6-1-2011

Human smuggling in Austria: a comparative analysis of data on smuggled migrants from former Yugoslavia and the Russian Federation

Daniela Peterka-Benton
Montclair State University, peterkabentd@mail.montclair.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/justice-studies-facpubs

Part of the Growth and Development Commons, Law Commons, and the Sociology Commons

MSU Digital Commons Citation
Peterka-Benton, Daniela, "Human smuggling in Austria: a comparative analysis of data on smuggled migrants from former Yugoslavia and the Russian Federation" (2011). Department of Justice Studies Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works. 81.
https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/justice-studies-facpubs/81

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Justice Studies at Montclair State University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Justice Studies Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works by an authorized administrator of Montclair State University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@montclair.edu.
Human Smuggling in Austria: A Comparative Analysis of Data on Smuggled Migrants from Former Yugoslavia and the Russian Federation
Author(s): Daniela Peterka-Benton
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc.
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23016215
Accessed: 06-02-2020 18:05 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms
Human Smuggling in Austria: A Comparative Analysis of Data on Smuggled Migrants from Former Yugoslavia and the Russian Federation

Daniela Peterka-Benton
SUNY Fredonia, Department of Sociology, Social Work, Anthropology and Criminal Justice

This article provides a summary of the author’s research on human smuggling in Austria comparing migrants from Former Yugoslavia and the Russian Federation. The project’s primary intent was to collect more detailed information on migrants seeking asylum in Austria and their use of smuggling services to leave their home countries, including detailed information on demographics, force or threat of force by smugglers, routes and methods of transportation, costs of smuggling, payment methods, and deeper perceptual questions regarding the flight. Another central premise of the article discusses how current distinctions between human smuggling and human trafficking are arbitrary in many regards.

INTRODUCTION

The media regularly reports on cases of people leaving their home countries in search of better lives for themselves or their families by illegally entering more prosperous or safe countries. Due to the secretive nature of these migration patterns, not much detailed information is available on the true extent of this phenomenon. According to data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2009), currently an estimated 30–40 million unauthorized migrants, comprising around 10–15% of the world’s immigrant population, are on the move in search of a better life. Relevant data on illegal migrant smuggling is almost impossible to come by because all involved parties know about the illegality of the actions and therefore are unwilling to provide any information to authorities. Many countries collect information on border apprehensions or apprehensions within countries’ borders, but what remains unknown is the true number of migrants who successfully traveled to their new destinations.

© 2011 by the Center for Migration Studies of New York. All rights reserved.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-7379.2011.00846.x

IMR Volume 45 Number 2 (Summer 2011):215–242  215
While politicians, lawmakers and law enforcement personnel are aware of the increasing extent of illegal migration, very little academic research has been produced over the past years focusing on this specific area. There has been an increased interest in human trafficking however, which very often is used interchangeably with human smuggling even though these two terms appear to differ in their nature. This essentializing of trafficking and smuggling into a singular concept neglects the areas of distinction and overlap between these terms, which is necessary for a meaningful research exploration.

The research presented here focuses on three main areas. First, the project was initiated to provide a more detailed descriptive study on the human smuggling process as it pertains to migrants that were apprehended or simply arrived in Austria as their main destination as well as a comparison to data collected by the Austrian police on human smuggling. The project furthermore tried to compare two different regions, which, at the time the study was conducted, represented the most frequent countries of origins of smuggled migrants in Austria. Finally, the study tried to generate some evidence of violent or forceful treatment of migrants by the people involved in the smuggling operation, which ultimately could be used to show that the U.N.’s bright line distinction between human trafficking and smuggling in reality is less concrete.

**HUMAN SMUGGLING VERSUS HUMAN TRAFFICKING – DISTINCT TERMS OR ESSENTIALLY THE SAME?**

For decades, the international community tried to formulate a universally agreed definition for human trafficking and smuggling. A consensus was ultimately found in the formulation of the “UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols” (United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network, 2000), which entered into force on September 29, 2003.

Traditionally, human trafficking is to be seen as a modern form of slavery which appears in many shapes and forms around the globe, including as sexual exploitation, bonded labor, forced labor, war slavery, child labor, and child soldiers. On the contrary, human smuggling is usually described as an illegal crossing of international borders by migrants without the use or threat of force by smuggling operators.
According to most definitions, the main components which separate human trafficking from human smuggling are the elements of force, fraud and coercion, a clear exploitation phase in the case of human trafficking, as well as the fact that human smuggling always involves the crossing of international borders, while human trafficking can also occur within countries. While the UN Convention identifies two clearly distinguishable forms of illegal migration, in reality though, these two terms do overlap in a number of areas. The great variety in migration strategies does not allow for clear classification of cases and throughout various stages of the journey it may remain unclear what kind of irregular migration is at issue (Bhabha, 2005). Numerous instances are known which start out as cases of human smuggling with consenting parties, which ultimately become instances of human trafficking when the victim is facing exploitation at the destination. Likewise, it is possible for illegally smuggled migrants to find themselves in truly life-threatening situations when they are cramped into small confined spaces without sufficient water and air to be smuggled across international borders. As Stoecker and Shelley (2005:66) point out:

“Significant violations of human rights may occur even though the smuggling process began with a consensual relationship. Smugglers may physically abuse the humans they move, subject them to overcrowding, or deprive them of food or water or needed medical care.”

Some may say that poor travel conditions and violence against migrants do not classify as indicators for a process changing from human smuggling to trafficking, but this issue portrays the difficulty with defining human smuggling as there are many levels to this kind of operation, some of which clearly exploit the vulnerable situation migrants place themselves into. Unfortunately to this date, the U.N.’s definition of human smuggling neglects to include these kinds of treatments, which gives the wrong impression of migrants and smugglers entering clean and clear business transactions. One main focus of this research project centered on a number of questions on violence as part of the human smuggling process, further strengthening the argument that human smuggling is not always the consensual and mutual process as which it is often described.

**ORGANIZING HUMAN SMUGGLING**

Illegal migration appears in many different forms, which always depend on the prevalent situation in the country of origin, but overall three basic
forms of illegal migration can be identified: illegal and clandestine crossing of a border, crossing of a border in a seemingly legal way (e.g., by using falsified travel documents), and staying after expiration of legal status in one country (Heckmann, 2004). Human smuggling organizations typically are only involved in illegal border crossings (either clandestinely or seemingly legal), however once the migrants are at their destination they typically cease involvement with the smuggled persons.

The process of human smuggling usually involves three stages; establishing contact with migrants and preparation, transit, and arrival during which members of smuggling operations perform different but very distinct functions. According to Schloenhardt (1999:217), division of labor is an essential feature which allows for only small units of the whole smuggling organization to be exposed at any point. Depending on the offered services, any smuggling enterprise usually is comprised of the following “specialists”:

- **Arrangers/investors** invest money in the smuggling operation and keep oversight of all related operations;
- **Recruiters**, who are often locals, get in touch with migrants and serve as middlemen between them and the smuggling organization;
- **Transporters** assist migrants during their emigration by providing transportation and providing specific information on how to interact with border patrol personnel or law enforcement of various countries. Transporters have to be very versatile in terms of their operations as they constantly have to react to changing border control strategies, routes etc. Transporters usually do not possess any specific information on the smuggling operation as a whole or the organization behind it.

Additionally, smuggling organizations employ corrupt public officials, informers, guides and crew members, enforcers and debt-collectors as well as money launderers and country specific specialists and supporting personnel (Schloenhardt, 1999:217–219). A similar description of roles in the smuggling operation can be found by Zhang and Chin (2002:751–754) who provide a very detailed description of Chinese human smuggling organizations.

This specialization of services provided could lead to the conclusion that smuggling groups are highly organized crime businesses with a myriad of interrelated members. In reality smuggling and/or trafficking organizations can vary greatly in terms of their organizational style. A background
article of the Vienna Forum to Fight Human Trafficking, held on February 13–15, 2008, distinguishes the already described highly organized criminal syndicates from much smaller bands like family operations, including extended family in destination countries, independently owned businesses, loosely based organizations moving people on a limited scale and individuals involved in the smuggling business (diplomats, foreign business executives, etc.) (UN.GIFT, 2008b Background paper 027:6).¹

Overall, although, limited specific information is known about smugglers, mainly due to the fact that smuggling operations are so diversely organized in the various countries involved. For example, in most countries smuggling operations are of a clandestine nature, smugglers in Iran openly post notices about their services in local newspapers (Kyle and Koslowski, 2001:64). General trends therefore rarely exist. The smuggling enterprise is not solely in male’s hand, women are known to be actively involved in many stages of the process even though there is no clear indication whether women are equally involved in supporting human trafficking and smuggling operations.² Smugglers can be of any nationality, even though in the recruitment phase mostly people will be employed who speak the local language and who are also knowledgeable about the local culture. In terms of age, no specific profile can be put on operators as they can range from their teens all the way to their late 50’s or even older. Smugglers come from all walks of life with various family backgrounds, and many occupational and criminal histories, which makes enforcement that much harder as a criminal profile for these people cannot be created (UN.GIFT, 2008a Background paper 016:5–10).

**HUMAN SMUGGLING IN AUSTRIA**

Human smuggling operations vary from country to country depending on legal, social, and geographic conditions, which complicate international comparisons. It is due to this circumstance that the results presented in this article focus solely on Austria.

¹Very little research exists on the differences or similarities between trafficking and smuggling operations. Several organized crime groups are known to be involved in both areas; however, it remains mostly unclear whether specific organizational differences could be identified.

²Former victims of human trafficking are known to be involved in all stages of the human trafficking process from recruitment to exploitation.
The Republic auf Austria is a federal parliamentary democracy in Central Europe. With a population of roughly 8.5 million inhabitants and a size of approximately 32,400 sq. mi, Austria represents a fairly small country sharing borders with eight other nations: Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. (U.S. State Department, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2010). Before the Schengen enlargement on December 2007 took effect, this geographic location made Austria extremely popular for smuggling operations, as the “gateway to the West,” but also as a desirable end destination for many migrants, as Austria represents an economically stable entity with the 23rd highest GDP (2009) in the world (World Bank. Data Catalog, 2010).

With limited academic research on human smuggling, two official data sources annually published by the Austrian Ministry of Interior provide at least some information on the number of migrants coming to Austria, many of which use smuggling services to enter the country: the Annual Report on Organized THB Crime4 (Bundesministerium fuer Inneres, 2004–2009) and the Asylum Statistic (Bundesministerium fuer Inneres, 2002–2009). While the Annual Reports on Organized THB place an emphasis on human smuggling, the Asylum statistic does not identify smuggled migrants as a separate group. With the limited data available although, the asylum reports at least paints some picture on which nationalities come to Austria, looking for asylum, how many applications are granted and denied as well as other asylum specific information. Here, focus will be given to the THB Crime reports, as they specifically address human smuggling.

Since 2003 sub department II/BK/3.6 – ZBS5 of Austria’s Bundeskriminalamt or Federal Police Forces, publishes an annual report on “Organized THB Crime,” which focuses solely on human smuggling activities in Austria. This constitutes the only publicly available comprehensive data source on this subject matter as all human smuggling related matters have to be reported to and investigated by Austrian police forces.

---

3 Extending the Schengen border to Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Malta.

4 The terminology used here may seem confusing as the entire THB Crime report deals with human smuggling and not human trafficking. The author decided though to keep the English translation made in the German report.

5 ZBS Zentrale Bekampfungsstelle für Schlepperkriminalität (Central Anti-Trafficking Unit).
The following description of Austria's human smuggling situation is based completely on data from these reports. Table 1.

While the number of cases, being defined as an incident in which one or more migrants are stopped by officials for human smuggling, illegal border crossing or illegal stay in Austria, remained mainly stable between 2000 and 2006, a steep decline in numbers becomes apparent in 2007, which primarily relates to the fact that Romania joined the European Union. While in 2006, almost 81% of all illegally entered (without the help of smuggling operations) or illegally staying (usually extending their visa) individuals came from Romania, in 2007 only 7% counted within this group, mostly in relation to active denial of residency. In 2008 numbers in all three categories remained at a low level, as compared with the years 2000–2006. A closer look at the numbers of seized illegal migrants reveals that most cases represent either situations of human smuggling or illegal entry/stay Table 2.

Generally, overall numbers of apprehended illegal migrants and smugglers are declining which could be attributed to the fact that the Schengen border extension in December 2007 expanded the Schengen


**TABLE 2**

**NUMBER OF SEIZED ILLEGAL MIGRANTS 2003–2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Illegal entry/stay</th>
<th>Smuggled migrants</th>
<th>Smugglers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>25,568</td>
<td>18,533</td>
<td>1,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>21,966</td>
<td>15,607</td>
<td>957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>18,133</td>
<td>20,894</td>
<td>713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>26,321</td>
<td>12,270</td>
<td>817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4,375</td>
<td>9,842</td>
<td>645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5,914</td>
<td>8,734</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

area outward. Once a migrant successfully crosses the Schengen border he or she can travel quite freely within other EU countries, hence smugglers are no longer needed to take migrants all the way to Austria.

If illegal migrants are stopped by Austrian officials, it most frequently occurs within the country’s borders. In 2008 (N = 7,425), 81.6% were stopped within Austria, 10.7% when they were leaving Austria, and 7.7% when they tried to cross the border into Austria.

Most migrants are stopped by law enforcement, while smaller percentages used to deal with the Austrian military, which secured the so-called “green border” and foreign authorities, mostly the case when illegal migrants are leaving Austria. In 2007,\(^7\) with customs checks still enforced along the nation’s border, 12,050 persons dealt with law enforcement, 1,481 with military officials, and 1,315 with foreign law enforcement or customs personnel.

Migrants and smugglers, who have been apprehended on Austrian territory primarily come from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, even though Austria saw an enormous increase of smuggled migrants from Afghanistan from 2007 to 2008. In 2008, the following nationalities appeared in a high volume.

- Smuggled migrants: Russian Federation (2,015), Afghanistan (881), Serbia (730);
- Illegal entry/stay: Serbia (717), India (344), Rumania (283);
- Smugglers: Serbia (48), Austria (41), Germany (20).

In regard to age, most smuggled migrants (N = 8,734) involved in 2008 were younger, with close to half of all smuggled migrants being between 19 and 30 years of age (44%). Twenty eight percent were younger than

\(^7\)This data is not available for 2008.
and the remaining 28% were older than 31, with declining numbers for older migrants. Smugglers (N = 371) generally tend to be a little older with 30% between the ages of 21 and 30 and 39% between the ages of 31 and 40. Thirty percent of all traffickers are older than 40, but only very few (1%) are younger than 20 years of age. Migrant smuggling, as a profession, tends to draw older, more mature people.

Most of the smuggled migrants pass the border either alone (72.4%) or in small groups of up to 5 people (25.2%). Only 2.5% traveled in larger groups over the border into Austria. These numbers also serve as a basis for which modes of transportation were preferred by illegal migrants to cross into Austria. The majority of migrants preferred street transportation lead by cars (30%) and followed by trucks (28%), minibuses (7%), and busses (5%). In comparison to that 14% used trains, only 2% crossed the border on foot, and 10% flew to Austria.

DATA COLLECTION

This study was conducted by a doctoral student at the University of Vienna with the intent to shed some light onto the issue of smuggled migrants in Austria. Specifically, this study intended to compare migrants from two geographic regions, the Russian Federation and countries which previously formed Yugoslavia, in terms of specific details on the smuggling operation through descriptive analysis of demographic data, information on smugglers, used routes and methods of transportation, costs and motivational aspects. The study also tried to connect its findings with overall trends of illegal migration as statistically presented in the Annual Reports on THB Crime by the Austrian federal police.

During the time of data collection in 2006, migrants from the two chosen geographical areas made up a substantial majority of all apprehended illegal migrants with the highest number of smuggled migrants coming from Serbia-Montenegro (2,636) followed by the Russian Federation (1,506). Therefore, it seemed feasible to focus on these particular groups to gain higher response rates and therefore more detailed information from survey participants.

Once basic research questions had been translated for the survey the bigger obstacle in this project had to be tackled: where to find suitable test subjects, how to gain access to them and what methodology to use with that particular group of people? Research in this field seems quite difficult because very often neither the participants in smuggling cases nor
the authorities dealing with them are particularly welcoming to researchers. Therefore, a short overview on the data collection process itself will be given, to illustrate possible ways of approaching such a research theme.

The number of known illegal migrants compared with “successful” ones, who simply disappear, is most likely much smaller. Migrants who are stopped by law enforcement or border enforcement agencies are first taken into custody and then usually transferred to one of three primary intake facilities run by the Austrian Ministry of Interior as the majority of those individuals will seek asylum in Austria. While these asylum facilities most likely do not house a representative sample of all smuggled migrants, they are among the very few places where this particular group of migrants becomes visible. Unfortunately, no data are available on how many of those migrants, who start the asylum process, planned to do so when they left their home. As indicated in conversations with federal police officers and the director of one of the governmental intake facilities many migrants probably had different plans, however starting the asylum process in Austria would keep them out of detention and allow relative freedom of movement once they are transferred to the intake facility.

Questions have been raised whether qualitative evidence on the strong link between human smuggling and the asylum system in Austria can be supported by statistical evidence. An analysis by Michael Jandl (2004:803), while being unable to provide ultimate statistical proof of causality, was able to demonstrate:

"a strong statistical relationship between illegal migration, human smuggling, the asylum system and the phenomenon of disappearance of asylum seekers while still awaiting their decision."

Looking at the two geographic regions in question, both areas also appear with the highest number of asylum applications. In 2006, the highest number of applications was made by migrants from Serbia (2,515 applications) followed by the Russian Federation with 2,441 applications. Overall migrants from the Russian Federation seem to receive asylum more easily than migrants from Serbia (Table 3).

These numbers clearly show that asylum statistics and migration patterns are linked.

At those intake facilities, aside from receiving shelter and basic medical and psychological care, migrants will start the asylum seeking process. Taking this circumstance into account, these primary intake facilities
TABLE 3

ASYLUM APPLICATION DECISIONS 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Positive (%)</th>
<th>Negative (%)</th>
<th>Other (%; on appeals etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


appeared to pose a good source for possible survey participants, while fully acknowledging that this process narrows the focus on a particular kind of illegal migrants who may or may not be able to represent the overall population of illegal migrants traveling to or through Austria. As described by the director of Austria’s biggest intake facility, migrants whose primary destination was Austria from the beginning are often transported by smugglers close to intake facilities so they can ask for asylum or receive information on where to go by smuggling operators.

Several other religious and non-profit organizations, such as “Oesterreichischer Integrationsfond” or “Evangelischer Fluechtlingsdienst Oesterreich,” do also provide temporary housing opportunities for migrants awaiting asylum decisions, however overall numbers of migrants housed at those locations are very low or they were unwilling to cooperate with this particular research project, which is why migrants at those facilities were not approached.8 In comparison, the largest primary intake facility located in Traiskirchen just south of Vienna, houses the largest number of migrants awaiting asylum decisions, providing a substantial population for possible survey participation (Table 4).

Taking all these circumstances into consideration, it seemed feasible to focus on migrants at two of those government run facilities, Traiskirchen and Thalham, even though they most likely represent a small percentage of all smuggled migrants.

The fact that the chosen facilities in Traiskirchen and Thalham are run by the Ministry of Interior created another obstacle in relation to getting access to them. It took 10 months and the support of the head of a federal police unit dealing with human smuggling and trafficking9 to finally get access to the facility in Traiskirchen on April 2006. During a first meeting with the director of the facility, it was discussed how the

8 The Integrationshaus in Vienna for example refused access to its facilities because they feared that the survey would seriously traumatize the housed migrants.
9 Sub-Dep. II/BK/3.6 – ZBS.
TABLE 4
ASYLUM SEEKERS HOUSED AT TRAISKIRCHEN 2003–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per January</th>
<th>Number of asylum seekers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>735</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A survey could be distributed to generate maximum flow back of useful information. The director rejected the idea of mailing surveys translated into the respective languages to all migrants housed in Traiskirchen at that time coming from the two chosen regions of former Yugoslavia and the Russian Federation because he feared that no one would take this seriously. He instead suggested actively approaching the people with the survey to ask for their participation. Access to the facility was restricted due to security reasons, which meant that test subjects could only be approached at the so-called “service point,” a casual social meeting place, which also housed an information desk staffed by European Homecare social workers and the “children’s house,” a facility where children can play with toys and watch TV, which was primarily frequented by mothers and their children. At the first data collection visit, a translator came along to speak with the migrants, but, and that did not come as a surprise, at both locations people did not share any information as they were approached by complete strangers. The difficulties resulting from this approach were discussed with members of European Homecare, the contracted social services provider for all primary intake facilities, who introduced an excellent idea, which made the whole data collection process a success. Instead of approaching migrants individually, survey distribution was linked with pocket money distribution,10 which occurred once a month (data were collected on three dates in May, June and October 2006). Social workers from European Homecare, established and respected among the migrants, approached people from the participating

10 Every person, independent of age, receives 40 Euros per month as “pocket money.” Housing, food, medical care, public transportation, education for children and other social services are provided for by the Austrian government.
geographical areas and asked for their participation. As those social workers could also communicate in the native language of participants, questions and unclear points could be addressed very easily. Unfortunately, neither the Ministry of Interior nor European Homecare would provide actual numbers of migrants housed at the participating survey locations, which made any true sampling process impossible. Instead the survey was handed to every person (from the two regions of interest), who would come to pick up pocket money, which included most of the adult migrants in Traiskirchen.

The primary question, working with this group, was identification of smuggled migrants from those who traveled without the help of smugglers. The underlying sample was drawn by issuing surveys to a larger group of migrants from the two regions, accepting only those as valid which answered at least one question in regard to smugglers or the smuggling operation. Surprisingly, out of 105 questionnaires which were handed out during the pocket money distribution, 98 turned out to make at least one reference to smuggling and were therefore classified as valid.

The second facility in Thalham could not be accessed but the director agreed to forward questionnaires to employees of European Homecare who would help asylum seekers from the Russian Federation and Former Yugoslavia to fill out the survey following instructions by the project leader. One hundred and forty five questionnaires were returned in July 2006 (after a 3-week wait period), of which 119 answered at least one question related to smugglers or the smuggling process.

Overall 217 surveys were found to make at least one reference to smuggling, of which 116 were answered by migrants from FYR\(^\text{11}\) and 101 from migrants from the RF. Comprehensively, the survey consisted of 33 questions incorporating five main themes: demographic data, information on smugglers, transportation, costs involved, and motivational questions.

**DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS**

As noted earlier, one area of interest in this study was to compare data on smuggled migrants published by the Austrian Federal police and to sup-

\(^{11}\) Ultimately only migrants from Serbia-Montenegro (back then still including the area of Kosovo) and Macedonia participated in the study, which were then summarized under the category FYR.
plement this information with more details in regard to smugglers and the journey itself (for the year of 2006). The following section provides a descriptive overview of findings based on a sample size of 217, unless otherwise noted. What has to be kept in mind although is, that these 217 valid responses represent only 1.8% of all smuggled migrants reported by the Austrian police in 2006 (12,270 migrants), therefore not providing a representative sample of smuggled migrants in Austria overall.

**Demographic Data**

Analysis of differences between the two groups, identifies migrants from the Russian Federation to be slightly older, more often married with children, which in turn leads to higher numbers of female migrants among travelers from the Russian Federation who mostly travel within family groups (Table 5).

**Smugglers**

As probably expected 78.3% of all participants experienced their first contact with a male smuggler, while only 4.1% got in touch with a female first. These results mirror the information published by the Austrian police, which identify 90% of all stopped smugglers to be male and only 10% female. Overall the number of contacts with several smugglers seems to be low, generally ranging between 1 and 3 smugglers. When comparing the two geographical regions a difference can be found where the majority of migrants from the Russian Federation ($n = 77$) appear to have contact with more than one smuggler (71.4%) while 56% ($n = 91$) of the travelers from the FYR only dealt with one smuggler, a circumstance, which can be probably explained by the differing distances to Austria.  

The literature often describes smuggling organizations as loose networks once the migrants are on their way, in which single persons are responsible for certain tasks along the way without necessarily being involved with the larger organization behind the operation. According to the U.N. Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns Report (2006:69), trafficking organizations, which tend to mirror or overlap with smuggling organizations, are structured into core groups working with a loose network of associates:

---

12 See Appendix, Table A1.
"Such groups are characterized as consisting of a limited number of individuals forming a relatively tight and structured core group surrounded by a loose network of "associates," with the small size of the group helping to maintain internal discipline. Such groups seldom have a social or ethnic identity – neither of the two groups identified had such. There is some sug-
gestion in the research that “core groups” are strictly profit-orientated and opportunistic, shifting between illegal activities on the basis of where the most profits can be generated.”

A point could be made that the small number of contacts could reference the fact that only a few “associates” really are involved with the actual transportation of illegal migrants.

In regards to the smugglers’ nationality very little information was given. Overall only 66.8% of all respondents knew or were willing to share information about the smugglers’ national background. Cumulatively, the most frequently mentioned nationalities were: Albania (21.5%), Poland (9.9%), Russian Federation (9.9%), and Serbia-Montenegro (8.8%). Many of the other mentioned nationalities came from countries along the typical smuggling routes which could point to the fact that smugglers might operate in or closely around their home countries (again relating to the idea of loose associates, who do not represent transnational criminals). As far as official police data for 2006 is concerned, out of a total of 817 stopped smugglers, the highest number came from Rumania (24.4%), a popular transit country for smugglers, followed by Slovakia (8.8%), and Austria (8.4%) while only 1.2% came from the Russian Federation and 3.4% from Serbia-Montenegro.

Before any process of human smuggling can occur, migrants need to get in touch with respective smugglers to help them leave their country. Smugglers conceptualize their activities as business operations without operating within clear organizational structures. As Bilger, Hofmann, and Jandl (2006:65) point out:

“Contrary to the portrayal of human smuggling as a distinct form of ‘organized crime’ in most media reports our research indicates that the market for human smuggling services is in most cases not dominated by overarching mafia-like criminal structures that have monopolized all smuggling activities from the source to the destination country. Rather, in many regions there exists a complex market for highly differentiated smuggling services offered by a multitude of providers that potential migrants can choose from.”

A comparison of the two geographic groups of this study shows some differences in regards to how the migrants contacted smugglers. The data clearly shows that among the three options friends or family organized contact, migrants contacted by smugglers themselves and migrants contacting smugglers, the majority of migrants from the Russian Federa-

13 See Appendix, Table A2.
tion \((n = 78)\) were given access to smugglers by friends and family \((32.1\%)\), while migrants from FYR \((n = 83)\) often contacted smugglers directly \((36.1\%)\). One possible explanation could be that most migrants from FYR came from Kosovo, an area which struggled with its rather chaotic political circumstance at the time, allowing criminals to operate more freely than in governmentally controlled Chechnya. A report by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (2004:6) on Combating Human Trafficking in Kosovo, describes the difficulties of police:

“[...] understanding the structure of organized crime groups, mapping the scope of the problem, identifying the regional criminal networks and then integrating the regional and cultural factors into the problem solving process.”

It is likely that smuggling operations share some characteristics of trafficking organizations or maybe even operate under the same umbrella, therefore providing the same problems for police forces under U.N. administration. It is also possible although that migrants from the Russian Federation did in fact use the help of family members to leave their homes, hence family members serving as smugglers, as indicated in the Annual Report on Human Smuggling 2007 published by the Austrian Ministry of Interior (Bundesministerium fuer Inneres) (2008:40).

**Threats and Violence**

As mentioned before, human smuggling is often understood as a “clean” business in which consenting and informed parties are involved without coercion, threats or the intent to compromise health/safety. This study, however, provides data indicating that human smuggling does in fact subject illegal migrants to threats or actual violence. 45.2% of all participants did mention that they themselves or their families have experienced some form of threat or actual force from the smugglers involved. As far as what kinds of threats or actual force the migrants experienced, it was possible to identify the following: Table 6.

Compelling questions related to this issue deal with the timing of when migrants were exposed to these threats or force: does it happen at the beginning of the trip, or during the flight or even at the destination? If we assume that smuggling organizations mostly consist of loose networks of single units and their relations, it is difficult to imagine that these “local
stage organizers’ work with methods known to be used frequently by organized crime groups (Heckmann, 2007:5). The data \( n = 168 \) shows that while only 3.7% described their treatment during the flight as violent, 37.8% described the smugglers as disinterested, 19.4% said that they had no contact with the smugglers and 17.5% described the smugglers as friendly. The high number of migrants having experienced some form of threat or actual force could point to the possibility that central organizers in the respective countries of origin might actually be the ones who make sure that the migrants are under sufficient duress not to inform the authorities if caught. While most research describes human smuggling organizations consisting of loose networks, local organizers are typically connected to the higher levels of the organization. Therefore, people who are closer to the actual organized crime groups orchestrate the smuggling operation, potentially serving as or providing enforcers to keep the soon-to-be-smuggled migrants in line. Additionally, the fact that those organizations are located in countries of origin usually gives them access to information about the migrants’ families making threats against them to appear more salient. This, however, is a mere hypothesis which demands further examination. One study conducted by Bilger, Hofmann, and Jandl, 2006; utilized semi-structured interviews with 46 migrants asking them about their involvement with small-scale self-employed smugglers versus larger smuggling networks with a so-called “organizer” on top who functions as the employer of all individuals involved in the smuggling operation. Respondents unanimously reported never having had any contact with that “organizer” but only with his intermediaries (Neske and Doomernik,
While these results give a general idea about the organizations behind the operation, not much can be inferred as far as violence and threats against smuggled migrants are concerned.

**Transportation**

Another goal of this study was to verify certain known travel routes from the two relevant geographic regions to Austria, however very few responses could be recorded, either pointing to the fact that the smuggled migrants did not want to share this kind of information or simply because they were unaware of their exact route. Respondents asked frequently about this particular question and mentioned that they didn’t know. This appeared authentic although unverifiable. More information was available on the transportation method ($n = 197$) which favored trucks (28.9% of all responses), cars (19.0%), by foot (17.8%), and minivan (15.8%). Respondents from both geographic regions did not mention planes and/or boats, which further strengthens the argument that they traveled via the usual land routes. Similar trends can be found by looking at official police data for 2006 which lists 19% using cars, 14% trucks, and 11% trains. While both groups seem to favor the same transportation methods, an interesting aspect in regards to walking certain distances becomes apparent. 31.3% of migrants from the Russian Federation reported walking during portions of their flight, in contrast to only 14.4% of migrants from FYR. This could point to the fact that smugglers seem to utilize the “green borders”, which are crossed by foot more frequently coming from the east, than coming from the Balkans. In fact Jandl (2007:304) has pointed out that:

> "statistics on apprehensions at various border types [...] indeed show a shift in the preferred modes of illegal crossings away from illegal crossings at the green border and towards official (road) border posts."

Crossing the border on foot is also listed as the most frequent method listed by the Austrian police (23% in 2006). This trend clearly changes in the following years declining to 15% in 2007 and only 2% in 2008, which is clearly linked to the Schengen expansion, now making it unnecessary to cross borders into Austria secretly.

Overall, migrants seem to travel in small groups or as families, another fact also supported by Jandl (2007:305), stating that fewer
migrants now are smuggled in large groups, allowing smugglers to hide them in vehicles or providing them with false documents. This trend can also be supported by Austrian police data on all smuggled migrants, of which, in 2006, 53.9% crossed the border alone, 35.3% in group up to five, and only 10.8% in groups larger than five (Annual Report of Human Smuggling 2006:28). This study predictably showed migrants from the Russian Federation travel most frequently with their partners and/or families while respondents from the second group mostly travel alone.\(^{14}\)

A clear difference can also be found when examining the travel circumstances of women. The majority of women migrants in this study come from the Russian Federation, correlating with the fact that the majority of travelers from this area group together with spouses and/or families. Females very rarely travel alone (3.9%, \(n = 189\)).

In regards to the planned destination (\(n = 148\)), 85.9% of migrants from Former Yugoslavia and 67.1% of migrants from the Russian Federation named Austria as their primary destination. 14.1% of the respondents from group FYR also mentioned Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, and Czech Republic while 32.9% of the remaining migrants from the Russian Federation listed France, Italy, Poland, Rumania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey.

**Payment**

Smuggling migrants across international borders has created a revenue driven industry generating high income for smuggling organizations. Research offers only a very few comprehensive studies in regards to these payments, like Melanie Petros (2005:5), who averaged smuggling fees within Europe to be around $2,708 based on the review of over 500 secondary sources.\(^{15}\) In this study, 52.5% (\(n = 181\)) of all respondents paid an amount between 2,000 and 5,000 (Euros or Dollars), while 26.3% paid between 500 and 1,999 (Euros or Dollars). Very few participants paid amounts exceeding 5,000 (Euros or Dollars).\(^{16}\)

\(^{14}\) See Appendix, Table A3.

\(^{15}\) It must be noted that there may be some qualitative issues with her data, since Petros, f. ex., does not distinguish between cases of human smuggling and human trafficking. Nonetheless her work provides a good starting point for an overall review of costs associated with those processes.

\(^{16}\) See Appendix, Table A4.
These results coincide with smuggling fees published in the 2008 Report on Organized THB, which lists smuggling costs from Kosovo to be between 1,500 and 3,000 Euros, depending on transportation method and route. Another interesting fact in regards to payment processes is that the preferred currency for migrants from Former Yugoslavia solely is the Euro. 99.1% of these respondents \( n = 111 \) acknowledged to have paid the smuggling fees in Euros. In contrast, 45.5% of smuggled migrants from the Russian Federation \( n = 88 \) paid in Euros while 51.1% still used the Dollar. Almost no one used local currencies. Slight regional differences appear by looking at the time of the payment. Sixty six percent of migrants from the Russian Federation \( n = 103 \) in comparison to 48.6% from Former Yugoslavia \( n = 74 \) paid their smuggling fees before the trip started.

As previously discussed, one possibility to pay for the smuggling operation and its associated costs is to agree to work for the smuggling organization in some way until all debt is paid off. In some instances, this takes advantage of vulnerable migrants allowing for the serious exploitation known from human trafficking cases making a distinction between the two terms less clear than presented by the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. According to findings from this study, 40.7% \( n = 91 \) of the respondents from both groups verified that they, instead of or in addition to payments made, agreed to provide some form of labor to pay for the smuggling costs. Unfortunately, the survey did not go into any detailed questions on the type of work that migrants were supposed to get involved with, which has turned out to be a serious flaw as it remains unclear whether this type of work would constitute a form of exploitation as can be found in human trafficking cases, or simply an agreement to work off the costs in a safe environment. Fifty four percent \( n = 63 \) of the interviewed migrants from Former Yugoslavia agreed to such payment terms while only 10.7% \( n = 28 \) of respondents from the Russian Federation got involved in similar payment deals. Unfortunately, only 91 participants responded to the respective question overall, which leaves a very small number of valid responses to work with. Within this very small sample, results point to a possible difference in regard to providing labor services as form of payment between men and women (Table 7).

While men almost equally either did or did not agree to offer labor as a payment option, the vast majority of female respondents did not seem to get involved with this kind of payment scheme, either because such arrangements are the domain of their male partners or simply
TABLE 7
LABOUR AS FORM OF PAYMENT * GENDER (N = 91)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour as payment</th>
<th>Male (%)</th>
<th>Female (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>47.9 (34)</td>
<td>15.8 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>52.1 (37)</td>
<td>84.2 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (71)</td>
<td>100 (20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

because more female respondents came from the Russian Federation whose migrants generally did not agree to such “payment plans.” Overall it must be pointed out though that the low response rate does not allow any for any claims being made for study participants as a whole and much less so for the general population of illegal migrants.

Motivation

There are many different reasons why people leave to start a new life for themselves and their families in countries far from home. These “push” and “pull” factors as described by Schloenhardt (2001) and Tschernitz (2004) include bad economic situations in countries of origin and the idea of wealth and safety imagined in the “golden West”. Participants in this study were also asked about their personal push factors, which led them to leave their homes. The outcome is not surprising, however one issue that has to be considered is the fact that all respondents applied for asylum in Austria. As political refugees generally receive greater preference for asylum, many participating migrants picked motivational factors for the flight connected to this theme. Four primary motivational factors could be identified based on multiple answer options; n = 186: 28.2% noted that life in a crisis area was too dangerous, 17.8% said that they and/or their family were politically persecuted, 12.8% mentioned problems with officials and that they had to flee and 7.3% could not feed their families anymore. Both migrant groups show similar results with insignificant differences.

The last item of survey deals with retrospective thoughts about the flight and how migrants see their decision in the context of their life in Austria. Both groups gave similar answers with most expressing happiness to be in Austria. Other thoughts include fear for family at home, concern about the future and that the flight was worth trying. Almost no one wants to return home or to discourage others from trying the same. An additional factor analysis identified four indexes, describing the migrants'
mindset: positive but wistful mindset, clearly positive mindset, negative attitude, and fear/concern. A comparison between the two geographical regions reveals a slight difference regarding the “positive but wistful mindset,” where migrants from FYR tended to pick more answers from that bundle. Analysis of gender differences shows that regarding the “clearly positive mindset” significantly more women tended to pick multiple answers from this bundle. While 61.9% (n = 160) of all men picked at least one answer from this bundle, 83.6% (n = 55) of all women showed a positive attitude in regard to the flight. Given the fact that most women came from the Russian Federation, many of them of Chechen descent, with its economic and political instability, it is not surprising that they generally seem to have a positive attitude about being in Austria.

CONCLUSION

The significance of this research lies in the fact that for the first time specific groups of illegal migrants could be questioned in detail on their smuggling experience without experiencing the kind of threatening situation that comes from questioning by government authorities. Very little information is generally available on the specifics details of the smuggling process. Even though only two groups (in limited numbers) were analyzed, the differences between various items make apparent how diverse the whole smuggling process really is. Law enforcement has to react quickly to new circumstances and ever changing practices by smugglers, often inhibiting fully effective enforcement, which might explain the fairly low numbers of apprehended smugglers in Austria (a trend in many other countries as well). Additionally, organizations charged with border security also need to take changing political circumstances into account, especially in a geographic region like Central Europe, with several countries which have recently joined the EU or still awaiting future ascendency. Membership in the European Union determines how countries can react to illegal migrants, as Jandl (2007:308) describes by looking at the Dublin Convention.

“According to this Convention, an asylum seeker claiming asylum in several EU Member States along his/her journey can be returned from the border where he/she is apprehended back to the EU country of his/her first asylum application.”

This circumstance will greatly impact travel routes and smuggling processes as migrants usually want to “appear” in specific countries for
the first time as their primary destination country. Furthermore, this research shows clearly that human smuggling organizations within Europe do in fact utilize threats or actual force to keep their “customers” under control. While such practices are well-known from Chinese “Snakeheads” (Zhang and Chin, 2002:753) and Mexican “coyotes” (Guerette and Clarke, 2005:169), smugglers within Europe often appeared to be more “business-oriented” and thus have been seen as benign. Overall, however, almost 50% of the respondents did mention some form of threats or force experienced from the smugglers, which shows some clear victimization on their part, which must be taken into account in apprehending migrants. Looking at the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols, one could argue that its definition and distinction between human smuggling and trafficking might need some revisions as these two agendas seem to have more overlap than previously thought.

The big question that remains is what can be carried out to control illegal migration and prevent exploitation of vulnerable people who very often just try to find a better life for themselves and their families. In the literature, we often find the description of “push” and “pull” factors, which either turn migrants away from their own country or lure them to an imagined better situation (Schloenhardt, 2001:86). European countries are most often confronted with economic migration which leads to the question whether bringing economic stability to underdeveloped nations will curb the illegal migrant flow long term. Schloenhardt (2001:87) does in fact believe that:

“[...] development aid to source and destination countries can reduce migration pressures and reduce the attractiveness of participation in trafficking operations.”

This change cannot be brought over night, but developed nations must keep the economic gap in mind, when long term, successful change should be established in regards to illegal migrant flows. In short term, countries often try to regulate migrant flows by tighter border security and stricter asylum laws. The Schengen Border Agreement, initially ratified in 1985 to create an area of free movement between the countries of France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, heavily relies on the EU’s outmost border regions to secure its whole entity. Today the Schengen area consists of 24 countries of which the following nine joined in 2007, most of them serving as the EU’s outmost south-east border region: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Initially, many Western European countries remained suspicious on the border control quality of the EU's new member states, a fear which has yet to be overcome completely. Europol's EU organized crime threat assessment report 2008 (European Police Office, 2008: 36) still foresees problems for the new Schengen countries in the North East in terms of increased criminal activities in the border areas of Latvia, Russia and Belarus. Many countries, however, have started intense international cooperation between new Schengen member states and their own law enforcement and border control agencies, greatly improving the situation especially along the border to the east.

Finally, governments could consider accepting the fact that illegal migration cannot be stopped with a straightforward “law-and-order” philosophy, taking a more discretionary approach as Papademetriou (2005) suggests. Governments could also offer more legal migration channels, control internal labor markets more closely to reduce opportunities for illegal migrants, convince illegal migrants to come out of hiding (reducing the number of unknown foreigners who might also pose threats to internal security) and consider cooperation programs with other countries in regard to reducing illegal migrant flows.

In today's world, countries move closer and closer with borders resembling arbitrary distinction lines with little actual meaning. Economically and politically, however, many regions in the world show enormous discrepancies, which will need to be addressed at some point to significantly impact the illegal migrations flows as they occur today.

**APPENDIX**

**TABLE A1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Smugglers*Group (n = 168)</th>
<th>Region FYR</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>51 (56.0)</td>
<td>22 (28.6)</td>
<td>73 (43.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>26 (28.6)</td>
<td>42 (54.5)</td>
<td>68 (40.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 3</td>
<td>14 (15.4)</td>
<td>13 (16.9)</td>
<td>27 (16.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>91 (100.0)</td>
<td>77 (100.0)</td>
<td>168 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values are expressed as Absolute (%).
TABLE A2
Contact with Smugglers*Geographic Group (n = 161)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of contact</th>
<th>Region FYR</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friends/family</td>
<td>12 (14.5)</td>
<td>25 (32.1)</td>
<td>37 (23.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant was contacted by smuggler</td>
<td>30 (36.1)</td>
<td>4 (5.1)</td>
<td>34 (21.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant contacted smuggler</td>
<td>5 (6.0)</td>
<td>18 (23.1)</td>
<td>23 (14.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>36 (43.4)</td>
<td>31 (39.7)</td>
<td>67 (41.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>83 (100.0)</td>
<td>78 (100.0)</td>
<td>161 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values are expressed as Absolute (%).

TABLE A3
Travel Partners*Geographic Group (n = 191)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Travel partners</th>
<th>Region FYR</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alone</td>
<td>31 (32.3)</td>
<td>20 (21.1)</td>
<td>51 (26.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse</td>
<td>7 (7.3)</td>
<td>24 (25.3)</td>
<td>31 (16.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>11 (11.5)</td>
<td>20 (21.1)</td>
<td>31 (16.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>47 (49.0)</td>
<td>31 (32.6)</td>
<td>78 (40.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>96 (100.0)</td>
<td>95 (100.0)</td>
<td>191 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values are expressed as Absolute (%).

TABLE A4
Amount Paid*Geographic Group (n = 181)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount paid</th>
<th>Region FYR</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>500–1,999</td>
<td>17 (16.3)</td>
<td>40 (51.9)</td>
<td>57 (31.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000–5,000</td>
<td>78 (75.0)</td>
<td>36 (46.8)</td>
<td>114 (63.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 5,000</td>
<td>9 (8.7)</td>
<td>1 (1.3)</td>
<td>10 (5.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>104 (100.0)</td>
<td>77 (100.0)</td>
<td>181 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values are expressed as Absolute (%).

REFERENCES


Bundesministerium für Inneres  

European Police Office  

Guerette, R., and R. V. Clarke  

Heckmann, F.  
2004 “Illegal Migration: What Can We Know and What Can We Explain? The Case of Germany.” The International Migration Review 38/3:1103–1125.


International Organization for Migration (IOM)  

Jandl, M.  


Kyle, D., and R. Koslowski  

Neske, M., and J. Doomenik  

Papademetriou, D.  

Petros, M.  

Schloenhardt, A.  

Stoecker, S., and L. Shelley

Tschernitz, A.

UN.GIFT

UN.GIFT

United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

U.S. State Department, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

World Bank. Data Catalog

Zhang, S., and K. Chin