expert and novice performance by alternation between expert and novice efforts in a shared problem-solving context sensitizes students to the details of expert performance as the basis for incremental adjustments in their own performance. Abstracted replay attempts to focus students' observation, comment, refinement, and correction and (2) bears a relatively transparent relationship to concrete products that are the outcome of the skill. The externalization of relevant processes and methods makes possible such characteristics of apprenticeship as its reliance on observation as a primary means of building a conceptual model of a complex target skill. And the relatively transparent relationship, at all stages of production, between process and product facilitates the learner's recognition and diagnosis of errors, upon which the early development of self-correction skills depends.

Applying apprenticeship methods to largely cognitive skills requires the externalization of processes that are usually carried out internally. At least as most subjects are taught and learned in school, teachers cannot make fine adjustments in students' application of skill and knowledge to problems and tasks, because they have no access to the relevant cognitive processes. By the same token, students do not usually have access to the cognitive problem-solving processes of instructors, as a basis for learning through observation and mimicry. Cognitive research, through such methods as protocol analysis, has begun to delineate the cognitive and metacognitive processes that heretofore have tacity comprised expertise. Cognitive apprenticeship teaching methods are designed, among other things, to bring these tacit processes into the open, where students can observe, enact, and practice them with help from the teacher and from other students.

Cognitive apprenticeship also requires extended techniques to encourage the development of self-correction and monitoring skills, as we cannot rely on the transparent relationship between process and product that characterizes the learning of such physical skills as tailoring. We have identified two basic means of fostering these crucial metacognitive skills. First, cognitive apprenticeship encourages reflection on differences between novice and expert performance by alternation between expert and novice efforts and by techniques that we have elsewhere called "abstracted replay" (Collins & Brown, in press). Alternation between expert and novice efforts in a shared problem-solving context sensitizes students to the details of expert performance as the basis for incremental adjustments in their own performance. Abstracted replay attempts to focus students' observations and comparisons directly on the determining features of both their own and an expert's performance by highlighting those features in a skillful verbal description, or, in some domains, through use of recording technologies such as computers or videotapes.

A second means of encouraging the development of self-monitoring and correction skills is based on the insight that these skills require the problem solver to
alternate some version of both generative and evaluative processes. However, both types of processes are complex and can be difficult to learn in tandem. Thus, cognitive apprenticeship involves the development and externalization of a producer-critic dialogue that students can gradually internalize. This development and externalization is accomplished through discussion, alternation of teacher and learner roles, and group problem-solving.

Some Caveats: Obviously, apprenticeship is intended as a suggestive rather than an exact model for teaching and learning in the future. In addition to the emphasis on cognitive and metacognitive skills, there are two major differences between cognitive apprenticeship and traditional apprenticeship. First, because traditional apprenticeship is set in the workplace, the problems and tasks that are given to learners arise not from pedagogical concerns but from the demands of the workplace. Cognitive apprenticeship as we envision it differs from traditional apprenticeship in that the tasks and problems are chosen to illustrate the power of certain techniques or methods, to give students practice in applying these methods in diverse settings, and to slowly increase the complexity of tasks so that component skills and models can be integrated. In short, tasks are sequenced to reflect the changing demands of learning. Letting the job demands select the tasks for students to practice is one of the great inefficiencies of traditional apprenticeship.

On the other hand, the economic bias in apprenticeship has useful as well as less-than-ideal effects. For example, apprentices are encouraged to quickly learn skills that are useful, and therefore meaningful within the social context of the workplace. Moreover, apprentices have natural opportunities to realize the value, in concrete economic terms, of their developing skill: well-executed skills result in saleable products. Cognitive apprenticeship must find a way to create a culture of expert practice for students to participate in and aspire to, as well as devise meaningful benchmarks and incentives for progress.

A second difference between cognitive apprenticeship and traditional apprenticeship is the emphasis in cognitive apprenticeship on decontextualizing knowledge so that it can be used in many different settings. Traditional apprenticeship emphasizes teaching skills in the context of their use. We propose that cognitive apprenticeship should extend situated learning to diverse settings so that students learn how to apply their skills in different contexts. Moreover, the abstract principles underlying the application of knowledge and skills in different settings should be articulated as fully as possible by the teacher; whenever they arise in different contexts.

We do not want to argue that cognitive apprenticeship is the only way to learn. Reading a book or listening to a lecture are important ways to learn, particularly in domains where conceptual and factual knowledge are central. Active listeners or readers, who test their understanding and pursue the issues that are raised in their minds, learn things that apprenticeship can never teach. However, to the degree the reader or listener is passive, they will not learn as much as they would by apprenticeship, because apprenticeship forces them to use their knowledge. Moreover, few people learn to be active readers and listeners on their own, and this is where cognitive apprenticeship is critical—observing the processes by which an expert listener or reader thinks, and practicing these skills under the guidance of the expert, can teach students to learn on their own more skillfully.

Even in domains that rest on elaborate conceptual and factual underpinnings, students must learn the practice or art of solving problems and carrying out tasks. And to achieve expert practice, some version of apprenticeship remains the method of choice. Thus apprenticeship-like methods are widely used in graduate education in most domains. Students are expected to learn how to solve problems that arise in the context of carrying out complex tasks, and to extend and make use of their textbook knowledge, by undertaking significant projects guided by an expert in the field.

We would argue that the development of expert practice through situated learning and the acquisition of cognitive and metacognitive skills is equally if not more important in more elementary domains. This is nowhere more evident than in the foundational domains of reading, writing and mathematics. These domains are foundational not only because they provide the basis for learning and communication in other school subjects, but also because they engage cognitive and metacognitive processes that are basic to learning and thinking more generally. Unlike school subjects such as chemistry or history, these domains rest on relatively sparse conceptual and factual underpinnings, turning instead on students' robust and efficient execution of a set of cognitive and metacognitive skills. Given effective analyses and externalizable prompts for these skills, we believe that these domains are particularly well suited to teaching methods modelled on cognitive apprenticeship. In the next section of this paper, we discuss a set of recently developed and highly successful models for teaching the cognitive and metacognitive skills involved in reading, writing and mathematics in terms of the key notions underlying our cognitive apprenticeship model.

A Success Model for Cognitive Apprenticeship

Palincsar and Brown's Reciprocal Teaching of Reading: Palincsar and Brown's (1984) method of teaching reading comprehension which exemplifies many of the features of cognitive apprenticeship, has proved remarkably effective in raising students' scores on reading comprehension tests, especially those of poor readers. The basic method centers on modelling and coaching students in four strategic skills: formulating questions based on the text, summarizing the text, making predictions about what will come next, and clarifying difficulties with the text. The method has been used with groups of two to five students, as well as individual students. It is called Reciprocal Teaching because the teacher and students take turns playing the role of teacher.

The procedure is as follows: Both the teacher and students read a paragraph silently to themselves. Whoever is playing the role of teacher formulates a question based on the paragraph, constructs a summary, and makes a prediction or clarification if any come to mind. Initially, the teacher models this process, eventually turning it over to the students. When students first undertake the process, the teacher coaches them extensively on how to construct good questions and summaries, offering prompts and criti-
justed over time to help a student for­
with groups of two students, the scores
accuracy, with very little change eight weeks
only one session. In a subsequent study
Table 1 shows a sequence of dialogues il­
become more proficient, the teacher
increased from about 30% to 80% ac­
thents who were poor readers, the me­
tive. In a pilot study with individual stu­
providing occasional hints or feedback.
er provides scaffolding for the students,
operation; it provides them with a more
words and with the activities of scann­
ing text and saying it aloud. Under the
new conception, students recognize that
learning requires constructive activities
such as formulating questions and mak­
summarizing is a fairly global test of com­
paragraph level, clarification attempts to nar­
words and phrase levels of meaning. Skill
at clarifying difficulties provides students
with the basis for using evidence from
subsequent text to disambiguate the
meaning of problematic words or phrases,
a key strategy employed by expert readers.
4. Prediction involves formulating guesses or
hypotheses about what the author of a
text is likely to say next, and as such, pro­
motes an overall reading strategy of hypothesis formulation and testing. The
inclusion of prediction as in explicit stra­
tegic activity for beginning readers reflects
the fact that skilled reading involves de­
veloping expectations and evaluating
them as evidence accumulates from the
text (Collins and Smith, 1982).
The third factor we think is critical for
the success of Reciprocal Teaching is that
the teacher models expert strategies in
a problem context shared directly and
immediately with the students (Brown &
Palincsar, in press). This organization of
teacher-learner interaction encourages
students first to focus their observations
and then to reflect on their own perfor­
mance relative to that of the teacher dur­
ing subsequent modelling. Here’s how it
works: both teacher and students read a
paragraph. The teacher then performs
the four activities: she articulates the
questions she would ask about the para­
graph, summarizes it, makes predictions
about what would be next, and explains
what part of the paragraph gave her dif­
culty. She may try to explain why she
generated a particular question or made
a particular prediction. What is crucial
here is that the students listen in the context of knowing that they will soon undertake the same task, using that expectation to focus their observations on how those activities are related to the paragraph. After they have tried to do it themselves, and perhaps had difficulties, they listen to the teacher with new knowledge about the task. As they read subsequent passages, they may try to generate a question or summary to themselves, noticing later what she does differently. That is, they can compare their own questions or summaries with the questions or summaries she generates. They can then reflect on any differences, trying to understand what led to those differences. We have argued elsewhere that this kind of reflection is critical to learning (Collins & Brown, in press).

Fourth, the technique of providing scaffolding is a crucial factor in the success of Reciprocal Teaching for several reasons. Most importantly, it decomposes the task as necessary for the students to carry it out, thereby helping them to see how, in detail, to go about the task. For example, in formulating questions, the teacher might first want to see if the student can generate a question on his or her own: if not, she might suggest starting a question with “Why,” or “How.” If the student still can’t generate a question, she might suggest formulating a simple “Why” question about the agent in the story. If that fails, she might generate one herself and ask the student to reformulate it in his or her own words. In this way, it gets students started in the new skills, giving them a “feel” for the skills and helping them develop confidence that they can do them. Scaffolding is designed to help students when they are at an impasse (Brown and VanLehn, 1980). With successful scaffolding techniques, students get as much support as they need to carry out the task, but no more. Hints and modelling are then gradually faded out, with students taking on more and more of the task as they become more skillful. These techniques of scaffolding and fading slowly build students’ confidence that they can master the skills required.

The final aspect of Reciprocal Teaching that we think is critical is having students assume the dual roles of producer and critic. That is, they must not only be able to produce good questions and summaries, but they also learn to evaluate the summaries or questions of others. By becoming critics as well as producers, students are forced to articulate their knowledge about what makes a good question, prediction, or summary. This knowledge then becomes more readily available for application to their own summaries and questions, thus improving a crucial aspect of their metacognitive skills. Moreover, once articulated, this knowledge can no longer simply reside in tacit form. It becomes more available for performing a variety of tasks; that is, it is freed from its contextual binding, so that it can be used in many different contexts.

Method: As we have discussed, a key goal in the design of teaching methods should be to help students acquire and integrate cognitive and metacognitive strategies for using, managing and discovering knowledge. However, it is our belief that the way in which these strategies are acquired and, once acquired, brought to play in problem solving is both subtle and poorly understood. In general, it seems clear that both acquisition and use of these strategies depend crucially on interactions between the individual’s current knowledge and beliefs, the social and physical environment in which the problem-solving takes place, and the local details of the problem-solving itself as it unfolds. A major direction in current cognitive research is to attempt to formulate explicitly the strategies and skills underlying expert practice, in order to make them a legitimate focus of teaching in schools and other learning environments. Indeed, all three success models we have discussed are based on explicit formulations of cognitive and metacognitive strategies and center their teaching around activities designed to explicitly convey these to students. However, we believe it is also important to consider the possibility that, because of the nature of the relationship between these strategies and the overall problem context, not all of the necessary—and certainly not all of the possible—strategies involved in complex cognitive activities can be captured and made explicit. In this regard, it is worth noting that these strategies and skills have tended to remain tacit and thus to be lost to formal education precisely because they arise from the practice of solving problems, in situ, in the domain. Moreover, we would argue that, even given explicit formulation of strategies, understanding how to use them depends crucially on understanding the way in which they are embedded in the context of actual problem solving.

For these reasons, we believe that teaching methods should be designed to give students the opportunity to observe, engage in, and invent or discover expert strategies in context. Such an approach will enable students to see how these strategies fit together with their factual and conceptual knowledge, and how they cue off and make use of a variety of resources in the social and physical environment. This is the essence of what we mean by situated learning (see Sociology), and the reason why the cognitive apprenticeship method, with its modelling-coaching-fading paradigm, is successful and perhaps indispensable. The following six teaching methods fall roughly into three groups: the first three (modelling, coaching, and scaffolding), are the core of cognitive apprenticeship, designed to help students acquire an integrated set of cognitive and metacognitive skills through processes of observation and of guided and supported practice. The next two (articulation and reflection) are methods designed to help students both to focus their observations of expert problem solving and to gain conscious access to (and control of) their own problem solving strategies. The final method (exploration) is aimed at encouraging learner autonomy not only in carrying out expert problem solving processes, but also in defining or formulating the problems to be solved.

1. Modelling involves showing an expert carrying out a task so that students can observe and build a conceptual model of the processes that are required to accomplish the task. In cognitive domains, this requires the externalization of usually internal (cognitive) processes and activities—specifically, the heuristics and control processes by which experts make use of basic conceptual and procedural knowledge. For example, a teacher might model the reading process by reading aloud in one voice, while verbalizing her thought processes (e.g., the making and testing of hypotheses about what the text means, what the author intends, what he or she thinks will happen next, and so on) in another voice (Collins & Smith, 1982).
Tables 3 and 4 give examples of teacher modelling of expert processes in the domains of writing and mathematics.

2. **Coaching** consists of observing students while they carry out a task and offering hints, scaffolding, feedback, modelling, reminders and new tasks aimed at bringing their performance closer to expert performance. Coaching may serve to direct students' attention to a previously unnoticed aspect of the task or simply to remind the student of some aspect of the task that is known but has been temporarily overlooked. Coaching focuses on the enactment and integration of skills in the service of a well-understood goal through highly interactive and highly situated feedback and suggestions. That is, the content of the coaching interaction is immediately related to specific events or problems that arise as the student attempts to carry out the target task. In reading, coaching might consist of having students attempt to give summaries of different texts. The teacher in the role of coach might choose texts with interesting difficulties, might remind the student that a summary needs to integrate the whole text into a sentence or two, might suggest how to start constructing a summary, might evaluate the summary a student produces in terms of how it could be improved, or ask another student to evaluate it. Similarly, the description of Scardamalia and Bereiter's classes, and of Schoenfeld's classes provide examples of how the teacher can function as a coach while students try to carry out tasks in writing and mathematics.

3. **Scaffolding** refers to the supports the teacher provides to help the student carry out a task. These supports can either take the forms of suggestions or help, as in Palincsar and Brown's (1984) Reciprocal Teaching, or they can take the form of physical supports, as with the cue cards in Scardamalia et al.'s (1984) procedural facilitation of writing or the short skills used to teach downhill skiing (Burton, Brown & Fisher, 1984). When scaffolding is provided by a teacher, it involves the teacher in carrying out parts of the overall task that the student cannot yet manage. As such, it involves a kind of cooperative problem-solving effort by teacher and student in which the express intention is for the student to assume as much of the task on his own as possible, as soon as possible. A requisite of such scaffolding is accurate diagnosis of the student's current skill level or difficulty and the availability of an intermediate step at the appropriate level of difficulty in carrying out the target activity. **Fading** consists of the gradual removal of supports until students are on their own. The three models described employed scaffolding in a variety of ways.

4. **Articulation** includes any method of getting students to articulate their knowledge, reasoning, or problem-solving processes in a domain. We have identified several different methods of articulation. First, **Inquiry Teaching** (Collins & Stevens, 1982, 1983) is a strategy of questioning students to lead them to articulate and refine "proto-theories" about the four kinds of knowledge enumerated above. For example, an inquiry teacher in reading might systematically question students about why one summary of the text is a good one while another is poor, in order to get the students to formulate an explicit model of what makes a good summary. Second, teachers might encourage students to articulate their thoughts as they carry out their problem solving as do Scardamalia et al. (1984). Third, having students assume the critic or monitor role in cooperative activities, as do all three models we discussed, leads students to formulate and articulate their knowledge of problem-solving and control processes.

5. **Reflection** (Brown, 1985a, 1985b; Collins & Brown, in press) involves enabling students to compare their own problem solving processes with that of an expert, other students, and ultimately, an internal cognitive model of expertise. Reflection is enhanced by the use of techniques for reproducing or "replaying" the performances of both expert and novice for comparison. This can be done through a variety of methods. For example, an expert's skillful post mortem of the problem-solving process, as Schoenfeld showed, can serve as a target for reflective comparison, as can the students' post mortems of their own problem-solving process. Alternately, various recording technologies, such as video or audio recorders, and computers, can be employed to reproduce student and expert performance. The levels of detail at which a replay should be done may vary depending on the student's stage of learning, but often some form of "abstracted replay," in which the determining features of expert and student performance are highlighted, is desirable. For reading or writing, methods to encourage reflection might consist of recording students as they think out loud and then replaying the tape for comparison with the thinking of experts and
and other students.

6. Exploration involves pushing students into a mode of problem-solving on their own. Forcing students to do exploration is critical for students to learn how to frame questions or problems that are interesting and that they can solve. Exploration is the natural culmination of the fading of supports. It involves not only fading in problem solving, but fading in problem setting as well. But students do not know a priori how to explore a domain productively. So exploration strategies need to be taught as part of learning strategies more generally.

Exploration as a method of teaching involves setting general goals for students, but encouraging them to focus on particular subgoals of interest to them or even to revise the general goals as they come upon something more interesting to pursue. For example, in reading the teacher might send the students to the library to find out what president died in office as a result of a trip to Alaska, or to investigate theories about why the stock market crashed in 1929. In writing students might be encouraged to write an essay defending the most outrageous thesis they can devise, or to keep a diary of their best ideas or their most traumatic experiences. In mathematics students might be given a data base on teenagers detailing their backgrounds and how they spend their time and money; the students' task might be to come up with hypotheses about what determines how different groups of teenagers spend their time or money that they then test out by analyzing the data base they have been given. The goal is to find general tasks that students will find interesting and turn them loose on, after they have acquired some basic exploration skills ....

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As teacher-educators committed to teaching philosophy for children, a fundamental problem before us is two-sided; on the one hand we want student-teachers to actually undergo the experience of teaching children the methods of reflective thinking. On the other hand, we are concerned that student-teachers are able to reflect upon their own teaching. To achieve these ends we have translated the philosophy for children experience into a Deweyan format. We have chosen from Lipman's (1982) Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery, the issue of making sense of statements as the test of theory and practice. Effectively this method becomes a dialogue in its truest sense. As the interaction evolves, child and student-teacher alike, are producing and are also being produced as learners.

The Dialogue As Method

The dialogue occurs between middle school students, grades 5-8 and beginning undergraduate education majors. The setting is a Laboratory School located within a University College. The conversation revolves around three interdependent texts:

a). Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery, which presents the child with the problematic situation of making sense of statements: converting ordinary sentences into their logical parts, b). Dewey’s (1902) The Child and the Curriculum, which tells the student-teacher how the child’s “instincts” must be actualized for learning, and c). the lived text of the classroom. Here the student-teacher and child are moving between Dewey and Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery.

Logic, Language and Dewey: a student-teacher dialectic

James Palermo and Kate D’Erasmo

How It Works

Articulation of the above texts occurs in such a way that both student-teacher and child are able to reconstruct their experience. The concern throughout is that children and student-teachers make connections which involve resolving a problematic situation. The student-teacher’s problem is that learning happen for the child (referred to what we have called reflecting upon their own teaching). The resolution of the student-teacher’s problem is spawned in the child’s confrontations with language through the structured lesson. Specifically, that children will be able to think reflectively by taking apart ordinary sentences, uncovering hidden connections between the words, and then identifying the logical functions which each part of the sentence performs. Thus the child is able to make his thoughts clear to himself and to others. Furthermore, the statements the children produce as a result of the lesson give concrete evidence regarding the student-teachers’ success.

Keeping in mind that student-teachers must shift the children’s thinking from an unreflective mode to thinking about thinking itself; examples appearing in Lipman’s (1982) Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery are used as a means of introducing models for children to recast ordinary English sentences into their logical form. The Stottlemeier story lays out the components of a logical sentence which are; the quantifier, subject, copula and predicate. In the example lesson (to follow) the concern is with having children identify the quantifier, i.e.: determine the amount of the subject term that is properly a member of the predicate term.

Making Connections

Our answer to the problem of combining the 3 texts, we believe, utilizes Dewey’s descriptions of the instinct of conversation in the child, i.e.: if the child is made aware of the inappropriateness of unreflective thinking through the philosophical dialogue, then he will choose a new, better, logically correct way of responding to experience. To do this we use Dewey’s (1902) essay, The Child and the Curriculum, as well as his notions of play and work found in his book, Democracy and Education (1918).
In our classroom the activity is its own end, instead of having an ulterior result. In our program, real learning for children involves thinking which is at once playing and doing. That is, children make sense of the world through play.

In looking at the two-sided problem our concern is to talk with children so that:

1). the children overcome unreflective thinking, and
2). student-teachers learn to teach.

We find the answer in Dewey's model. Having emphasized the necessity of relationships between work, play and learning, what still remains is the question of how the child will be motivated to play and to learn. Dewey's (1902) answer is found in his essay, The Child and the Curriculum, where he ties motivation to exercising the child's instinctual nature. Here, Dewey describes the child as a bundle of instincts. The instincts are: 1). communication, 2). construction, 3). inquiry, and 4). aesthetic. The exercising of these instincts culminates in the integration of work and play, and this integration into pedagogy demands the same exercising of instincts on the part of the student-teacher. We call these interactions the dialogue.

**Experiential Ties**

Instead of the lesson being a teacher-centered activity with second-hand accounts of other people's experiences taken from books, Dewey wishes to engage the child's observation, memory and imagination. To accomplish this he chooses to exercise what has been named above as the child's instincts. Dewey's view of exercising these instincts seems to contradict accepted notions of teaching. According to Dewey, the communication instinct is properly exercised when children are engaged in conversation about things in their direct experience that are important to them.

Unlike the traditional model: recitation, there is a motive, here, which comes from the child's social experience with other children in saying something which is important to him/her. The second instinct is construction, and construction means: . . . expression in play movement, gesture, and make believe (which finds) outlet in shaping materials into tangible forms and permanent embodiment.

In our classroom, the child's daydreaming is promoted and his imagination is channeled into the making of an object or into an activity which he shares with others and in both cases imagination, in the form of the produced creation, becomes a tangible object.

The inquiry instinct, in Deweyan terms grows out of the combination of the constructive impulse and the conversational.

In inquiry the children's conversations are self-directed toward developing a plan of action. This play of action involves a construction which can only happen if the children follow rules which then impose an order on their shared experience. Later we will establish how directed play utilized the inquiry instinct.

The fourth and final instinct is aesthetic, which, according to Dewey (1919) is:

. . . making the construction adequate, make it full, free and flexible, give it a social motive, something to tell and you have a work of art.

In our specific case we will show how children play with the relationships between thought and words in sentences in such a way as to reveal through placement, combination and dialogue the "meaning of their linguistic meaning" in its very creation.
The test of teaching logic here is to exercise the child's instincts within the teaching situation. The first step of the student-teacher is to construct or set down a lesson plan which speaks to these needs. The following is an example of this.

The student-teacher's lesson objective is for the children to learn the logical parts of a sentence, through exercising the four instincts. As an introductory experience, they focus on one part—the quantifier. Demonstrating this idea can occur physically. The procedure involves teachers and students alike forming a circle and then putting their hands in that circle and call that ALL. This means "all of these hands are members of the total category of members of the sixth-grade classroom." Then one child leaves the circle and the children see the concept of SOME demonstrated physically. This continues (children and student-teachers alike leave the circle until only one remains.) The notion of SOME is re-emphasized by this fact. Finally, the last person leaves the circle and the notion of NO (or NONE) is physically demonstrated. At appropriate junctures, the correct terms are reinforced by children using flash cards.

As a direct result of this activity, the children are familiar with the concepts of ALL, SOME, and NO, and are prepared to continue with the rest of the lesson which re-emphasized the logical structure of a sentence. In this part of the lesson the children are confronted with the problem of how to physically represent the logical parts of a sentence. The children use tape and scissors and break into teams and are told to physically construct the logical parts of a sentence. Within the teams the children talk with one another. The conversation instinct is exercised as the children hypothesize possible answers for the problem and test these ideas. Finally the children decide to put tape on the floor in the form of circles. The circles represent logical categories. They are they labeled as follows: subject, copula, and predicate. This has exercised the construction instinct.

Next, the inquiry instinct comes into play. This has been partially satisfied in the previous discussion of how to solve the problem of physically constructing the logical parts of a sentence when the children considered the means to be used to reach the goals. The real test comes out of the children being able to manipulate the categories and make the correct judgments.

To this end, they play a game in which each child must be able to make class or category distinctions. The student-teacher's task is to put questions to children which demand that the child continually make correct subject/predicate connections.

To begin this game, the student-teacher asks all those who are wearing jeans to stand in the taped circle labeled predicate. Then the student-teacher tells all the boys wearing black-colored jeans remain. Finally, at the last direction, the boy who has black-colored cuffed jeans is the only one left.

What happened is that the children have applied the ALL quantifier to subject and predicate terms having real distinction. In following the rules of the game the children have actually experimented, developed a solution, that is; they have fulfilled the need to exercise the inquiry instinct. The actual playing of the game physically demonstrated the children's solutions to the problem of using direct experience and manipulating direct objects to make sense of the logical structure of a sentence. Thus the aesthetic instinct in the described lesson has been exercised in the combination of inquiry, construction and conversation; students have worked together producing taped circles which represent the way in which they impose a logical coherence upon their lived experience.

Our objective imposed a multifaceted format. Student-teachers need to experience the act of teaching while the children must experience methods of reflective thinking. In a program such as ours, as illustrated in the described lesson, we are able to achieve these ends. Here, play and work, theory and practice, problem and idea, doing and undergoing, instincts and dispositions, combine in the dialogue of logic and reconstituted experience for both student-teacher and child.

References
I Think, Therefore I Can:
Attribution and Philosophy for Children

Terry Allen

'Tis a lesson you should heed,
Try, try again.
If at first you don't succeed,
Try, try again.
—William Edward Hickson¹

I think I can—I think I can—
I think I can—I think I can—
I think I can—I think I can—
I think I can—I think I can—
I thought I could . . .
—the Little Engine that Could²

is said that philosophy begins in wonder. The question, “Why?” is asked and a response is given. But, when school children answer, their response may at times be too conclusive and final, perhaps unsupported by adequate evidence. And if the conclusion is unspoken or unconscious, it may be important for the child to reopen the question; for though young thinkers have an uncommon tendency to ask, “Why is that other person the way they are?” their more natural inclination seems to conclude (not ask), “This is why I am as I am.”

Children, as do adults, sense the existence of reasons and causal factors behind their failures and successes. They learn to attribute those results to something “true” about themselves. Their interpretations become a part of self-definition, something fixed—a concluding statement about the competence of self-as-person. This attitude or fixed feeling about oneself is sometimes difficult for the individual to recognize or verbalize to others. In looking for patterns, meaning and some truth, about one’s self and abilities, experience tends to force information on the person, and such evidence (through failure and success) brings a defining way of explaining, an attribution, used to understand who we are. In some sense this directs the tendencies concerning whatever attitude and effort are brought to a given project or situation; and the attribution may determine whether or not the individual will even make an attempt.

When is it safe to “try, try again”? When is it reasonable to really believe, “I think I can”? One’s attributions about self may in large measure determine the limits and degrees of freedom one will allow themselves, especially when faced with the challenging tasks of an academic setting.

Attribution may be defined as a process as well as a conclusion. Individual persons explain situations and circumstances occurring to themselves and others (Anderson & Arnoult, 1985; Dix & Grusec, 1985). Attribution involves intriguing subtleties of thought, interpretation, and an explanation of consciousness and the thinking process; attribution theory likewise contains illusive qualities that defy reduction to a particular scientific, empirical base or explanation of a neural-mind relationship (Parisi, 1987, p. 243). The complexity and “cloud of ambiguity” (Wilson, 1985, p. 10) that seem inherent in attempts to investigate and understand or control inner mental states makes studies in attribution challenging and necessitating creative, but sometimes cautious, interpretation. However, implications drawn from such studies can be remarkable and useful with regards to helping professions such as teaching and parenting (Barker & Graham, 1987, p. 65; Dix & Grusec, 1985; Dweck, 1978, p. 1040).

The idea that mental states (eg, attributions) have behavioral incidents (antecedent and consequent) provides a basis for studying the accuracy and consequences of beliefs (attributions) about one’s own or another’s mental states (Wilson, 1985), especially when self-reporting is compared to actual performance. Certain kinds of mental states are stimulated through past and present situational and dispositional (traits and beliefs) conditions (Anderson & Arnoult, 1985; Harvey & McGlynn, 1982; Reeder, 1982). These result in various attributional characteristics. Maturation, including language acquisition and verbal sophistication, also plays an important role in the kinds of attributions individuals make or are able to verbalize (Dix & Grusec, 1985). It is possible for example, that a “discounting principle” occurs (as reflected in verbal responses) generally starting about age 9 (Wilson, 1985, p. 29) and “compensatory judgments” regarding the relationship of praise/blame to ability/effort (perhaps a form of the discounting principle) may not occur until age 11 or 12 (Barker & Graham, 1987); learned helplessness (the focus of this study) and ego threat seem to be functions of one’s understanding (by age 11-12) of ability as capacity (Miller, 1986).

Anderson and Arnoult (1985) suggest that the process of attribution, though not well understood, may involve two stages which consist of first, formulating plausible causal factors, and secondly, choosing the “best” attribution (conclusion) from the examined “list” of possible causes. There seems to be a cyclic effect in which a given attribution (following an event) will effect a “success expectancy,” which in turn effects one’s motivation. There is a resulting influence on performance and thus, subsequent (or reinforced) attributions. Dix and Grusec (1985, p. 205) explain Weiner’s model of attribution in a similar way. An attribution (explanation) is made following an observed behavior; this (attribution) results in future expectations regarding success/failure and an affective reaction, which reinforces or reconfirms one’s conclusions about self and others.

The powerful effect one’s self-talk has on motivation and vice-versa is of genuine importance to us as persons. At times such attributions and motives may be consciously accessible, and even when unconscious (or unheeded) seem to be partially dependent on other factors such as the particular situation, cause, or content area being evaluated and the individual personality involved (Marsh, 1986; Miller, 1986; Wilson, 1985). For this study we suggest that under certain circumstances, some individuals tend to display behaviors (eg, reduced effort) that derive from particular styles of ego-protection. One such style may be termed “learned helplessness.”

Learned helplessness involves an attitude by which one concludes the inevitability of certain aversive consequences or events (Kleineke, 1978). Even though early learning about oneself takes place under a particular set of circumstances, and a later situation (eg, because of maturation) would allow control and change, a person with learned helplessness continues to perceive that his actions will not effect circumstances or outcomes. One way of thinking about this is that the individual sees himself not “as an agent, but the recipient of whatever pain happens to come along” (Wenar, 1983, p. 159). Not having a firm sense of oneself as an agent leaves a person open to regarding self as ineffectual, and feelings of powerlessness and helplessness may cause reduced effort in avoiding pain or failure. Regardless of children’s true or realistic capabilities, if they believe themselves to be ineffectual, incapable of developing and working a strategy to avoid failure, or as not personally responsible for their condition, they often continue to experience losing and failure. They may see their failure as a result of a “permanent defect” (Anderson, Horowitz, & French, 1983).

For example, because maturation rates differ, some children may enter school before they have developed eye move-
ment and focus capability that is necessary for early letter differentiation and reading skills (Soderman & Phillips, 1986). Because of a consequent difficulty or early failure in reading, this may result in early self-labeling and discouragement. And of particular interest to teachers of students in the middle elementary grades is the possibility that learned helplessness is developmental in the sense that it seems rarely to be found in kindergarten children but appears to increase after that (Wenar, 1983). By the time children are in the fifth grade, such an attitude is able to effect mood and depression, as failure begins to be perceived as an implication of a stable limitation in ability to perform, that is, a loss of control over one's ability to avoid failure. If this developmental pattern is true, it would seem to carry challenging implications for those involved in education. Believing in and providing opportunity for children to recognize, develop, and value their own thinking processes with its inherent responsibilities and possibilities, would seem an important way of helping children see and believe in their “agent status”.

In the schools, we could do better at helping children realize this. But to convey the message that children are simply victims of an insensitive data-conscious, technical-skill education system, would be to, in some sense, play into the hands of the heart of the learned helplessness syndrome. In other words, we would be suggesting that children are outwardly controlled and so unaccountable for the painful consequence of failure. However, Dweck (1986) emphasizes personal differences (in personality?) that strongly effect motivation in children. She differentiates between those with “learning goals” and those with “performance goals.”

Students with learning goals are defined as those who seek to increase personal competence and to understand or master something new. They thus tend to see their intelligence as malleable and their motivation to learn challenging tasks is high even if confidence is low. They perceive that greater effort will pay off. Within the context of this article, these children would see themselves as agents and reasonably in control of their learning and behavior; thus they would not be as likely to use learned helplessness as a possible pattern of ego protection.

Students who value performance goals, on the other hand, tend to see their achievement as serving to avoid negative judgments or to gain favorable judgments on their competence. They tend to see their intelligence and abilities as fixed (therefore out of their control) and are more open to adapting a helpless behavior pattern.

The presence of challenging tasks or failure in the classroom are seen to be not as detrimental to motivation as is the attitude children bring to the situation. Those with learning goals (and here I am going to “jump to a possible conclusion”; that those with learning goals are closer to philosophical thinking) use challenge, obstacles, and failure to put forth more effort or to analyze and adapt strategies. Whereas children with a fixed, stable view of their intelligence and ability have concluded that they can't and interpret aversive or difficult situations as predictive of failure and thus tend to withdraw defensively.

Those who view capacity for intelligence and ability as attributed to “that's just the way I am,” perceive their status to be fixed (stable), and externally (rather than self) controlled and will tend to experience decreased personal involvement and motivation. Performance outcome is seen to be beyond personal control (e.g., the teacher just doesn't like me) and it is difficult to attribute personal responsibility for future results. Such an attitude of discouragement or helplessness seems also to be global rather than specific (Anderson & Arnoult, 1985); it tends to generalize to unrelated tasks, and thus influence performance in other situations (Kleinke, 1978, p. 173).

In contrast, those who believe that they can affect their circumstances and increase skill through effort and more effective strategy (Anderson & Jennings, 1980) will tend to cope better in stressful situations and use past successes and failures to strategize in an adaptive manner for future problems. They will have less tendency to give up. Initiative and involvement, it would seem, will remain higher for those who have come to believe in their ability and responsibility to think for themselves. Successful individual performance, when seen as the result of effective internal control helps to alleviate an attitude of learned helplessness. Taking reasonable and personal responsibility for successes and failures likewise helps students to be more persistent when dealing with future problem solving tasks.

Attribution will affect one's expectations and future motivation. The question is asked, “What kind of child-rearing practices, family environments, and life experiences lead to particularly adaptive or maladaptive attributional styles?” (Anderson & Arnoult, 1985, p. 273) Does such a question in itself presuppose the child to be a recipient of, rather than an agent within his environment? The process stressed within the Philosophy for Children program is at least built upon the ideas of believing in the validity and significance of the child-as-person and his effective contribution to philosophical thinking within a community of thinkers who are interested in what is. And what is seems at least to be persons remarkably capable of accurate thinking and imaginative insight, remarkably capable of searching through implications in thought and scrutinizing the conclusions we so irresistibly tend to draw. Persons are capable of seeing themselves for who they are.

This present study was designed to offer some indication as to whether or not such a teaching-learning style (as shared in the Philosophy for Children) would be particularly helpful to students who may have begun to see themselves as helpless.

I believe that some students have begun to see themselves as poor thinkers by the time they reach sixth grade. This will effect their choice of academic pursuits and the effort likely to be put forth in the various classroom tasks. If this is an aspect of learned helplessness, it will likely effect not only their view of themselves as students, but also their performance when faced with the threatening or difficult situations represented by testing or new learning opportunities. Teachers are not unfamiliar with the student who appears to not try, for example, in a standardized testing procedure by seemingly trusting to chance or simply not working. The same student may, after even a brief exposure to a new math technique seem to fold and say, “I don't get it,” ceasing meaningful effort. Such behavior may be a sign of discouragement, and though we stress the importance of justice in considering the nature of a child and what we ask them to do,
it does not seem desirable to shield a student from all uncomfortable situations. And even though all failure to meet one's potential may not of necessity be attributed to a form of learned helplessness, it does often seem that a lack of learning is due in part to a lack of effort motivated by a conclusive acceptance that it wouldn't help anyway.

But could such a de-motivating response be lessened through a consistent application of principles that encouraged children to think philosophically? Such thinking is open to all and not the domain of only those whom the system has identified as "successful learners." Success is often based on response to a certain style of thinking that stresses data accumulation, or to skill in critical thinking that emphasizes various "scientific" problem-solving techniques. Schools often tend to value and reward those types of thinking processes, perhaps because they are pragmatic in the immediately economic sense. Perhaps a higher view of personhood would actually open the domain of only those whom the system affirmed as thinking people, was particularly beneficial to those students whose grades and standardized scores might be a source of discouragement in defining themselves as students.

Accordingly, during the following year (1987–88), we pre-tested two sixth-grade classes during the first weeks of school in both reading comprehension (Stanford Achievement Test) and New Jersey Test of Reasoning Skills. One class again became the control, and the other would be involved in Harry Stottlemeyer's Discovery, a novel in the Philosophy for Children program, and philosophical discussion about three, thirty to forty-five minute sessions per week for six months. The classes were post-tested in both tests in March, 1988.

The study involved two groups of similar children. All were sixth-graders at Salem Academy, a private, interdenominational Christian school in Salem, Oregon. Families tend toward middle class and are generally interested and involved in their children's education. Both classes had 26 students. The control class had 17 boys and 9 girls and their mean age as of March 1, 1988 was 11.81 years. The experimental group had 19 boys, 7 girls, and a mean age of 11.86 years.

On the pre-test (Stanford Achievement Test, Intermediate 2, Form E, The Psychological Corporation, 1983) the lower half of the control group had four of thirteen students score below the 50th percentile rank in reading comprehension. The lower half of the experimental group had nine of thirteen score below the 50th percentile. The chart below compares the reading comprehension scores of the four groups (Ex-high and low; Con-high and low).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>Pretest Means</th>
<th>Posttest Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>raw score</td>
<td>% G.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Experimental</td>
<td>54.7 47%</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Control</td>
<td>35.8 52%</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Experimental</td>
<td>54.9 92%</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Control</td>
<td>54.3 92%</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the post-test, the control group had five of thirteen students score under the 50th percentile, while only two of thirteen in the experimental group scored below the 50th percentile.

Gain in the raw score for reading comprehension was used as the dependent variable. Two independent variables were considered—involvement in philosophy for children and the initial use of reading scores to group the students into "high" and "low" categories. The results were then calculated using a 2 X 2 ANOVA procedure.

The interaction between reading comprehension gain and involvement in the program was statistically significant. How much can be attributed to the program itself and the opportunity for children to begin to see themselves as capable thinkers who then try harder on tests of reading comprehension? Is such an attitude generalizable to other kinds of life situations, for example, in the area of human relationships, dealing with temptation, and finding purpose and fulfillment in life? I think so and hope to continue efforts to help children grow in their capacity to deal thoughtfully and reasonably with life's issues and the implications of personhood.

Meanwhile the statistically significant interaction indicates that the gain in reading comprehension was impacted by the use of Philosophy for Children in the classroom.

The results of this study offer preliminary indication that a six-month involvement in the Philosophy for Children program may be more beneficial in raising reading comprehension scores for children who are poorer readers than for
those identified as more skilled. In both the experimental and control groups, the lower half made more gain in reading comprehension scores than the rest of their classmates, but those in the lower group of the class that was taught Philosophy for Children made gains that were significantly greater.

Perhaps more study in the area of learned helplessness and in the understanding of discouraged children would lend additional support to the idea that consistent involvement in a "community of inquiry" and an opportunity to approach learning philosophically will be of particular help to those students who, for some reason, have begun to think of themselves as ineffectual thinkers.

It seems likely that children who gain in the belief that they can think for themselves and whose imagination is stirred through dialogue and wondering about meaning, will in turn grow in confidence and motivation to try harder, because it is safe to try again and they can truly say, "I think I can!"

Concepts that stress "thinking like a winner" and "believing in oneself" are common truisms in our society, where great emphasis is placed on performance, often in comparison with others. It becomes somewhat a pragmatic tool or means of accomplishing some greater, desired end. But for the school child, who has begun from age five to define himself in a group, presented with tasks done individually but compared to the group norm (and some of these tasks may appear bewildering, fatiguing or irrelevant), real or sensed failure and disinterest may result in the conclusion that "I'm not very smart compared to the others." In this case, it may not be a matter of achieving some extrinsic goal, but an intrinsic belief about meaning as a person that colors even survival tasks or the potential to realize deep personal fulfillment.

It is not that we need change in favor of some "less academic" or less challenging course. Jesus, in speaking to the teachers of law and religious leaders, rebuked them for their practice of giving the tenth of all their spices, "of mint, dill, and cummin," but meanwhile neglecting "the more important matters of the law—justice, mercy, and faithfulness". He tells them, "You should have practiced the latter, without neglecting the former." Those leaders were characterized as "blind guides who strained at a gnat, but swallowed a camel." Perhaps we have neglected the weightier matters in education, those things that bring heart to the learning-growing process and that involve a high view of what it is to be a person, to think, to wonder, to search for meaning, and to contribute meaningfully to the process of community.

This involves an understanding of what has been called "the essence of education," (Sharp, 1986) and the "heart of education," (Lane, 1987), and I believe we can include these without neglecting academic demands inherent in preparing young people for an intellectual, knowledgeable, or practical niche in a community of thinking workers, or working thinkers, as technicians, or artisans of some kind. But first we should foster a community of those who think and inquire, who are not fearful of self-examination, and who acknowledge their responsible accountability to the broader virtues of truth, wisdom, and love.

REFERENCES

Akrasia and animal rights:
Philosophy in the
British primary school

Patrick J.M. Costello

In Britain today, the discussion of philosophical ideas is a seriously neglected element in the education of primary school children. No doubt a major reason for this unfortunate state of affairs is a widespread acceptance of the notion that such children are simply not equal to the task, since they are largely incapable of the mature reflection and rational thought which philosophy presupposes. Philosophy, it is suggested, belongs to the later years of secondary education, if not to universities and colleges. The best way to refute such an argument is to show, in some detail, that young children are capable of engaging, in a competent and often skilful manner, in philosophical debate.

Several authors agree that children's stories may be used as vehicles for the introduction of philosophical ideas. According to Matthew Lipman:

Using the techniques of children's storytelling, it should be possible to relate idealized instances of cooperative, participatory discovery, not only of the principles of logic, but of ideas in a wide variety of philosophic domains... All that is necessary is that [the stories] should serve as springboards for intellectual discussions, and that these discussions should serve in turn to promote a
heightened awareness of and understanding of the world these children inhabit, as well as of their own identities in that world.\(^9\)

I read the following short story to a top class of sixteen mixed-ability eight-to-eleven-year-old pupils at a small village primary school on the outskirts of Hull. In writing it, I intended to introduce the children to the philosophical problem of weakness of will or *akrasia* and to a fallacy in inductive reasoning known as *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* (after this, therefore because of this). However, during the session (and quite by chance) we also discussed the important ethical issue of animal rights. The story is the fourth in a series involving three children: Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing, who are searching for a land where there are some good rules by which to live. Having visited the Snow Queen and the kingdoms of King Eversonne, and King Extrawork and having found each unsatisfactory, the children now travel to the Land of Youth.

**The Land of Youth**

Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing began their journey in high spirits. They were looking forward to seeing the Land of Youth and they discussed what it might be like. “One thing’s for sure,” said Knowlittle, “it must be warmer than the Snow Queen and the children now travel to the Land of Youth.

At that moment, the sun emerged from behind a large cloud and shone down on the three travellers. “The sun must have heard you, Knowlittle,” said Knownothing cheerfully, “look it’s smiling at us.” “Don’t be silly,” said Knowless, “the sun can’t hear you because it doesn’t have any ears. It can’t smile at you either, because it doesn’t have a mouth.” Suddenly, the sun disappeared behind a very black cloud. The sky quickly grew dark and raindrops began to fall from the sky. “Now look what you’ve done, Knowless!” said Knownothing in a vexed tone. “You’ve upset the sun and now we’re all going to get wet!” It began to rain more heavily and Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing had to shelter beneath a large oak tree. “I’m hungry,” said Knownothing, producing a large bag of sweets from his pocket. “You’re always hungry!” shouted Knowlittle. “Eating too many sweets is bad for you,” said Knowless confidently. “I know,” said Knownothing, “but I can’t help it. Each morning I tell myself that I am not going to eat any sweets today, but I always do. I really want to stop, but I just can’t help myself.” Having said this, Knownothing swallowed all the sweets in the bag in one go. “If you had really wanted to stop, you wouldn’t have emptied the bag of sweets into your mouth,” said Knowlittle. “Quite right!” exclaimed Knowless, “you could have emptied it into our mouths instead. Really! Some people have no self-control!” “What’s the use of trying if I know that I’m not going to succeed?” said Knownothing. “I may as well enjoy the sweets and save my energy.”

At this point, it stopped raining and the sun reappeared from behind the cloud. “It seems that the sun has forgiven you, Knowless,” said Knownothing, “come on, let’s go.” The three children resumed their journey and soon arrived in the Land of Youth. A boy of about their own age greeted them. “Welcome to the Land of Youth,” he said warmly, shaking hands with each of them in turn. “My name is Falgan. What brings you here?” “We soon arrived in the Land of Youth. A boy of about their own age greeted them. “Welcome to the Land of Youth,” he said warmly, shaking hands with each of them in turn. “My name is Falgan. What brings you here?” “We came to an end at last!”

[Having read the story to the group, I asked for comments on it, which were discussed. There then followed a dialogue which I recorded on tape. The transcript is given below with minor omissions. Grammatical errors have been allowed to remain.]

**PC** [Does] brightness make you sneeze?

Richard It makes me sneeze.

**PC** Does it? What do you think about this statement, Michelle?

Michelle You have no proof or evidence that the sun was smiling at him.

[COMMENT: In a previous session, the children had suggested two terms, "proof," and "evidence," which might be adduced in support of one’s arguments. Their tendency to refer to both terms at once is a consequence of my having adopted this practice for mnemonic purposes.]

**PC** Do you think the sun can smile at us?

Chorus NO!

Melanie Yes.

**PC** When does the sun smile at us, Melanie?

Melanie When it’s bright.

Russell I used to think when the sun comes out, it was going to come down and play with me and when it goes back in a cloud it was going to go for his dinner and then it came back out again and go for its tea and then go for its supper and then go to bed!

[Laughter]

**PC** Well, I think the children in the story were having thoughts like that, weren’t they? What do you think, Timothy, about this idea of the sun smiling at us?

Timothy When you look at it, really stare at it, it looks as though there’s a big grin on its face.

Melanie Yes, it does.

**PC** So, does the sun come out when it’s happy . . . ?

[Matthew Parker shakes his head.]

**PC** No, Matthew?

M. Parker No . . . it’s just amongst clouds what cover it up and then the clouds go.

**PC** Doesn’t it have something to do with whether or not the sun’s happy?

M. Parker No, it’s because of a cloud.

**PC** So, what do you think about this statement . . . ? “The sun must have heard you, Knowlittle, it’s smiling at us”?

M. Parker They have no proof or evidence that the sun come out just because they said something.

[COMMENT: Matthew spots the fallacy in a post hoc, ergo propter hoc argument.]

**PC** Let’s say the sun had gone behind a cloud . . . and we said the words “magic dust’
and all of a sudden, the sun came out and shone down on us again.  

M. Parker That would just be... luck and timing.  

PC What if I said, "magic dust," and the sun came out, then it went in again, a little bit later, and I said, "magic dust," and the sun came out again; wouldn't that give us the proof we require to say that what we said caused the sun to come out, Matthew?  

M. Parker No, it would just be the same—luck.  

PC What if I said it fifty times and each time the sun came out?  

[COMMENT: I am attempting to ascertain whether the children will find the fallacy more plausible if there are a greater number of instances to consider. Russell remains skeptical.]  

PC What about this statement: "The sun can't hear you, it hasn't got any ears. The sun can't smile at you, it hasn't got a mouth." What do you think about those statements?  

Caroline You have no proof or evidence that it hasn't got a mouth or ears.  

PC How would we get some proof about whether or not the sun has got ears and a mouth? Russell?  

Russell We can't.  

PC So does that mean we believe that the sun does have ears and it does have a mouth?  

Russell We can't.  

PC No, it's not called a round argument... Melanie?  

M. Parker Yes, a round argument.  

PC Why would it still be lucky, Russell?  

Russell Because you've just got no proof or evidence that you are doing it, because you don't know and if it's a real cloudy day like it more or less is now, it'll probably just be luck.  

PC Why do we not believe it then, if we can't prove that it doesn't?  

Russell We just can't, because we can't get to it. Well, we might be able to get to the sun, but we can't go on it.  

PC Well, why isn't that a reason for us saying: "Well, the sun does have ears"?  

Russell You don't know whether it has.  

PC But you've just said to me you don't think the sun has ears... If I said to you:  

"Well, the sun does have a pair of ears and it does have a mouth," what would you say to that?  

Russell I'd think it would be stupid, because you've got no proof or evidence that it has got ears or a mouth.  

PC So, what do you say to a person who says to you... "The sun has two ears... and a mouth, and you have no proof or evidence that it doesn't?"  

Timothy They have no proof or evidence that it does.  

PC So, are the two arguments as good as each other?  

[Some children say "No," and some say "Yes."]  

PC Why not, Russell?  

Russell Because it can't have ears or things, it can't.  

PC Why can't it?  

Russell Because it can't.  

PC Well, now, watch this: I'm going to write on the board. I've said to Russell: "Why can't the sun have ears?"...  

M. Parker Oh, yes.  

PC And I said to Russell, "Why can't the sun have ears?" and Russell said, [I write "Because it can't." on the board.] Have we met an argument like this one before?  

[COMMENT: In a story called, "Miss Frost Sets a Challenge," Miss Frost offers Knowlittle, Knowless and Knownothing three samples of reasoning to evaluate. The first involves two children, John and Sarah, who go to different schools. John says, "My school is better than yours. "Why is it better?" asks Sarah. "Because I go to a better school." ]  

M. Parker Yes, a round argument.  

PC No.  

Melanie A circular.  

PC A circular...  

Melanie Argument.  

PC Why do we call it a circular argument, Melanie?  

Melanie Because it just goes round and round and round.  

Michelle It's just repeating itself.  

PC What do we think about circular arguments? Are they good arguments, do you think?  

Chorus No.  

PC Why are they not good arguments, Michelle?  

Michelle Because they just carry on and carry on and they don't give you a good statement.
PC They don’t give you a good statement. They don’t give you what?
Jayne A good argument.
Caroline Proof or evidence.
PC Of what?
Caroline Whether the sun has got two ears and a mouth.
PC Excellent. Now let me ask you this . . . Knownothing says this: “You’ve upset the sun and now we’re all going to get wet!” What does he mean by that do you think? Matthew Parker?
M. Parker He’s trying to say that they are all going to get wet, even thought it wasn’t him who said it.
PC What do we think about that statement then?
Russell Not very good, because you can’t upset the sun, because the sun can’t hear you. It must be about sixty-eight million miles away.
PC Nine-three million miles away.
Russell Has to have good ears, if it has got ears, to hear us!

[Laughter]
PC Knowless says: “Eating too many sweets is bad for you,” and Knownothing says: “I know, but I can’t help it!” What do we think about that statement from Knownothing?
Russell He’s got no proof or evidence that he can’t stop, because he might be able to stop, but he’s got no proof or evidence that he can’t.
PC What did he do immediately after he had said this . . . Trudelle?
Trudelle Went and swallowed the whole sweets.
PC So, do you think he was trying very hard to stop . . . Melanie?
Melanie No.
Russell Yes.
PC You do, Russell?
Melanie He wasn’t even trying.
Russell Yes, because . . . if he swallows them, he won’t taste them. So if he doesn’t taste them, he’ll get fed up of them and then he’ll stop.

[COMMENT: Russell argues that swallowing the sweets is an excruciating circumstance, not an extra-inculminating one. This is something I had not thought of when I wrote the story.]
PC Do you think that was his intention when he swallowed the whole bag of sweets—not to taste them?
Chorus No.

PC Why do people usually eat things rather quickly in that sort of way?
Caroline Because they can’t help it.
Samantha T. Because they’re greedy!

[Laughter]
Jon It might be their dinner.
PC Kelly?
Kelly Could be hungry.
PC Jayne?
Jayne I eat my sweets fast before my dad comes in, because he always pinches them all.
PC Oh, your dad has one sweet tooth. A bit like me: I have a sweet set of teeth.

[Afternoon Break]
PC Immediately after Knowless has emptied the bag of sweets into his mouth, Knowless says: “Some people just have no self-control.” What do we mean by “self-control”? Michelle?
Michelle It means that if you see something and you want it, your mind’s telling you one thing to do and the rest of your body is telling you another thing to do.

[COMMENT: An excellent formulation of the dilemma facing a weak-willed person.]
PC And if you’ve got self-control, what happens?
Michelle If you’ve got self-control, you listen to your mind and if you haven’t got self-control, you just go and get that thing you want.
PC Can someone give me another expression for “self-control”? Two words . . .

[After several unsuccessful attempts, I say:]
PC Well, we’ll have a game of “Hangman,” then, as we usually do.

[COMMENT: When the children are unable to give me the word or expression I am looking for, I just walked up to you and said, “Here, do you want my ‘Mars Bar’?”]
PC Why will I need will-power, Tim?
Timothy Say you’ve gone on a diet and you couldn’t eat one single “Mars Bar,” then you’d need will-power.
PC Caroline?
Caroline You could be walking down the street and your friend just walked up to you and said, “Here, do you want my ‘Mars Bar’?”
PC Why would I need will-power there, Caroline?
Caroline To stop you from saying “Yes.”
PC What other sorts of situations require us to have will-power?
Michelle Drinking.
PC Drinking what?
Michelle Wine, beers and spirits, and things like that.
PC Why do we need will-power when we think about wine and beer? Matthew Parker?
M. Parker Because you can get addicted to it.
PC What do we mean by “addicted”? Kirsty?
Kirsty Always wanting some.
PC Now say you’re addicted to cigarettes . . .
Russell My sister.
PC Your sister’s addicted to cigarettes is she?
Russell Not addicted, but, not actually addicted, she’s tried to stop.
PC She tries to stop. Does she succeed?
Russell Sometimes.
PC Let’s say she was never able to stop. Would she be addicted?
Russell: Yes.
PC: Is Kownothing addicted to these sweets?

Russell: Yes.
PC: Melanie?

Melanie: He might not be, because he hasn't even tried to stop.

Russell: That means he's addicted then, if he hasn't tried to. He doesn't intend to try, so he's addicted.

[COMMENT: According to Melanie, someone is addicted to something only if he or she has tried unsuccessfully to give it up. However, Russell argues that since Kownothing has made no attempt to give up sweets, one might justifiably suppose that he does not intend to do so and that consequently, he is addicted.]

Richard: Oh, yes.
PC: Any other thoughts? Matthew?

M. Parker: When I go shooting, and say it's Sunday, and I'm shooting for rabbits and a pheasant gets up, I need loads of will-power not to shoot the pheasant.

[COMMENT: Matthew provides us with a philosophical "gold nugget" to be explored: the question of animal rights.]

PC: Why do you need lots of will-power there, Matthew?

M. Parker: So I don't shoot it.
PC: And is your will-power strong enough?

M. Parker: Yes, most of the time.
PC: But sometimes it isn't strong enough?

M. Parker: ... I haven't shot, I've always missed.

[Laughter]

PC: Is that because you're a bad shot, or is it because you intended to miss?

M. Parker: Oh, it's because I'm a bad shot.

PC: So, on those occasions when you fired at the pheasant, what would you say about your will-power?

M. Parker: It wasn't very strong.
PC: What do you think about that question of shooting pheasants? Is that something that we should all be doing, do you think?

Russell: No.
PC: Who says "Yes"?

[No-one raises his or her hand.]

PC: Who thinks it's something we shouldn't do?

[Fifteen children raise their hands. Richard does not put his hand up.]

PC: Does this mean, Richard, that you think shooting pheasants is a good thing?

Richard: ... if you like chicken, you could shoot one and then you might like it, so you carry on.

PC: So, you think it's quite a good thing ... to do?

Richard: Yes and no.
PC: Why "no," then?

Richard: Because if it's out of the season, you're shooting them ... you're not allowed to.

PC: So, does that mean when it's out of season, it's a bad thing to do?

Richard: Yes.
PC: But when it's not out of season, it's a good thing to do?

Richard: Yes, because you can go and farmers ... PC: What about farmers?

Richard: They sometimes shoot probably them.

[COMMENT] Richard equates what is morally right/wrong with what is lawful/unlawful.]

PC: What do you think about farmers shooting pheasants ... Melanie?

Melanie: Because, well how would Richard, or whoever shoots pheasants, like a pheasant, or somebody, to come up and shoot him?

[Laughter]

[COMMENT: Melanie alludes to what might be called "the universal aspect of ethics." For example, the "Golden Rule" enjoins us to treat others as we would have them treat us. The first formulation of Kant's categorical imperative is: "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." In suggesting that the pursuance of our universalising should extend to non-human animals, Melanie shows herself not to be a supporter of contractual theories of ethics.]

PC: But pheasants can't shoot us, can they, Melanie?

Melanie: No, or whatever—a giant came and shot him. I mean, you know Richard, he's bigger than a pheasant, so ... to the pheasant he's a giant. PC: What's wrong [with] shooting pheasants, then? Sally?

Sally: It's cruel, and you shouldn't shoot anything, because they have a life the same as us.

PC: Why do farmers shoot pheasants, then? Russell?

Richard: To get food.

Russell: Because if a pheasant went ... in a farmer's field and ate all the crops, they'd have a good right to kill the pheasant.

PC: Why would they have a right to kill the pheasant?

Russell: Because it ate all the crops.
PC: Let's say you went to the farmer's field and there were some ... potatoes there and you thought, "Yes, I'm going to have some potatoes for my tea tonight. I'll have some." The farmer comes along ... and takes out his shotgun and shoots you, Russell. Is he entitled to shoot you?

Russell: No.
PC: Why is he not entitled to shoot you, but he's entitled to shoot the pheasant?

Russell: Because it's a law not to kill. Like, say if he came up to me and shot me, he'd probably be put in prison. But if he came up to a bird and shot the bird, he wouldn't.

PC: But you said to me, the reason why the farmer is entitled to shoot the bird is because the bird ate his crops. Now, I'm saying to you, if you came along and took some of the farmer's crops, wouldn't he be entitled to shoot you?

Russell: No.
PC: Why not?

Russell: Because we're... he needs a law to shoot us.
PC: Okay, Jon?

Jon: Well, it's illegal to shoot people, but it's legal to shoot a pheasant.

PC: The only reason I asked Russell that was because... he didn't say to me the farmer could shoot the bird because it's legal; he said ... the farmer could shoot the bird because the bird took the farmer's crops.

Russell: Yes.
PC: So, I'm giving him another example where someone takes the farmer's crops... Russell: Yes, but the farmer... probably wouldn't shoot us because he'd know he would get ten years hard labor or something like that.

PC: If the pheasant... swoops down on the farmer's field and makes off with a potato ...is the pheasant... stealing?

Chorus: Yes.
PC: Matthew Parker, why is the bird stealing?

M. Parker: Because the farmer's grew it and done everything to it
and the pheasant just comes and takes it.

PC Okay. Is the bird stealing, Matthew Hayton?

M. Hayton No.

PC Why not?

M. Hayton Because [the farmer] doesn't know that it's the pheasant... it could be someone coming in the village.

PC Let's say the pheasant actually takes the potato. Does this mean that the pheasant has stolen the potato?

Russell Yes.

PC Trudelle?

Trudelle No, because it's what it's supposed to eat. A pheasant can't read... so if there's a sign or something up with the growing potatoes, he can't read that.

Russell You don't know whether a pheasant can read.

Richard They're allowed to read a cartridge!

[Laughter]

PC They can read a cartridge.

Richard If it hit them!

[Laughter]

PC Trudelle says the pheasant can't read. Why would that mean for you, Trudelle, that the pheasant isn't stealing the potato?

Trudelle Because it's what he's used to eating. It doesn't know that you're not supposed to...

Russell We're used to eating.

Trudelle He's used to eating things like that.

PC When we were discussing the example of the lady who takes the loaf of bread from the shelf in the supermarket... we were discussing all sorts of reasons as to why we might be able to say: "This person is stealing or has stolen the loaf of bread." For us to be able to say we had enough proof that she stole it, we needed to prove something about what we called her state of mind. We needed to prove that she ______ to steal it... What's the word I'm after?

Caroline Intended.

PC Superstar! We needed to prove that the lady intended to steal the loaf for us to be able to say that in fact she stole it, or she was engaged in stealing it. Now, if we could prove that the bird intended to steal the potato —the bird... swoops on to the potato... up and away. That bird has intended to steal the potato, hasn't it?

Richard While it's flying it'll get shot.

PC What do you think, Jon, has the bird intended...

John It's their way of life. How do they know that you're not allowed to pinch potatoes...? They just think that they're there to eat.

PC Okay. What if there was an adult who couldn't read? And let's say the sign in the farmer's field said this:

[Laughter]

[Write "NO STEALING" on the board.]

PC What does the sign say, Michelle?

Michelle "No Stealing."

PC Now, let's say this adult who comes along to the farmer's field sees this sign. And this person isn't a very good reader, Caroline, and he thinks it says, "No Sunbathing."

[Chorus: Yes.]

PC What do we eat it?

Richard Because that's your main meal on Christmas.

PC Do we eat chicken at any other time of the year?

[Chorus: Yes.]

PC Why do we eat chicken?

M. Parker Because it tastes nice.

PC But... you've all been telling me: "I don't think it's right to shoot a pheasant."

Timothy Yes, but there's hundreds of chickens in the world; there's not that many pheasants.

PC Oh, that's the reason why we don't shoot the pheasant, is it?

Timothy Because they've got loads of chickens in captivity and they keep breeding them and breeding them, so there's hundreds and thousands of chickens.

Russell There's hardly ever any pheasants.

PC So, if there were a lot more pheasants, would that mean that it would be justifiable to shoot the pheasant?

Richard Yes.

Timothy Not if they were wild.

PC Why not?

Timothy Because it's like, say you were Tarzan and someone came up and shot you, you're wild. So, it's not really justifiable to shoot you.

PC Well, there wasn't a time...
when the chickens were wild . . .

Russell Not all of them.

PC Russell?

Russell You might have got some in captivity and then they bred and them ones what they bred . . . them wouldn't have been in the wild.

M. Parker But pheasants are bred in pheasant farms. Last weekend we went to a pheasant farm in Welton.

Richard There's millions of pheasants.

Chorus Not as many as chickens.

PC So, you're saying to me, Tim, that if a bird is in captivity, it might be all right to kill it and have it for your dinner. But if it's in the wild, then it's not right to kill it. Is that what you're saying?

Timothy Yes.

PC What do we think about that, Sally?

Sally If, at Christmas, you eat a pheasant or a turkey, you might not have shot it—someone else might have and you might have bought it.

PC Now, what's the difference?

Jon A lot.

PC What's the difference, Jon?

John You haven't gone out and shot it, so it's not your problem.

PC Is it not?

Jon It's there for you to eat; it's shot now and you can't do anything about that.

[COMMENT: Jon wishes to argue that in instances where one might ascribe moral blame for the killing of an animal, such an ascription should be directed to the killer alone and not to the consumer.]

PC Imagine the situation in the supermarket, where there are fridges full of chickens . . . Why do you think these chickens are lying there in the supermarket?

Richard They've been strangled, not been shot.

Russell Because they're dead!

PC Why are they there? What's the purpose of them lying in the shop, Caroline?

Caroline For us to eat them.

PC Let us say we all decided today: "Well, I don't think it's really right to strangle chickens". Would there be a lot of chickens in the shops in the next few weeks, if everyone in [this village] decided that they weren't going to eat chickens anymore, because they didn't like the way the chickens are strangled?

M. Parker Other people . . . not from [this village], would go and get them.

PC Let's say the whole of North Humberside decided that they weren't going to eat chickens any more . . .

Melanie But . . . people might come for a holiday.

PC But, if a lot of people decided that they weren't going to buy the chickens, would there be much point in killing them and bringing them to the shops?

Russell No.

M. Parker Yes.

Melanie No.

Richard If you let them wild and then people might say, "There's a good bird, I'll shoot it," and then they'll shoot it, start eating it and then they'll buy it from the shop.

M. Parker But, even if we never ate them, they would still be in the shops, because they'll just keep them until you did want them.

PC What do you think of this argument, Tim, because you said to me, "It's not really our problem—we didn't shoot the chicken." What do you say to this: the person who shoots the chicken, or strangles it, is shooting or strangling the chicken because he wants to sell it to a store, to a supermarket [which] wants to sell it to us. Let's say we decided we weren't going to eat chicken any more, because . . . we didn't agree with chickens being killed for us to eat. Would there be much point in going around strangling chickens, or shooting them?

Timothy No.

PC If you say to me, "It's not my problem—someone else has shot the chicken or strangled it," [someone] might say to you, "Well, if you weren't so intent on having chicken for your Christmas dinner or your Sunday lunch, then these people would never bother shooting chickens or strangling them and so chickens would just be allowed to live." What do you say to that argument?

Timothy That's a good argument.

PC Why is it a good argument?

Timothy Well, because there's nothing really that I can answer back.

PC Is there something you can answer back, Richard?

Richard It would spoil Christmas dinner.

PC Why would it spoil Christmas dinner?

Richard Because you won't have a chicken or something like that.

PC What do you think about that, Jon?

Jon Rubbish!

PC Why is it rubbish?

Jon There's thousands of more things what you could have without meat.

PC Like what?

Jon You could have real fancy salads and things.

Russell Yes.

PC Let's now go back to this question of when we need a lot of will-power. Have we ever been in a situation where we said to ourselves, "I know that I shouldn't do this . . ." and then later we say to ourselves: "Well, I did it after all," [Has] anyone ever been in a situation like that, where you thought something wasn't the right thing to do, but you did it anyway? Matthew Parker?

M. Parker I have two [grandmothers]. One lives in Hull and one lives here. And my [grandmother] who was here was ill, so I really should have gone to my [grandmother's] in Hull. But, instead, I thought, 'I'll go to my [grandmother's] in Hull,' but I never.

PC Where did you go?

M. Parker My [grandmother's] here.

PC Why do you think you did that?

M. Parker Just because I could play with all my friends here.

PC Who was it who . . . gave me an excellent definition a while ago, who said, "My head is telling me to do one thing." Was that you, Michelle?

[Michelle nods her head]

PC Would you say that again? "My head is telling me to do one thing and . . ."
Michelle: "...the rest of me is telling me to do another thing."

PC: Now, what was happening to your body, Matthew, at the time of this problem you had? Was your head telling you one thing?

M. Parker: Yes.

PC: What was your head telling you, your brain?

M. Parker: Not to do it, but my body was getting ready to do it.

PC: Matthew's head was telling him he should go and stay with one grandmother, but his body was packing his bag...

[Laughter]

PC: ...to go and stay with his other grandmother. Now, do you think the reason for that is that your body was stronger than your brain?

M. Parker: Yes.

PC: Has anyone ever been in a situation where they've needed some will-power and their brain was telling them one thing and their body was telling them something else, and they decided to do what their head was telling them? Russell?

Russell: My garage roof isn't that high, but... I was going to try and jump off it... but I thought, "No!"

PC: Why did you think,"No"?

Russell: Because I could have broke my neck!

PC: So you decided not to do it?

Russell: Yes.

PC: So what your... brain was telling you was stronger than what your body was telling you?

Russell: Yes.

PC: Why do you think sometimes people feel that they should not do something... but they go ahead and do it anyway?

M. Parker: Because, though deep down they want to do it... the body doesn't want to do it.

PC: Oh, I thought you were telling me it was the body that wanted to do it, but the brain didn't.

M. Parker: It depends what it is.

PC: So, you can change these around, can you?

M. Parker: Yes.

PC: Sometimes it's the brain telling you to do it, sometimes it's the body... Well, if you really wanted to do something, why do you tell yourself to stop? Why don't you just go ahead and do it? Jon?

Jon: Well, in food matters, your eyes are too big for your belly!

PC: What do you mean by that?

Jon: There'll be a big trifle and you go, "I'll have a bit of that" and you don't eat it all.

PC: Do you sometimes think to yourself, "Well, there's an enormous trifle on the table. I should really only have one portion"? But what happens, Jon?

Richard: It's all gone.

PC: Why is it all gone?

Richard: Because you ate it all.

PC: Why did you eat it all?

Caroline: Because you didn't have any will-power.

PC: Now, are there any other situations that you can think of... where it would be important to have some will-power? Melanie?

Melanie: Sally’s sister and I go to gymnastics and it was our first time on the big bag, because we'd only been going on the little one.

PC: Yes?

Melanie: My head was telling me, I was scared to do it and don't do it, and in the end I did it. It wasn't so bad after all.

PC: So, are there times when it's right to ignore what the brain is telling us?

[Three children answer: "Yes," and one answers, "No."]

PC: Let me ask you another question... in the story Kn0wnothing says, "What's the use of trying, if I know that I'm not going to succeed? I may as well enjoy the sweets and save my energy." What do we think about that?

Timothy: He's got no proof or evidence that he's not going to succeed.

PC: What would count as proof and evidence for us there, Tim?

Timothy: If he throws all his sweets away.

PC: What else might he have done with the sweets, if he wasn't going to give them away?

Timothy: Give them to his friends.

Richard: Put them in his socks!

PC: What use would they have been to him in his socks?

Richard: If he wanted them, he wouldn't like to eat them because they'd be all smelly!

[Laughter]

PC: Sally?

Sally: When Kn0wnothing said he was going to eat the sweets and when he did, then he said, "I wish I didn't do that now." His friends said... why didn't he put them in their mouths?

PC: Yes. What do you think about that?

Sally: They would have done the same.

PC: So, what do you think about them telling him off?

Sally: Not very good.

PC: Why not, Sally?

Sally: Because they'd have done the same.

PC: Melanie?

Melanie: It's the same as biting your fingernails though. Why doesn't he put vinegar on them? Put vinegar on them to stop biting your nails— you can put vinegar on the sweets to stop him eating them.

Chorus: Ughh!

Jayne: I like vinegar!

PC: Caroline?

Caroline: What if you like vinegar, though?

Russell: Vinegar on sweets!

PC: If you haven't got any vinegar, Caroline, you're going to need a lot more what?

Russell: Salt and pepper!

[Laughter]

PC: Caroline?

Caroline: Will-power.

PC: That's when you're going to need even more will-power. Now, one last question on this story. Kn0wnothing says this to Knowless when the sun comes out from behind the cloud: "It seems as though the sun has forgiven you, Knowless." What do you think about that?

Richard: No, because the sun can't hear you or see you.

PC: If you think that the sun can't hear you or see you, isn't it possible that the sun might be able to forgive you, Richard?

Richard: No.

PC: Why not?

Richard: Because it can't hear you or see you.

PC: Kirsty?
Kirsty: Just because it's come out again after going in, it doesn't mean to say it's forgiving. It could just have gone behind a cloud and come out.

PC: Yes, it might. What would be the word we would use for that, Matthew, that you mentioned before? If a person said something and the sun went behind the cloud, you said that was an example of what?

M. Parker: Luck.

PC: There's a longer word, as well, that that might be an example of. Can anyone think? Let me see how many letters there are in it. Eleven letters... It would be an example of something beginning with...

M. Parker: Solution.

PC: We'll have another game of "Hangman," then.

[I write eleven dashes on the board.]

PC: I'll give you the first letter. "C." Someone tells me without me giving any more letters. Caroline?

Caroline: Curiosity?

PC: No, it wouldn't be an example of a curiosity... Kirsty?

Kirsty: Coincidence?

PC: Excellent... can you spell it for me, Kirsty, please?

[Kirsty shakes her head.

PC: Well, you don't know until you've tried. You're like Knownothing.

M. Parker: You have no proof or evidence you can't do it.

[COMMENT: This is an excellent example of how insights gained in a philosophical discussion can be applied in practical and non-contrived situations in the classroom. Hopefully, such discussions will also be of benefit to children in their lives outside school.]

PC: What does she have no proof or evidence of, Matthew?

M. Parker: She can't do it.

PC: That she can't spell it. Excellent.

[Kirsty spells the word with some help from one of her classmates.]

PC: Excellent. Not only a class of excellent thinkers, but a class of superb spellers as well! Now, I've got something to say to you. That is the best discussion I have ever had with a group of children... Now, what do we think about these people—you remember I mentioned a famous person—what was the famous person's name, Jon?

Jon: Plato.

PC: Why did I mention Plato to you, Jon?

Jon: He said that you can't study philosophy if you're under thirty.

[COMMENT: In the Republic, Plato argues that dialectic (philosophy) can only be introduced to those who have successfully completed many years of training and study and who have reached the age of thirty.]

PC: What do we think about that, Caroline?

Caroline: It's not true because we... you can and he's not including you, either.

PC: Jayne?

Jayne: You've got no proof or evidence that you can't do philosophy if you're under thirty.

PC: If I wanted to go and talk to some adults and to say to them, "I have a group of children... who are capable of engaging in philosophy and they're Second, Third and Fourth Years," what would my tape provide for me, Melanie?

Melanie: Proof and evidence.

PC: So, what do we think of Plato's argument, Kirsty, that you can't study philosophy until you're thirty?

Kirsty: Wrong.

M. Parker: He has not got no proof or evidence.

PC: He has no proof or evidence... This tape, in fact, provides evidence of the opposite. Thank you very much.

These factors together indicate that to limit the study of philosophy to secondary schools, colleges and universities, is unwarranted.

In conclusion, I suggest that the teaching of philosophy to children can do much to counteract the prejudices and unreasonableness which are a fact of everyday adult life. It is the responsibility of the philosopher, one of whose tasks is to clarify our thinking, to initiate such teaching.

References


2. On the desirability of providing substantial transcripts of philosophical dialogues rather than reports of short conversations which are, in large part, the product of the writer's memory, see Miller, R.B., "How to win over a skeptic," *Thinking*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1986, pp. 46-48. Excellent examples of such transcripts can be found in Michael Pritchard's *Philosophical Adventures with Children*, University Press of America, 1985.


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Paul Strand: Shafeenwaz Tourkeee Sayed, Garrawan, Delta, Egypt, 1959
Leonard Nelson was a champion, in pre-Hitler days, of the Socratic method in the teaching of philosophy, and several of his students, particularly Gustav Heckmann and Minna Specht, recognized in Nelson's approach a mode of teaching children as well as adults to think for themselves and in community. Heckmann has published Das Gespräch (Schroedel, 1981), and an English translation has now become available. What follows is the first chapter of that translation. The entire book will soon be listed by IAPC (in typescript.)
Bellow, I will be reporting on how I used the Socratic method in decades of Nelson-based University teaching of philosophy. I will be reporting on pedagogic experiences and on the personal experiences that go with it, as far as they are relevant to how philosophical insight is gained. Experiences constitute the substance of this work; I have not been able to fall back on literature very much.

I could not deal with the practical application of the Socratic method in teaching mathematics in schools and universities, either.

The reader will find the reports on my experiences in Chapters 1 to 6 and Chapters 10 and 11; interpretations of these experiences, contributions towards a theory of the Socratic discourse will be found in the second half of Chapter 6 and in Chapters 7, 8, and 9. In the last two chapters, I will be contrasting my own experiences with the Socratic discourse with both an ancient and a modern conception: Plato's description of the Socratic "art of midwifery," and the "rational discourse" as conceived by the Göttingen theorist of jurisprudence, Robert Alexy.

This work would not have been written at all had it not been for my wife, Charlotte. She gently talked me into tackling it in time; the interest with which she followed its progress helped me not to depart too much from concrete experiences in the theoretical discussion of philosophical reasoning.

CHAPTER ONE

The Most General Definition of the Socratic Method. Introduction to the Reports on Socratic Seminars.

Socratic method, in the widest sense, is used wherever and whenever people try, by reasoning out a problem together, to approach the truth. This is often attempted sporadically in conversation. I would call a discourse socratic in which it does not just appear sporadically but dominates the conversation; a discourse in which this "reasoning it out jointly" takes place all of the time.

One specific form of this Socratic discourse is the didactic Socratic discourse. Here, a tutor who must be better versed in the subject under discussion than his students helps them to arrive at a judgment of their own by reasoning. I was introduced to the Socratic method by Leonard Nelson when listening, in 1922, to his public lecture, "The Socratic Method." Here, Nelson presents it as the only viable method for teaching philosophy. This constitutes a special application of the method; the general definition I have given of it comprises more than teaching.

However, my personal experiences of the Socratic method, on which I shall report in the following concern the specialized field of teaching, and in particular, of teaching philosophy. I practiced the method for some years in teaching mathematics and philosophy in the Landeszirungsheim Walkemühle [Translator's note: a boarding school and training college for both children and adults] which had been founded by Nelson, until it was closed by the Nazi authorities in 1933, and the, after World War II, for several decades in philosophical seminars in the Hanover Teachers' Training College.

I shall begin by reporting on my Socratic seminars in Hanover. With the exception of the seminar about Moral Law, described in Chapter 6, these were of four hours' weekly duration, comprising two 90-minute sessions on two consecutive working days. A notice on the noticeboard informed students about the conditions of work as follows:

The intention, in this seminar, is not to study a philosophical text. The particulars are to cooperate in finding, by discussion and jointly reasoning it out, possible solutions to a philosophical problem. This can be done, for we all possess reasoning faculties. However, it requires unusual tenacious hard work. A seminar of this kind can only be successful if the participants are ready to make that effort.

One precondition of this is continuous and regular attendance. If you are in doubt whether you shall be able to spare the time to come to all sessions this term, you had better not attend at all, for sporadic attendance will interfere with the work of the group. But regular participation in the discussions is not enough either to produce results; participants will be expected to elaborate in writing on the results of the discourse.

Thus, the seminar requires a considerable amount of work to be done by the participants—say, five hours a week.

I am mentioning this in order to make sure, as far as possible, that preconditions for fruitful work in this seminar are met, in order to prevent disappointment, and in order to give prospective participants the information they need to decide whether or not they want to join.

Readiness to make the effort described above, and normal intelligence, are the only qualifications required. A knowledge of philosophical literature or previous training in philosophy is not necessary.

Our first session will be particularly important. In it, all this: the specific way in which the seminar is run, and what is required from the participants, will be discussed in detail. We shall also choose, in this session, the philosophical problem we wish to discuss. Participants may suggest problems to be discussed, and we shall choose the one in which the participants are most interested.

It enhances the participants' capacity for team reasoning when they write minutes. For, while in the discourse every participant has to concentrate on the others' thoughts again and again, in writing minutes afterwards he is free to follow his own train of thought without interruption, and can assume a critical distance to what was said. As for myself, the students' minutes show me whether the discourse has left things muddled or whether there have been misunderstandings. These I take up again in the next session for the students to discuss them again. Often, too, the minutes contain more than a rendering of the discussion, they take the argument further, and this too I can present to the group in the next session for them to discuss it.

However, during the discourse the students should not burden themselves with the task of keeping minutes. They need to be free for the discourse; it is the discourse that keeps the seminar alive in the first place. For their own record of it, it is quite sufficient for the students to take down the expressions I record on the blackboard; these are the ones with which, or on which, we still work. If the minutes are incomplete that is not problem; they still serve their purpose of having the students reflect quietly on what was said in the discourse.
At the start of a discourse I read to the students minutes which give a good summary of the train of thought of the previous discourse, or minutes which introduce a new thought continuing or extending the line of reasoning. This is helpful for picking up the argument where we had left off at the end of the previous session.

The necessary information about how we will proceed having been given, we then, in the first session, set ourselves to choosing a subject matter. I make some statements circumscribing the area of problems which can fruitfully be tackled in a Socratic discourse. In the Socratic discourse we use only one tool: that of reflection on experiences common to all participants. Problems which require other tools to settle are thus excluded.

Such instruments are: (1) The experiment or observation in vivo or in the laboratory, (2) empirical surveys, like the ones used in the social sciences, (3) historical studies, (4) the psychoanalytic method of uncovering a person's individual problems.

As far as I can see, all problems which do not require the use of any of these four tools, may be fruitfully tackled in a Socratic discourse. These are the fields of mathematics and philosophy—philosophy in the widest sense of the word, including logic of science, basic problems in politics and education, and including problems regarding the structure of our inner experience. For everyone has inner experience, and many of its phenomena are familiar to all of us. We can examine them together. Such self-knowledge regarding our human condition is a splendid Socratic subject matter; the seminars about volition and about freedom, on which I shall report in the following, are examples of this.

However individual psychic problems are excluded from the Socratic discourse since they can only be examined with the fourth of the tools I mentioned.

After this circumscription of which problems it is possible to discuss in a Socratic discourse, the students, in the first session of the seminar, name problems that interest them. In general, we choose, from a number of suggestions, the question which interests the group most. Very occasionally I suggested a problem myself, but only in a very preliminary and tentative wording (e.g., "freedom of the will") which does not yet imply a precise definition of the problem.

The seminars on which I report in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 comprised about 20 sessions each, lasting about 90 minutes; adding up to about thirty full hours' work per term. If we compared this with the dimensions of the problems discussed in each seminar, we note that a Socratic seminar does not cover much of a "syllabus." These seminars simply serve a different purpose. This purpose will be discussed later. The participants usually numbered about a dozen; sometimes rather less than that.

Like the others, I write minutes, as soon as possible after each session while it is still fresh in my mind. In the process, I often notice nuances of a thought, aspects of the problem under discussion, which had escaped me during the discourse. Or possibly the need for re-opening a subject for the purpose of clarification is brought home to me. I also make pedagogididactic annotations in my own protocol, but it on the group as a whole or on individual participants. For me, writing the minutes is the most effective method of preparation for chairing the next session.

One important instrument for having a productive discourse is the "metadiscourse." Both the term and the process denoted by it have evolved during our work; they are not of my invention. The term denotes the interruption of the investigating discourse on a subject matter by a discourse on the discourse. My personal motto for this is: Every feeling of discomfort must be voiced. We state what we feel is unsatisfactory in our common endeavor. Participants might be critical of the behavior of individual fellow-students or of the chair. There might be discontent with the ponderous, unproductive, or muddled character of the discourse, a discontent for which the reasons are not yet obvious. We reflect on how to put an end to such shortcomings.

Participants will also sometimes voice their pleasure about a successful discourse in a metadiscourse, and we will then reflect on what it was that made the discourse so successful. A metadiscourse is held as soon as one of the participants, or the chair, states their pleasure or discomfort on a subject being discussed.

For the information of the students who are not yet familiar with Socratic work, I described the method in a leaflet, "Philosophy by Discourse," as follows:

The other day, a student expressed her expectations from the Socratic discourse like this: "To reflect on the phenomena we meet with in such a way that we gain insights which are more profound than the ones with which we started off." The Socratic discourse achieves this deepening of insight by activating team thinking. This comprises, first and foremost, understanding each other in every detail. In a Socratic discourse we do not confine ourselves to superficial agreement with an idea, but check on our own understanding by having another participant expressing the same thought in his own words, and having the participant who voiced the original idea comment on that. Thus, step by step, full empathic agreement is reached, rendering the original thought more precise and enriching it with nuances of meaning.

As a rule, conflicting opinions on the matter at hand thus emerge and are thrown into sharper relief in the process of discussion. However, the Socratic discourse does not stop there. Socrates, as Plato described him, believed in truth, and truth cannot be self-contradictory. Diverging and antagonistic standpoints are thus seen as a challenge to enter into the Socratic experiment proper: whether, and to what extent, we can successfully attempt to carry on reasoning it out between the two contradictory stances, to examine argument and counter-argument, until all participants fully agree with each other. This is not, as a rule, achieved by adopting one stance in all its aspects and rejecting the contradicting stance in all its aspects. Rather, agreement is achieved by purging each of the stances of elements which do not stand up under scrutiny; thus, the nuclei of truth in both stances are apparent in a purer form, and both stances turn out not to be contradictory, but complementary.

For the Socratic experiment to be successful, participants have to behave in accordance with the objective of the experiment. They have to be willing to understand the other person, and have to help others understand what they
themselves are saying by trying to express themselves clearly and simply.

To start with, understanding in detail can only be achieved if the chairperson sets himself or herself the task of bringing it about. He has to do two things in order to make sure of this: he must keep the students' attention focused on the aspect of the problem currently under discussion, or bring them back to it again and again until it is clarified as much as the stage of the discussion permits and warrants. Moreover, he must observe whether or not full consensus has been reached, and if that is not yet the case, keep the discourse focused on the problem under discussion.

In my own experience of chairing such discourses, the chairperson has his work cut out attending to these tasks. He is not at liberty to express his own views on the problem in the discourse, to elaborate on them or deal with objections to them. His task is an entirely different one: helping to make sure that justice is done to the students' views, views which will often be diametrically opposed to his own, so that the ideas expressed may then be more fully understood than the student who expressed them initially realized.

The chairperson has to be impartial. He must not favor his own opinion by the way he chairs the discourse. On the contrary he must see to it that every view expressed in the discourse has an equal chance of being assessed thoroughly and objectively. If the situation warrants, he will have to curb a participant who states his views energetically, so that a less energetic participant can have his say and develop his own position. The same thing goes for the protection of those who think somewhat more slowly against those who can rapidly produce a coherent argument. As a rule, the chairperson is occupied full-time with these tasks.

In view of this, it will also be apparent that understanding and consensus in the strictest sense can, as a rule, only be achieved when a chairperson takes care of these tasks. It is rare, even for a group long experienced in Socratic discourse, to meet these requirements of intense communication without a chairperson.

I will now present five reports on Socratic seminars, which I wrote after their termination, in some cases years after the event. To draft these reports, I used my own minutes of the sessions, which are much more detailed than the reports, into them I inserted didactic commentaries in which I discussed the problems I was faced with as a chairperson.

By starting with reports about seminars which have really taken place, I am adhering to the Socratic principle that insight into a general rule can only be obtained by looking at, and analyzing, a concrete experience which comes under the heading of that general rule.

However, the Socratic work described here bears the stamp of my own personality and its assets and shortcomings. In no way does it represent the full scale of possible individual variants of the Socratic method.
The Study of Teaching and Curriculum

Joseph Malanga

INTRODUCTION

As an adolescent in high school physics or geometry class, I occasionally would find myself perplexed or even angered at Ricky, another student who was always asking questions about the problems the teacher has assigned for homework, or the formulas that had been presented in class. "How do you know these formulas really work?" or "Why isn't my solution right if I arrive at the same answer?" he would ask Mr. Murray, in geometry, and Mr. Billings, in physics. Almost daily, a similar discussion would ensue on the possibilities of Ricky's dissent, while I, a preoccupied adolescent, was extremely bored. Why, I fumed silently, is he making such a fuss over the internal angle of a triangle? Haven't teachers been teaching us kids those darned formulas for years? Why would Mr. Murray waste time telling us something that was wrong? I believed that he wouldn't and that Ricky was just showing off how smart he was. Still, Ricky, who always got the best grades in math and physics, while I struggled perennially with anything numerical, continued to challenge the obvious.

The upshot of all this is that after years as a teacher and as an administrator, I came to realize that it wasn't Ricky who had the wrong idea after all, but myself, for thinking that it was a waste of time, or even wrong to question what the teacher taught. But I think that, unfortunately, this type of attitude is often fostered in our schools, whether intentionally or not. After all, what classroom teacher, trying to impart a planned body of knowledge to a group of 30 youngsters in a limited amount of time, is really able to determine if each one truly understands the subject material he or she has just been "taught"? It's easy for a teacher, especially in secondary school, to assume that because the students are not asking questions, most of them probably understand the material. But if many of the students are, as I was, merely accepting the material as true while still struggling to apply and understand it, then only the "squeaky wheels," like Ricky, may be getting the attention critical to really understanding and personalizing subject matter.

When I became familiar with the Philosophy for Children program, I felt I
had experienced a revelation. Perhaps there was, after all, a way to help more and more children gain the insights that would help them become “squeaky wheels” like Ricky. Instead of just accepting knowledge, the children I worked with (and myself) learned the skills of inquiry that would prevent one from living “the unexamined life” that students too frequently tend to revert to. The unique and excellent study premise of the Philosophy for Children program (e.g., the study of ethical inquiry through novels) provides a way for students to sharpen their analytical thinking skills by examining questions that are relevant to them personally. In fact, as Tony Johnson says, “the intent of the Philosophy for Children program [is] to enhance the child’s natural reasoning abilities by assisting the child in the discovery of the rules of reason and their application.” (p. 14) Using the concept of “communities of inquiry,” children are encouraged to form dialogues among their peers, much like Ricky’s questions to Mr. Murray. By engaging in these dialogues, the children try to answer the questions brought up in the discussions, without the influence of value judgments from the teacher. Hopefully, they will ultimately use these dialogue skills to gain insights about other areas of their life and studies.

Being a Philosophy for Children enthusiast, I naturally wondered why all teachers weren’t using these nifty programs, or others like them to help their students gain analytical thinking skills. Surely every teacher wants his or her students to have the best skills possible. While this may be largely true, Johnson notes that not all teachers are capable emotionally, or equipped technically to teach this unique program to their students. Successful teachers of Philosophy for Children programs have learned to be open-minded and allow their students to pursue answers, even those that are different than the teacher’s. Additionally, they have the technical knowledge that will allow them to teach their students about methods of inquiry and rules of reason. I think though, that teachers must also possess firm concepts about the study of teaching and curriculum in general, and about teaching thinking skills in particular, in order to carry out confidently the mission of the Philosophy for Children program.

WHAT IS TEACHING?

The question of what, exactly, is teaching has been pondered by theorists and researchers for some time. Even back in 1879, Pattison wrote on the practical art of education:

“...of all the practical arts, that of education seems the most cumbrous in its method, and to be productive of the smallest results with the most lavish expenditure of means. Hence the subject of education is one which is always luring on the innovator and the theorist. Every one, as he grows up, becomes aware of time lost, and effort misapplied, in his own case. It is not unnatural to desire to save our children from a like waste of power.” (Mark Pattison, “Milton” 1879, p. 45, in Passmore).

Certainly this has held true even in recent times, as a proliferation of research and techniques for teaching implore us to try team teaching or open classrooms or traditional memorization drills, all of which have value, yet none of which are quite complete on their own, in my opinion, for a teacher to adopt exclusively. And what poor teacher (who really cares, that is,) hasn’t found him/herself at wit’s end trying to offer the benefits of a variety of teaching techniques to her students in the unreasonably short amount of time given each year to “accomplish something.” The practical craft of teaching, then, is demanding as well as cumbrous. Besides being a master of many techniques, the teacher must also be a superlative manager of time and people.

So, what is teaching really? Passmore (1980) quotes Scheffler on the concept of teaching, for a definition which I find particularly favorable to the goals of Philosophy for Children: “Teaching may be characterized as an activity aimed at the achievement of learning and practiced in such manner as to respect the student’s intellectual integrity and capacity for independent judgment.” (p. 19) As Passmore notes, the specific use of the word “aim” implies that the end goals of the act of teaching may be uncertain, and not guaranteed. How different this is from a definition of teaching which says, for example, that teaching is the practice of specific activities which achieve learning. In the second definition, there is the assumption that learning can be readily measured, once it is taught. This
may be true if we are trying to teach our students simple arithmetic or how to identify and repeat syllables written on a page (ostensibly called reading). I ask Johnny what two plus two equals, and Johnny answers, "four.' But suppose I want to "teach" Johnny about citizenship, or even just history. If I teach Johnny about the Declaration of Independence by telling him that is was a significant point in American history which marked the beginnings of our country as an independent nation, and then ask him to confirm his knowledge and "understanding" of what I taught him, bright little Johnny will probably tell me that "the Declaration of Independence was a significant point in American history ..." (just as I would have dutifully told Mr. Murray that $x = a + b$. But how much has Johnny really learned?

TEACHING AND LEARNING

It is important to note that the act of teaching has a logical outcome, the act of learning. And while I've mentioned that the two may not necessarily happen together as we hoped they would, it's important for the teacher who hopes to apply the concepts of the philosophy for children program to his/her repertoire of teaching skills, to understand how teaching and learning are connected, or more aptly as the previous paragraph would suggest, disconnected. Teaching as I've noted, is an activity which hopefully promotes learning. But what precisely is learning, and how do we know if our students have learned the things we've taught them, and further, what good are these things to them, when, and if, they learn them?

Lapp et al. (1975) make several comments about the act of teaching which I find useful. In a philosophical/social context, the authors note that learning is a process which interacts with teaching. Both the teacher and the student take on each other's roles at varying times. They note that the "teacher is not simply the authority who teaches but also a student who learns through the unique experiences and insights of his students" (p. 211) The reciprocal of this statement is also true in a very significant sense. The insights and unique experiences of a teacher color all his/her lessons, whether intentionally or not. Children learn more than just the facts, even if that's all they'll repeat to you. They also pick up the prejudices of the person imparting the facts, as well as making value judgments about the way the facts were given. Lapp et al. tells us that "a child learns through his experience" (p. 155) An example from my own experience points to this process of osmosis in one of my own students.

Bill, whom I'd always considered bright, but somewhat intellectually lazy, turned in an essay one day, which, like most of his other essays, was a duplicate of certain facts I'd taught in class. Since the essay question had specifically asked for students to make their own judgments, I felt compelled to ask Bill why he had merely parroted the facts. Rather than being dumbstruck or evasive about his reply, Bill came right to the point: "Isn't that what you wanted me to do?" When I explained that I'd hoped he would apply what he had learned to his own experience, he looked at me, embarrassed and confused, obviously feeling like he had failed the task I'd assigned him (which in a sense, he had) and said, "But what do any of those things have to do with me?" It became immediately and disconcertingly apparent to me that what Bill had "learned" from my lecture was that (a) the teacher's opinion was the right answer, and (b) learning was a bunch of dry facts that had little personal meaning. This was exactly the way I had felt so many years ago, listening to Ricky grill Mr. Murray about geometry.

So, in a very important sense, teaching and learning are intimately interrelated, as I have learned. Even if we examine learning through the laws of Thorndike, who wrote about instrumental conditioning in 1921, we find that man learns through "bonds" or "connections" which offer "veritable hotbeds for the growth of learned habits" Thorndike (p. 22) Thorndike characterized the psychology of learning through three laws, those of: "Readiness, Exercise and Effect." When man, or other animals are "ready" to learn, Thorndike asserts that "the conduct of such is satisfying" but "annoying" if he is not ready. Further, he noted that the tendency to strengthen the particular learning bond made, depended on its "use" or "disuse" and the frequency thereof, as well as the number of satisfying connections made by a particular usage. Finally, when the connections made in learning bonds are "satisfying," the strength of those bonds are increased (pp. 23-24) Translated into personal terms, Thorndike makes what I believe are three important and universally applicable conclusions for teachers, no matter what other theories and philosophies of learning they may adhere to. The first is that learning involves "bonding and connecting," with a satisfying source. For most contemporary learning situations, I believe that means a teacher. Secondly, the use or disuse of that connection will determine the quality of the bond. And finally, if the bond is satisfying, its strength will be increased. That brings us to the question of how a teacher optimizes the opportunities for his/her students to experience learning "bonds," and how he/she helps strengthen these bonds once they've hopefully occurred.

TEACHING AND CURRICULUM, PLUS A DOSE OF CARE

The most obvious way that a teacher stimulates learning in his/her students in the classroom, is through the use of curriculum. Curriculum forms the "superstructure," from which the teacher and student conduct their learning interactions. Hodgkin offers a definition of curriculum which I feel is complementary with the premise of teaching philosophy to children. He writes: "The curriculum is a small world or microculture created by teachers at various levels of abstraction for learners to explore" (p. 86) This is an important concept for it stresses that curriculum can never be considered as merely the materials that the teacher has at her disposal, with which to impart a body of knowledge to her students. There is the inherent assumption that curriculum is "living" it integrates with "culture," which illuminates society as we know it at any given time. Therefore, the microculture of a curriculum should become a world in miniature for its students. Indeed Hodgkin further asserts that, "In such exploration, not only will some of the structure of knowledge be rediscovered, but values will also be kindled, for it is only in creative and open situations that the learner's own evaluative powers and judgment are brought into play." (Ibid.) How similar this is to the premise of the Philosophy for Children program that I and my students engaged in, where the rules of acquiring
and examining knowledge were "rediscovered" at every session. Lembo further concurs with Hodgkin on the importance of "reality oriented" curriculum. Lembo asserts that curriculum must be "reality oriented" in order to help students "develop" the constructive attitudes and skills he needs to grapple with the whole range of real-world events and issues" (p. 82) These types of activities in curricular settings also enhance self-discipline, self-appraisal, motivation, problem-solving skills, creativity, social awareness and personal sense of value. And, if that's not enough to persuade one that a living curriculum is the only type worth teaching, consider the words of Komisar, whom Lundgren quotes on the developing "science" of curriculum:

"...in education, then, it is not the language that is distinct and special but rather its users. The language of education is the common language of daily affairs as used by a specific identifiable group of persons in the conduct of a distinct set of tasks." (p. 121)

The important thing about the study of curriculum as it relates to teaching and learning is that it's not so much the "learning" that's so important, as it is who's learning "the learning" and further, who's teaching the learners. Curriculum, in my opinion, study, and experience has always been about people, no books. A particularly cogent example of this happened to me once when I was teaching literature to a group of seventh-graders and tenth-graders in different years. While I was looking for "interesting" reading material for my seventh-grader from amongst the meager potpourri of textbooks that my impoverished school district had provided me, I came upon what I felt would be a "sure winner." It was a series of nature stories about the habits of vultures. I felt it would appeal to the glory interests of my restless seventh-graders. And even better, it had a whole set of text-related exercises and projects, and even a test at the end. So naturally I was somewhat flabbergasted and deflated when my students overwhelmingly found the story boring and even distasteful, and declined to invest even a modicum of effort into the "exciting material" I had presented them with.

On the other hand, I once chose to read, out of pure desperation, a story from an Alfred Hitchcock anthology entitled, "The Mugging" to my tenth- and eleventh-graders one day to fill in extra space I had in that week's lesson plan. To my astonishment, my students' response to this short story about two young juvenile delinquents who unwittingly send their female companion to her tragic death at the hands of the intended victim, was overwhelmingly enthusiastic. For weeks afterward, my students, normally somewhat lethargic underachievers for the most part (having been assigned five groups of non-college prep kids that year), were consumed by the story. There were extra-credit projects, composition, class-discussions and artwork depictions that adorned the walls of our classroom. I think my students learned more from that short short (which was ultimately purloined from by desk by one admirer) than all the Shakespeare, Hawthorne and Dickens that subsequently passed through that classroom for the fest of the year. The lesson that I learned and that is constantly echoed in the words of curricular theory, is that curriculum is nothing without relevant, personal connection that makes it come alive for the learner. Surely then, the search for this personal connection should be the prime concern for teachers imparting curriculum to their students.

That brings me to the conviction I've come to hold that successful curriculum also needs "a dose of care" added by the teacher in order to help germinate the seeds of learning that might otherwise find barren soil in the attitudes and willingness of students to learn. By "care" I mean "affection for," even love for the students as individual persons. Nothing is picked up faster by the child than the feeling he is not liked. And, nothing, poor curriculum included, may have a more negative effect on a student's self-esteem, than the conviction that either the teacher doesn't like him or her or just as bad, doesn't care whether he/she "learns" or not. Holt, writing about children and love, quotes Dr. Mary Meeker who concluded, as did many others, that very young children who were denied maternal or even adult affection on a prolonged basis suffered physical as well as emotional damage. Said Meeker:

"When an infant...does not receive a response to his only means of communication, a cry, the whole sensori-motor integration of vision, hearing, balance, motor and tactile impulses is not developed in the vestibular and reticular formations in the brain—all of which are necessary foundations for developing the many pathways in the brain connect the hemispheres and modes for mediating the external environment." (Kohl, p. 300)

In other words, babies who were starved for love could not learn as well. Kohl asserts that the need for love and its connection with learning continues as the child grows and enters school. Children who find love in their worlds, including the "microculture" of curriculum, will embrace learning wholeheartedly. Says Kohl, "For it is love, not tricks and techniques of thought, that lies at the heart of all true learning" (p 303) For those teachers who will accept the challenge of using the Philosophy for Children programs to help their students gain learning skills, love, or at least an attitude of respect that says, "I believe in your capacity to grow," is critical. Johnson stresses more than once, that only teachers who are "committed to open, honest inquiry," will ultimately be able to successfully use the Philosophy for Children program in their own classrooms. Inherent in this dictum is the teacher's respect for their students' inherent abilities. (p. 15)

As a concluding thought on curriculum and love, I found it interesting and enlightening to consider the "personal" thoughts of Carl Rogers on teaching and learning. One of his significant convictions about teaching and learning was that only learning which "significantly influenced behavior," was worth noting. Further, "...the only learning which significantly influences behavior is self-discovered, self-appropriated learning" (p. 601) In consequence, Rogers finds that, as a teacher, "...[he] realize[s] that [he] is only interested in being a learner" His humanist conception of the classroom exhorts the teacher (as Philosophy for Children training does), to do "away with the exposition of conclusion, for we would realize that no one learns significantly from conclusions" (p. 602) So then, how do we, as teachers who "love" our students well enough to let them experience "self-appropriated learning" of curriculum, do just that?
TEACHING THINKING SKILLS

The best way to help students to “learn” for themselves, I believe, is to teach them to think for themselves. Not surprisingly, the acquisition of analytical thinking skills is a major concert to teachers and theorists alike. Here is where a major paradox appears in American education, in my opinion. If we as educators and as a society agree that it is important to teach our children to “think for themselves,” why then, for heaven’s sake, do we often waste time and energy doing just the opposite? It frequently seems that the ultimate results (if not the goals) of educating our students is to standardize, homogenize and de-individualize them for the sake of academic measurement and the attainment of vague societal objectives. As I said at the beginning of this paper, it is understandable that teachers tend to ignore the needs of their students to be individuals, because we operate in a system that has grown to the proportions of an immense bureaucracy. Consider what Kohl says about the craft of teaching:

“Teaching well involves different skills in different school settings. In a traditional classroom teaching well consists of being able to manage a large number of students who are required to master a preset and inflexible curriculum. To do this a teacher must be able to control the students with a minimum of conflict and keep them moving through standard texts or workbooks. Since all the students will be doing the same work, the faster and slower students must somehow be accommodated in a way that neither accelerates nor hinders the moderate and orderly pace of work of the majority of the group. This modulation requires considerable skill, especially if the faster students are not to become bored and the slower ones rebellious.”

(p. 29)

I’m sure that there is virtually no teacher, working in U.S. public schools today, who is not familiar with the above description of a classroom, and the consuming duties of a teacher as classroom “administrator.” The matter of large-scale control is one that we teachers can hardly get away from in terms of its effects on our teaching styles, as well as its effects on our students. It makes sense, then, that analytical thinking skills, and the ability “to think for oneself” are as important to impart to students now, as they were thousands of years ago when Plato and Aristotle taught reason to much smaller groups of students. While giving students analytical thinking skills won’t assure that they’ll get the optimum benefit from curriculum (especially if it’s not particularly relevant), it will at least give them the option to find other experiences in their learning and life environments that are relevant. Even Plato asserted that memories were stimulated from the “soul.” Is it any wonder that too many of our students can’t remember much of the “soul-less” learning that we try to dutifully cram down their throats?

The problem with teaching analytical thinking skills to students is that, as Barry Beyer tells us, “teachers and texts usually fail to provide explicit instruction in what these skills are and how to employ them.” (p. 44) The “hit-or-miss” nature of how most wisdom about thinking skills are imparted to students, just isn’t sufficient to insure that students will pick up these special “tools” and assimilate them into their learning repertoire, according to Beyer. Beyer’s advice about teaching thinking skills is particularly in tune with the goals and premises of the Philosophy for Children program. Says Beyer, “Any school that hopes to help students learn thinking skills must provide direct and continuing instruction in how to execute these skills as part of a multi-grade, sequential skill program.” (p. 44) Naturally, I feel, as do many other, that the Philosophy for Children programs offer just this experience for children.

Briefly, how does a teacher impart thinking skills to his/her students? Beyer identifies three “essential components” that are necessary to the successful learning of thinking skills. These include: “the learning environment, the strategies and methods used to provide instruction, and the coordination and structure of skill teaching throughout the entire curriculum.” Beyer notes that a supportive learning environment also encourages students to “risk thinking” the same way that “philosophical communities of inquiry” do in the Philosophy for Children programs. Among all the ingredients needed for a successful “thinking skills” class, the most “crucial” is “direct instruction in the nature of specific thinking skills and how to use them,” according to Beyer. The Philosophy for Children programs, as designed by Lipman, provide the effective skill teaching “strategies” that help children master analytical thinking skills, including systematic instruction of all kinds, integrated, developmental, remedial and direct; as well as curriculum guides, and cross-curriculum teaching. Teaching thinking skills cannot happen in a vacuum as Beyer notes: “The goal of teaching thinking skills is not simply to teach such skills to the exclusion of all else; it is to equip students with the thinking tools they need in order to learn.” (p. 48) With this in mind, it is possible to consider how the acquisition of thinking skills is affected by the application of curriculum.

CONCLUSION

I hope that my readers are beginning to understand how my personal revelations on high school geometry, and a “squeaky wheel” named Ricky have led me to find the particular benefits of teaching philosophy for children programs to my students. While the acquisition of analytical thinking skills, “the ability to think for oneself,” are of prime importance to students, teachers who attempt to apply the principals of Philosophy for Children in their own classrooms in order to facilitate the acquisition of these skills, must not only be “open minded and committed to honest inquiry,” but also understand the basic premises behind the study of teaching and curriculum in order to apply them effectively in a Philosophy for Children program. Teachers who find that the definition of teaching is intimately intertwined with the concept of learning will ultimately find that they do not necessarily “achieve teaching,” but facilitate the process of learning by “aiming” their teaching efforts in that direction. The personal connections that make effective learning are best enhanced through relevant curriculum and a healthy dose of love. Finally, in today’s mass learning environment, the best way to help students become self-directed learners is to teach them analytical thinking skills, exactly like the ones emphasized in the Philosophy for Children program.
Annotated Bibliography

Aristotle, "On Memory and Recollection." In Wittrock, pp. 22-6

Aristotle tackles the problem of how one remembers, and how memory is different from recollection. Memory is induced by primary sense faculty, while recollections follow a trail through a more complex thought process.


Fairfax University professor of Education, Barry Beyer asserts that most schools don't have comprehensive and continuing programs aimed at developing critical thinking skills. He offers a basic overview on the structure and types of activities that a desirable program would incorporate.


Hodgkin, a faculty member at Oxford, develops a theory of education based on the assumption that human beings have a basically exploratory nature. In this sense knowledge needs to be seen as a "generative process, rather than a static body of facts and socially sanctioned activities."


Holt tells us that despite what some schools of thought have espoused, children do not need to be forced to learn. With enough encouragement and love on the part of teachers and parents, they will joyously pursue learning.


Johnson, a consultant to the Philosophy for Children programs, as well as University of Texas philosophy professor, describes the basic premise of the programs as developed by Lipman, including the incorporation of Lipman's specially designed curricular materials. Student and teacher goals are also outlined, both in general and more specific terms.


Herbert Kohl is a noted author on the subject of teaching and learning. In this book, he examines the "craft of teaching" from a practical "real world" perspective, and offers his insights on how to conduct successful teaching.


Lapp Bender, Ellenwood and John examine recent views on teaching and learning as they apply to philosophy, psychology and curriculum. Of all styles of teaching-learning, the authors choose the four which best characterize the remaining: classical, technological, personalized and interactional.


Lembo examines and discusses the process of learning by which the teacher and learner share responsibility for the end result. Optimum curriculum comes from reality-oriented basis.


Lundgren gives a global as well as historical perspective of curriculum research. Thought on curriculum since the 1970's indicates an emphasis on the importance of relating the curriculum to the persons imparting, and experiencing it.


Passmore, a noted philosopher, analyzes the principles of education from a philosophical standpoint. His concept of teaching maintains the student's capacity for independent judgment, and asserts that teachers "aim" at the achievement of learning.

Rogers, C.R. "Personal Thoughts on Teaching and Learning," in Wittrock, pp. 600-602.

Rogers offers his humanistic and individualistic impressions of how optimum learning takes place. It is self-discovered, and self-directed. Teachers are encouraged to avoid dispensing "conclusions" to their students and treat all learning as a continuing process for teacher and students alike.


Thorndike describes the processes involved in the act of learning according to a "behavioral" formula in which learning is the natural outcome of readiness. Further, the exercise of learning or lack thereof, as well as its relative pleasantness for the learner, will enhance or decrease the strength of the learning "bond."


Wittrock has collected a large volume of recent as well as classical research and thought on the subject of learning and instruction. This is an extremely useful volume for those who want an overall view of the concepts behind modern instructional thought in America.
The first portion of this article appeared in Vol. 7, No. 3, of Thinking. It was, however, unintentionally abbreviated. The conclusion and omitted notes are provided here. Florence Hetzler is President of the ACPA Round Table of Philosophy and is a professor of philosophy at Fordham University.

The Person and The Little Prince of St. Exupéry

Florence M. Hetzler

To treat another personally is to tame him. In the fable, The Little Prince, obviously the fox and the snake were more than animals. They were symbols that could be treated personally, and they had more mystery than the first two readings of this book might suggest. After he is tamed, the fox adds his secret: “What is essential is invisible to the eyes. One really sees with the heart.” That is true. What is essential is not seen by the intellect alone. Reading ee cummings will also make this clear. St. Exupéry speaks of love as a prior commitment of responsiveness by which we have access to the Other that includes us. One is not responsive with the head alone. It is the experience of inclusion that is important in the I-thou relationship. Exclusion alienates, diminishes, and hurts... forever. To know the personal other, one must often ask questions. The other is not always so open that its disclosure is easily seen. Professor Thomas de Koninck has likened the little prince to Socrates in his dialogues. The little prince asks questions but doesn’t always wait for the answer. He is the gadfly who asks the questions. Both are often quiet when answers are given, perhaps because they are thinking of what the next question should be; perhaps too, because they want to give time for reflection to the one questioned. The prince actually gives birth to knowledge by his questions much as Socrates did with his maieutic method. The prince is bothered, it seems by what the common good is and by what he...
means by the individual good, the good of a flower. The good of the planet earth seemed injured by the kinds of convoluted people that he met there. They were adding nothing to the common good and in turn received no individual good. It seems worth noting here that Professor Thomas de Koninck when he was a young boy was present in his home in Quebec City when St. Exupéry came to discuss the common good with his father, Professor Charles de Koninck, then Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of Laval University.

In a way, the little prince is the you that the pilot seeks to become. He answers to the curiosity of the prince who was never satisfied with the answers. He asked, for example, why people take express trains but don't know what they are looking for. They turn around. In the midst of all these questions and in the presence of the little prince the pilot is no longer alone and realizes himself as a person. He will also have the prince to remember. In this book stars play an important part, even of remembering. They are looked at different points of view. The scientist and businessman view them differently. The businessman collects them and reigns over them, because he saw them first. For sailors they are guides and for scientists, for example, Galileo, they may be problems. The businessman counts them.

Erazim Kohak, in his book, The Embers and the Stars: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Moral Sense of Nature, has the laudable audacity to speak of the necessity for man of seeing his place in the cosmos, with the stars, and of the relationship of himself to that cosmos as a prerequisite for the personhood of man. The counted star cannot be so primary as it was for man who only counted them.

The prince knew the importance of the personal. About to return to his flower, he tells the pilot that that night it would be a year since he had arrived on the earth directly beneath his star. The pilot asked if what was going on, the matter of the snake, was a bad dream. What about the snake, was a bad dream. What about the meeting place and the star? All that the prince answered was: The thing that is important is the thing that is not seen. He continued: "It is just as it is with the flower: If you love a flower that lives on a star, it is sweet to look at the sky at night. All the stars are a-bloom with flowers..." And again, "It is just as it is with the water: Because of the pulley, and the rope, what you gave me to drink was like music. You remember how good it was."

Here we have shared experience. We also have vagueness. There will always be more of you to share, yes, even to share intergalactically. There will always be more of you to share, yes, even to share intergalactically. There will be the extraterrestrial sharing from earth to the asteroid and from the asteroid back to earth. There is the ongoing creativity of friendship... forever. There will always be a you even if the you is not visible. What is unseen is what is important. Looking with the heart will always be a creative responsibility for the accomplishment of personhood. Ties are established and re-established forever. "Apprivoiser" is to tame. This love, this ongoing freedom is the processive achieving, neverending wholeness of reality in personhood that involves stars, sunrises and sunsets, traveling by the flights of birds, calling from mountain to mountain, and trying to answer the hello of the echo.

Alasdair MacIntyre also feels that experience is important and theory not enough. He says: "The notion that the moral philosopher can study the concepts of morality merely by reflecting. Oxford armchair style, on what he or she and those around him or her say and do is barren."20

To become a person we need the concrete. We thirst for it. It is true that we need theory but we may get philosophy better by literature because there we obtain insights not attainable in conventional philosophy. Philosophy often is not sufficiently concrete, while literature has the concrete plus the theory, plus the insights. There is in this book a metaphysics of the person that is revealed in its epistemology, cosmology, psychology, ethics, etc.

Becoming a person is man's vocation. Upon this depends the quality of the future of the human race. As a work of literature, The Little Prince, better than a philosophy text, gives us the person as the all-encompassing philosophy of man. St. Exupéry was a man of the future. He flew planes when planes were little used.22 He dared the future. From the skies light were for him signs of consciousness on earth. His little book is a challenge to become persons. It is a guide just as the stars were his guides in flying his plane over the arid Sahara. It is a guide to a peaceful City of Man, the Person.
BOOK REVIEW...

The Fieldston Ethics Reader  
Mark Weinstein and Beatrice Banu, editors.  

Educators searching for a way to promote the moral development of high school students should consider the merits of this recently published volume. The Fieldston Ethics Reader was developed over five years of experimentation in the ninth- and tenth-grade ethics curriculum at the Fieldston School in New York City, the high school component of the Ethical Culture Schools. These independent schools, two elementary and one upper, serve 1500 students and have been committed for over a century to the principle that “good education is of necessity ethical education.” The chief editor, Dr. Mark Weinstein, has been an ethics instructor at Fieldston and is now Assistant Director of the Institute for Critical Thinking, Montclair State College.

The primary goal of the Reader is the promotion of thoughtful, independent decision-making in the domain of moral judgment. Its defining characteristics are: 1) the reading of lively, short passages (1-14 pages) from classical and contemporary literature organized according to topics deemed to be of special concern to young adults; 2) open-ended, philosophically-focused class discussion, and 3) written exercises designed to foster critical thinking—in particular the identification and comparison of criteria and hierarchies of criteria at work in the beliefs and actions of the characters in the selections, the authors of the passages and in the students themselves.

The text is divided into three parts entitled, “Who am I?”, “What controls me?”, “Where am I going?”. The parts are subdivided into sections under which the readings are collected. Each part, each section and each selection is prefaced by an introduction included to provide context, to raise issues and to suggest themes that might draw the readings together. Each selection is followed by one or more of the following: a discussion plan, an exercise, a writing assignment. The quality and variety of the authors, styles and vehicles of expression is impressive. Included are short stories by Ernest Hemingway, Franz Kafka, Bernard Malamud, Joyce Carol Oates and Kurt Vonnegut; poems by Gwendolyn Brooks, Theodore Roethke, Longfellow and Shakespeare; selections from Huckleberry Finn and Black Boy; articles from Time, Psychology Today, and various newspapers; essays by Lewis Thomas, Bruno Bettelheim and Willa Cather and passages from the philosophical works of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Mill and Sartre. While it seems clear that the Reader was designed to be a self-contained resource, a short xeroxed instructor’s manual is available.

The structure of the text, its organizing themes and the critical thinking slant of the exercises reveal certain assumptions about the relationship between reason and moral judgment. The basic principles align themselves with the philosophy of Kant and the more recent psychology of Kohlberg. The embedded model of moral decision-making is the solitary independent thinker acting on principles that have met abstract standards of reason. These standards include the coherence of various beliefs and the consistency between belief and action. They are important. There is great controversy as to their adequacy. They have been criticized by various thinkers as views that fail to take into account the degree to which the highest quality of moral judgment arises out of community rather than solitude. They have also been charged with male bias by feminists who believe there are alternative, even preferable models of moral judgment characteristic of, but not restricted to, females.

The Reader is just one part of the overall program of ethical education at the Ethical Culture Schools. Education is understood to have “the three-fold purpose of usefulness, social criticism and cultural appreciation.” All students in all grades participate in a curriculum informed by ethical concerns. Courses in traditional departments are designed with attention to ethical issues. An eight person ethics staff assists with course development and teaches its own roster of ethics courses at various levels. In addition, each upper school student must complete a substantial community service requirement to earn a diploma. This is certainly one of the most thorough, longived, non-sectarian ethically-focused educational programs in the country. It was in this context that the Reader was developed. It is the central resource of an ethics course for ninth and tenth grades meeting two times a week for a semester taught by the ethics staff. According to the director of the Ethical Culture Schools, Dr. Radest, it has proven itself to be effective. That claim can be neither confirmed nor disconfirmed by an independent standard at this time.

The Reader was published in the belief that it can be successfully used in other contexts. For schools without a formal ethics curriculum, a high school English course is the most obvious alternative. The richness, variety and literary quality of the selections should satisfy the appetites of students and the aesthetic requirements of instructors. The room for selectivity built into the structure of the book allows instructors to vary the material and to match the readings with the interests and abilities of their classes. The text could be used to compose or supplement a semester or a year long course. The brevity of the selections means that the Reader cannot by itself provide the
opportunity for a sustained analysis of a single coherent text.

To be successful in promoting the development of moral judgment, an English teacher would have to make some important contributions to what the Reader offers. Even with the guidance provided by the introductory notes, discussion questions and exercises, the instructor will be challenged to produce philosophically-focused discussions. A flexible text constructed out of such a variety of short readings lacks two elements that contribute to success of such discussions. First, both students and instructors gain by having the readings informed by models of philosophical inquiry such as are found in Plato's *Theaetetus* and in the Philosophy for Children novels. Second, there are important advantages to pursuing issues over time with increasing depth and with attention to coherent development which this format makes difficult to secure.

I'll end with a suggestion and a question. My suggestion is to reconstruct the Instructor’s Manual to include most of the material that supplements the selections in the Reader and more comments on pedagogy. I say this for two reasons: First, the strategy of the open-ended class discussion—discussions that begin with student reactions to the readings—is stressed in the present instructor’s manual. Such discussions, however, may be subverted by the decision to include the discussion plans and exercises in the main text. It is better for the questions to come from the students. The teacher can then introduce appropriate exercises. Secondly, the instructor’s manual itself is undervalued at present. The manual includes the clearest statement of how the Reader can best be employed in promoting the development of moral judgment. It will not be able to have the impact it should in its present undeveloped form. I have said that a great deal is asked of the instructor when literary selections are used in this way. My question is: How successful is someone interested in moral development and ethical issues, but trained in literature, likely to be without special training in relevant philosophical topics and pedagogical strategies? Once success is defined, the answer is an experimental one.

Tom Hodgson
Are children more anything than adults?
It is commonly believed that children are, by nature, more imaginative than adults, but this is questionable. It is probably the case only in cultures like our own which put a higher social and economic value upon practical and abstract thinking than upon wonder and images; in a culture which put a high value on imagination and a low one on logic, children might well appear to be more rational than adults, for a child is not, by nature, more anything.

The mark of a good teacher
A good teacher is constantly preoccupied with teaching his pupils to get along without him.
—Anonymous

Becoming “Real”
Is it worth it to search for a meaning of life—to become real?
My four-year-old niece, Katie, was visiting in November. Katie worshiped my 11-year old daughter, Maggie, and tries to impress her and get her attention. Being 11 makes Maggie so superior and once when Katie asked a “dumb” question Maggie responded, “Be Real!” (This is a popular expression nowadays among preadolescents.) To this Katie asked, “Like the skin horse?” I did not get this at all. Skin Horse, what was that? When I asked Katie about this Skin Horse, she said, “You know, in the Velveteen Rabbit book.” I looked it up, hoping to find out what she meant and found the answer to many large questions. I want to end here with a short passage which is long on meaning:

“One day the young rabbit asks the Skin Horse who has been around the nursery quite some time what is real? And does it hurt?

“Sometimes,” said the Skin Horse, for he was always truthful. “When you are REAL you don’t mind being hurt.”

“Does it happen all at once, like being wound up,” he asked, “or all bit by bit?”

“It doesn’t happen all at once,” said the Skin Horse. “You become. It takes a long time. That’s why it doesn’t often happen to people who break easily, or have sharp edges, or who have to be carefully kept. Generally, by the time you are REAL, most of your hair has been loved off, and your eyes drop out and you get loose in the joints and very shabby. But these things don’t matter at all, because once you are REAL you can’t be ugly, except to people who don’t understand.”
—From a paper, “Becoming ‘Real’,” by Mary Parks, Western Michigan University.

How should Plato be taught?
One of the most disheartening intellectual experiences I ever underwent was to hear Plato’s Republic discussed by a philosopher who simply sat down with the text in his hand and chatted about it. The Republic is a magnificently organized work, in eleven parts, each with its own character, and with a larger and more complex structure underlying this clear division. It opens quietly, with a chance meeting of friends, and Socrates talking with an aged man; it closes superbly, with a vast vision of the life after death.

Often, in its grandeur and control, it reminds me of a Beethoven symphony. But of this we learned little or nothing from the amiable and even condescendingly light conversation of our teacher. No doubt we learned much by finding it out for ourselves; but some of us never fully realized it. When Plato composed The Republic, he designed it as carefully as Ictinus planned the Parthenon. To ignore or minimize this architectonic quantity is to do a grave injustice to a great writer, and to obscure one of the finest achievements of the Greek genius, its capacity for strong yet subtle structure.
—Gilbert Highet in The Immortal Profession.

On the instruments of intellect
The intellect, by its native strength, makes for itself intellectual instruments, whereby it acquires strength for performing other intellectual operations, and from these operations gets again fresh instruments—or the power of pushing its investigations further, and thus gradually proceeds until it reaches the summit of wisdom.
—Spinoza, “On the Improvement of the Understanding.”

Logic
The first thing children want to know about anything which they are told of and which is new to them is, what it will be like.
This volume contains eight of the presentations made to the first British conference on informal logic and critical thinking. It also contains an Introduction in which the editor, Alec Fisher, explains some of the basic issues and how the papers fit together.

Professor Blair (Windsor, Ontario) characterises informal logic thus:

Informal logic teachers are trying to help their students better to understand and evaluate actual arguments (not invented, artificially neat and tidy examples) as they are used for real life purposes. Starting from short and simple examples, and moving to longer and more complex ones, they teach ways to extract, display and evaluate these arguments.

Of critical thinking he says;

There is general agreement about some of the elements of critical thinking. The term seems to name a complex virtue. As an intellectual virtue it includes skills and understanding — including but not restricted to, an ability to formulate and assess arguments, sensitivity to language, a sense for the importance of context, and an ability to apply and also critically reflect on the appropriate criteria of judgement.

Professor Govier (Calgary, Alberta) surveys the advantages and the disadvantages of six different ways of attempting to teach reasoning skills.

Professor van Eemeren (Amsterdam) advocates a comprehensive notion of argument and a speech-act approach to the study of argumentation.

Professor Morton (Bristol, UK) shows how ubiquitous inference is and discusses some of the intractable problems thrown up by implicit premises.

One of the most famous and well-established approaches to teaching reasoning skills is Matthew Lipman's Philosophy for Children programme. This was demonstrated to the conference and discussed by Dr. Robinson (Warwick, UK). Both his discussion and a transcript of part of the demonstration are contained in the Proceedings.

Critical Thinking (92 pp A5) is published by the University of East Anglia. The price, including post and package, is £5 in the U.K. and £6 overseas. Orders should be sent to the Philosophy Secretary, School of Economic and Social Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, and cheques should be made payable to the University of East Anglia.

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