Chapter One: Migration and Radicalization in the Age of Covid-19

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Acknowledgments

Every immigrant has their story. It rests on the tip of their tongue; but stays secret. When you get them in the right space it spills out, as it has for many semesters in my Justice in World Migration course at Montclair State University. I’ve heard so many of these stories first-hand: a young woman whose family immigrated without documents from the Philippines, a woman in her mid-twenties who came to America alone from Georgia as a teenager and worked as a home health aide to bring her family to the States, a student from Albania suffering the tension between her family’s desire for tradition and her yearning for modernity, students from Palestine and Syria who came to America looking for a better life away from conflict, students from Haiti who couldn’t contain their excitement while expressing how enamored their parents were with the comforts of life in the United States. These tales of hope, hardship and family showed me for the first time who my students truly are: inspirational people who are fighting to achieve an audacious dream while also working to fit into a new society.

There are other important immigrants in my life. My Dad came to America on New Year’s Eve 1969. His brother took him to see A Charlie Brown Christmas in New York City that winter. He went to a bunch of colleges in the Maryland area, finally graduating from West Virginia University as an electrical engineer. He went back home to Israel and met and married my Mom there in the late 1970s. They settled in Philadelphia, where I was born in 1979.

My grandparents were also immigrants. They left generations of history and their possessions in Tripoli, Libya to move to Israel after World War II. They settled in refugee camps and immigrant cities. Their children fought in wars and found solace in religion, the military, education and science. Their grandchildren achieved the immigrant’s unspoken dream; a dream that’s mixed with existential fear so no one dares express it. We succeeded in school and work in our new lands while retaining our family’s identity and traditions. We ascended without losing our roots.

Every immigrant knows that you need help in this life and you need to be self-sufficient when helping hands aren’t available. It’s been my goal to help others achieve their dreams since so many people have helped me.

Our common humanity may seem irretrievably lost from the perch of news broadcasts, but I see it every day at my university, in my neighborhood and in my family. I saw it at our research team meetings preparing for this book. Great thanks to Timothy Cross, Nani Sulava, Elisabeth Gasson and Emily Ritter for their amazing research work.

I would also like to thank all of the commenters at my home university and at conferences who made this work a better one.
Most importantly, I thank my family who has made our pandemic-induced home-imprisonment into a special respite from hectic “normal” life. Talya’s art and Shai’s music (and mini-figures) filled the house. Lev found quiet spaces to imagine alien worlds. Ariel, the backbone of our family, has been the ultimate companion, motivator and work-out partner.

This book is dedicated to my parents Shimon and Yehudit Rubin who painted a life in America that took imagination, diligence, sacrifice, confidence, creativity and passion. A lot of hard work goes into all the literal and figurative flowers they make bloom.
Chapter One
Migration and Radicalization in the Age of Covid-19

Abstract
How do we flatten the radicalization curve? How do we quell the millions of people disaffected by their new societies or by the changes to their old ones? In 2020, with covid-19 running rampant, trends regarding migration and radicalization took a backseat. But migration and the reactions it causes in host-societies a critically important issues for our post-pandemic world. As migrants move to new lands, they are subjected to accusations of being radicals and criminals, and are blamed for extremist nationalist violence on the part of their hosts. The politics of migration have pulled some democracies into illiberalism and recent shifts in human geography have the potential to dramatically change many nation-states. Migration will continue to be a major factor in shaping democracies, defining conflicts and reshaping national characters. This book examines radicalization of migrants and their hosts. It traces the process of radicalization among migrants and hosts in multiple milieus (Ch. 2); it explores a broken system of world migration where hosts and migrants fight over rights to land (Ch. 3); it projects into the future, predicting how migration will affect the post-pandemic world (Ch. 4); and it develops policy prescriptions for improving the current system of world migration (Ch. 5). This chapter sets the stage by laying out the debate on migration, the reasons for migration, and the effects of migration on hosts and migrants alike. All of these factors are considered against the setting of covid-19.

Key Words: Migration, radicalization, covid-19, pandemic, illiberal democracy, far-right violence, terrorism.

In 2020, we sat at an unprecedented crossroads. The Indian writer Arundhati Roy said that during the pandemic: “We have a past. And we have a future. And right now we’re in some sort of transit lounge. And there isn’t any connection between the past and the future”\(^1\). Yet, the present, as always, was weighed down by the past and pregnant with the future. For instance, with climate change, historical climate degradation has led to mass extinction and global warming\(^2\). During the spring of 2020, that climate degradation was slightly reduced due to the social distancing mandated by governments in response to the covid-19 pandemic\(^3\), but it was still a reality as seen by California and Oregon wildfires run amuck and an unprecedented number of hurricanes forming in the

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\(^3\) The Economist, “A New Opportunity to Tackle Climate Change,” 21 May 2020.
Atlantic in September 2020. The present contains a possible future where humans continue to treat the climate as they had throughout the 20th and 21st centuries or one where major change is made. The future is in our hands like it always has been, but it is much more malleable than usual due to the pause in life fomented by covid-19.

The same can be said of immigration. Prior to the current crisis, the immigration debate centered on a “human rights-versus-security” dynamic that somewhat mirrored the debate around legislative responses to terrorism. Just like with the post-9/11 civil liberties versus security dichotomy⁴, pro-immigration activists claim to support human rights while nationalists claim to support order. Just like with terrorism, one side sees security as the critical value, the other views rights in the same way. With the immigration debate, concerns about cultural continuity are also endemic.

This study seeks to explore the future of immigration using radicalization as a tool for predicting what will transpire. The issue of immigration has always brought with it racism, xenophobia, radicalization, hot tempers, and chauvinistic policies. One way of measuring how well immigrants are integrating and how hosts view those immigrants is by looking at radicalization on both sides.

By definition, radicals are extremists, so their actions are not indicative of whole populations. Yet, extremism has support on the political spectrum. A few extremists will turn to violence often inspired by many more people who may support such actions or who raise anti-immigrant views. These extremists, while by definition rare⁵, frequently have outsize effects on societies through their acts of violence be they hate crimes, terror attacks, harassment or property destruction.

Further, radicalization is part and parcel of the conflicts inherent in any society. It does not occur in a vacuum. Hanna, Clutterbuck and Rubin define radicalization as a “process whereby individuals transform their worldview over time from a range that society tends to consider to be normal into a range that society tends to consider to be extreme”⁶. It’s important to note that this definition does not include an assumption that radicals commit violence. As Brian Jenkins affirms, not all people who radicalize turn to violence. Instead, some radicals “go all the way” and become violent extremists while others “drop out” at various points in the process⁷.

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⁵ A majority of people usually are not deemed “extremists” given that “extreme” implies holding beliefs on the tail end of a normal distribution.
Since radicals sit on society’s extremes, examining radicalization trends is a method for seeing how significant problems with immigration have become. Viewing radicalization as a move toward an extremist viewpoint allows for viewing the phenomenon on “both sides” of the immigration issue. So both immigrants who radicalize and hosts who become extremists due to anti-immigrant views will be counted here. It should be noted that while anti-immigrant forces are normally dubbed reactionaries, here the use of the term radicalization (as defined above) is meant to show that the same processes work on those who support and oppose migration.

This book will explore the future of immigration through the prism of radicalization by answering the following questions:

* Why do migrants and hosts radicalize?
* How does the present state system and migration regime affect this radicalization?
* How will the economic pressures and border closures imposed by the reaction to the covid-19 pandemic affect the situation?
* In light of what is found on immigration and radicalization, what might the future of migration look like?
* Finally, what can be done to limit radicalization purportedly caused by migration and globalization?

The book is organized around these five questions with each chapter focusing on at least one of them. This first chapter introduces the topic. Chapter Two explores the causes of radicalization among migrants and among hosts. Chapter Three examines the role of the current state system in creating tension between natives (or hosts) and migrants. Chapter Four predicts the future of migration and the implications of covid-19. Chapter Five illustrates some potential solutions to the issue of radicalization purportedly caused by immigration.

The book’s findings are based on comparative case studies and legal analysis. As the final chapters project into the future, historical case studies are employed to ground the predictions. Many studies on terrorism and radicalization exist, but all suffer from the issue of overdetermination. For instance, many scholars and policy analysts see poverty as a cause for terrorism. Poverty may play a role, but the billions of poor people in the world would surely have destroyed everything by now if poverty led directly to terrorist violence. The same goes for other causal factors such as feelings of isolation in a new

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8 I will mostly use the term “hosts” to refer to a nation’s non-migration population. Given the use of the term native for identifying indigenous populations and the fact that colonialism and conquest have greatly diminished the number of indigenous people in many countries, there is no perfect term for describing people who live in a country but are not migrants. Some might be citizens, but some might not be. Some might truly be natives, but others might not be. Some might be non-migrants, while others may consider themselves part of the country’s society even though they at one point did migrate to the country. For this reason, I will mostly use the imperfect terms hosts, but also employ native-born population, non-migrants, and natives, to distinguish between these people and incoming, new migrants.
society or feelings of humiliation due to being oppressed by a majority population group. These factors certainly play a role but radicalization and especially terrorism are exceedingly rare phenomena and explaining their occurrences with broad variables that cover huge swathes of society lead to overdetermined outcomes and unsatisfactory explanations. For the sake of this study, why a specific individual radicalizes is not as important as alleviating the root conditions that both harm migrants and cause some people to adopt extremist ideologies.

Problem Framing: The Immigration Knot

We live in an era of mass movement caused by large, coalescing structural factors. This doesn’t mean that every year will see record migration levels. But it does mean that the general trend will be toward increased migration in the future.

Human migration works through countervailing forces: a push and a pull. There are factors that push people to leave and factors that pull people in to new lands. Push factors capture the reasons people want to exit the countries they live in. These reasons could include violence, instability, poor governance, or lack of economic opportunities in people’s countries of origin. Like with all human endeavors, these push factors do not affect all people in a country equally. Two people living in the same Syrian community may both feel the burdens of violence and instability, but one may choose to stay (to tend to elder grandparents, to stick with the comfort of a native culture, etc.) while the other chooses to leave. The choices of people to migrate are riddled with complexity and difficulty due to the uncertainty of what might transpire in whatever new land the potential migrant seeks to inhabit. Will one be accepted? Will a language barrier make life awkward and difficult? What economic opportunities will there really be?

Pull factors are those variables that lead a migrant to select a specific new land. These are the variables that make one destination more attractive than another. Economic opportunity, political stability, peace, and a good education system are all pull factors.

Push and pull factors form two sides of the same coin. But the world only includes both when there is enough inequality of condition in it. In other words, if every country had the same problems (or very similar ones) then moving wouldn’t be worth the trouble. Why move to the next street over if that street has just slightly smaller potholes and slightly less obnoxious neighbors? Moving one’s place of residence is a hardship even when it’s done within the same city, moving to a new country has the same emotional, economic and physical costs while also subjecting a person to a potentially new culture, language and way of life. This cost makes migrant’s consider moving to a new place only if their current situation is untenable or if their new potential situation is obviously better than the current one.
As Figure 1.1 depicts, due to the costs of migrating, the probability that a person will leave their home country for another follows an exponential rather than a linear curve. At first, with few push factors, the person is unlikely to leave their home country. As push factors accumulate in number or intensity, as depicted on the x-axis, the likelihood that a person will seek to move elsewhere increases. The curve bends upward exponentially because as pull factors accumulate in number or intensity, the likelihood of a person migrating increases as well.

Table 1.1 breaks this process down further.
Table 1.1, Outcomes of A Person’s Migration Decision Under Varying Degrees of Push and Pull Factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Pull Factors</th>
<th>Low Pull Factors</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Push Factors</td>
<td>Person is highly likely to migrate due to bad situation at home and good situations elsewhere.</td>
<td>Person is likely to migrate due to bad situation at home and acceptable situations elsewhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Push Factors</td>
<td>Person will consider migrating due to good situations elsewhere, but is also content at home. In this situation, an employer (for instance) could pay the costs of moving to tilt the scales.</td>
<td>A person will very likely not migrate because there is little reason to leave and other options are not much better than their current situation.</td>
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The second-largest wave of migration in human history, occurring in the 2010s, was caused both by push factors like war and poor governance and pull factors like economic opportunity and political stability. In sum, global inequality—inequality of economic, political and physical condition—drives immigration. In recent years, war and poor governance have sent migrants out of Syria, Eritrea, Libya, and elsewhere to Europe and the Middle East, from the Americas to the United States and from poorer South and Southeast Asian states to richer ones. All of this movement has many causes including violence, economic inequality, a world system that values borders over free human movement, and environmental degradation.

The modern world system is one where goods and commerce can cross borders freely but people cannot. Humans are deemed “illegal” if they do not follow laws regarding legal entry into a new land. These people can seek asylum (or refugee status) in certain cases, but many countries have attempted to narrowly circumscribe who gets granted this status given the perceived moral hazard of accepting “too many” refugees. Barack Obama’s grappling with how many Central American children to accept presents one iteration of this thought process. As Vaughan Lowe observes, asylum is a strange process given that one’s ability to petition for asylum is normally predicated upon irregular/illegal entry into a state.

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Migrants and hosts have competing demands. Host countries and their citizens seek to maintain some form of communal identity and solidarity. In addition to these cultural concerns, they also have economic, physical space, sovereignty, public order, and health concerns regarding migrants. Citizens in host countries want citizenship to mean something apart from residency and to gain some good from being part of a group. Coordinated and committed groups, after all, solve collective action problems in ways that loosely-identified individuals do not.

From the perspective of migrants, host countries are seen as opportunities for improved life circumstances. International law enshrines some rights to treating people with dignity and to freedom of movement. There are also processes for achieving refugee status for those who are threatened in their home countries. Refugees, as defined by the widely ratified 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, are people who leave their home country and are prevented from returning due to “a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Asylum seekers are people who migrate to a new country in the hopes of being recognized as refugees.

Rights of refugees are balanced by states’ rights to sovereignty (or control) over their given territories. These sovereignty rights largely override migrant rights for a number of reasons including that international organizations are made up of states (which act in their own interests, not the interests of unnamed migrants) and that states have domestic law enforcement abilities while international legal bodies and NGOs largely do not. International bodies, NGOs, publics and the media can seek to shame states into accepting migrants, but this shaming is not always effective.

Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations’ version of America’s Bill of Rights, narrowly circumscribes an individual’s freedom of movement. The UDHR states in Article 13 that, “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country”. Article 14 of the UDHR allows for asylum-seeking but only for political reasons. Article 14 reads, “(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations”. It is critical here to emphasize that there is no right to asylum, only the right to seek asylum from states—and enjoy asylum if it is granted.

On the side of non-migrants, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in Article 15 that, “(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality”. To those living in the country of their birth or where they’ve resided for many years, nationality

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16 United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”.
means something. It comes with culture, history and language. Nationality is central to the identities of people residing in the nation, and even those living in its Diaspora, due to holidays, traditions and shared histories. Nationality, and the citizenship that comes with it, are endowments that provide those in the rich world with huge advantages that they personally did little to secure. For this reason, Ayelet Shachar argues that those with rich-country citizenship’s should bestow monetary “insurance” upon those less fortunate who are citizens of poorer countries. Shachar describes those with rich world citizenship as winning “the birthright lottery,” while those with citizenship to poorer countries presumably lost the same lottery17.

Arguments for and against the rights of the migrant center on two sets of concentric rights: the rights and obligations of nations and the rights and obligations of individuals. Michael Walzer holds that communities have rights to order themselves as they see fit; a right which he links to a nation’s right to self-determination. Walzer holds that states are like clubs or neighborhoods and that the most important thing we can distribute to each other is membership in those clubs. States, he argues, are like private organizations not public ones and they can choose the character that they want for their community. Forcing states to accept members they don’t want is akin to taking away their power of self-determination to shape their state and communities as they see fit. Walzer says that we are obliged to help others when they cross our path in the wilderness, so we are also obliged to help others when we have space for them to live or, like refugees, they have no place else to go. But he says we have the right to construct our communities with rules that suit community members and to create our membership rules in the image of these communities18.

In other words, the right of immigrants does not supersede the self-determination of states. Walzer holds that immigrants have an obligation to try to fend for themselves and only when they really cannot do so, states have the obligation to take them in. Walzer adds that states do have an obligation to take in people who they helped make into refugees—like Iraqis or Vietnamese people whose countries America invaded. But these obligations have limits. States do not have to accept people who are significantly different from the citizens of the state, such as accepting Communists into a democratic state. The racial or ethnic connotations of this argument could certainly yield racist or ethnically intolerant justifications for keeping people out. However, Walzer rests this conception, again, on the right to self-determination. An honest account of nationalism certainly also shows that it is racially and ethnically exclusive in many instances. After all, nationalism is the project of creating states for supposedly distinct peoples.

Walzer underpins his work with social contract theory, which states that citizens all signed a figurative contract to join their state which binds them to the government and confers legitimacy on leadership. Walzer believes that there is no real contract, but rather that mutual acceptance of the government, communal association and a shared life and liberty make a country into a community. Walzer says that the borders that

communities create are “lines [that] establish a habitable world”\textsuperscript{19}. And that once these lines are crossed, the safety of the community is gone\textsuperscript{20}.

By contrast, Joseph Carens avers that, “Borders have guards and the guards have guns. This is an obvious fact of political life but one that is easily hidden from view—at least from the view of those of us who are citizens of affluent Western democracies. To Haitians in small, leaky boats confronted by armed Coast Guard cutters, to Salvadorans dying from heat and lack of air after being smuggled into the Arizona desert, to Guatemalans crawling through rat-infested sewer pipes from Mexico to California—to these people the borders, guards, and guns are all too apparent.” Carens leaves us with a question: “What justifies the use of force against these people”?\textsuperscript{21}

The author answers his question by employing John Rawls’ theory of justice to propose an open border policy. An open border policy is one where immigration is as free as possible, where anyone or virtually anyone can legally cross any border at any time. Carens pulls back at points in his article “Aliens and Citizens,” saying that for reasons of public order or national security, one might be able to justify not letting some people into one’s country. But he still holds that morality demands that the borders of all countries be as open as possible.

Carens derives this position from an accounting of how moral agents living under a Rawlsian veil of ignorance would select immigration policies. John Rawls proposes that fair moral rules can be derived from a fair circumstance. That circumstance is one wherein people do not know identifying factors about themselves; in other words, a “veil of ignorance” hides their identities from even themselves. By bracketing a person’s identifying factors, Rawls seeks to create a situation where objectivity takes hold. From this position Rawls deduces three principles, which Carens applies to the situation of immigrants. John Rawls’ principles of justice contend that moral agents living under a veil of ignorance would choose to maximize freedom (Liberty Principle), create rules that make for fair opportunities to pursue better lives (Principle of Fair Opportunity), and, with all else being equal, maximize the position of the least well-off (Difference Principle)\textsuperscript{22}. Carens’ extension of these principles finds that objective individuals should want (and view as just) immigration systems that maximize individual freedom, allow people fair opportunities to pursue better lives and, with all else being equal, maximize the position of the least well-off. Carens believes that an open border system secures these goals\textsuperscript{23}.

While both of these theoretical approaches have merit, how they interact with the empirical world is critical. For instance, while communities of members who comprise “a people” exist theoretically, increasingly the world Walzer describes doesn’t exist. Instead, many nations are composed of multiethnic, diverse mixes of peoples where

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} Walzer, Michael. \textit{Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations}, 4\textsuperscript{th} ed. (New York: Basic Books 1974), pg. 55.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Walzer, \textit{Just and Unjust Wars}, pg. 62.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Rawls, John. \textit{A Theory of Justice}. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1971).
\item \textsuperscript{23} Carens, “Aliens and Citizens.”
\end{itemize}
many times majorities impose their vision of “the nation” onto minorities. These projections can have terrible consequences, for instance, when new migrants are not granted citizenship rights because of their ethnic origins such as is the case with workers in Gulf nations such as Dubai where 90% of residents are estimated to be non-citizen expatriates24.

Carens’ description is also flawed because immigration is increasingly tied to security and secure borders are a good that citizens are willing to fight and die for. After all, the very immigrants who go through all manner of phantasmagoric hardship to arrive in the United States by crossing through the Sonoran Desert, do so because America provides a stable, orderly, secure and safe life for many25.

These issues encapsulate the continuing argument about the meaning of the state, the nation and the people in an increasingly globalized world. In recent years, millions of new immigrants have made new homes in developed countries. Host countries have met these migrants with weariness and, at times, violence because the twin forces of immigration and globalization threaten the unity of the nation. In a world where one’s identity is tied to one’s state, an increasingly interconnected and multicultural state can be disconcerting. *What does national identity mean if the nation keeps changing its stripes? What does national identity mean if the nation is subsumed by regional and global interests?*

Populist leaders like America’s President Donald Trump, Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Turkey’s President Recep Erdogan and others have stepped into this mix promising a return to traditional nationalism and an end to what they call “mass migration.” The covid-19 crisis has only exacerbated this mix as immigrants are now vulnerable to attacks for being potential disease vectors. These attacks on immigrants range from Chinese policies forbidding the movement of African migrants to American bans on travel from certain countries and harassment of people of Asian descent the world over26.

In a world that seems to be shrinking, what is the future of migration? What immigration approach is reasonable in a world where, in 2020, a novel disease is endemic? And how will hosts and migrants alike react to the policies and movements of the present and near-future? Migration policies have inspired radicalization among both migrant and host communities in the past, so what can we expect in a future where migrants may be viewed as disease-carriers and where people may become increasingly

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desperate to both defend their borders and to leave poor, unsafe or authoritarian-ruled countries?

Before the year 2020, questions about the future of migration focused on the effects of climate change and inequality, the standing of human rights and the morality of borders. But, due to the global covid-19 pandemic, concerns about population movement have taken on a new tone. After all, if people, voluntarily or not, limit their travel and movement in order to reduce disease transmission, then human rights approaches to migration may be viewed as second-order concerns. Covid-19 provides ammunition for those who side with states against migrants, but it also raises legitimate issues for human rights advocates. Do citizens deserve to be protected from international travelers who may spread illness? Is it the state’s responsibility to help the unfortunate or oppressed when it is dealing with reduced budgets, job losses and a health crisis? Isn’t it the state’s role to protect those within its borders from the spread of disease? As Sarah Song notes, these pro-state arguments don’t just get uttered by conservative voices, but also by progressives like Bernie Sanders who seek to protect domestic workers.

So what happens to migrants and hosts when pressures are added due to high levels of migration, economic uncertainty, conflict and, now, disease?

As both sides grow frustrated due to the complexity of the world’s current immigration system, more migrants and hosts are prone to radicalize. Their views may calcify around extremist perspectives as they try to navigate a changing world that seems to undercut their very identity. The Covid-19 crisis exacerbates these issues.

This study defines radicalization as a process by which an individual or group adopts extremist political and/or social views. This definition allows one to see that radicalization is endemic to both sides of the immigration debate and has been for decades if not centuries. Unfortunately, the term “radicalization” has been glued to migrants but not hosts. Unwelcoming hosts usually are called “xenophobes,” but it is instructive to note that immigration policies and actions lead both hosts and migrants to extremism. For this reason, this study examines radicalization on both sides. After all, radical groups, such as those in Europe, carry out many anti-immigrant hate crimes. Further, a recent report details that in every year between 2015 and 2017, over 50% of French, German, Greek, Hungarian and Italian nationals were “migrant phobic.”

**Host and Migrant Radicalization in a World of Covid-19**

While we do not know the lasting effects of the covid-19 crisis, we do know that it has already affected immigration radically. When the Ebola outbreak hit between 2013 and 2014 in West Africa, Barack Obama’s administration never closed off travel from the region to the United States. Instead, incoming travelers were monitored. The thinking was that travel bans would lead to people hiding their illnesses, as happened when a

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man traveled to Nigeria with Ebola. In 2020, travel bans and quarantines, which radically hindered travel, became common not only between countries but also within them. It is hard to know how long this situation will last, but its potential effect on migration could be monumental.

Policies that limit movement to quell the spread of a virus have put much greater emphasis on border security. They have also limited legal methods for crossing borders as many, in 2020, have been shut due to covid-19 concerns. Further, these policies have increased xenophobia (radicalization among hosts in the parlance of this study) as hate crimes against Asians in America and elsewhere have been coupled with a high incidence of covid-19 spread among low-income guest workers in places like Dubai and refugee workers in meat-processing facilities in the United States. In sum, arguments against a human rights approach to immigration have been given increased legitimacy and urgency just like they did at the outset of the 21st century due to the September 11th attacks.

As history has shown time and again, extremism is bred when pressures boil, economies crash and people feel desperate. The Great Recession, for instance, saw a rise in affiliation with white supremacist groups in the United States. These pressures are boiling once again with the covid-19 crisis. Unfortunately, the term radicalization has been almost exclusively attached to Muslims who develop extremist views many times in non-Muslim lands. Research has shown that these people feel rejected by their host societies. For instance, in France, the system of laicite (secularism), has been found to hinder integration of religious minorities who, in certain cases, turn to extremism. Alienated immigrants turn to extremist beliefs when they are targets for harassment and abuse. Disaffected newcomers then may turn to charismatic extremist mentors who them under their wing. This is the process by which many people radicalize in prison, a context where alienation is endemic. Radicalization, of course, is not a Muslim-only phenomenon as the white supremacist example shows. Economic pressures also lead

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host populations into the arms of anti-immigrant groups. The October 2018 Pittsburgh synagogue shooter after all murdered worshippers because the Tree of Life Synagogue had hosted an event for an organization that aids refugees\textsuperscript{35}.

A critical approach to explaining the incidence of radicalization examines power differentials in society and the wider world. Without looking at the broader societal picture, the reason why people turn to extremism can seem quizzical. Further, the exact form of their resistance—be it through jihadism or anti-immigrant hooliganism—cannot be well explained without looking at societal conflicts. People join movements and adopt forms of protest that exist in their societies. In some contexts, immigrants will not have strong protest or extremist movements to latch onto, in others they may. The same goes for hosts who feel pressured by migrants. Obviously, a disaffected migrant or host who can easily tap into an existing radical group is more of a threat than one who cannot.

Tensions between native Europeans and late-generation Muslim immigrations have boiled throughout Europe for years. These tensions are nothing new as Algerian migrants to France committed terrorist attacks starting in the late 1950s due to the conflict between their homeland and its colonizer. Examples of Islamophobia in Europe are plentiful, they include: riots in Paris’ banlieus\textsuperscript{36}, Switzerland’s constitutional ban on new minarets on mosques\textsuperscript{37}, the banning of the veil in France and, potentially, Germany’s ban of the burqa\textsuperscript{38}, the Netherlands’ ban on the export of halal meat\textsuperscript{39} and the rise of far-right groups across the continent\textsuperscript{40}. The thousands of Muslim immigrants that came to Europe after World War II have not been well assimilated into European society\textsuperscript{41} and this shows in radicalization on both sides. Further, the Muslim unemployment rate in Molenbeek, the Belgian neighborhood described by media sources as an incubator for terrorism\textsuperscript{42}, is 30\%\textsuperscript{43}.

While Europe and the United States have similar legal systems and are similarly developed, the problem of jihadist radicalization is greater in Europe due to a larger proportion of Muslims living there. The European Union now has a five percent Muslim population (though the percentage is about 8% in France and Sweden) while America’s Muslims account for one percent of the total population\(^44\). European Muslims are also poorer and less well-integrated into their new societies’ than American Muslims. European countries have been slower to adopt community policing practices (employed by some American police departments) and are also mostly white, making incidences of police harassment of Muslims by white officers more common in Europe\(^45\).

Large disaffected minority groups, composed of recent or new migrants, are vulnerable to radicalization due to their treatment by the majority. Discrimination is a critical factor in the process. For Muslim migrants, religion can be employed as a form of protest against the majority culture. Religion also coheres groups, making it an attractive community-builder for newcomers. Religion has been employed in the Middle East to challenge authoritarian government. The rise of the Hamas movement among Palestinians and of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt serve as examples of this dynamic\(^46\). Western wars with Muslim countries don’t help the situation. While Polish immigrants to Great Britain face harassment, they do not turn as readily to violent groups because the relations between the UK and Poland are generally good\(^47\). France’s twenty-first century bombing of Mali and its conduct in Algeria in the mid-twentieth century exhibit the very real conflict between European and Muslim countries\(^48\). European powers were also involved in American-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

These wars contextualize the analysis of migrant radicalization host countries. Migrants may have been pushed out of their lands by the very people whose lands they now inhabit. Muslims and Christians don’t exist in a world where the two religions live together in perfect harmony. They live in a world where the religions view one another with suspicion. A world where ongoing and past conflicts breed grievance and division.

Due to geopolitical, inter-religious conflict, this same dynamic of radicalization occurs among hosts. Illiberal democratic leaders such as Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, Israel’s Binyamin Netanyahu, Donald Trump and Viktor Orban have come to power due to a


wave of anti-globalist sentiment as citizens of democracies have felt “left behind,” as *The Economist* magazine put it, by globalization. These leaders are vanguards in a debate about the future of democratic polities in an era where multinational corporations jump borders at will, cash transfers in the blink of an eye, jobs off-shore with ease, and GDP’s contend with Gini coefficients for importance. For instance, Israel in March 2020 went through a third round of elections due in no small part to Binyamin Netanyahu trying to avoid a corruption trial. Meanwhile, the country, ostensibly rich and thriving due to an ongoing tech boom, has seen the rise of a large protest movement centered on grievances including high unemployment, high cost of living, and an inability of the regular Israeli to make ends meet. Immigrants from Russia and the Middle East are sometimes targets of these grievances as the state provides welfare schemes for newcomers.

In a world where countries are increasingly multicultural and economically globalized, anti-immigrant sentiment has become a winning electoral strategy in places as diverse as the United States, Sweden, India, South Africa, Austria, Australia, France and the UK. After years of Western countries decrying foreign terrorism, radicalization is now rife on both sides. Anti-immigrant violence in America and New Zealand as well as calls for “Poland for Poles” today outpace jihadism or violence committed by newcomers. One might argue that the covid-19 pandemic could quell this dual radicalization by “flattening” immigration, but economic calamities and political crises do not often lead to increased tolerance of diversity and democratic values. In many cases, crises, such as economic downturns, have been used by leaders with autocratic tendencies to undo democracy.

**Conclusion: Flattening the Radicalization Curve**

So how can we flatten the radicalization curve on both sides of the equation? Albert Hirschman holds that there are three ways people react to “systems in turmoil”: they can disengage (“exit”), they can protest or work for change (“voice”) or they can follow orders (“loyalty”). With immigration schemes, migrants are literally choosing to “exit” one community to enter a new one. When newcomers arrive, hosts may welcome them loyally or raise their voices to challenge the entrance of new migrants—whether they

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53 Levitsky, Steven and Daniel Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die* (New York: Crown 2018). The authors show how Adolf Hitler, Reccep Erdogan and Vladimir Putin used crises to consolidate their power on pgs. 92-96.

enter legally or not. Migrants, in turn, can also look to fall in line becoming “model immigrants” through loyalty, to figuratively “exit” their new societies by sticking to ethnic enclaves or to raise their “voices” through constructive advocacy or through extremism.

The view held by both hosts and migrants that they have received a “raw deal” and need to lash out at their society is strong evidence of an immigration system in need of reform. In the immigration debate, neither side is truly serious about solutions. One side looks at security, the other at human rights. Each rejects the other’s views outright. Security? Why should that be a concern? Why should a so-called citizen have preferential treatment over someone else? We’re all human after all, one refrain ends. The other side asks: Why should someone’s humanity alone give them entrée into my community? Shouldn’t citizenship, nationality and membership mean something? Aren’t some entries into my community authorized or legal and others illegal? And what about the security of our people? Isn’t a border warranted?

A human-rights approach or a security approach alone won’t fix migration policy—and there is likely no way to stop humans from wanting to migrate, sometimes against the laws of the states they enter. But, today’s debate unnecessarily simplifies the issue. This simplification leads to radicalization on both sides: the side of the hosts and that of the migrants. Migrants feel rejected by host societies and sometimes turn to extremist views. Hosts feel erosion of their community identity or economic competition from migrants and may lash out in response.

Studies have shown that some migrants (mostly second-generation or later) have endorsed terrorist violence particularly in Europe and that some terrorists have transplanted themselves in new societies in order to commit attacks (the so-called sleeper cell phenomenon). And while terrorism remains a rare phenomenon in the rich world, Western democracies are very concerned with terrorism as exemplified by their statements, defense policies and public polling data. Jihadist radicalization, a process of adopting extremist violent beliefs, has been a constant concern among Western governments and their citizens since at least the turn of the century.

While hosts are not always fond of immigrants, views of immigration vary around the world. A recent Pew study found that over 60% of Canadians, Swedes, Brits and Australians view immigrants as a strength, while over 55% of Americans, Japanese, Mexicans, Germans, Spaniards and French-people said the same. In Israel, South Africa, Russia, Poland and Italy majorities said that immigrants were a greater burden than a strength. In Greece and Hungary, the numbers were even starker: almost three-quarters of survey respondents held the view that immigrants were a burden not a strength.

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Jihadist radicalization and the entrance of extremist terrorists through legal or irregular migrant routes has become a bugbear for leaders such as Orban and Trump. Migrants are linked to violence by these politicians and their followers. Yet, the nativist terrorism seen in Russia, Poland, Germany and America is many times discounted by domestic politicians. Further, radicalization, which could be bred by an unwelcoming host environment, is ignored as migrants are seen as weapons whose arrival means dilution of, and possibly even violence against, the native population.

The future, then, is a troubling prospect as Germany, Sweden, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and America deal with, in some cases, unprecedented numbers of newcomers. The Palestinian case in the Middle East provides a signpost for what could happen to Syrian refugees: generations of limbo. The Rise of the Neo-Far Right is also a troubling prospect. Integration, as evidenced in the American case, poses a possible positive future. A multicultural future, the domestic mosaic touted by liberal Europeans, could also provide a balanced path.

Terrorism looms as both an issue for politicians to exploit and a potential outcome either of handling migration incorrectly or of migrant absorption systems becoming overburdened. While terrorism and migration are not necessarily linked issues (as the data will show in Ch. 2), solutions can be inclusive of both issues. For instance, bettering conditions in poor countries that export violence would reduce both export of nonviolent migrants and violent terrorists. Additionally, developing a more equitable approach to placing migrants in new countries (so as to alleviate the undue burden on the welcoming few), would make the lives of all people better and reduce the likelihood of excluded migrant communities overburdening domestic systems.

Sarah Song breaks through the simplified debate on immigration by proposing a system of “closed borders and open doors.” She believes that both the “ethic of membership,” which says that people are obligated to their fellow community members, and the “ethic of universalism,” which holds that people have obligations to their fellow human beings, should be followed. Following both paths entails restricting the movement of migrants “[w]hen the basic interests of prospective migrants are not at stake” but also adhering to democratic principles. These principles oblige countries to treat human beings equally and respectfully, to refrain from discriminating against people and to apply legal practices fairly and equitably through due process rights. To this end, tenure of residency, even for those inhabiting a state without papers should be an important factor in determining when states are justified in deporting people57. After all, long-time residents many times become part and parcel of “the people” that make up the democratic community58. Song argues, though, that a universal right to migrate anywhere and for any reason needs to be balanced against the countervailing arguments of hosts that may not want their countries to face the instability of not being able to control their communities59. Finally, she states that while refugees should be accepted by states, according to the international law obligations states themselves agreed upon.

57 Song, Immigration and Democracy, pg. 190.
58 A great portrayal of an irregular migrant becoming part of the community is captured in the story of Jose in Francisco Cantu’s The Line Becomes A River (Cantu, Francisco, The Line Becomes a River: Dispatches from the Border (New York: Riverhead Books 2018)).
59 Song, Immigration and Democracy, pg. 110.
“[a]ddressing the challenges of migration must be part of broader efforts to end the conflict, violence and deprivation that fuel migration”\(^\text{60}\). In sum, the needs of migrants and hosts need to be seriously examined and accounted for so that radicalization on both sides is limited. Respecting the rights and obligations of democratic communities alongside the needs of migrants presents a welcome start for a new world.

**Plan of the Book**

Every immigrant story begins with a plan, this book is no different. The next four chapters will lay out the current state of world migration and how it leads to radicalization of both migrants and hosts. Each chapter will answer a key question. Chapter Two evaluates the connection between migration and radicalization. Chapter Three examines the current state system and migration regime and its effect on radicalization. Chapter Four projects what the future of migration might look like given current trends. Chapter Five concludes the book by proposing policy prescriptions that could reduce the likelihood of radicalization by hosts and migrants. This book’s suppositions, predictions and conclusions would have been different in a pre-covid-19 world and, at the time of writing, the long-term effects and longevity of the pandemic are unknown. How the pandemic affects migration and radicalization is surely only beginning to be understood. This book provides the first attempt at deciphering the ramifications of the pandemic on states, migration and the radicalization process.

\(^\text{60}\) Song, *Immigration and Democracy*, pg. 131.
Chapter Two:
Immigrant Extremists and Domestic Xenophobes:
How Migrants and Hosts Radicalize

Abstract
Governments consistently justify reductions in and barriers to migration on national security grounds. Even pro-migrant authors such as Joseph Carens say that "public order" can be a factor in determining who is allowed to enter a sovereign nation. The recent connection between migration and terrorism has been ballyhooed by the media due to concerns of radicalism in Europe brought by new immigrants. Yet radicals are rarely new migrants. Instead, non-domestic terrorists in the West usually come from second- or third-generation immigrants who have become disenchanted with their new societies. Those who view migrants as terrorists tend to ignore the vast amount of domestic—both far-left and far-right—terrorism that occurs in democracies and adopt the blinkered view that only non-Christians can be terrorists. The chapter will: (1) show that the connection between migrants or refugees and terrorism is tenuous at best; (2) describe how radicalization, the greater threat, happens; and (3) describe how radicalization of migrants and hosts occurs.

Key Words: Migration, Immigration, Radicalization, Terrorism.

Anti-immigration forces see a world where the historic movement of migrants in the 2010s leads to a dystopian tomorrow replete with crippled Western economies and terrorist violence in host-city centers. Linking migration to national security has, since antiquity, been a move made by leaders seeking to control their populations and the flow of populations into their lands. This “us vs. them” dynamic has been reinforced by violent, sensational though rare terrorism in the West such as the 2020 spate of attacks, including a beheading, in France. These attacks by recent immigrants or minority populations have led some citizens and world leaders to link migration to terrorism implying that the solution to one, such as a border wall or visa restrictions, is the solution to both.

This renewed hostility to migrants has come in many forms including rioting in Greece, fence-building in Eastern Europe, a proliferation of walls and fences all over the

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world\textsuperscript{64}, and hand-wringing about the “wave” of Mexicans, Syrians, Africans, Afghans, and any other peoples searching for a better life.

The state of migration has gone from massive movement to a jarring stop due to covid-19. Before the virus, there were more people being displaced by persecution or conflict than at any time since World War II\textsuperscript{65}. As Joseph Chamie writes, “Among its many repercussions, this pandemic has greatly affected international migration, which has become a fundamental and essential component of the globalized economy. In their attempts to stem the spread of the virus, governments worldwide have closed their borders, issued travel bans, and severely limited human mobility. Those measures, however, have been largely ineffective in halting the virus’ spread”\textsuperscript{66}. The virus wasn’t stopped but many people have been. These barriers to migration have been coupled with an anti-immigrant environment in many Western countries, which was spurred by populist leaders whose nativist policies are based on claims of national solidarity and economic security\textsuperscript{67}.

After the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, far-right parties in Europe called for a revision of migration policies while “leaders in Poland and Slovakia warned that the influx of migrants into Europe posed security risks”\textsuperscript{68}. The reaction to 9/11 focused Americans on aviation security and the visa process while more recent attacks have yielded similarly bespoke proposed policy solutions. For instance, the Bangladeshi legal permanent resident who set off a bomb in a New York City subway station in December 2017 was granted his legal status as the nephew of a naturalized American citizen. Akayed Ullah’s immigration story led some in the White House to call for an end to so-called “chain migration”\textsuperscript{69}. Indeed, President Trump declared in January 2018 that, “the family reunification program—which he and other immigration opponents prefer to call ‘chain migration’—opens the floodgates to ‘virtually unlimited numbers of distant relatives.’” Contrary to the President’s statement, “relatives other than spouses, parents and minor children are subject to annual caps and country quotas.” Further, President Trump called for a reassessment of the diversity visa program, which his Department of Homeland Security erroneously tied to terrorism despite a Cato Institute report that


“found that lottery visa holders actually killed only 8 of 3,037 Americans murdered by foreign-born terrorists since 1975.”

The heavy focus on foreign-born terrorists diverts attention from those who are radicalized at home including the far-right extremists who have committed many more terrorist acts against Americans than any other group has since 2001. This “exception is the rule” mentality seems to apply only when migrants commit violence as the same logic has not applied for school shooters or non-migrant terrorists. One explanation for this view is that the state can deport or limit migrants while it has fewer options in dealing with citizens. Still, right-wing domestic terrorism has been ignored in the United States in recent years to the detriment of national security.

This chapter employs a critical criminological perspective in arguing that in order to understand migrant violence and radicalization, the wider social and political landscape needs to be understood. It will be shown that the link between migration and terrorism is tenuous at best, but that there are real reasons why some immigrants to the West radicalize and that these reasons have to do with discrimination and worldwide conflicts between the West and Muslims. Violence committed by Islamic extremists will continue, particularly in Europe, until these very real conflicts are resolved.

A renewed hostility to refugees

Christopher Rudolph encapsulates the “problem of migration to nation-states” when he argues that, “by introducing large numbers of people of diverse ethnocultural and ideological backgrounds to a host-society, the globalization of migration represents a potentially significant threat to notions of stable national identities, cultures, and ways of life.” He notes that 9/11 served to securitize migration after a period during the 1990s when migration was seen as an economic win-win. It bears emphasis that after 9/11 fully 65% of Americans answering a November 2001 Fox News poll said that all immigration to the country needed to be stopped. Links between migrants, particularly unauthorized migrants, and terrorists were soon being bandied by officials all over the world.

Today’s version of the migrant-terrorist, the ISIS-member-disguised-as-refugee or the lone-wolf-Islamic-radical, is no less dire. As Felix Bethke writes, “there is a general consensus that the refugee influx increases the risk of terrorist attacks in the host countries.” Indeed, NATO commander Philip Breedlove claimed in early 2016 that the

refugee flow to Europe was “masking the movement” of ISIS terrorists who were “spreading like a cancer” among refugees. Bethke notes that studies such as those by Choi and Salehyan and Milton, Spencer, and Findley demonstrate connections between hosting refugees and an increased incidence of terrorism in the host country. Bethke also stresses that poor conditions in refugee camps could lead to radicalization due to the fact that countries taking on large numbers of refugees, such as Kenya and Lebanon, lack the resources to properly care for these newcomers.

Alex Schmid, in a report that gathers extant evidence on the migrant-terrorism connection, highlights examples of radicalization in refugee camps with the emblematic cases being the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan and the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran. However, he also notes that refugees have themselves been the focus of xenophobic attacks. Schmid believes that a poor handle on the large influx of refugees coming into both Europe and the Middle East could yield more transnational terrorism.

While the logic that poor conditions yields radicalized refugees makes sense, the economic argument only goes so far. There is no direct line between poverty and radicalization. Perhaps mistreatment is an exacerbating condition, but if being poor or a refugee was directly causally connected to violent radicalization then more violence would be seen in places like Malawi, in the refugee camps of Kenya, and in places like Bangladesh. While some violence does emanate from these regions, the poorest places in the world are not the most radical; poverty and radicalization do not cleanly overlap. Poor conditions alone do not explain the problem.

One proposed solution for the problem of refugees or migrants radicalizing actually exacerbates the issue. That is: anti-globalization economic protectionism, which manifests itself in stricter migration policies and an unwillingness to join global trade efforts or treaties. Refugees and migrants are borne of a state-system that keeps people out. Nation-states provide internal security and other goods such as national identity to their citizens, but they do so at the cost of keeping millions of people from moving to greener pastures. When nation-states fail, their human contents spill out into a world that either ignores, condemns or mistreats them. These people crossing borders “illegally,” without asking, are metamorphosed into criminals who are “trespassing.” As the world’s stable countries shut their gates, while the countries they have destabilized fester, the human cost continues to rise.

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Civil Death and Statelessness: Migrants and Terrorists as the Ultimate Other

The Western consciousness has inextricably linked migration and terrorism. Thomas Nail writes that migration is seen by some in Europe as a form of barbarian warfare, a “flood” of human beings meant to overwhelm any dam the European Union erects. President Donald Trump’s descriptions of migrants as hardened criminals or potential terrorists have contributed to the view of migrants as invaders. Sam Huntington’s depiction of the “Mexican immigrant invasion” of the American civilization in The Clash of Civilizations was picked up by then-candidate Trump who labeled Mexican migrants “rapists and murderers”.

Many in the US and Europe view migrants as “unequal to citizens.” Like barbarians before them, Nail emphasizes that both migrants and terrorists are viewed as threats to the nation-state. Nation-states have exploited both groups. Pakistan claims to distinguish between good and bad terrorists in its provocation of India. Ancient Rome took in barbarians under a deal where they joined the Roman Army and faced heavy taxes in the year 376; juxtapose this ancient example with a modern one: Turkey accepting millions of Syrian refugees and granting citizenship to tens of thousands of them with the intention of using them as electoral support for the ruling AKP.

Like migrants and refugees, terrorists are viewed as non-citizen “barbarians” undeserving of rights. According to Human Rights Watch, since the 2001 terrorist attacks on American soil, 140 countries have passed anti-terrorism legislation that has increased executive power, reduced free speech, prolonged pre-charge detention and reduced the privacy of individuals, among other civil liberty abridgments. While many of these countries are not liberal democracies and so their citizens do not enjoy wide rights, liberal democratic rights have been significantly narrowed in response to terrorism. Practically all liberal democracies have passed anti-terrorism, liberty-abridging legislation since 2001. A 2012 Human Rights Watch report exempts Norway, but Norway has since bolstered anti-terrorism legislation after the far-right, “lone wolf” attacks in Oslo and Utoya in 2011.

83 Nail, “A Tale of Two Crises,” pgs. 158, 165.
86 Nailm “A Tale of Two Crises,” pg. 62.
87 Nail, “A Tale of Two Crises,” pg. 165.
After 9/11, the phenomenon of people moving to or visiting a country with the express interest of carrying out an attack against their hosts rose to public salience as did the perception of Muslims as terrorists. The 9/11 effect led to a redoubling of security efforts all over the world. One of the outcomes of this focus on security was a linking of previously concerning security issues with terrorism. For instance, port security was always important to keep out unwanted contraband but, after 9/11, terrorism was bandied as a reason to protect and surveil shipping containers, ship’s cargo and ports.

In the same way, migration—which always posed some security concern—was linked squarely to terrorism. In America, terrorists crossing the long, unguarded border from Canada became just one of many fears as the Immigration and Naturalization Service became the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration Control and Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection agencies. President Donald Trump took these twin fears to new levels as he repeatedly linked migration to terrorism by stating that the MS-13 gang was rife with undocumented terrorist migrants.

Definitions of both migrants and of terrorists have been manipulated for political purposes. Terrorists have traditionally been those seeking to commit violence to gain attention for a political cause. But today politicians link terrorism to all manner of phenomena whenever it suits them.

Migration, or immigration in the common parlance, has also morphed. While immigrants have not always been welcome in their host countries, carefully separating asylum seekers from legal migrants from guest workers and so on is critically important. In today’s rhetoric in Europe and America, migrants are generalized to seem like they are all refugees or all “illegals” or all criminals. “Othering” migrants and foreigners has been a human trait for millennia, but today’s dim view of migrants undoes recent progress that led to a more sanguine view of newcomers. Both migrants and terrorists, through the relegation of their human rights and sometimes citizenship rights, face civil death when they inhabit liminal spaces outside the body politic.

Citizenship is meant to protect the individual from the government by ensuring individual rights. In addition to the legal construct of the “citizen,” which entitles an

98 Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the Alien.”
individual to certain rights and benefits, citizenship brings with it a sense of belonging\(^99\). Citizenship is the highest legal status one can hold in a state but it does have its limits. For instance, states can prevent dual citizenship\(^100\).

Civil death occurs when citizenship is rescinded or hollowed out. As Audrey Macklin writes: “The core citizenship rights are the franchise and the right to enter and remain. Legislated felon disenfranchisement, both temporary and permanent, is still lawfully practiced in several US states”\(^101\). Countries may also prevent citizens from entering creating de facto stateless people\(^102\). Canada has done this with a number of citizens and America reportedly did the same when it confiscated the passports of US citizens of Yemeni origin\(^103\).

Although the numbers are small compared to those whose civil death is caused by felony, in the UK citizenship revocation has become a practice targeting exclusively male Muslims. This practice is carried out not by legislation but by executive discretion. Macklin calls this phenomenon “political death” and states that “This ‘political death’ is a sibling to the historic practice known as civil death, whereby slaves and felons were denied legal personhood”\(^104\).

The civil, or political, death of the alleged terrorist can quickly turn into death in actual terms. The British Bureau of Investigative Journalism reports that two British nationals whose citizenship was revoked were soon-after killed by US drones\(^105\). The same can be said of American citizens. Anwar and Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, American citizens, were killed by drone strikes. Since in the US citizenship is more strongly protected, the father and son suffered a political and real death while still holding American citizenship. In Canada and the US, prominent politicians such as Hillary Clinton have announced that citizenship is a privilege not a right\(^106\).

International law dictates that a state may not reduce a citizen into an alien since doing so would make the person “stateless”\(^107\). For instance, Canada’s Bill C-24 allows for punitive citizenship revocation but is limited by the prohibition against creating stateless persons\(^108\). Additionally, some countries revoke citizenship after a person has

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\(^{101}\) Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the Alien,” pg. 6.


\(^{103}\) Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the Alien,” pg. 7.

\(^{104}\) Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the Alien,” pgs. 7-8.

\(^{105}\) Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the Alien,” pg. 8.

\(^{106}\) Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the Alien,” pg. 9.


\(^{108}\) Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the Alien,” pgs. 20 and 26.
been out of the country for a prolonged period of time and others simply refuse to allow their citizens to reenter the country.

In 2006, after the July 7, 2005 tube and bus bombings, the UK expanded its right to revoke citizenship under the British Nationality Act due to the “homegrown” nature of some of the bombers. Citizenship now could be revoked if the Home Secretary believed that doing so would be “conducive to the public good”\textsuperscript{109}. Since 2006, 53 British nationals have had their citizenship revoked with all but one having lost their status while abroad\textsuperscript{110}.

In the US, losing one’s citizenship without consent is nearly impossible due to Supreme Court cases bolstering citizenship rights. America has not attempted to use its limited expatriation powers even in cases where a citizen was clearly planning against the state\textsuperscript{111}. Instead, America has engaged in drone strikes against its own citizens. These included the targeted assassination of Anwar al-Awlaki, his son Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, Kemal Dawish and Sameer Khan in Yemen as well as Jude Kenan Mohamed in Pakistan. Another American, Warren Weinstein, was inadvertently killed by a drone strike. The US government—in a 2011 secret memo—detailed their legal justifications for these strikes\textsuperscript{112}, yet surely democracy entails greater protections for citizens’ rights than the occasional secret memo clarifying extra-judicial killings. Oversight and transparency are critical democratic values that need to be upheld. The public simply does not know what to believe in these cases. For this reason, the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights filed suit against the government for the killings of the al-Awlakis and Sameer Khan\textsuperscript{113}.

In Israel, on July 31, 2003, the Knesset passed the Nationality and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Order) – 2003, which “prohibits the granting of any residency or citizenship status to Palestinians from the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories ... who are married to Israeli citizens.” Thousands of families are affected by the mandate. Though it was originally slated to last just one year, Knesset has extended this law every year since\textsuperscript{114}.

Some citizenship rights were temporarily abridged in the UK due to the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005) and Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and in America due to the USA Patriot Act (2001)\textsuperscript{115}. Laws such as these have diminished due process in America

\textsuperscript{109} Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the Alien,” pgs. 15-16.
\textsuperscript{110} Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the Alien,” pg. 17.
\textsuperscript{111} Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the Alien,” pgs. 19-20.
\textsuperscript{115} MacDonald, et al., “Citizenship, community and counter-terrorism,” pg. 448.
and produced weak citizenship\textsuperscript{116}. In the UK, Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister’s focus group studies found that Asians and Blacks have felt a great loss of rights and a reduction in their identification with the United Kingdom due to anti-terror laws\textsuperscript{117}. Counterterror laws have redefined citizenship for the worse. Western governments eliminate citizenship rights through a two-part process: first, strip the individual’s citizenship and, second, “deport the newly-minted alien”\textsuperscript{118}.

Another form of civil death is the prolonged detention-without-charge of terror suspects. Law enforcement and governments defend the practice by describing it as a necessary tool for thwarting terrorist plots. Yet untold numbers of people around the world end up losing bedrock citizenship and human rights such as the right to see a judge and to know the charges being brought against them. Detained people accused of terrorism are also frequently tortured. Protections against using force on detainees slide away as the imprisoned are alleged to be enemies of the state.

The George W. Bush Administration routinely subverted power from the judiciary in the name of counterterrorism. It did so with the creation of secret CIA detention facilities abroad\textsuperscript{119}, and with the prolonged detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay\textsuperscript{120} and of those who were declared enemy combatants without charges being brought against them. Some inmates collected by President George W. Bush still remained in Guantanamo Bay under President Trump, who sought to continue the detention center’s use for housing terror suspects\textsuperscript{121}.

In Israel, many Arab prisoners are dubbed “security prisoners,” which is a similar categorization to the US’ “enemy combatant.” Security prisoners do not have the rights of a regular prisoner, but they are afforded Geneva Convention protections\textsuperscript{122}. Even so, Israel employs tactics such as sleep deprivation and stress positions on Palestinian prisoners, which can be defined as “torture”\textsuperscript{123}.

A staggering number of Palestinians are being held in Israeli jails. Btselem, an Israeli human rights group, estimated in 2006 that 8,085 Palestinians were imprisoned in


\textsuperscript{117} Jarvis and Lister, “Disconnected Citizenship?,” pg. 673.

\textsuperscript{118} Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the Alien,” pgs. 2-3.


\textsuperscript{120} Laura Donohue writes that, “A year and a half after attacking Afghanistan, America continues to hold more than 600 men from 43 countries at Guantanamo Bay” (Donohue, Laura K. “The British Traded Rights For Security, Too,” \textit{The Washington Post}, 6 April 2003).


\textsuperscript{122} Gal-Or, “Countering Terrorism in Israel,” pg. 150.

Israeli civilian jails, 2,384 of them without charge. In August 2015, that figure had shrunk to 5,373 security detainees and was down to 4,207 in August 2020. As of August 2020, 355 Palestinians were being held by Israel under “administrative detention,” two of them minors. This figure has been as high as 847 in the 2007.

According to Btselem, “Administrative detention is detention without charge or trial, authorized by administrative order rather than by judicial decree.” Much like America’s “enemy combatants,” Israel has held Palestinians, “in prolonged detention without trying them and without informing them of the suspicions against them. While detainees may appeal the detention, neither they nor their attorneys are allowed to see the evidence.” As Btselem notes, “due to the substantial injury to due process inherent in this measure, international law stipulates that it may be exercised only in very exceptional cases – and then only as a last possible resort, when there are no other means available to prevent the danger.”

In France, a judicial order can lead to up to a six day detention without charge for a terror suspect. In the UK, terror suspects can be detained for up to 14 days—down from the 28 days passed by Gordon Brown—but a much higher figure than most liberal democracies allow. America’s indefinite imprisonment of Guantanamo detainees—today dwindling in number to only 40 (from 112 in 2015 and a high of 779)—is a form of political death all its own.

Laws that discriminate against Muslim populations are emblematic of a wider war against Muslims and migrants. Both the migrant and the terrorist are viewed as Others that can lawfully be extracted from society or the body politic and whose lives have less worth than those of “real” citizens. Migrants, like terrorists, are detained in large immigrant detention centers and refugees feel a form of statelessness that is many times tantamount to civil death.

While citizens who turn radical can be slated for civil death, migrants are unfortunately labeled as threats before they even enter the state. Stories from Europe about migrant terrorists are easy to find in the popular press. Yet, systematic, scientific studies have

129 Human Rights Watch, In the Name of Security.
repeatedly shown that there is no connection between immigration and terrorism\textsuperscript{132}. Immigrants do not readily turn into radicals and, when they do, it is because of a mix between the environment they encounter in their new countries and the state of the world. As Bichara Khader aptly summarizes (mirroring the main arguments of this book):

“My arguments are that Muslims are settling permanently in Europe, that the vast majority want to live in peace, that European integration policies have been erratic and inconsistent and that only a tiny minority of Muslims are engaged in radical activities. I also argue that in addition to faith-based radicalisation (religiously-motivated groups or individuals), there is an identity-based extremism (far-right parties), which is no less dangerous, and Europe should confront both problems by drying up the ideological sources of extremism. Finally, I make the point that Islamist radicalism in Europe remains marginal. This radicalism is not the result of failed integration, but rather local-global connections, which are linked to identity rupture and the exposure of young European Muslims to the unbearable images of destruction and violence in many Muslim countries, mainly those in the Middle East”\textsuperscript{133}.

**Alleged Connections Between Migrants or Refugees and Terrorism**

The post-9/11 discussion on migration centered on the fact that all of the terrorists involved in that attack entered the US on valid visas\textsuperscript{134}. Martin and Martin, highlight the post-9/11 obsession with stopping unauthorized immigrants, fixing the visa system, thinking twice about accepting refugees, and incorporating all other manner of national security apparatus to the policy of US immigration\textsuperscript{135}. Previously difficult to imagine policies, such as the proposal of a national identity card system or the USA Patriot Act’s granting the government power to detain terror suspects without charge for up to seven days, became possible in the environment of hyper-vigilance that existed in the years after the 9/11 attacks\textsuperscript{136}. Steven Camarota, writing about one year after the 9/11 attacks, harped on the US visa system and attempted to distinguish between legal immigrants and the temporary visa holders and lawful permanent residents he saw as the real problem. His contention was that the visa and permanent resident systems needed stronger vetting in the wake of the 1993 and 2001 World Trade Center attacks\textsuperscript{137}. Still, it should be noted that even in Americans’ state of alarm, the national ID card, meant to “thwart terrorist-aliens,” received little public support\textsuperscript{138}.

\textsuperscript{132} Forrester, Andrew A., Benjamin Powell, Alex Nowrasteh and Michelangelo Landgrave, “Do immigrants import terrorism?,” *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 166 (October 2019), pgs. 529-543.
\textsuperscript{133} Khader, “Muslims in Europe”.
\textsuperscript{135} Martin and Martin, “International Migration and Terrorism.”
\textsuperscript{136} Martin and Martin, “International Migration and Terrorism,” pgs. 338, 341.
Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt’s study of the connection between migration and terrorism finds little evidence for the proposition that terrorism travels with migrants. The authors point out that many studies exploring the immigrant-terrorism link select on the dependent variable by only researching immigrants who turned to terrorism. They also observe that many studies in this area are based on anecdote or opinion rather than systematic data. This may be because terrorism is rare and the few notable cases rise to public consciousness via the news media, which makes the acts of terrorists salient but not emblematic of the wider population.

In their study, which examines all manner of immigrants to OECD countries, Dreher, et al. find that relatively highly skilled migrants are significantly less likely to commit terrorism in their new countries than lower skilled migrants. They note that qualitative evidence—which is necessary in this case due to the complexity of the radicalization process—points to a majority of “foreigners committing global terrorism [having] lived in the country they attack for an extended period of time rather than entering and immediately engaging in an attack.” The authors further find that strict laws that limit immigrant rights or prevent integration of migrants have the opposite of their intended effect as they serve to alienate, and perhaps radicalize, migrants.

In contrast, Bove and Bohmelt argue that “immigrants are an important vehicle for the diffusion of terrorism from one country to another” through the mechanisms of social bonds that lead to the transfer of extremist beliefs. The authors, however, find that blocking immigrants provides no panacea. Their statistical findings support liberal migration policies. In fact, they find that countries that welcome more migrants actually have lower levels of terrorist attacks.

Relatedly, Milton, Spencer and Findley argue that poor treatment of refugees could lead to increased transnational terrorism. After 9/11, many nation-states increased restrictions on refugees and their movement. Moreover, people with refugee status were already not treated humanely as “refugees far too often occupy unsanitary and isolated camps, which lack access to basic resources and health care.”

The mechanisms for turning refugees into radicals are highlighted in Ben Rawlence’s *City of Thorns* wherein al-Shabaab militants offer work to poor, struggling refugees who fled al-Shabaab in the first place. In one chapter, failure on a UN employment test is equated with joining al-Shabaab since refugee employment prospects are so dim.

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142 Dreher, et al., “The Effect of Migration on Terror,” pg. 5.
145 Bove and Bohmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?,” pg. 584.
While in *City of Thorns*, and in the case of refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo, radicals are present to indoctrinate migrants, the implication in some terrorism studies is that deprived conditions alone lead to radicalization in some sort of spontaneous generation borne of frustration. The isolation of refugee camps, in addition to the economic vulnerability of refugees, makes the camps potential petri dishes for terrorism as happened in the Dadaab camps.\textsuperscript{149} The isolated and dehumanized state of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan serves as another case in point.\textsuperscript{150} It’s important to note, however, that poverty or isolation alone did not cause extremism in either case; instead, refugees are actively recruited by radicals in both. While only 10% of modern cases of large groups of refugees crossing borders have resulted in civil conflict, Milton, et al., citing Sageman, worry that negative refugee experiences may lead to radicalization. After all, radicals normally come from people whose “personal experience resonates with the propaganda of the terrorist organization”\textsuperscript{151}.

Employment opportunities are critical for the integration of migrants and refugees. Yet, refugees are usually barred from entering the labor markets of their host states, with Uganda being one of few exceptions, due to fears of them taking jobs from citizens.\textsuperscript{152} Unemployed refugees are vulnerable to radical appeals. While Darfuri refugees described by Jessica Alexander seemed immune to radicalization, other persecuted groups are described in academic and lay literature as being particularly vulnerable.\textsuperscript{153} This is why Betts, et al. argue for more inclusion of refugees in labor markets.\textsuperscript{154} A study by Philip Verwimp, cited in Bethke, “reveals that the gap in youth-employment between nationals and migrants is correlated with the number of fighters” that join the conflicts in Syria and Iraq coming from those countries. Verwimp notes that Belgium has the highest such gap in employment.\textsuperscript{155} This points to the power of economic factors in pushing people to terrorism. Such factors include the relative deprivation hypothesis, which states that people turn to violence when they believe they cannot attain the necessary goods for competing fairly in society. The key to relative deprivation is fairness and a comparison between groups. If everyone is deprived in society, then there is little reason to feel anger at one’s condition. But, if one group is promoted over another, the deprivation of the worse-off group is acutely felt which can lead to anger, frustration and violent outcomes.

\textsuperscript{154} Betts, et al., *Refugee Economies*.
For all the concern on radicalization and immigration’s links, researchers have found little correlation between the two in the United States. A report by the Cato Institute’s Alex Nowrasteh shows that zero Americans were killed in terrorist attacks carried out by nationals of the seven countries singled out in Trump’s “Muslim ban” between 1975 and 2015. Further, Nowrasteh shows that refugees historically have posed no threat to Americans. Since 1975, “twenty out of 3.25 million refugees welcomed to the United States have been convicted of attempting or committing terrorism on US soil, and only three Americans have been killed in attacks committed by refugees—all by Cuban refugees in the 1970s”157. According to the New America think tank, “every jihadist who conducted a lethal attack inside the United States since 9/11 was a citizen or a legal resident” and many were second-generation immigrants, a fact which points to problems of assimilation and integration rather than the transport of a virulent terrorist ideology that comes part and parcel with the migrant.

There is little link in Europe or America between first-generation migrants and terrorism, but research shows that second- and third-generation immigrants are more likely than their parents to turn to terrorism. The issue may be that focusing on immigrants and refugees is easier than highlighting the complicated radicalization of recently-arrived domestic populations. Further, making visa policies more rigid may detract from international students, foreign workers or tourists—all major economic buoys to nation-states. Immigrants and refugees carry the accusation of being security threats with little evidence to support the claim.

**Radicalizing Migrants or Radicalizing Domestics?**

Economic conditions aside, the radicalization process needs to be better understood in order to understand what factors lead people living in the West to embrace terrorist violence or causes. Some evidence of the radicalization process makes it appear incredibly idiosyncratic. Sayyid Qutb, the famed Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood theorist, was radicalized by his time in Colorado where he took issue with women and men dancing with one another in church. If the quotidian experience of living in a Western country alone transforms a person into an extremist, as has been said of the experiences of Qutb and 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta among others, prevention likely falls more along the lines of psychological than social interventions. Like picking out school shooters, over-determination makes it highly difficult to select which newcomers will be

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158 Friedman, “Where America’s Terrorists Actually Come From.”
the very few who radicalize due to common factors such as alienation, depression or cognitive dissonance.

Marc Sageman’s evidence emphasizes how terrorists since 9/11 have been radicalized domestically rather than exporting their beliefs. He notes “an Atlantic divide” separating poorer European Muslim migrants and refugees from richer Muslim migrants to America. This divide has exacerbated in recent years “as returnees from Syria with links to Daesh members have coordinated raids” in Paris and Brussels. Meanwhile, the US has seen “homegrown plots carried out on behalf of Daesh,” but not actually coordinated by the organization, such as the 2016 Orlando and 2015 San Bernardino shootings.

Sageman traces the process of radicalization as it moves from political protest to an embrace of political violence. This escalation of an individual’s propensity for violence is normally due to a corresponding escalation of conflict by the state against people with whom the individual feels an affinity. Other factors leading to radicalization include the protesters’ growing dissatisfaction with non-violent means and an incident causing moral outrage. These stages finally lead to the birth of a new martial identity. Sageman finds that, in the 10 years following 9/11, only 14% of the jihadist terrorists targeting the West came from abroad—the other 86% were radicalized domestically.

This is why Sageman argues that closing borders to migrants or putting more restrictions on refugee flows won’t stop the terror threat, in the US at least. With so few terrorists coming from abroad, the worry actually should be radicalizing domestic Muslims through the ham-handed implementation of biased migration or law enforcement policies. Moreover, fighting Muslims abroad may lead to more jihadist sympathizers both at home and abroad, which aids jihadist recruitment and further worsens the problem.

Skillicorn, Leuprecht and Winn contend that a major problem with studies of radicalization are that they select on the dependent variable. Indeed, even the best of these studies tout their credentials by citing the radicals that they interviewed. Skillicorn, et al.’s Ottawa Radicalization Survey shows that those who are dissatisfied with their own lives in addition to being dissatisfied with the moral and religious world “become more overtly religious in ways that involve high-frequency and small-group religious activity, and they show a willingness to admit to supporting organizations that fight oppression even if they break the law.” To this end, the authors note that social welfare alone may not scupper radicalism among migrants and that assuaging a
migrant’s compunctions with the religious and moral world may be a quest outside the ambit of the modern state169.

Ekaterina Stepanova argues that the facile link made between large-scale terrorism, radicalization and immigration needs to be further scrutinized. She highlights that, “an excessive focus on the problems associated with the integration of migrants tends to depoliticize terrorism and downgrade the importance of the broader international political agenda to European Islamist terrorists”170. She notes that those who point to inequality and segregation-fueled rioting in France’s banlieus and similar discontent in Europe’s “grey suburbs” as evidence of a terrorism and migration link are wrong-headed. After all, she argues, these acts were not carried out by terrorists so they should not be forwarded as proof of a link between migration and terrorist radicalization. Further, Stepanova, like Sageman, argues that many European terrorists, unlike Russian terrorists, have been well-integrated, second-generation citizens171.

**How Migrants and Hosts Radicalize: Comparative Cases in Britain, Russia and France**

Comparing xenophobic attacks in Russia to violence committed by Muslim radicals in France to the treatment of Polish immigrants in Britain reveals common factors. While non-violent, Polish immigrants in Britain face discrimination, marginalization and exploitation172. A 2019 survey of 1,000 Eastern European students whose parents immigrated to the UK (most of the respondents were Polish) found that a staggering 77% said they were victims of racism or bullying. Telling quotes from the respondents included one saying: “At my last school someone made xenophobic comments about my nationality and tried to burn my hair. Last year, in my current school, a group followed me around chanting ‘Ukip’ and that I should fuck off back to my country.” Another declared that, “I was bullied from the age of six to the age of twelve. I had rocks thrown at me, vile rumor spread about me, my possessions stolen – I was mocked and verbally abused simply because I’m Polish”173. Newcomers are subjected to taunting and attacks everywhere. Poles in Britain provide a good backdrop. Brits do not welcome Poles, but Poles also don’t commit serious violence against Brits. The Russian case differs in degree on both sides.

The fall of the Soviet Union led to an economic collapse and identity loss that left many Russians feeling alienated, abandoned and desperate. Far-right nationalism, including neo-Nazism, flourished in this environment. Immigrants became a target. In 2009, Russia was “home to half the world’s skinheads, average[d] several dozen fatal attacks on ethnic minorities yearly, and ha[d] seen local ordinances and pogroms intended to

170 Stepanova, Ekaterina, “Radicalization of Muslim Immigrants in Europe and Russia,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 29 (2008), pg. 2.
171 Stepanova “Radicalization of Muslim Immigrants in Europe and Russia,” pg. 2.
reverse the access of immigrants to Russian markets”\textsuperscript{174}. By 2018, however, analysis by Moscow-based human rights group SOVA, xenophobic violence had markedly declined\textsuperscript{175}. Still, government attempts to staunch this violence have sometimes backfired as arrested far-right radicals have gained notoriety\textsuperscript{176}. A 2018 study found that xenophobia in Russia was actually concentrated in Moscow and that rural areas exhibited less xenophobic attitudes\textsuperscript{177}. The decline in xenophobic crimes could be due to the benefits of immigration. Muslim immigrants are revitalizing flagging Russian villages that fell hard after Communism. These immigrants fill low-wage jobs that are not attractive to ethnic Russians. Yet, they still face discrimination\textsuperscript{178}.

So what changed between 2009 and 2018? Russian GDP and the price of oil (a key Russian commodity) were actually higher in 2009 than ten years later. Further, immigration actually went up after 2010. The simplest explanations for a reduction in xenophobic attacks on migrants don’t hold. Instead, government rules standardizing work permits, giving legal status to illegal immigrants and making it easier for migrants from former Soviet countries to gain access to the Russian labor market (through visa-free travel), shaped migration so that the great majority of migrants come from the former Soviet bloc\textsuperscript{179}. As Mirovalev reports, Russian villagers prefer to have Muslims from ex-Soviet countries migrate to their regions rather than Chinese immigrants\textsuperscript{180}.

Further, Vladimir Putin has worked to quell xenophobic violence. Asked in 2003 about campaigns using “Russia for Russians”, Putin’s response was unequivocal: “Either they are people with no sense of decency who don’t understand what they’re saying, in which case they are just stupid, or they are provocateurs, because Russia is a multi-ethnic country”\textsuperscript{181}. In 2006, Putin criticized the police for failing to contain xenophobic crime, and in 2008 declared that “[m]ilitant nationalism, xenophobia and appeals for violence


\textsuperscript{175} Yudina, Natalia, “Far-right and Arithmetic: Hate crime in Russia and efforts to counteract it in 2018,” SOVA: Center for Information and Analysis, 4 February 2018, https://www.sovacenter.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2019/02/d40603/.


\textsuperscript{180} Mirovalev, “How Muslim migrant are reshaping Russia’s dying countryside one, village at a time.”

\textsuperscript{181} “Live Hot Lines: Excerpts from the President’s Live Television and Radio Dialogue with the Nation,” Kremlin.ru, 18 December 2003.
and ethnic hatred have always been, and will remain, a time bomb under our statehood”\textsuperscript{182}.

Still, the reduction in xenophobic attacks in Russia from the first decade of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century to the second is not a straight line. The conflict in Ukraine in 2014 fomented xenophobic sentiment as did the 2013 Moscow mayoral race. Marina Kingsbury finds that the Russian government and mass media has twisted xenophobia for their own purposes when seeking to divert attention from internal social problems such as corruption, lack of freedom and economic crisis\textsuperscript{183}. Moreover, Chechen violence against Russia was most pronounced in the first ten years of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century and has since declined as the Chechen Wars have receded. Chechen terrorism still occurs in Russia but is more sporadic and concentrated in Chechnya and Dagestan so it is less of a concern of the Russian public\textsuperscript{184}. The Russian case clearly shows the role of economic and social upheaval in anti-migrant radicalization as well as the role of elite incitement. Policy changes and elite statements countering nationalist radicalization quelled xenophobic attacks on migrants. Further, a reduction in the broader conflicts between Russian and migrant laborers and between Russians and Chechens, reduced xenophobic tensions.

The Russian case deviates significantly from the case of Muslims in France and Britain whose radicalization has become a sort-of framework for how the process happens. Margarita Bizina and David Gray find that young Muslims in France and Britain many times live in impoverished conditions and find themselves in separate, parallel societies compared to their hosts. Bizina and Gray write that charismatic community leaders can then turn these marginalized youth to radicalization because they have been disaffected by their wider society\textsuperscript{185}. Andre, Mansouri and Lobo track the difficulties young French Muslims have in integrating into a society ruled by laïcité, a system that promotes “Frenchness” and secularism above other identities. The authors find that religious leadership is critical in steering Muslim youth toward an Islam based on observance and faith rather than on external manifestations of their faith some of which are not allowed in certain French spaces. This conundrum has been exacerbated by a rise in Islamophobic attacks in France that occurred in response to the 2015 Charlie Hebdo killings. While most French Muslims do integrate, many struggle and Andre, Mansouri and Lobo emphasize that religious leaders play a critical role in moving French Muslim youths toward or away from radicalization\textsuperscript{186}. Bizina and Gray find that French Muslims have less trouble in their laïcité-ruled new society than British Muslims do in a

\textsuperscript{182} BBC. 2006. “Putin berates police for failing to crack down on xenophobia.” February 17.


multicultural system that leaves many Muslims living in completely segregated ethnic enclaves\textsuperscript{187}.

**Muslim Radicalization In and Out of Prisons**

Like migrants or refugees, prisoners throughout history have radicalized in ways that emulated outside radical movements. Like all prisoners, radicalized prisoners seek to address their concerns about injustices both in the prison and in the wider society\textsuperscript{188}. As Michael Welch states, “the inmate social world is shaped by the personal characteristics that convicts import into prison”\textsuperscript{189}. Muslim prisoners inhabit societies that are in conflict with Muslims. This is why conversion to Islam is seen as an act of rebellion or radicalism by inmates. Inter-religious conflicts range from uneasy relations within civil society to violence and even wars. For instance, heavy discrimination and profiling against Muslims in France has led to higher incidences of French Muslim inmates radicalizing\textsuperscript{190}. In general, Europe has done a worse job than America in assimilating Muslim populations and radicalization of Muslims in Europe has been more prevalent for this reason\textsuperscript{191}. Tensions in society naturally spill over into prisons.

Critical criminologists explain the incidence of crime by examining power differentials in society. Contextualizing radicalization in this way allows for a much more specific understanding of the radicalization process. For instance, pressures and tensions in prison and society lead people to radicalize, but without seeing the wider picture how those people radicalize and what forms their radicalism take cannot be properly understood.

Radicalization in prisons is a form of protest against power differentials in society. So a Black prisoner may turn to Black nationalism or Islam as a protest against treatment of Blacks in America. A Muslim prisoner in France may turn to extreme ideologies due to the treatment of his or her people in France. The prisoner could also radicalize due to vicarious outrage or vicarious humiliation in response to events outside of the inmate’s immediate society\textsuperscript{192}. For instance, the plight of the Palestinians could lead a Muslim in Germany to radicalize.

In Europe, tensions between Christians and Muslims have been boiling for decades. In 2020, Austria and France, among others, saw radical violence committed by Muslim

\textsuperscript{187} Bizina and Gray, “Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern for Counter-terrorism.”
\textsuperscript{191} Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{192} Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, pg. 73.
extremists. While attacks by Muslims such as the November 2015 shootings and bombings in Paris receive international media attention, the failures of European countries to integrate Muslim populations achieve less notice. Not only have far-right groups radicalized Islamophobes across Europe, but government policies have also institutionalized racism in Europe by banning new minarets on mosques in Switzerland, banning the export of halal meat in the Netherlands, and banning Muslim garb in France, Norway and Germany. Riots Paris’ banlieu further evidence tense intercommunal relations.

The millions of Muslims who moved to Europe after World War II have not been well integrated into European society. In Molenbeek, Belgium, a neighborhood described by media sources as a terror incubator, the Muslim unemployment rate is 30%. There is also a greater proportion of Muslims in Europe than in America. Only one percent of Americans are Muslim compared to five percent of Europeans adhering to Islam. Europe’s Muslims are also poorer than Muslims in America. After all, it takes less money for people from the Muslim world to get to Europe. European policing

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practices are also more reliant on profiling and less reliant on community policing. For this reason, tension between white officers and Muslim civilians is more common in Europe than in the United States.\textsuperscript{203}

Just like rising migration rates lead hosts to radicalize, harassment and discrimination lead migrant or minority groups to radicalize. Prisoners, by definition, have been rejected by society and, in turn, are apt to adopt extremist views. Religious extremism has served as a reaction to brutal secular governments in the Muslim world for decades. The failure of Arab secular, socialist governments further exacerbated the issue. Muslims turned to religion as a form of redemption in response to losses in wars against Israel and a realization that Arab socialism had not improved the lot of Middle Easterners and North Africans.\textsuperscript{204} Support for Hamas, for instance, grew among Palestinians as the failures and corruption of the Palestinian Authority accumulated.\textsuperscript{205} In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, where al Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri cut his teeth, grew in power in reaction to peace accords with Israel in the late 1970s. The mujahideen’s successes against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and al Qaeda’s attacks on America added to the prominence of religious extremists in the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{206} Muslims turned to religious radicalization as a protest against brutal secular governments or as a reaction to anti-Islamic actions by Western governments. The presence of organized and successful religious extremist groups in the Muslim world helped the cause.\textsuperscript{207}

Muslims radicalize for very real reasons. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon led to the creation of the Shia group Hezbollah. The 2003 Iraq War led to the creation of the Islamic State, which was initially called al Qaeda in Iraq. Thousands of lives have been destroyed by drone strikes in the Muslim world. While Western publics don’t feel the impact, these strikes grievously harm communities. Many Americans don’t realize that, at minimum, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have been killed due to the American invasion in 2003.\textsuperscript{208} France’s actions have also led to radicalization and terrorism in its former colonies Algeria and Mali.\textsuperscript{210}

\textsuperscript{203} Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{205} Martin, Essentials of Terrorism, pgs. 134-5.
\textsuperscript{206} Martin, Essentials of Terrorism.
\textsuperscript{210} Haddad, “France’s Forever War.”
Conditions in prisons merge with conditions in the outside world to forge radicals. In
the Middle East, prisoners have few rights and are often tortured. Groups like the
Islamic State recruit and organize in prisons. According to Weiss and Hassan, “Whether
by accident or design, jailhouses in the Middle East have served for years as virtual
terror academies, where known extremists can congregate, plot, organize, and hone
their leadership skills ‘inside the wire,’ and most ominously recruit a new generation of
fighters.” A prison term can aid one’s reputation in the world of criminals and
radicals. For instance, Ayman al Zawahiri gained “global notoriety” while
incarcerated. Prison served to educate other inmates in the tools of revolution. Weiss
and Hassan state that, “Prison was [Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s] university.” Former
ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi used his time detained by US forces to recruit fighters
for his war against Americans and Shia Muslims. This process of organization and
recruitment behind bars is not unique to jihadists. All criminal organizations and gangs
engage in this behavior.

The methods by which prisoners organize and radicalize are instructive for
understanding radicalization among migrants and refugees. Prisoners and migrants
alike radicalize due to real grievances in the outside world. These grievances could be
experienced personally by the individual or felt vicariously through media reports or the
pain of one’s religious community. Both migrants and prisoners are cut off from their
loved ones and broader communities. They may feel isolated and alone, they may feel
unstable. This isolation and instability leads people to seek refuge in any community one
holds dear. It also causes increased sensitivity to grievance and injustice in the wider
world. The experience of prisoners, for this reason, helps us see why migrants radicalize.

How Radicalization Happens

As the previous sections have found, migrants and hosts radicalize for similar reasons.
Both are spurred by economic conditions, dubbed here “lack of opportunities” to
encapsulate economic crisis and economic competition. Both are also driven by broader
conflicts. Inter-religious wars yield inter-religious tensions between migrants and hosts.
For hosts, elite incitement plays a critical role that leads them to turn to nationalism and
potentially join up with radicals. This is seen in cases where nationalist fervor has
yielded anti-immigrant violence such as in Russia, the United States and Kenya. Elites
can also tamp down xenophobic attitudes as was discussed in the Russian case.

For migrants, the dynamic works slightly differently. Exclusion from the new society
works in tandem with broader conflict and a lack of economic opportunities to lead the
newcomer to reject their new society. This process can then lead to a migrant, be they in

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211 Till, Brain, “A Note on Egyptian Torture,” The Atlantic, 1 February 2011,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/02/a-note-on-egyptian-torture/70476/; Khalili, Laleh and
212 Weiss, Michael and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. New York: Regan Arts, 2015, pg. xv.
213 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS, pg. 5.
214 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS, pg. 9.
215 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS, pg. 119.
prison or outside it, to join with radicals and become radicalized. The existence of a radical group to latch on to (online or “in real life”) is critical.

Note that each step is discrete. The process does not work like a waterfall. One can strongly subscribe to nationalism or strongly reject one’s new society without further radicalizing. Part of the process of radicalization involves meeting or joining radicals. If one doesn’t seek these people out, the process stops. If one can’t find such people, the process stops. Of course, “lone wolves” do exist but many of these people are radicalized online rather than in person, so the term is a bit of a misnomer

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**Figure 2.1, How Hosts Radicalize.**

Lack of Economic Opportunities
- Elite Incitement ➔ Rise in Nationalist Sentiment ➔ Meet/Join Radicals ➔ RADICALIZATION
- Broader Conflict

**Figure 2.2, How Migrants Radicalize.**

Lack of Economic Opportunities
- Exclusion in New Society ➔ Rejection of New Society ➔ Meet/Join Radicals ➔ RADICALIZATION
- Broader Conflict

**Disconnecting Migration from Terrorism**

While a connection between terrorism and immigration remains anecdotal, perceptions can play a large role in reality. Popular press and elite rhetorical narratives about radicalized foreigners assaulting citizens play on the sensitivities of those in the West

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who feel helpless in the face of globalization. Martin and Martin emphasize that “Elected public officials at the federal, state and local levels played an important role in deflecting anger that may have otherwise been directed at immigrants.” For instance, after the 9/11 attacks, “President Bush, Mayor Giuliani and other officials quickly distinguished between the vast majority of law-abiding immigrants and the very few terrorists who had attacked the country.” Public officials visited mosques and met with Arab and Muslim community leaders in the quest to show the public that Muslims and terrorists were not one and the same.

Contrast this behavior with that of President Trump who said “Islam hates us” and tweeted warnings of Muslims infiltrating migrant caravans. Resurgent ethnonationalists in Europe and America in 2020 opposed immigration and saw no need to distinguish between Muslims and terrorists. In fact, these groups and leaders like President Trump seek to emphasize the “radical Islamic” nature of the terrorism they oppose—and ignore the radical nature of the white supremacist and far-right terrorism dubbed “domestic.”

Felix Bethke emphasizes that this rejection of migrants leads to violence against refugees, an oft-ignored factor in discussions of terrorist violence. He calls for more compassion for refugees entering Europe and the West as a means for reducing radicalization. He also proposes increasing aid to terror-prone countries to build their security and social capacities so that they too can better serve their populations.

Radicalization and terrorism are a two-way street. State violence against and oppression of Muslims, especially in Europe, has led some migrants to turn to terrorist violence. This violence cannot be explained by material conditions alone, but must be placed in a wider landscape that includes the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, human rights abuses in the Middle East and the cynicism of Western state support of the oil industry, Gulf monarchies, and colonialism. With these compass points in mind, the connections between migrants, refugees, radicalization, and the rare terrorist violence committed in Western countries can be seen.

The present political context in the West, where some world leaders denigrate migrants, where drones continue to strike tribal people, where the proxy war in Syria takes new forms, and where an impasse continues to fester in Israel-Palestine, is not conducive to the integration of millions of African and Middle Eastern migrants into Europe and the Middle East. Scholarly evidence shows that the vast majority of these migrants will not radicalize and, on the contrary, that many of these migrants will face violence and discrimination at the hands of domestic populations.

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218 Martin and Martin, “International Migration and Terrorism,” pg. 342.


220 Bethke, “Migration of Terrorism,” pg. 70.

221 Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone


47
The next chapter examines the state system and land rights claims as systemic causes of tensions between migrants and hosts.
Chapter Three

Native and Migrant Land Conflicts:
Justifying Migration and Explaining Radicalization in a World of State “Boxes”

Abstract

Artificial borders and boundaries form a map that reinforces divisions between people. Justifications for these divisions are usually based on history, the outcomes of conflict, ethnicity, narrative myths, and nativity. This chapter, evaluates these—and other—justifications for land ownership with two main questions in mind. First, "Who Owns Land?" In other words, what normative justifications for land ownership are valid and which are not? Second, "What Justifies Keeping People Out?" In other words, do reasons of nativity, security, coherence, ethnicity, etc. justify keeping migrants, refugees and others out of certain lands? Case study analysis of land claims made in Israel-Palestine will be employed to further explore the topic. In the end, it will be argued that that nations and nationalism and their concomitant justifications for ownership and exclusion are the great barriers to a more just land distribution and system of human migration.

Key Words: Land Rights, Land Ownership, Native Rights, Migration, Exclusion.

We live in boxes. Each box is said to contain a “people,” that is: a type of human. These people can be linked by culture, language, skin color, history, religion, or anything else.

We teach our children about the box we live in. How the box came to take on its current mix of human contents. Why that mix is the right mix.

They also learn about the boxes nearby. How they contain different humans with different experiences.

This world of boxes has a certain beauty to it. We can look at a picture of all the boxes stacked atop one another and marvel at the diversity of humanity. We can feel safe that bad people, wars and disasters are contained within faraway boxes.

The news tells us about these events. In one box there’s a famine. In another there looks like a genocide may happen. In another: disease. We read about these boxes and watch what happens in these boxes. They move us in some ways, in others it just feels good to be informed. After all, our box is what really matters.

Today, people don’t attack other people’s boxes as much as they once did. Instead, we fight within our own boxes and worry more about the people within our boxes than those outside of them.

Lately, though, the whole system of boxes has looked like it might fall apart.
People have been spilling out of some boxes and rolling into others in huge droves. Some boxes have become too cramped. Some contain too much internal violence. Others are too hot, too cold, too dry, or too wet.

The people who move boxes say: there should be no system of boxes! People should just be allowed to live wherever they want!

The people who stay in their boxes say: the box system keeps us safe! The contents of our box made sense before you came! Maybe you should get out!

If we ask anyone today ‘who owns land?’ The answer that comes back will either be the people or the state. The problem is that while states work for many people in the rich world, they are failing many people in parts of the world plagued by poverty, war, environmental degradation, and predatory governments. As these people move from their boxes into those of others, the human community needs to reevaluate how land ownership is justified. Simply stating that something called a nation-state legally controls the territory within certain borders is not enough in a world where the nation-state system has failed so many. This question of ownership goes to the root of the issue of a just global normative order for migrants. It also deals with radicalization: how people perceive the justness of the world they live in affects how they react to events within it.

Arguments about migration center on land. Who deserves it? Who gets to live on it? Who gets to move to it? These arguments deal primarily with rights: rights of movement, rights of ownership, citizenship rights, residency rights.

The world of boxes is at a turning point. People are spilling out due to desertification, flooding, state failure, gross economic inequality and war, among other reasons. Though the covid-19 pandemic has stemmed migration temporarily, these causal factors remain. These factors are also connected. Environmental degradation links directly to human conflict. As Jared Diamond shows in *Collapse*, climate change is an underlying factor just about wherever war occurs today223.

As food, land and water resources dwindle, particularly in population dense places like Rwanda and Burundi, conflict ignites. These resource conflicts serve to exhume the extant problems in the state system. In this system, people are tied to their governments and given limited rights to cross international borders into new lands even when circumstances are dangerous in their home countries. This is despite an international human rights regime that claims to enshrine a right to asylum, a right to move freely (at least within borders), and a right to citizenship or nationality224. States, particularly poor and authoritarian ones act as “boxes” that hold in people and problems until they “explode”—as Syria did in 2011—and undermine the security of their neighbors.

Where does radicalization fit in? Radicalization, and the terrorism it breeds, acts as a causal factor in pushing people out of dangerous countries and as a consequence of state

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failure. Radicalization is also a fact of life in an unequal world where, as Ayelet Shachar establishes, those born in the rich world gain an enormous birthright inheritance that gives them far more wealth, power and freedom of movement than those in the developing world. Radicalization arises out of inequality as it is a product of grievance and derives from a desire to make substantive change. It also comes about when hosts feel the burden of (perceived) competition and cultural change in response to migration.

On a deeper level, then, deciphering native and migrant rights is central to solving the problems of the future where presumably millions of migrants will continue to seek greener pastures in safe and prosperous states. Fixing a system that doesn’t work for so many people will also alleviate radicalization. Within the state, people are divided into various units: the individual or the collective, natives and migrants. The arguments of natives and migrants will be examined to see whether one group has a clearer moral claim to land than the other. In the end, it will be shown that a new system and way of viewing land is needed in a world where so many people are looking to change locations. These conclusions will be elaborated upon in Ch. 5.

**A New Land Ethic: Higher Morality and Land**

Joshua Greene in *Moral Tribes* argues that the world would be better if it were populated by moral utilitarians. This is because, he believes, utilitarians would reach out to groups wider than their “tribe” and seek justice on a more global level. Greene’s argument is that doing the greatest good for the greatest number of people means giving our excess goods to others in need. To this end, land conflicts would need to be solved not by historical justification, which will be explored below, but by a higher moral code.

A new land ethic is needed for reconciling the rights of natives and migrants. The current system of states and territories works well for many people—those in successful units—but works very poorly for others. Those for whom it works poorly includes people living under harsh governments that extract goods from them like North Korea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan. It also works poorly for people living in countries whose governments are failed or fragile like in Yemen, Libya, or Somalia. With civil wars becoming the near-exclusive form of war in modern times, people in places like Syria, South Sudan, parts of Mexico, and northeastern Nigeria also do not benefit from the current state system. Finally, environmental changes have made life in places like Bangladesh and the Maldives—and perhaps soon the Persian Gulf—

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increasingly difficult. In many places, like in Yemen or Sudan, war, failed governance and environmental factors overlap to make life incredibly hard for many people.

The choices for these people are limited: stay or move somewhere else to try to find a better life. As Joseph Carens argues, if we put ourselves in their shoes through Rawls’ original position thought experiment, we would realize that anyone would want to move to safer ground if put in such dire circumstances. After all, as Ayelet Shachar evidences, our life opportunities are greatly determined by the lucky circumstances of our birth which bequeath some of us with membership into prosperous nations and others of us with membership into predatory or impoverished nations. In a world where humans are boxed-up into these “bounded membership communities,” global inequality is inevitable.

Here land rights will be explored as a way of seeing what justifies the current state system. The question of who deserves to own land is central to the questions of migration, citizenship and native rights. All of these issues revolve around moral concepts of distributive justice: in other words, who should get what. The contention in this chapter is that the very system of divvying up the Earth into separate boxes perpetuates problems by sealing people into unsafe spaces and by creating a logic for keeping needy people out of desirable territories. This logic also needs to be examined in light of the 2020 global pandemic, which has justified some uses of land rights for keeping people out and which has great future ramifications.

Migrants who want to join the rich world face the twin problems of private property and the nation-state. These concepts moor people to certain lands and justify their placement on those lands. The state-sized equivalent of private property is the conception of sovereignty which provides the government of a bounded territory with free reign to rule in that territory as they see fit just like individuals can, within limits, do what they see fit on their private lands.

As migrants continue to move from Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Libya, and other troubled spots into a weary Europe, the question of who deserves what land and how the world’s territory should be distributed has become an acute one. The topic will be explored with a focus on the tension between natives and migrants.

**Who Owns Land?**

Land conflicts riddle the planet and human history. From Israel and Palestine to Northern Ireland to South Africa and Zimbabwe to Australia and New Zealand. Too often these conflicts are reduced into the differing peoples or views that encapsulate the conflict: a war over religion, an ethnic conflict, a battle of races. Yet what unites conflicts the world over is a patchwork of laws, customs and histories involving land rights and ownership.

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232 Shachar, *The Birthright Lottery*.
The way that humans come to own land, like the simple answer to the question “Who owns land?,” is varied. There is no one unifying law over land. Court cases document land contestations such as in the domestic American setting over eminent domain or oil drilling rights or in the international setting over native rights, borders, or maritime rights. Conceptions of who has rights to land differ greatly across the planet and have changed throughout history. Communist countries see the land as owned by the collective or by the government (as a proxy for the collective), capitalist countries view land as (mostly) privately owned by individuals, monarchies see the land as owned by the king or queen, nomadic tribes see the land as owned by no one (or by “nature” or “gods”), and religious people see the land as owned by God (and sometimes view themselves as God’s representatives on Earth).

Further, methods of land acquisition vary widely, leading to divergent claims to rightful ownership. Some of the world’s land has been acquired through purchase, some through conquest, some through “discovery” (for instance, humans crossing the Bering Strait into non-human populated land), and some through settlement (for instance, when Europeans “settled” America). With all land conflicts, history is a tool of those who make claims. So are land titles (versus oral claims), claims of improving land (versus “doing nothing” with it), claims of being peaceful (versus being violent), claims of winning wars fairly (or unfairly), claims of needing land for defense (or for aggression), claims that God (or a King or Queen) bequeathed land, claims that the government owns all land, claims that land is needed to extract certain resources (or to preserve them), and claims of being there first. On top of these multifarious claims, the edifice of law about land was erected by “state” governments who claimed huge tracts of land for themselves and who made agreements to respect and recognize each other’s plots. It is important to note too that land laws have been used to “reform land use” usually through some sort of “more equitable” redistribution and to justify current land holdings. These land reforms, such as in China or Zimbabwe, are contentious to say the least.

The focus here will be on who should own land and, by extension whether and how we can justify excluding others from land. Ultimately, the tension between migrants and hosts rests on this issue. Further, conflicts that lead to migration and exacerbate radicalization rest on land disputes. These conflicts can have to do with land where natives share land with settlers like Zimbabwe, land where natives share land with settlers that claim that they are the real natives like Israel-Palestine, land where settlers control land in which some natives remain like Australia and the United States, and land where poor drawing of borders and a history of colonialism create conflicts between peoples like in Africa and the Near East. A rigid international border system that promotes border fixity over human geography doesn’t help matters. These conflicts have come to a head in the twenty-first century as a huge influx of refugees from Iraq, Syria and Africa have migrated to neighboring places like Lebanon, Jordan and Europe. Refugee supporters ask: What gives anyone the right to keep out a person in need, especially one who has a great risk of dying if not let in?

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At the same time, arguments that support native rights are frequently bandied to condemn settlers and colonizers, and to propose just solutions to land conflicts. The natives were there first. Settlers and colonizers stole land. Theft is a crime; land theft a crime against humanity. The issue is presented as a cut-and-dried one. While in some cases colonizers, as the Spanish conquistadors did in Cajamarca\textsuperscript{235}, came specifically to steal and plunder, other issues are more complicated. Israel-Palestine, with the Jewish history of the Holocaust and connections to the land, is not simply a story of settlers or colonizers stealing from natives—though that is certainly one valid narrative\textsuperscript{236}.

Today’s Australians, New Zealanders, Americans, Canadians, and South Americans may be descendants of conquerors or settlers but so are some inhabitants of today’s France, England and Russia. Should we punish the descendants of these conquerors considering, for instance, how many Southeast Asians now live in Australia, how many Central Americans live in the United States (not to mention the descendants of Black slaves), and how many Ethiopian and North African Jews live in Israel? Is there even a just way to punish the wrongdoers so many generations later? In Israel-Palestine the wrongdoing is current so the answer is more immediate, but in Australia the brunt of the damage occurred in the past (though, of course, mistreatment of natives continues to this day). Aboriginals have some rights but their country is controlled by newcomers and it was taken hundreds of years ago. The same can be said for Native Americans, Canada’s First Nations and Alaska Natives.

A great give-back to natives makes moral sense but is impractical. After all, “finder’s keepers” and “we were here first” are simple, just, effective rules for governing human interactions. Yet with land, the issue of need arises as well. Is it right for natives to effectively cut their land off from anyone who needs safe harbor? Do native rights supersede all other claims to land? Human rights concerns have imbed the migration debate, but if native rights are paramount then there isn’t much to argue about.

**Land Ownership through the Ages**

Since the dawn of *Homo sapiens sapiens* (and before), humans have formed groups, packs, clans, or tribes. At first, human groupings were small—the size of “bands”—but, as human populations grew and expanded, these bands became clans and then tribes. Jared Diamond divides human societies into four main groupings: bands consisting of dozens of people, tribes consisting of hundreds, chiefdoms consisting of thousands, and states consisting of over 50,000 people\textsuperscript{237}. As societies grew, they became more complex in their methods of governance, food production, and land distribution.

For the vast majority of human existence, the species has organized itself into tribes of hunter-gatherers. As Joshua Greene explains it, if an extraterrestrial visited Earth every 10,000 years over a 100,000-year span leading up to today their field notes would denote nine visits where humans number less than 10 million hunter-gatherers using


primitive tools and one final visit where there were over 7 billion humans organizing themselves in sophisticated societies\footnote{Greene, Joshua. Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason and the Gap Between Us and Them (New York: Penguin Press 2013), pg. 12.}.

Hunter-gatherers live off of the Earth and, for this reason, their belief-systems usually imbue the Earth, the trees, the animals, and the land with “spirits” or mystical powers. As Walter Echo-Hawk notes, “In primal cosmology, only a thin line exists between humans and the animals and plants that live in tribal habitats—and everything, including the land itself, has a spirit”\footnote{Echo-Hawk, Walter R. In the Light of Justice: The Rise of Human Rights in Native America and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Press 2013), pg. 139.}. Contrast this with the settler mentality where land is viewed as a resource or as territory to be subjugated and conquered\footnote{Echo-Hawk, In the Light of Justice, pgs. 135, 140.}.

For this reason, private property was not an invention of hunter-gatherer tribes. Instead, to them the land was owned by gods or nature. Humans could not own land—and they didn’t need to; nomadic or semi-nomadic tribespeople may have inhabited certain territory but they had no great need to own a particular sphere of land. As Jeffrey Herbst shows in the African case, due to low population densities in most of the world and a lot of available land, land contestations were largely unnecessary for most of human history due to the ability to simply move to an as-yet-uninhabited space\footnote{Herbst, Jeffrey. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2000); Scott, James C. The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2009).}.

This changed with the advent of farming as farmers are dependent on specific plots of land for their crops\footnote{This is not to say that natives did not have farming. Native Americans did have complex, farming-based societies (Page, In the Hands of the Great Spirit).}. The Torah is littered with phrases regarding farming. The shunned Esau hunts and craves game; Noah plants a vineyard after the flood. The Book of Leviticus exhorts the people on what types of domesticated animal to eat, the Book of Deuteronomy lists rules about farming, and the Book of Exodus discusses rotating fields.

Farming yielded the need to control a certain parcel of land. Pre-farming humans needed to be nomadic due to the itinerant nature of hunting and gathering. The farm changed their way of life as food, animals and plants are readily available on domesticated plots. The importance and recency of this change cannot be overstated.

Farming yielded the need to fence off land from “the wild”: from undomesticated animal intruders and from thieving humans. Anyone who has planted a garden understands how insects and small mammals can ravage one’s “crop.” The need to protect the farm led to a series of successive changes in how humans viewed their relationship to land. Of course, not all humans moved to farm-based societies and many still hunt and gather today though their numbers have precipitously dwindled.

A typical hunter-gathering tribe sees land as owned by gods or nature and views the Earth as imbued with spirits. Each animal and plant is revered for it is needed for food. Hunting and gathering requires patience and some luck. While the same attributes help
farmers, less luck is required if farming is done right. The numerous prayers for rain in Biblical texts are evidence of this fact. With rain, a farm produces food—not much else is required.

Farming led to the walling off of land plots and to a sedentary human population. This sedentary population was worried about its security. James Scott describes the image of the barbarian that “urban” or “civilized” societies create. The “hills people,” the “people of the interior,” the barbarians are people that view the Earth much differently than those who live in “the center.” They are nomadic or semi-nomadic, they value freedom greatly, and, for this reason, Scott argues they flee government control. In the East and West, humans worried about such people pillaging their towns, stealing their women, and eating their crops. A friend, Josiah Seale, described to me once how tribes in the North Rift region of Kenya raided each other to steal cattle; good raiding abilities equated to male sexual prowess among the tribe’s women. Farming and the anxiety that it induced (a sedentary people may have lost the ability to hunt and gather) generated the need for increased security in the form of fences and centralized governments. As Jared Diamond contends, farming created an excess food supply which allowed people to specialize in the fields of religion, writing, and other trades. Yuval Harari similarly sees farming as a huge sea change in human life, but one that may not have been worth the trouble. Harari argues that while farming built wealth for human societies, it degraded the life experiences of most human individuals who now had to toil for their food and consumed fewer calories on average than their hunter-gatherer brethren. This state of affairs lasted until modern times, when farm yields have grown substantially.

Andro Linklater traces things a bit differently. He sees the idea of private property as a revolutionary concept that changed the world. Linklater argues that North America is truly the first private property territory as, for instance, Queen Elizabeth granted all the land discovered on St. John’s Island off of Newfoundland to the discoverers she chartered. Of course, natives had been fishing in these territories for centuries but they had not conceived that land could be owned outright by individuals.

Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto agrees that property itself is an idea. He writes that, “[P]roperty, like energy is a concept; it cannot be experienced directly. .... [N]o one can see property. ... The proof that property is pure concept comes when a house changes hands; nothing physically changes. Looking at a house will not tell you who owns it.” De Soto writes that, “Over decades in the nineteenth century [the century of nationalism in Europe], politicians, legislators, and judges pulled together scattered

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247 Linklater, Andro. Owning the Earth: Transforming History of Land Ownership (New York: Bloomsbury 2013), pg. 3.
248 Linklater, Owning the Earth, pgs. 2-3.
facts and rules that had governed property throughout cities, villages, buildings, and farms and integrated them into one system. This ‘pulling together’ of property representations [was] a revolutionary moment in the history of developed nations”250.

De Soto asserts that property rights in the West were created “for the mundane purpose of protecting property ownership”251. I contend that John Locke’s ideas about property rights led to the property title revolution in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries252. Evidence for this proposition comes from Alexis de Tocqueville. In The Old Regime and the French Revolution, Tocqueville writes that shortly before the outset of the Revolution an Intendant found that, “Everybody insists on having his share of the land, with the result that estates are broken up into innumerable fragments, and this process of fragmentation is going on all the time.” Tocqueville further observed that, “Then, as in our own day, the peasant’s desire for owning land was nothing short of an obsession and already all the passions to which possession of the soil gives rise in present-day France were active”253.

This desire of the peasants to own property came to them via the Lockean idea of universal property rights. To Locke, anyone can own land, it’s just a matter of acquiring it first and improving it254. De Soto asserts that, “By transforming people with property interests into accountable individuals, formal property created individuals from masses. People no longer needed to rely on neighborhood relationships or make local arrangements to protect their rights to assets”255. Further, “By making assets fungible, by attaching owners to assets, assets to addresses, and ownership to enforcement, and by making information on the history of assets and owners easily accessible, formal property systems converted the citizens of the West into a network of individually identifiable and accountable business agents”256. In the developing world, elites have coopted the desires of individuals for property rights, placing in front of them bureaucratic red tape. In fact, at the time of De Soto’s writing in 2000, it took as many as fourteen years to achieve legal property status in Egypt and up to nineteen years to do so in Haiti257.

Louis Hartz, in The Liberal Tradition in America, underlines America’s “national acceptance of the Lockian creed”258. Locke conceives of property as a pre-political right and, therefore, sees the liberal rights that government enshrines as necessary in order for the government to remain viable. Under Locke’s theory, if the government does not preserve property, then people have no duty to follow the government259.

250 De Soto, The Mystery of Capital, pg. 52.
251 De Soto, The Mystery of Capital, pg. 46.
256 De Soto, The Mystery of Capital, pg. 58.
257 De Soto, The Mystery of Capital, pgs. 82-3.
259 Locke, Second Treatise of Government, pg. 111.
Under feudalism, the “landlord” controlled property and the peasants or serfs could live on it. When capitalism undid this system, the landlords became landowners and the peasants and serfs were thrown off the land\textsuperscript{260}. The idea that a lord can own property came from the idea that God owns the land. The logic goes that God owns the Earth and the King or Queen is God’s representative on Earth, so the land is owned by the noble family and they can bequeath plots to others. By some measures the Queen of England owns one-sixth of the land on Earth and, in so-called Crown lands such as the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, she has the legal right to seize land without providing compensation\textsuperscript{261}.

To be sure, conquest underwrote the creation of the private property system in the so-called New World and, in many ways, in the Old World where feudalism ruled. As Jared Diamond notes, centralized governments take much more for themselves than tribal governments do\textsuperscript{262}. A private property system might be fair if it were based on fair initial acquisition and fair transfers, but that cannot be said for the systems that exist today. The inequality that private property created led to the anti-private property movement supported at various times by anarchists, Communists, natives, and environmentalists.

Clearly there are some historical and theoretical hurdles to establishing a just system of land ownership and land rights. Conquest, “discovery,” different theories about who owns what and about who can own what all muddy the topic. We now turn to two main arguments, the argument of the native and of the migrant, to try to narrow things down. These arguments underpin many of the claims made today about the modern system of immigration and, as such, affect future migration and radicalization.

**Arguments for the Native**

Absent historical and cultural connections, there are two bases for the natives’ argument for owning land. The first is rather simple and easy to understand: we were here first. The people that settled a land first deserve to live on it. Why? Because they are the original claimants and there are no previous claims. The second argument, relatedly, is John Locke’s labor-mixing argument. Locke argues that since each person owns their body, they own the output produced by their body’s work. In cases where no one else has a previous claim, he posits that “mixing your labor” with an object yields ownership of that object or area of land. It is unclear if measurement or walling off land is sufficient to meet Locke’s concerns\textsuperscript{263}. Perhaps building a home on the land is necessary—Locke does not make this clear. Robert Nozick pokes fun at Locke’s argument stating that one could pour a can of tomato juice into the ocean and thereby own the ocean according to the labor-mixing theory\textsuperscript{264}.

\[260\text{Linklater, } Owning the Earth, \text{ pgs. 13-19, ch. 15.}\]
\[261\text{Cahill, Kevin. } Who Owns the World: The Surprising Truth about Every Piece of Land on the Planet (New York: Grand Central Publishing 2010), \text{ pgs. 16-19.}\]
\[262\text{Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel, ch. 14.}\]
\[263\text{Linklater, } Owning the Earth, \text{ ch. 13; Linklater, Andro. Measuring America (New York: Walker Books 2002).}\]
Nozick makes an important note in this section: those seeking private property need to show how they came to own that property, while those seeking collective land rights need to show why they deserve these rights. As Nozick writes,

“We should note that it is not only persons favoring private property who need a theory of how property rights legitimately originate. Those believing in collective property, for example those believing that a group of persons living in an area jointly own the territory, or its mineral resources, also must provide a theory of how such property rights arise; they must show why the persons living there have rights to determine what is done with the land and resources there that persons living elsewhere don't have (with regard to the same land and resources).”

Nozick contends that a just theory of land appropriation and of land transfer needs to be established and he believes that a free market system achieves this goal.

Competing claims to Antarctica—with as many as ten countries staking claims to the land—show how even uninhabited, virtually uninhabitable land can be contested by state-units that seek resources or future opportunities. A treaty that expires in 2041 presently reserves Antarctica for scientific purposes, but the issue remains of how such a land might be acquired aside from “discovery,” flag-planting and “making claims.” The issue shows that dividing up land is actually made more complicated by the lack of a human presence, the native claim that “we are here and we need the land” circumvents other distributive justice considerations.

The native argument is beautiful in its simplicity and logically consistent. A people “discovered” a land and “conquered” it from non-human animals and nature. Or else, they came to share the land with the original, non-human animal discoverers of the land. As Jack Page writes, the first human Americans “were people who felt akin to other creatures in a way that few people alive today can imagine.” They settled the land and created a home there. They mixed their labor with the soil and should enjoy the fruits of that labor. Shouldn’t these people have airtight rights to ownership of the land?

There are a few countervailing factors here to explore. First, is who are “the We” that claim to be original owners. Surely, some tribes killed and conquered others throughout history and many original inhabitants have died off. Then, there is the issue of minorities within minorities, which today is sometimes captured by those who study intersectionality. Specifically, within each group exist sub-groups which could also be disenfranchised by the main group. Moreover, groups may have merged or split or consolidated or comingled. Saying with certainty that my ancestors have a claim to this

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265 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, pg. 153.
266 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, pg. 168.
267 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, pgs. 174, 182.
270 Song, Sarah, Justice, Gender and the Politics of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2007).
land is exceedingly difficult to do in the modern age—and, of course, modern courts have used this argument against natives. Perhaps people like you owned land like this, but it would be hard to link one’s lineage to a certain piece of territory without documentation or archaeological or genetic evidence. As land rights have moved from collective to individual claims, a contradiction has arisen: collective tribal groups making claims of private (individual) property ownership.

The native claim can also be attacked historically. Were you truly the first natives here? Do you truly own this land? The questions of “we” and the questions of “when” comingle. From a naturalistic perspective, humans “took” land that is meant to be owned by all of nature. From a related animal rights perspective, humans took land that animals treaded on before—often this led to the extinction of animal species.

Finally, the native claim can be attacked by shifting the basis for land ownership. This can be done legally: by saying, for instance, that title is necessary to own land. Or it can be done politically, by conquering land. And usually it is done through both means: new rulers require a new way of viewing land, which usually means bad news for the original inhabitants. Of course, changing the rules does not make the conquest of land moral.

All that said, in a vacuum, native claims are difficult to morally counter. If they were there first, they deserve the land. We would want the same respect. If extraterrestrials came to Earth, we would not think that they have a viable, moral claim over our planet regardless of their intelligence, intentions, needs, or strength. Earthlings are the natives, not them. We were here first. And, more than that, we need and deserve the land.

The qualifier here is that humans do not live in a vacuum. They live in a world of competing claims. In some cases, multiple groups claim to be native for different reasons. In others, multiple groups have claims over land based on different arguments.

For instance, today’s Anglo-Australians could be said to have stolen their land from aboriginals on the basis that perhaps their great-grandparents did the stealing. In that case, perhaps we can say they are at fault. Yet what about the Chinese-Australian family that purchased a home from a Sri Lankan-Australian family who purchased the same property from an Anglo-Australian? Is this just the transfer of stolen property or does the muddying of evidence against these successive owners dilute the natives’ land claim? A pro-native argument would say: transfers of land to successive people definitively do not dilute the natives’ claim. If I steal your purse and it gets sold to four different people over a series of years, is it not still your purse? Perhaps we can say that the fourth-string buyer is not a criminal (or as criminal) as the original thief, but ownership of the purse should not be in question.

This opens a new topic. Is land different from a purse? All humans need land to live on. They do not need purses (though they may need money). People are also bound to certain territories by governments and borders. They also may be citizens of a certain land. Telling a citizen of Australia to clear out so that aboriginals may retake the land is not as simple as telling someone that they are in possession of a stolen purse. The native

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271 Page, In the Hands of the Great Spirit, see for instance the discussion of the Indian Claims Commission on pages 394-403.

272 Harari, Sapiens.
argument also falters when we consider migrants, whose claims are explored in the following section.

Arguments for the Migrant

People decide to leave the land they were born on for a variety of reasons. These include war and conflict, resource depletion, environmental degradation, the spread of disease, medical reasons, financial opportunities abroad or lack of opportunities at home, family reconnection, political reasons, educational pursuits, and persecution in their home lands. In addition to these reasons, we may not want to live in a world where movement is overly circumscribed. The ideal world is certainly one where we can physically move to pursue opportunities or avoid threats. Being forced to stay on a certain territory limits opportunity and makes us vulnerable. As Daniel Dennett shows, movement is the central innovation of animals. Plants can gather energy while staying in one spot, but have virtually no defenses if someone were to approach them with bad intentions. Animals need to move around to accrue energy (food), but can avoid threats\textsuperscript{273}.

Saying that humans must live on certain pieces of land is an exceedingly strange proposition in the modern world. Air travel makes physical movement across the Earth fast and affordable. The Internet connects people—economically, financially, socially, romantically—across the globe. In many circles, cosmopolitanism, the belief that we are one human family, is on the rise\textsuperscript{274}. And instances where people are forced to stay on certain territories, such as Palestinians in Gaza or people living in dictatorships like North Korea or Uzbekistan are condemned and seen as extremely undesirable. In some traditional societies, women are forced into domestic roles but such a proposition is seen as backward, inegalitarian and unjust in the modern world.

To stretch the concept further, natives became indigenous to all places except for East Africa because they travelled. Across islands to get to New Guinea and Australia. Across the Bering Strait (or, truly the land bridge known as Beringia) to get to the Americas\textsuperscript{275}. Natives, like all humans, want the right to move around too. They just have a special claim to land that migrants might not.

But if natives were justified in their pursuit of better lives, then aren’t today’s migrants justified in their movements too?

This question turns on the difference of entering “virgin,” uninhabited land versus entering inhabited land. The great conquerors of the Americas are still presented as “discoverers” of “new land” to schoolchildren in America. If they discovered a new land, then taking it as their own is justifiable. But, obviously, America was no more “discovered” by Columbus than Israel was discovered by the Zionists or South Africa by the Boers. Perhaps the land was new to them but the land had already been discovered

\textsuperscript{275} Diamond, \textit{Guns, Germs and Steel}, pg. 38; Page, \textit{In the Hands of the Great Spirit}, pgs. 18-21.
and populated by the indigenous peoples living on that land. Taking from those people moves a person from the category of migrant to one of a settler or colonist.

A migrant is anyone who moves from one land to another, the term also carries the connotation that the traveler is willing to live under the established order of the people of their new land. A doctor who moves her family to a new country for work is an example of a migrant. A settler is a migrant who seeks to transport not only herself, but also her way of life to a new land in the form of a settlement. Settlers do not intend on living under anyone else’s established order. The Dutch, today called Afrikaners, who moved to South Africa were settlers. Colonists seek not only to establish their way of life in a new land, but also seek to conquer, or colonize, the new land and its people. Colonizers may not be migrants at all, they may simply be people seeking to profit from the wealth of a certain land, settling the land may not be their concern.

On this spectrum, colonizing land is the most difficult action to morally defend, settling land a little less difficult, and migrating is the easiest action to defend. Morally defending colonization would mean having to take on the belief that one people is, for some reason, more deserving of land (or the resources that land holds) than another. Even if such a proposition could be shown to be true, the primacy of the claims of the original inhabitants weigh strongly against viewing the colonists as rightful owners. One potential moral justification is that the land needs to be colonized because either the native people are living under a terrible government, the natives are not “developing” the land or because the colonizers were forced to leave their own land. These reasons may provide some motivation for colonization but don’t meet modern moral standards. Freeing people from a terrible leader is a worthy goal, one that Michael Walzer says can be the basis for a just war276, but colonizing them afterward is certainly morally indefensible. Human populations may have to move for a variety of reasons, but conquering their new hosts is not justifiable in such a situation.

Creating settlements, like the British did in Jamestown, is a more moral proposition particularly when a settlement can be created in an area of land that is presently uninhabited. Having the permission of the current inhabitants makes settlement building a consensual and justifiable practice. There are Chinatowns the world over where Chinese people maintain their culture and live with their co-ethnics (and with other East Asian peoples), but none were forcibly established. With the permission of their hosts, these become ethnic enclaves and not settlements. Religious minorities, such as Mormon offshoot-groups, may set up settlements in the southwestern United States and these settlements are morally permissible to the extent that they are accepted by their local communities and governments. Of course, in Palestine, settlements have been forcibly erected. While contentions over certain pieces of land may present issues in some of these cases, these projects are immoral to the extent to which these settlements are established through force and conquest.

Migration provides a strong counter to the native argument. The pro-migrant individual asks: who are you to tell me that I cannot traverse borders? Who are you to shoot or

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detrain me if I move to this land? Why must I live a poor life because I had the dim luck of being born in an impoverished or war-torn land?²⁷⁷

Rights derived from primacy do not necessitate rights to refuse others, such as refugees who must leave their land for reasons of survival. Joseph Carens argues from the perspective of John Rawls that migrants should be allowed to go virtually anywhere they want. He begins with Rawls’ mechanism of the veil of ignorance and the original position. The original position is our position before “the state of nature,” one of the simpler ways to think of it is our position before we were born. Behind the veil of ignorance, we are ignorant to who we are or will be. Rawls argues that fair rules for society can only be created if we eschew our biases. Thinking of ourselves in the original position, behind the veil of ignorance eliminates our bias. If we don’t know who we are, or who we will be in the future, wouldn’t we want to create a world that’s fair for everyone? Further, wouldn’t we want to “buy insurance” for ourselves by making the ideal world one where the worst-off have a decent life?²⁷⁸ Rawls creates an ideal society where liberty, fair opportunity, and a decent life for the worst off are foundational principles.

Caren’s applies this idea to migration. In the original position, wouldn’t we find keeping out migrants immoral in all but the most extenuating national security situations? Caren’s argument implies that liberty, fair opportunity, and a decent life for the worst-off would be best achieved in a world where people can freely (or mostly freely) traverse borders²⁷⁹.

By contrast, Michael Walzer argues that states are like private clubs and that, as clubs, these communities can exercise their sovereignty and right to self-determination by concocting their own laws of inclusion and exclusion. To Walzer, sovereignty has little meaning without the right to exclude. Indeed, in Spheres of Justice, Walzer argues that, “the primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human community. ... Men and women without membership anywhere are stateless persons”²⁸⁰. Walzer’s argument in essence asks: would you want outsiders to be able to overrun your neighborhood without your consent? He also notes the importance of being part of a community and of being able to form the character of that community²⁸¹.

The human desire to pursue a better life is universal, and even children understand the rights of the “me-first,” original owner. Conflict arises where the native and migrant arguments collide—and this is where radicalization takes hold on both sides. The colonization of Australia and America do not perfectly fit this bill, but perhaps the conflicts in Israel-Palestine or in Liberia do. These are cases where worthy people

²⁸¹ Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pgs. 86-91; Walzer, Spheres of Justice.
(meaning needy people, displaced persons or refugees) with some claim to the land they migrated to, came into conflict with natives. In Liberia, freed African-American slaves became colonizers of an African land\textsuperscript{282}; while in Palestine, Jewish refugees sought to create a safe haven through colonization and settlement of a land with which they have religious ties. In both cases, a simple rule that grants total control to the current inhabitants, or to those who are or claim to be indigenous, erases too much nuance and shunts the complexity of competing claims.

\textbf{Comparing Arguments about Rightful Land Ownership and Redistribution in Zimbabwe, Palestine and Israel}

In Zimbabwe, land reformists who sought to kick out white farmers make the claim that whites (or their ancestors) stole African land and so they may not own it in the present\textsuperscript{283}. This is a classic native argument just like the one that aboriginals deserve land in Australia. The problem in Zimbabwe was that farms were taken from white farmers and then the land reverted back to the bush\textsuperscript{284}. The push against white farmers in Zimbabwe also did the country no favors with international trade as it led to an erosion of property rights throughout the country\textsuperscript{285}. Still, these facts alone do not change the moral claim of Black Zimbabweans to land and are, in fact, ironic given the history of white colonialism and the control of whites over much of the international market. Large corporations and other monied interests did not want to do business in a place that seemed to capriciously take land from long-time owners—even if there was justification for doing so.

After the fall of long-time leader Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe agreed in 2020 to repay white farmers for lands that were expropriated from them and given to Black families\textsuperscript{286}. This restitution is meant to undo a domestically divisive, racially-motivated policy enacted by Mugabe. It’s also meant to bring the country into compliance with world standards. What’s interesting about the Zimbabwe case is that an attempt to rectify past wrongs led to international opprobrium and ostracism due to the need to entrench predictable property rights and rules of land transfer in the world capitalist economy. Investors could not confidently move money into Zimbabwean projects

\textsuperscript{282} Library of Congress, “History of Liberia: A Timeline,”
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gmdhtml/libhtml/liberia.html. It should, of course, be noted that the freed slaves were not original inhabitants of Liberia, but rather of Africa in general—a point lost on the Anglo-Americans who sought to send them back to their supposedly native home.


without knowledge that their investments would be protected from being upended by the redress of historical grievances.

By contrast, in Israel and Palestine competing claims to land mirror one another. Both sides make religious claims that God or His prophets gave this specific land to a specific group of people (and both groups claim to embody that specific people). These claims are supported by religious documents. Of course, to the non-religious, these claims could be dismissed. An ardent atheist might say that one can create a mythical god that then grants one’s group any set of lands and then, through circular reasoning, claim that land. Of course, such an argument ignores the reality of religious life for many people and the history that religion captures. Muslims, Jews, and Christians did not post facto invent their religious connection to the land of their prophets, rather their religions imbue certain lands with symbolic meanings due to historical connections. While non-native Liberians may not have strong connections to the specific land of Liberia, people of the Abrahamic religions all have connections to cities like Jerusalem and Bethlehem. These historic, religious and symbolic connections are the same types of connections that natives in America or Australia might hold up as evidence of their right to land.

Another argument is based on international law. In the modern age, United Nations recognition is the primary way by which a new state is formed. States that do not have UN recognition, like Kosovo and Somaliland, suffer from a lack of legitimacy that brings with it financial, security, scientific, and other drawbacks. Being recognized as a state by the UN means that the other UN member-states view that state as real and legitimate and are willing to do business with that state on an equal platform. Israel’s creation by UN recognition in the late 1940s, just like Pakistan’s, provides one argument for its ownership of land. That said, of course, the United Nations is a political not a moral body and its decisions on their own do not constitute normative justifications. The Palestinians emphasize the 1947 UN partition plan that would have partitioned the land into Arab and Jewish states.

A related argument involves the British. Both sides claim that the British colonial administration gave them the land, through either the 1917 Balfour Declaration or the 1939 White Paper. Again, the British colonial administration’s actions might explain motivations for Jewish migration but the British colonizers did not serve as moral arbiters nor did they have any rightful claim over the land. As such, the gift of the land from the British to Jews or Arabs does not prove who is the morally appropriate owner—it only proves that one body transferred ownership to another. The same can be said of land that was transferred from the British to the Hashemites and Saud families that created Saudi Arabia and Jordan. These royal families have some connection to the land, but their ownership of their countries is not necessarily moral or legitimate.

A fourth set of arguments that are proffered regard war and human rights. Specifically, the Jewish side in this conflict claim that they won wars against the Arab side and that the land they conquered is thus fairly theirs. Of course, whether the wars constituted crimes of aggression, as defined by Michael Walzer, is an important piece for determining whether this reasoning makes any sense. Even if war can be justified as self-defense, conquest and capture may not be justified. Israel makes claims that these

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287 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, chs. 4 and 6.
conquests were necessary for security reasons or for future land-for-peace swaps but such claims emphasize a temporary, war-time need for land capture. An argument based on temporary need is a flimsy one when trying to divine who is the rightful possessor of land. Of course, temporary security needs many times become permanent ones\textsuperscript{288}. Further, both sides claim that the other has committed human rights abuses through massacres or terrorism or crimes against humanity. Recent competing court cases are testament to this fact. In 2015, the Palestinian Authority was found guilty of terroristic crimes in an American court and fined $218 million\textsuperscript{289}. Meanwhile, the PA has submitted evidence of war crimes committed by Israelis to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. In light of Palestinian-provided evidence, the ICC, in 2019, opened an investigation of Israeli war crimes, pointing to three specific incidences that occurred during the 2014 Gaza conflict\textsuperscript{290}. The attempt to prosecute Israeli General Ariel Sharon for the Sabra and Shatilla massacre is also testament to the legal battle that this conflict has spawned\textsuperscript{291}. Human rights claims tie themselves to land claims as they attempt to show that “the other side” is undeserving or unworthy of land since they are aggressive, intolerant and abusive. They also support a view that the opposing side commits wanton violence or criminal acts against peaceful natives or rightful landowners. Of course, each side sees itself as acting in self-defense.

Still another argument turns on whether the Jews who came to Palestine were refugees, migrants, settlers or colonizers. My own grandparents came to Israel as refugees. But many Jewish settlers came before them. The Zionist project of the European Jews was conceived of as a settlement but, like the European settlement of North America, it took on colonial tones. As Ari Shavit notes, the Jewish settlers willfully ignored the Arab villages around which they were about to settle\textsuperscript{292}. Palestinian sources strongly view Jewish settlement as colonization, particularly because it came from Europe and came with a state-building plan\textsuperscript{293}.

Jewish sources prefer the terms settlement or migration. Both sides can agree that the Jews did not migrate with the goal of being controlled by the British or by the local Arabs, there was at least a settlement goal in mind\textsuperscript{294}. The Jewish side extrapolates upon

this argument by dovetailing it with the need for the Jews to find a homeland due to global anti-Semitism in general and the Holocaust in particular\textsuperscript{295}.

In this case, unless one counts the Jews as natives due to their living in Ancient Israel during antiquity, the Palestinians do have a native claim. But just like other native claims, this moral certitude leads to legal limbo due to the current international legal system and the fact that millions of Jews live in Israel-Palestine. In a “white farmer” scenario, future Palestinians could redistribute land away from Jews, but such an action would trade native rights for migrant rights and seek to erase modern history. Israel exists not as an idea, but as a living state and the same goes for Palestine. Unfortunately, the impasse in resolving Palestinian concerns and the two sides’ competing claims to land leads both sides to radicalize and view one another as enemies pitted in a zero-sum contest. In 2020, Gaza was still controlled by Hamas, Palestinians still fruitlessly sought legal recognition and Israel’s Binyamin Netanyahu continued his prime ministership without any inclination of seeking to resolve disputes with Palestinians.

Finally, there is an argument that those who improve the land should own it. This follows from an extension of John Locke’s labor-mixing argument. Locke holds that adding value to land is necessary in order to own it\textsuperscript{296}. Locke held that “the natural right to land was established by use and occupancy”\textsuperscript{297}. Puritans in America accepted this logic in stating that “landed property depended on their own efforts in improving the ground, not on English law”\textsuperscript{298}. Zionists who saw themselves as people who “made the desert bloom” followed the same logic. Law was one thing, but those who improved the land should own it. This argument buttresses the claim that governments can take private property under eminent domain in order to improve or develop the land. It also has some validity in the sense that doing something with land (living on it, growing crops on it, building villages on it) has more human value than planting a flag in it.

The improvement argument rings true in some contexts, for instance, natives in North America improved the land by “clearing plots of land, diverting streams, creating irrigation channels, building huge mounds, [and] burning large areas to encourage new vegetative growth”\textsuperscript{299}. The problem with this argument comes when it diminishes native claims by, for instance, claiming that natives do not deserve their land because “they did nothing with it.” Such an argument supposes that Anglo-Australians built Sydney and Melbourne so they “deserve” the land or the Anglo-Americans built up the island of Manhattan so they “deserve” it. Deciphering how one can tell that land has been improved is a concomitant problem\textsuperscript{300}. Is destroying nature to create a huge city an improvement or not? It may be for some human communities, but not for others.

The related issues of use and occupancy are tough ones. Jewish settlers bought large tracts of land in British Palestine through the Jewish National Fund, Palestinians claim

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{296} Wolff, Jonathan. \textit{An Introduction to Political Philosophy}. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press 2006), pg. 141.
\textsuperscript{297} Linklater, \textit{Owning the Earth}, pg. 27.
\textsuperscript{298} Linklater, \textit{Owning the Earth}, pg. 28.
\textsuperscript{299} Page, \textit{In the Hands of the Great Spirit}, pg. 92.
\textsuperscript{300} Wolff, \textit{An Introduction to Political Philosophy}, ch. 5; Freyfogle, Eric T. \textit{Bounded People, Boundless Lands: Envisioning a New Land Ethic} (Washington, DC: Island Press 1998).
\end{footnotes}
that these purchases we made from absentee landowners who in many cases neither used nor occupied the land301. Insofar as land was bought, and only parts were, the Jewish side has a valid claim of a just transfer of land. Still, the related issue of land title is a hotly contested one. Palestinians frequently argue that fraudulent or incorrect land titles were used in Jewish land purchases. And in native-versus-settler disputes the world over, land title (in other words, paper) is used to legalize and leverage the settler/colonizer/migrant’s claims and discount native oral histories.

To conclude, there are many justifications in addition to migrant-need and native-desert that are made in land rights claims. Religious connections may be thrown out by the non-religious, but when they coincide with historical connections to the land they should be taken seriously. The transfer of land by international bodies may be seen as valid insofar as such bodies are objective and legitimate. Transfers made by colonizers is less valid. War conquests cannot be justified—though they account for a lot of territorial ownership today. And while human rights abuses sully the parties involved in land disputes, the ones that matter most in land disputes are those that involve land theft. Whether migrants can be categorized as refugees, settlers or colonizers is critical in determining moral right. Palestinians seek to define Israeli Jews as colonizers, Israeli Jews prefer settlers and, of course, many really were refugees. Finally, improving the land and using it (by living there) certainly help one’s claim to land.

**Conclusion: Supporting Natives and Migrants**

A new land ethic is needed to deal with contested land situations and, relatedly, to inform a new global migration scheme302. Without a new land ethic and without a new process for welcoming migrants equitably, radicalization of those who see themselves as natives and those who are viewed as non-natives will continue unabated.

Viewing land rights differently does not mean open borders, an end to private property and an end to the nation. As Sarah Song states we have “mutually constraining” obligations to both societies’ existing members and to humankind as a whole. Supporting members and migrants may sound contradictory, but it is the tightrope that democratic countries, committed to “equality and antidiscrimination” as well as “norms of fair play and social membership,” walk303. A commitment to human rights coupled with one to democratic membership obligates people to respect the rights of migrants and the boundaries of existing native or host groups.

We live in a world where people view land in vastly different ways. India, to Hindu nationalists, is seen as a Hindu goddess just like Israel is viewed as sacred and inviolable land by religious Jews. Such views of land make any changes or accommodations nearly impossible.

The right to migrate comes down to a human’s right to self-preservation. Having the misfortune of being born in an unsafe place or as a persecuted minority somewhere is not the fault of the threatened individual, family or community. Angela Merkel’s

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302 Echo-Hawk, *In the Light of Justice*, ch. 6.
gracious policy of helping the various migrants and refugees that seek sanctuary in Germany speaks to this ethic. As a haven for the world’s Jews, the creation of Israel followed the exact, same logic.

Cultivating refuges becomes problematic when those refuges harm current residents. Hosts, like natives, forward important arguments about membership. Host countries also hold the leverage in the migration debate: they can direct resources into accepting or rejecting migrants.

Pandemic, economic recession, war, poor governance, and deteriorating environmental factors will continue in some combination into the foreseeable future. Consequently, patchwork answers to migration are not sufficient; they won’t help hosts or migrants or alleviate native-migrant disputes.

The state system that partitions the Earth between a set of different governments turns land claims into a zero-sum game of “Us” versus “Them.” Claims to land and desires for societal cohesion are not all borne of racist intentions. Instead, migrants and natives employ the biased fairness that humans of all stripes suffer from. That is, we are biased toward our in-groups and ignore or oppose claims made by out-groups304. Arguments about who should live where end up boiling down to what side the arguers were born on.

Claims that migrants or natives always should have their rights promoted over anyone amount to oversimplifications. People have real, historical connections to land. Refugees have real needs and rights; often their survival depends on outside assistance. The moral justification for people living on conquered lands is flimsy at best—but going back to times before these conquests is impossible.

The UN partition of Palestine into Jewish and non-Jewish-Arab territories in 1947 sadly sparked a regional conflict that continues to this day. Assigning blame is secondary to what can be done to solve the problem. The issue is complicated by land purchasing, historical connections on both sides, and the attempts to solve the problem through international law (via UN resolutions and international courts and investigations).

The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples calls for native peoples to be respected and for their cultures to be protected305. Conquered lands should be returned where doing so is possible (for instance, no cities are built on the land) and reparations should be given where doing so is impossible. A 2020 US Supreme Court decision did not “return” half of Oklahoma to natives, but rather affirmed that most of eastern Oklahoma was, by dint of treaty, Creek Indian land306. Decisions of this kind provide a roadmap for a more fair and equitable land distribution in post-colonized states.

304 Greene, Moral Tribes, chapter 3.
Reparations should be paid to indigenous groups and formal apologies made; Canada’s incipient attempts to rectify past abuses of the First Nations serves as one example\(^{307}\). American Indian tribes have had varying success rates with litigation to gain recompense for stolen lands. The Penobscot and the Passamaquoddy of Maine, for example, “won 300,000 acres of land, $27.5 million and recognition as ‘Indian tribes’” in 1980\(^{308}\). Still, the United States is one of many states where the theft of land from natives has not been justly resolved.

A new land ethic requires us to view all of humanity as the stewards of our planet and to balance historical justifications to land use and ownership with present realities. Doing so will certainly be difficult but the current system of recriminations and claims in cases of territorial disputes such as Israel-Palestine has not led to resolution. The covid-19 crisis could provide renewed focus on land disputes as the pandemic has both reemphasized the importance of ownership of land and the human yearning for movement.

International recognition of new territories needs to be bolstered by the creation of more objective international bodies that, for instance, do not have a stake in the political outcomes of certain territories. Where land disputes occur, objective bodies (insofar as objectivity is possible) should attempt to rectify them. The peace processes in Northern Ireland and South Africa are testament to the ability of human beings to settle long-held disputes over land in a way that most see as equitable. The United Nations, with its current Security Council veto powers, may not be the appropriate venue for such resolution. The International Criminal Court, though still finding its footing, or an independent body like it, could be more objective but would have problems with enforcing any broad, political decisions\(^{309}\).

Andro Linklater states that, “the way you own the earth requires the agreement of your neighbors, the society you live in, and the government of your country. In a very fundamental way, it is the glue that holds community together”\(^{310}\). Land rights are important to nationalists, homeowners, tribe members, and refugees alike. The need to have rights to land, if not ownership, is necessary for human existence. As Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “(1) Everyone has right to own property alone or in association with others; (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of their right to property.”\(^{311}\).

Viewing the world as a collection of boxed-off states reinforces a quasi-feudalistic system wherein land is owned by some and not others. Under capitalism, those who own land have benefitted greatly—“real estate” wealth stems from land viewed as both property and investment—but the spoils from real estate wealth have been showered on

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\(^{310}\) Linklater, *Owning the Earth*, pg. 12.

the few. Inequality has grown to untenable levels particularly due to the covid-19 pandemic and its attendant economic hardships\(^{312}\).

The state system along with the human population boom have tilted land rights away from the migrant and strongly in favor of the person presently sitting on the land. Migrants should be allowed to cross borders where doing so does not displace natives. Natives should be able to make rules that exclude migrants only on the basis of resource scarcity and security (including public health “security” reasons), preserving cultural integrity is also important but cannot be a limitless right. In sum, natives have a primary right to land but they also have a duty to respect the rights of migrants.

The state system was built on the concept that different peoples should live in different boxes. As the contents of those boxes shifts, the logic behind the system needs to be reevaluated. Land rights, private property and sovereignty maintain the present system—a system that is codified by laws written by those who benefit from it.

We need to create a more inclusive order. This system should begin with the states that already function well then needs to move on to the people in the states that function less well. More objective international bodies, ones that like NGOs are not based on state membership, need to be created through reform or from whole cloth to help alleviate land rights issues. Natives and migrants will have to learn to coexist in a world where movement from one’s home will prove necessary or desirable to ever-increasing millions of people. As humans continue to pour out of their boxes, it is time that we created a system where the box you were born into is not a death sentence and where people are valued over lines on a map.

This is especially so in 2020, when borders have closed in order to stop the spread of covid-19. Clearly, borders have some use. They can act as barriers to the spread of illness or crime. The system of bordered nation-states, unfortunately, is much more mature than the present system of migration—which is organized in some ways (“legal migration”) and chaotic in others (“illegal immigration”). In our world, migration is viewed by too many as a privilege and not any sort of right. Radicalization takes hold in states where migration numbers spike because migrants know they deserve human rights and nationalists know they deserve rights to self-determination. A better organized system of world migration will help alleviate the issue of radicalization of those who move and those who stay.

These big-picture, systemic issues will be explored further in the next two chapters. Ch. 4 presents a series of potential future outcomes for the medium-term relations between international migrants and their nation-state hosts and Ch. 5 develops some potential solutions to the issues of migration and radicalization.

Chapter Four:
Idealism, Integration or Illiberalism?: Global Futures for Immigration after Covid-19

Abstract
This chapter explores possibilities for the future of migration given current trends. Predicting human future behavior is difficult, but probable outcomes can be outlined. In that spirit, this chapter examines a future of open borders, a future of lockdown, a future of illiberal democracy, a future of integration and a future of conflict. Each future will derive from existing trends. The future sketches establish premises for evaluating policies in the final chapter.

Key Words: Future of Migration, Illiberal Democracy, Integration, Lockdown, Open Borders, Refugees.

If we are to believe current prognostications, the world has a serious migrant-integration problem that is only going to get worse. In The Strange Death of Europe, Douglas Murray laments the loss of a white, Christian Europe. Murray writes that two forces will bring about the end of a Europe composed of distinctive French, Swedish, British, Spanish, Greek and Italian people. “The first is the mass movement of peoples into Europe. In all Western European countries this process started after World War II due to labor shortages. Soon Europe got hooked on the migration ... The result was that what had been Europe—the home of the European peoples—gradually became a home for the entire world”313. The second factor bringing about the “end of Europe” is that the continent “lost faith in its beliefs, traditions and legitimacy”314.

Tim Marshall, discussing migration in South Asia, arrives at a similarly alarming and commonly held conclusion. Marshall reports that, “Many parts of the world are already seeing ‘climate refugees,’ and tens of millions more are destined to be, heading mostly for urban areas, as even small changes to climate can have catastrophic results for local populations.” Marshall highlights desertification in Africa and flooding in South Asia. He then adds that, “When you apply this predicted future to a country such as Bangladesh, where modern health care is scarce and education levels are low, if a fifth of the land is flooded, and some of the rest is no longer fit for agriculture, then obviously huge numbers of people will move”315.

In “The Hispanic Challenge” and his book Who Are We?, Samuel Huntington contends that the American creed is “under assault” due to the rise in Hispanic immigration. The problem, Huntington posits, is that Hispanics differ culturally and linguistically from

314 Murray, The Strange Death of Europe, pg. 3.
Anglo-Protestants. Additionally, they are supported by new ideas about transnationalism, identity politics, multiculturalism and diversity that cut against the typical American Dream story of success and assimilation. Huntington writes that, “the single most immediate and most serious challenge to America’s traditional identity comes from the immense and continuing immigration from Latin America, and especially from Mexico, and the fertility rates of these immigrants compared to black and white American natives”316. Huntington dismisses those who celebrate the “Americano dream,” contending that “there is no Americano dream. There is an American dream created by an Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican-Americans will share in that dream and in that society only if they dream in English”317.

When radicalization and terrorism are added to the equation the case for a dystopian future brought about by uncontrollable migration is all-but guaranteed. Sasha Polakow-Suransky in Go Back to Where You Came From catalogs some of the shocking attacks that occurred in Europe in 2015 and 2016: the Charlie Hebdo killings, the shootings in Paris, the bombing of the airport and subways in Brussels. Polakow-Suransky writes that, “Across Europe, terrorist attacks have been exploited by the far right as opportunities to stoke anti-Muslim sentiment; too often, journalists and intellectuals have played along”318. But the process is a bit more nuanced than simply one of overreaction. Polakow-Suransky avers that, “rapid immigration is bound to provoke a xenophobic reaction, especially when newcomers compete with locals for jobs, housing, and welfare benefits. Likewise, terrorist attacks tend to pit security concerns against basic liberties and test the resilience of democratic institutions. When the two occur at the same time—and the terrorists belong to the same ethnic and religious group as the new immigrants—the combination of fear and xenophobia can be a dangerous and destructive force”319.

The pandemic adds yet another layer to fears about the future of immigration. Will migrants spread disease? Will virus shutdowns melt into stricter border policies in the medium-term? Will shutting the valve of migration lead hosts to value migrants more or see that they can do well without globalization?

Migration is an issue intertwined intimately with the future. Countries extrapolate from current migration patterns about how they will look in the future and how many more people they can take in. Migration comes in trends. It tells us about the present state of our world. But there is always a reason for people to move: economics, war, climate change, disease.

Immigrants seek a better future while hosts wonder what the future holds for them. Will their culture be maintained? Will good-paying jobs still be available when migrants undercut the labor market? Will migrants bring crime or disease or instability?

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317 Huntington, Samuel P., Who are We?: the Challenges to America’s National Identity. (New York: Simon & Schuster 2005), pg. 300.
319 Polakow-Suransky, Go Back to Where You Came From, pg. 5.
Rapid migration exacerbates these issues as hosts have little time to acquaint themselves with migrant cultures and feel disconcerted by the numbers of people quickly entering their countries. Muslims make up around 5 percent of the population in European countries, with the exception of France where the number is closer to 8 percent. Marshall writes that while these numbers are small, Muslims “are far more vocal about religious issues than any other community and are therefore more noticeable through media coverage.” More important is the fact that Muslims are concentrated in urban areas: “Approximately 20 percent of Stockholm is Muslim, 13 percent of Amsterdam, 15 percent of Brussels, and 12 percent of Cologne.” Migrants prefer to move to urban centers where there are more job opportunities and where they can live in neighborhoods with their co-ethnics. This makes their presence more visible, and makes them seem more plentiful, than they may actually be.

Thomas Malthus predicted that natural human growth would lead to great misery due to overpopulation and the Earth’s inability to sustain so many people. When Malthus wrote his *Essay on the Principle of Population*, the Earth held one billion people. Today, there are close to eight billion. “Yet we don’t starve,” Gregg Easterbrook observes. “There is sufficient food that obesity is a public health problem not just in rich nations but in parts of the developing world. Today there are twice as many people who are overweight as the *total* number who were alive when Malthus said there were far too many mouths to feed.” Instead of having too little food for so many people, food supplies actually exceed demand. During the covid pandemic in America, in April 2020, farmers dumped millions of gallons of milk and destroyed hundreds of thousands of eggs as they simply had no one to sell all those perishable foods to due to school, restaurant and business closures.

Projections about human society are notoriously difficult to make even for the near-term. No one in 2018 could have predicted that a global pandemic would shutter the world two years later. Like Malthus, humans are apt to make linear predictions: perhaps the weather will get hotter by a degree each year or our children will grow by two inches each year or our bank accounts will grow by $10,000 each year. But we know from experience that the future moves in fits and starts. The world may get much hotter one year and colder the next, children grow linearly and in spurts and bank accounts move up and down with the economy and the inconsistency of unexpected expenses.

As Yuval Harari explains in *Sapiens*, “History cannot be explained deterministically and it cannot be predicted because it is chaotic. So many forces are at work and their interactions are so complex that extremely small variations in the strength of the forces and the way they interact produce huge differences in outcomes.” Human society is a level two chaotic system. The weather, a level one chaotic system, does not react to predictions we make about it: the clouds don’t decide not to rain just to confound weather reporters. Level two chaotic systems react to predictions we make about them:

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heaping praise on a young student’s brilliance could yield complacency and future failure or empowerment and future success—either way the prediction affects the behavior. As Harari remarks, “A predictable revolution never erupts”\textsuperscript{323}. Leaders either subvert revolutions or get caught off guard by them. Either way, human behavior gets in the way of making accurate predictions. Harari concludes that, “history is not a means for making accurate predictions. We study history not to know the future but to widen our horizons, to understand that our present situation is neither natural nor inevitable, and that we consequently have many more possibilities before us than we imagine”\textsuperscript{324}.

While making prediction is more art than science, it is still useful to model our future. Covid-19 prediction tools, such as those created by the University of Washington’s Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluations, help us see where the pandemic is going, evaluate how our present behavior could affect the future and develop mitigation plans\textsuperscript{325}. As Inga Holmdahl and Caroline Buckee emphasize in \textit{The New England Journal of Medicine}, “Unlike other scientific efforts, in which researchers continuously refine methods and collectively attempt to approach a truth about the world, epidemiologic models are often designed to help us systematically examine the implications of various assumptions about a highly nonlinear process that is hard to predict using only intuition. Models are constrained by what we know and what we assume, but used appropriately and with an understanding of these limitations, they can and should help guide us through this pandemic”\textsuperscript{326}.

Families budget for the future in order to plan when to spend and when to save. Assuming present income-levels, present expense-levels and mild inflation, a family can produce a budget adding in anticipated costs like house fixes, bar-mitzvah costs and car payments. While the predicted budget will not mirror the future exactly, models help us see what different futures might hold and plan accordingly. In the least, one could see that, without a lot more saving, you won’t be able to afford that Tesla for a long time or, at current savings rates, you’re on track to be able to pay for college for your children.

Returning to migration and radicalization, policies affect future outcomes. When Angela Merkel opened Germany’s doors to migrants in 2015, over one million people moved to the central European country\textsuperscript{327}. Policies also change in reaction to events. A dramatic reduction in migration to Britain, for instance, let’s say due to Brexit, could lead British voters to elect a more immigrant-friendly government that would change migration policies.

This chapter presents a suite of possibilities for the futures of migration and radicalization. As stated at the outset, many see migration and climate change leading to

\begin{itemize}
    \item Harari, \textit{Sapiens}, pg. 241.
\end{itemize}
ecological and governmental collapse\(^{328}\). Others worry about the future of democracy either because of migrants\(^{329}\) or because of the reaction of hosts to those migrants\(^{330}\). Obviously, the future will be different in different places. The following sections attempt to predict the future of migration based upon current trends.

**Predicting Radicalization**

The likelihood of radicalization of hosts and migrants is predicated on a few factors including the speed and size of immigration flows, the level of acceptance of the host-public toward newcomers, national immigration policies and the differences between the host and migrant communities.

Table 4.1 depicts some potential outcomes for radicalization given the interaction of two important variables: immigration policies and the speed of migration. If migrants are not accepted due to strict anti-immigration policies and sentiments, as in South Africa and Australia, radicalization is highly likely on both the parts of migrants and hosts in the face of rapid immigration. Rapid immigration still causes issues when migrants are welcomed as newcomers and natives struggle to acclimate to one another and forge a renewed democratic society together. Gradual immigration with anti-immigrant policies produces less radicalization though, as seen in the American case, anti-immigrant sentiment can still boil under the surface as America saw with the explosive xenophobia of the 2016 Donald Trump Presidential campaign. Gradual migration with welcoming policies, seen in Sweden between about 1980 and 2012, produces the least radicalization. After 2013, immigration to Sweden spiked with over 100,000 immigrants in 2014 alone (compared to less than 60,000 combined in the 12 years before) and Sweden has since had trouble with integration\(^{331}\). Terrorism, though still uncommon in Sweden, has become more frequent in recent years\(^{332}\).

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\(^{330}\) Polakow-Suransky, *Go Back to Where You Came From*.


Table 4.1, Will Migrants Radicalize?: Predicting Radicalization by Contrasting Migrant-Welcoming Policies with Speed of Immigration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speed of Immigration</th>
<th>Migrant-Welcoming Policies</th>
<th>Anti-Immigrant Policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Immigration</td>
<td><strong>Merkel Model.</strong> Host countries seek to accept migrants but struggle with speed of migration. Radicalization is likely on both sides as migrants and hosts struggle to realize ideals of an open society.</td>
<td><strong>French, South African and Australian Models.</strong> Hosts and migrants both struggle with migration. Migrants may be targeted for violence. Radicalization on both sides is highly likely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradual Immigration</td>
<td><strong>Swedish Model pre-Arab Spring (1980-2012).</strong> Migrants integrate into host societies with little radicalization.</td>
<td><strong>United States’ post-9/11 version of “Prevention through Deterrence.”</strong> Host countries have more time to acclimate and react to migration. Radicalization is more likely on side of hosts due to anti-immigrant policies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The Merkel Model and Open Borders**

Given the probability of publics clashing under anti-immigration policies, Angela Merkel’s model of open borders and acceptance holds appeal. German Chancellor Angela Merkel promised in 2015 “to welcome any Syrian, regardless of whether they’ve already been fingerprinted in Greece, Hungary, or any other EU country”\(^{335}\). To be clear, in the face of humanitarian crisis, Germany did not open its borders completely under Merkel, but the country did open their borders to Syrian asylum seekers. Merkel defended the plan by saying that Europe “must move and its states must share the responsibility for refugees seeking asylum. ... If Europe fails on the question of refugees, its close connection with universal civil rights will be destroyed”\(^{336}\). A future where the Merkel Model, or a wider-conceived open borders scheme, is more widely adopted would be one of freer movement, tolerance, and presumably reduced nationalism.

As Chancellor Merkel stated, such a model would be predicated on a human rights approach. Open borders would be justified in light of democratic and humanitarian values and the values of cosmopolitanism, which states that all humans are endowed

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\(^{336}\) Murray, *The Strange Death of Europe*, pgs. 80-81.
with equal rights and all are deserving of respect regardless of where they were born. The rights of migrants would be secure and the world would no longer be stuck in a system of closed-off boxes and nationalist squabbles over who owns what would diminish.337

But Merkel’s Model has its downsides. For one, countries that act alone in adopting this model, especially during a migration crisis, stand to become magnets for migration. Asylum seekers will look to travel to these destinations. As Patrick Kingsley reported in 2017, “When I’d previously asked Syrians where they wanted to end up, I drew a range of answers: Holland, perhaps, or Sweden, Austria or the UK. Now almost everyone says they just want to reach Germany.”338 Indeed, “During 2015 around 400,000 migrants moved through Hungary’s territory alone. Fewer than twenty of them stopped to claim asylum in Hungary”339.

Further, public opinion has turned against Muslim migrants to Europe. A 2017 Chatham poll of Europeans found that in eight of ten countries surveyed a majority of respondents agreed with a statement that “All further migration from mainly Muslim countries should be stopped.”340 The proportion of Germans who don’t believe that Islam belongs in their country went from 47% in 2010 to 60% in 2015 and 65% in 2016.341 The rise of Pegida (People against the Islamization of the West) and the victories of the AfD (Alternatives fur Deutschland) political party highlight the very real consequences of a welcoming strategy in the face of rapid migration.342

Merkel’s ostensible immigration goals are to create a stronger nation through the injection of hundreds of thousands of migrants and to increase the number of young people in Germany. Merkel’s plan could subvert the demographic threat brought about by low population growth and “graying” populations in many developed countries. Though cynics contend that she is just looking to bolster her party’s electoral outlook—an accusation also levied at Turkey’s Recep Erdogan.

For Merkel’s strategy to work a lot needs to go right. The economy needs to provide jobs for most of the newcomers, xenophobic sentiments need to be kept at bay, some integration needs to occur, and immigrants and refugees need to be carefully placed around the country so as not to overwhelm labor markets or public services in specific localities. If these factors are not carefully considered, small but significant numbers of migrants could turn to terrorism as they may feel alienated, underemployed and unwanted—an outcome seen in Belgium and France. Merkel herself stated that while she believed her migration policy was “absolutely right,” she regrets not having done more to prepare her country for the influx of migrants that came in 2015.343

337 See Ch. 3.
338 Kingsley, The New Odyssey, pg. 263.
339 Murray, The Strange Death of Europe, pg. 81.
340 Murray, The Strange Death of Europe, pgs. 318-319.
341 Murray, The Strange Death of Europe, pg. 318.
342 Murray, The Strange Death of Europe, pgs. 239-241; 289-291.
343 Polakow-Suransky, Go Back to Where You Came From, pg. 252.
Open borders are celebrated by authors such as Joseph Carens who rightfully emphasizes the morality of welcoming refugees and migrants. But we are far from a cosmopolitan world where people see themselves as world citizens. As Polakow-Suransky records, “All modern states distinguish between members and nonmembers.” Globalization has created a lot of concern among the so-called “left behinds” who feel rooted in a place and don’t relate with elite talk of being unfettered by state and nationality. Fast change can worry anyone. It particularly worries people who don’t feel plugged-in to elite circles.

Open borders, as seen in the German case, will create demographic shifts that come with cultural shocks to host countries and migrants alike. Workers need to know they are supported, not that they are interchangeable with people willing to work for less in a country halfway across the world. Nationalism and illiberalism are rising due to the very real concerns of citizens in rich countries about the effects of change.

To open borders and global justice theorists, the most sanguine world would be one where increased globalization creates more tolerant publics. Migrants are welcomed and hosts are respected. Citizenship’s power erodes and is replaced with people holding multiple citizenships or some kind of global citizenship. As Jacqueline Stevens observes, “the nation’s borders are regulated through the use of force in order to circumvent free movement.” Stevens argues that birthright citizenship imposes heavy costs on people: “Birthright-citizenship rules help in subordinating people living outside their countries of origin.” She remarks that while nation-states no longer enslave their opponents in war, human trafficking and the treatment of undocumented workers “facilitates an illegal slavery through birthright citizenship.”

As Nathan Smith argues, opening borders would reduce worldwide poverty, increase liberty, speed economic growth and forge a more efficient labor market. Tim Marshall worries that open borders would lead to mass movements of people from poor countries and regions into rich ones. Such large movements of people may lead to retrenched nationalism and host radicalization.

A world of more open borders could be a much fairer world. But the transition to getting there will be messy. The migration from Syria and elsewhere into Europe after the Arab Spring led to dejected migrants adopting extremism and the radicalized nationalism of hosts. Open borders make moral sense. It isn’t fair that individuals benefit enormously

345 Polakow-Suransky, Go Back Where You Came From, pg. 20.
348 Polakow-Suransky, Go Back Where You Came From, pg. 289.
350 Stevens, States without Nations, pg. 47.
from the inheritance of the citizenship they are conferred by the accident of birth\textsuperscript{353}. But there are real consequences to rapid migration and, as long as states retain their sovereignty, they can switch to more anti-immigrant policies in the face of problems with immigrant integration. The Merkel Model has its positives, but it comes at a great cost to democracy as the next section illustrates.

**Illiberal Democracy**

In *Developing Democracy*, Larry Diamond defined illiberal democracy as a form of electoral democracy where civil liberties are not widely respected and human rights abuses persist. According to Diamond, this limits the stability and legitimacy of the ruling regime for three reasons: first, it fails to fulfill people’s expectations of economic and physical security; second, the military remains an unaccountable, reserve domain of power; and finally, human rights victims tend to come from racial or ethnic minorities most likely to rebel. Diamond, writing in 1999, noted that few of the world’s democracies fulfilled both their liberal and democratic aspirations. Yet, he concluded by positing that an anti-democratic reverse wave was unlikely because military establishments, discouraged by past failures, had become reluctant to take power; publics showed little appetite for a return to authoritarianism; and no anti-democratic ideology had arisen to challenge democracy’s ideological hegemony\textsuperscript{354}.

Twenty years later, Diamond’s predictions appear quaint in light of the recent, worldwide erosion of democracy. Democratic backsliding, to use Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg’s term, has most clearly occurred in Poland, Hungary and Brazil where leaders have centralized executive power, reduced the powers of the press and diminished judicial checks on power\textsuperscript{355}. This trend can also be seen in Israel, India and Kenya, as well as in the United States where President Trump berated the press and courts alike. “Freedom in the World,” Freedom House’s annual report on the health of the world’s liberal democracies, found that worldwide democratic values declined for a fourteenth consecutive year in 2019. Troublingly, the organization found that electoral processes were the component of democracy that eroded the most in the past four years as governments have limited access to voting and diluted the power of the vote\textsuperscript{356}.

Freedom House’s 2019 *Freedom in the World* report entitled “Democracy in Retreat” catalogues a litany of bad news for proponents of liberal democracy. The report states that Poland’s conservative Law and Justice party (PiS) has “laid waste to the country’s legal framework in its drive to assert political control over the entire judiciary”\textsuperscript{357}. In Hungary, Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party have “presided over one of the most dramatic [democratic] declines ever charted by Freedom House within the European


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Union”. In Turkey opposition leaders have been imprisoned and “freedoms of association, assembly and expression” have been curtailed. In Tunisia, democratic consolidation “continued to sputter” while in Israel the residency of Palestinians in Jerusalem was revoked and the status of Arabic as a national language was downgraded. In Bangladesh, security forces “intimidated and arrested” opposition supporters prior to parliamentary elections. While in the Americas, Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro continued his authoritarian rule after a presidential election that banned opposition parties and Jair Bolsonaro was elected to the Brazilian presidency despite rhetoric that was “steeped in disdain for democratic principles”.

Mass world migration has become a common scapegoat for the current “reverse wave” of liberal democracy. Migration could link to democratic backsliding in three ways. First, the Cultural Defense Narrative holds that large flows of migrants threaten host populations leading the hosts to worry about the future of the society they made together. Too many outsiders leads to a concern, in other words, about cultural preservation. This concern, then, translates into a desire to limit migration. The anti-immigrant push, then, gets transmogrified into an anti-liberal turn because liberal universalism opposes nationalism. Liberal universalistic values are founded upon the importance and equality of all human beings and do not privilege one group over the other. Host groups, then, turn to nativism and nationalism as a way to counter the dilution of their culture and their worries about societal change.

Second, the Competing Moralities Narrative is based upon the ethics of the immigrants themselves. Liberals base their morality on the ethic of autonomy: the centrality of the individual and the need to provide that individual with an interference-free space to operate. New immigrants, especially those coming from non-democratic societies, may adhere more strongly to the ethic of community, which emphasizes the centrality of the family or ethnic group. This communal ethic may be coupled with an ethic of divinity, which posits that certain actions or objects are sacred or pure and others are impure or degrading. Liberals do not value communal ethics because they seek to highlight abuses to individuals within communities, particularly those who are less powerful or part of minorities. These abuses can easily occur in systems that are based on group rights. Further, religious or divinely-inspired morality does not speak to liberals because they support pluralism and choice whereas an ethic of divinity presupposes that one religious group’s values need to be respected or adhered to in all cases.

363 Murray, The Strange Death of Europe.
These competing ethics lead liberal host societies to push for anti-immigrant policies and to, paradoxically, support nationalism as a means of retaining the liberal character of their societies. New Atheist and secular arguments in Europe against Muslim practices—some of which have led to discriminatory laws—are a case in point. Liav Orgad states that the “illiberal practices” of new Muslim migrants to Europe, such as female genital mutilation, foment tensions between modern, host societies and immigrants who adhere to traditional values. The clash between modernity and tradition, when coupled with Europe’s “demographic crisis due to the numerical erosion of its population” puts the issue of cultural preservation in stark relief.

The final narrative, based on Economic Fairness, links migration to economic and resource competition. More migrants entering a political space leads to more competition over jobs, which can create wage deflation. Further, poor migrants, like those coming from the Middle East and North Africa into Europe or from Central America and Mexico into the United States, may draw from the polity’s pooled resources such as hospitals, schools and welfare programs. These newcomers, in big enough numbers, are viewed as a weight on the country’s economy and an undue burden on taxpayers. The liberal conception of taxation is founded upon a redistribution of wealth within the polity, not on a redistribution of wealth to other polities—though foreign aid is tolerated in small doses. The Economic Fairness Narrative leads host communities to eventually push for nationalistic and illiberal governance due to their belief that immigrants are unfairly taking jobs, reducing wages and draining shared resources.

All three of these narratives share the belief that a democracy is a circumscribed polity made up of a specific people. And, in reality, all three narratives—Economic Fairness, Competing Moralities and Cultural Defense—come mingle within people and communities. Democratic theorists posit that a polity should be made up of a self-ruling and circumscribed group. Jean-Jacque Rousseau and modern deliberative democratic theorists such as Josh Cohen believe that polities should be small allowing for direct democracy. Migration upends the intimacy of such states and challenges their conception of the polity.

Paul Collier’s *Exodus* is fraught with concern regarding potentially out-of-control migratory feedback loops wherein Diaspora communities continually welcome ever-more migrants into host societies. As migration accelerates, it might be claimed, the sheltered small-society democracy erodes. Who, after all, are “the people” when a constant flow of newcomers fills the seats at the town hall? All of the narratives explaining why migration might lead to illiberal practices draw from this belief that democracies are built upon specific social components and that “opening the door,” so to speak, to anyone could diminish or destroy democratic culture and values.

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367 See European laws to limit the heights of the minarets on mosques and to ban kosher and halal meat as described, for instance, in Laurence, John, “Europe’s Failure to Integrate Muslims,” The Brookings Institute, 15 March 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/europes-failure-to-integrate-muslims/.
Immigration has been a factor in the illiberal turn in many democracies. Donald Trump’s immigration platform was a major rallying cry in his election campaign and was a priority-area in his presidency. Syrian migration into Turkey could be a factor in pushing the country further toward authoritarianism. The same could be said of Greece whose center-right party took back power in 2019 and has criticized the welcoming of exiles. The rise of the far-right group Pegida in Germany and the anti-immigrant party Rodina (or “Motherland”) in Russia also was caused by host-resistance to immigration.

Migrants themselves need do nothing to become the totems that elites use to galvanize the masses against liberalism. Elite incitement characterized by anti-minority rhetoric, after all, was a key factor in genocides such as those in Germany, Bosnia and Rwanda. The narratives that link migration to illiberal democracy are countered below to show that the future is not necessarily one where immigration neatly causes illiberalism, which implies that reducing immigration solves problem.

Illiberal democracy is not about liberal or democratic values being preserved but rather about government executives gaining control. This trend accelerated after the 9/11 attacks when civil liberties were reduced in many countries including in France, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel. Government executives—whether presidents or prime ministers—have argued for decades that they need increased powers in order to quickly challenge potential threats. Emergency laws in countries like Syria and the erosion of an admittedly flagging democracy in Russia show the end-result of these executive power-grabs: authoritarianism. Viktor Orban and Binyamin Netanyahu’s individual battles to stay in power as long as possible speak to their authoritarian tendencies, rather than to their stance of immigrants. As a Washington Post article on Hungary’s Orban and Serbia’s Aleksandar Vucic detailed, “Orban and Vucic have both moved to dismantle institutional checks and balances and centralized power in their own hands; they have also benefited from European Union support and ineffectual domestic opposition. But it is their domination of the media that has underwritten their success.” Centralization of power around the executive links illiberal democracies to countries like Russia and China where government crackdowns on rights move in lockstep with increased authoritarianism.

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375 Csaky, Zselyke, “Hungary and Serbia have found new ways to smother the media,” The Washington Post, 5 June 2019.
Elite incitement also plays a role by attempting to mobilize one portion of the population against another. The mobilized portion of the population is then given wide latitude in how they treat the besmirched group, which could be a religious minority, a social class or the LBGTQ community. In-group versus outgroup language builds a bond between the mobilized part of the populace and the elites who incite them. This bond has been critical to fascist mobilizations. Elite incitement can be divorced of any real threat as was seen in cases of genocide and in anti-immigrant rhetoric in countries without much immigration. As Katharina Natter shows in the Moroccan case, the salience of the issue of immigration in Morocco has risen despite extremely modest immigrant numbers (the share of immigrants in Morocco rose from 0.17% to 0.25% of the overall population from 2004 to 2014).

Globalization and nationalistic reactions to it have also led to illiberal democracy. After all, migration was at a low ebb during the Great Recession that began in 2008 and, yet, far-right groups in Europe and the United States saw an uptick in membership during that period despite weak economies in the developed world acting as a deterrent to developing-world migrants. Globalization gave the working class a case of Durkheimian anomie as their manufacturing and service sector jobs hopscotched different nations through waves of outsourcing and offshoring. The Economist ran a cover article in October 2017 on those “left behind” by globalization who, the newspaper contended, needed to be accounted for and taken care of in a refashioned capitalist system. This logic follows Karl Polanyi’s argument that capitalism run amuck leads to fascism as those “left behind” and without a social safety net seek to upend the system even if the system benefits the country in the aggregate. Migration is a part of globalization, but capital and companies move much more freely across borders than people do in the modern world. Donald Trump’s “American carnage” inauguration homily spoke to those “left behind” by the economy, the so-called “forgotten men and women” who had been ruined by the capitalist class and cosmopolitanism.

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The opponents of liberal democracy have clearly attached their causes to those who oppose immigration and support xenophobia. After all, nationalism is a powerful drug and any in-group solidarity movement pairs well with an out-group to scapegoat. The realities of migration in Germany, Greece, Turkey, Jordan, Arizona and Texas cannot be denied. In some states and locales, migration has changed the landscape and may have become unmanageable for a variety of reasons. Cultural preservation, competing moralities and economic fairness become real concerns in these spaces.

But preserving culture does not necessitate eroding electoral processes or quieting the free press. These illiberal actions might be justified as nationalistic, but they are simply brazen power grabs made by elites that seek to control governments. In countries where migration is a worry of the population, all the better for government executives who seek to exploit real or perceived concerns of their citizenry. Liberal democracy gets portrayed as universal liberal cosmopolitanism: a system that sees human beings as interchangeable and values the human rights of all regardless of where borders lie. In an atmosphere where the effect of growing migration and globalization is feared, universal liberal cosmopolitanism becomes an easy foil and one that allows illiberal forces to conflate liberal democracy with the death of the polity. All nations, even those made up mostly of immigrants such as Australia, Israel, Canada and the United States, value their shared culture and view migration as a factor that needs to be regulated by the state. Regulating migration could mean anything from taking a log of who comes in to closing the border. When those who defend liberalism are conflated with those who reject this regulatory role, democratic values are in trouble. Crafty executives know this and use this logic to their advantage as they seek to loosen term limits and increase executive control. It is critical to add that, “North American democracies were the first to establish ethnic immigration selection criteria and the last to abolish them, long after most Latin American autocracies did so.” This shows that immigrant-centric states with supposedly liberal universalistic values can fall prey to nationalism just as easily as other polities can.

Mass migration could lead to a world of restricted rights and closed borders where migrants are shut out by radicalized hosts. Continued inequality and war could continue to buffet liberal democracy with increasing numbers of migrants. Hosts and migrants will radicalize in turn as integration efforts crumble. As Polakow-Suransky writes, “Liberal democracies are better equipped than authoritarian states to grapple with the inevitable conflicts that arise in diverse societies, including the threat of terrorist violence. But they also contain the seeds of their own destruction: if they fail to deal with these challenges and allow xenophobic populists to hijack the public debate, then votes of frustrated and disaffected citizens will increasingly go to the anti-immigrant right, societies will become less open, nativist parties will grow more powerful, and racist rhetoric that promotes a narrow and exclusionary sense of national identity will be legitimized.”


\[386\] Natter, “Rethinking immigration policy theory beyond ‘Western liberal democracies,’” pg. 5.

\[387\] Polakow-Suransky, *Go Back to Where You Came From*, pg. 292.
Recent trends provide hope for at least a cyclical turn between populism and cosmopolitanism. In 2020, Hungary and Poland’s leaders were being heavily pressured by the European Union, Donald Trump lost the Presidential election and Jair Bolsonaro’s party lost municipal elections in Brazil\textsuperscript{388}. Still, in response to radicalization, Emanuel Macron has restricted liberties in France\textsuperscript{389}. The future, after all, is not monolithic and as long as democracies allow for power transfers, there will be a push-and-pull between forces that support and oppose liberalism.

**Lockdown: Severely Restricting Migration**

The covid-19 pandemic led to unprecedented border closures, quarantine rules and other travel restrictions across the globe\textsuperscript{390}. Economic slowdowns and extensive job losses brought about by pandemic slaked any remaining thirst for new immigrants among those living in developed countries. The reality that migrants could now be covid-carriers did not help their cause.

Many countries already support strict immigration-control regimes. Mexico “annually deports more people than does the USA” and, based on its 1974 General Law of Population, it can reject migrants if they disrupt “the equilibrium of national demographics.” Americans may find it ironic that Mexico has the toughest immigration laws in North America. In Mexico, undocumented people caught a second time can receive prison terms of up to ten years\textsuperscript{391}.

Australia subverts human rights law by placing asylum seekers and undocumented migrants on the islands of Nauru, Manus Island and Christmas Island. Immigration posters proclaim to migrants that there is “No Way” they will “make Australia home.” Australia’s strict policy has led to many deaths at sea. Almost 2,000 people died, according to the Australian Border Deaths Database, trying to get into Australia between 2000 and 2015\textsuperscript{392}. After trying to dissuade migrants from coming to their country with “inhospitable” onshore camps in 1999, Australia “upped the ante” by moving migrants to “hellholes” on Manus Island and Nauru where Australian rights did not hold\textsuperscript{393}. On Nauru, human rights abuses piled up including rapes and denying migrants care\textsuperscript{394}. Australia also passed a law that retroactively made “babies born to detained mothers” into “illegal maritime arrival[s].” This meant that children born on Australian soil were treated as if they had been apprehended on a boat\textsuperscript{395}. In a strange turn, in response to

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\textsuperscript{391} Marshall, *The Age of Walls*, pg. 52.


\textsuperscript{393} Polakow-Suransky, *Go Back to Where You Came From*, pg. 94.

\textsuperscript{394} Polakow-Suransky, *Go Back to Where You Came From*, pg. 94.

\textsuperscript{395} Polakow-Suransky, *Go Back to Where You Came From*, pg. 246.
accusations of human rights abuses and illegal detentions, Australia announced that the Nauru camp was “open” and people detained there could leave freely.\textsuperscript{396}

Lockdowns and border closures sound like appropriate tools for managing the negative externalities inherent in globalization. A return to the local has its advantages, but rejecting and abusing desperate peoples searching for a better life just because a state can undermines the world of human rights and human dignity the United Nations-era aimed to create. The industrial age has seen cycles of internationalization followed by protectionism. The post-covid era may be no different. Even with a return to pre-covid levels of international movement, societies may seek to wall themselves off from others as best they can. The coronavirus pandemic is just one factor that could justify protectionism. Increased enmity between nations, as seen between America and China during the Trump Administration, could also lead to protectionism.

The desirability of lockdown is questionable in the long- and medium-term. World prosperity is built on trade. Countries gain much from working together for mutual security and prosperity. International institutions such as the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the European Union have brought prosperity to people all over the world. Further, isolationism has a dim history: the Great Depression and, to some degree, World War II were precipitated by isolationist stances. Further, global problems like migration, terrorism and climate change cannot be solved by isolationist countries working alone.\textsuperscript{397} As Tim Marshall concludes, “history suggests that isolationism does harm the USA in the long term; whenever it has withdrawn into itself, it has always been drawn out again, and not always when it was prepared to be”.\textsuperscript{398}

Lockdowns and border closures may prove to be impractical strategies in a world of increased migration and connections. While the world builds more and more border walls, people can still cross borders with fraudulent papers or a tourist visa.\textsuperscript{399} Attempts to seal one’s country from covid-19 have been counterproductive: the world economy requires openness, the virus travels discretely and isolationism leads to economic stagnation.\textsuperscript{400} A recent University of Sydney study found that pent-up forces might yield large numbers of people to migrate when the pandemic ends.\textsuperscript{401}

More walls and harsher detention centers will lead to multiple problems. First, these tools are not as effective as policymakers make them out to be. In an unequal world, people will find ways to migrate to avoid threats or to pursue better opportunities. Second, harsh policies reaffirm nationalist radicalization and cause migrant radicalization as migrant groups feel unwanted. This was evident in Ch. 2’s discussion of

\textsuperscript{396} Polakow-Suransky, Go Back to Where You Came From, pg. 247.
\textsuperscript{398} Marshall, The Age of Walls, pg. 55.
\textsuperscript{399} Marshall, The Age of Walls, pgs. 2, 52.
radicalization in prison. Finally, liberal democracies and the current international order are based on a respect for human rights that is severely undercut if countries engage in wanton abuse of migrants. While some seek to bracket the treatment of these people, reductions in human rights erode democratic values for everyone.

Integration, Enclaves and Refugee Limbo

In many cases, where incoming migration has already happened or where we might perceive it as an inevitability, the key to a better future will be integration. As Germany’s Federal Minister of Health Jens Spahn stated in 2016, “The best thing Germany can do now...is try to integrate as many people as possible so the financial burden is low.” Spahn noted that Germany had a need for skilled labor but that the Syrian refugees it accepted largely did not have skills that matched what the German economy needed. He said that the best case scenario was one where economic integration of the Syrians would lead to growth in the German economy402.

Immigrant integration entails social inclusion. Integrated migrants become part of their new societies. They do not have to fully assimilate, but integration involves some give-and-take: migrants adopt some identities from their new society and add some of themselves to their new vistas. Successful integration enriches both the migrant and the host. As Peter Schuck states, “Immigrants’ cultural impact on American society...is a function both of the values that they bring with them to the United States and of those they acquire here as they rub shoulders with Americans”403.

The United States is known for being a “melting pot” where immigrants can quickly make homes and become Americans. In American Crucible, Gary Gerstle chronicles how the United States has long been viewed “as a divine land where individuals from every part of the world could leave their troubles, start life anew, and forge a proud, accomplished and unified people”404. Peter Schuck adds that, “the ease of acquiring membership in the American community has been striking. As early as the colonial period, citizenship was automatically conferred by birth within the colony; for those born elsewhere, that status could still be readily obtained”405.

Yet, as Gerstle shows, America has long struggled between a civic nationalism based on liberal values and a racial nationalism based on white supremacy406. American racial nationalism is built on a racial hierarchy that many American whites strive to maintain. As Ibram Kendi charges, these people “define policies not rigged for White people as racist,” they view anti-racism as a struggle against white people, and they hold a deep nostalgia for a past where American minorities were powerless and less numerous407. Evidence of racial nationalism is plentiful: President Andrew Johnson called the Civil Rights Act of 1866 a “bill made to operate in favor of the colored against the white race,” former US solicitor-general Robert Bork in 1978 called affirmative action supporters

402 Polakow-Suransky, Go Back to Where You Came From, pg. 256.
405 Schuck, Citizens, Strangers and In-Betweens, pgs. 25-6.
406 Gerstle, American Crucible.
“hardcore racists of reverse discrimination,” and Rudy Giuliani in 2015 called the Black Lives Matter movement “inherently racist.”408 Any move to erode American white supremacy is countered with accusations of racism against whites.

Racial nationalism precludes integration. Immigrants from Cuba to America may “graduate to whiteness,” meaning they assimilate into the majority power-group, but a Haitian can never be white. In Europe, the problem could be worse. While far-right forces like to blame immigrants for failing to integrate, European “national identity is still largely perceived as being ethnically defined”409. France and Belgium produced “a hugely disproportionate number of” ISIS fighters due to their policies of forcing newcomers to choose between their heritage and their new land. As Polakow-Suransky emphasizes, “ISIS has a name for this strategy: eliminating the gray zone” and, too often, this overbearing assimilation policies lead migrants to reject their new societies in France and Belgium410.

Integration is even tougher for refugees. Palestinians have been stuck in refugee camps for generations. In City of Thorns, Ben Rawlence chronicles the horrible conditions and constant pressure to leave inherent in the Dadaab refugee camps housing Somalis in Kenya411. In 2020, the governments of Tanzania and Burundi agreed to a secret pact stating that Burundian refugees should “return to their country of origin whether voluntarily or not”412. Burma’s Rohingya people have been denied entry to numerous countries due to their lack of citizenship papers413.

Refugees are supposed to be granted temporary havens in their new lands. But, instead, repatriation rarely happens. Host countries grow tired of refugees, as in the Dadaab case, and try to push them out. Many other countries, like Saudi Arabia, avoid bringing in refugees in the first place. For every Turkey or Germany, there are multiple countries that vilify refugees or seek to prevent their entry.

Without prospect for integration, many migrants create and join what Doug Saunders calls arrival cities. Arrival cities are usually known as “slums, favelas[,] shantytowns[,] urban villages [,] and barrios”414. These ethnic enclaves can benefit migrants and hosts or they can fail both. African American “arrival cities failed—because property ownership was unattainable in urban districts owned by indifferent or intolerant outsiders, because arrival-city residents were excluded from the economic and political mainstream by racism and bad urban planning, and because of the absence of government support and institutions.” Saunders worries that many of today’s arrival cities could also become “places of failed arrival”415.

408 Kendi, How to be an Antiracist, pg. 130.
409 Polakow-Suransky, Go Back to Where You Came From, pg. 156.
410 Polakow-Suransky, Go Back to Where You Came From, pg. 153.
415 Saunders, Arrival City, pg. 25.
As seen in the cases of Somali and Palestinian refugees, among others, large, permanent refugee populations frequently become restive and turn to violence given their lack of prospects. Without integration of migrants, failed arrival can lead to radicalization and violence. As Jens Spahn said, integration is the best hope for the future.

But what outcome is probable? Most countries will not seek to absorb large refugee camps into their populations. Taking on so many new, and ethnically distinct, poor people could be destabilizing. Integration will be difficult to attain if the world continues to see inter-religious and cross-class conflict. Failed regions, cities or camps will yield more radicalization and violence. James Piazza finds that failed or failing states are more likely to house, export and be targeted by terrorists.

Hope for integration in Europe is dim. A 2018 Pew Research report found that many Europeans agreed with the statement that newcomers “can never be one of us.” The high was in Belgium, where 48 percent of respondents agreed with the statement; the low was in Sweden, where 22 percent agreed. Three-quarters of Belgians and three-fifths of French people agreed with the statement that: “Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others.” More than half of French people, but only one-fifth of Swedes thought it necessary to have a family background in their country to belong. A separate study found that, three-quarters of people in Turkey thought it was important for newcomers to believe that Turkey was superior to other countries. As De Conink, Ogan and d’Haenens aver, “negative attitudes toward refugees may be explained by the feeling that the new arrivals can never truly belong.” The authors further found Sweden to be the most welcoming European country to migrants and highlight economic prosperity, effective integration policies and high educational attainment as important variables in determining whether hosts will accept migrants.

An integrated, prosperous future is possible for America, Germany and others. But a future of segregation, anti-immigration and chauvinism—marked by failed arrival cities and refugees stuck in limbo—is just as likely and must be guarded against. The final chapter (Ch. 5) will propose options for preventing that outcome.

**Civil and Inter-state Conflict**

Continued growth in migration and urbanization could lead to internal conflict in migrant-importing and –exporting countries. The vast numbers of Syrians who entered Europe in the mid-2010s could become disaffected. Post-covid economic downturns could leave these people shut out from the job market and vulnerable to anti-migrant harassment. Forcing people to stay in increasingly crowded, developing urban cities could also lead to civil conflict.

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418 De Conink, David, Christine Ogan and Leen d’Haenens, “Can ‘the Other’ Ever Become ‘One of Us’?: Comparing Turkish and European Attitudes toward Refugees: A five-year exploratory study,” *The International Communication Gazette* 0 (0), pg. 17.
419 De Conink, et al., “Can ‘the Other’ Ever Become ‘One of Us’?,” pg. 16.
Civil conflict could take the form of riots as it did in the spring and summer of 2020 in America. It could take the form of radicalization and terrorism as it has in the twenty-first century in Europe, Africa, and elsewhere. As Adam, speaking of the Syrian uprising he was a part of, explained, “What’s crucial in this whole process is that you don’t matter. You as an individual...mean absolutely nothing. And that’s when you understand why people get radicalized. I completely understand why somebody would join ISI or al-Qaeda or the Assad regime or the Kurdish groups. You are in dire need for a narrative that can justify this futility”.420

In the extreme, life in failed states could lead to the rejection of the Western system of state borders and the apocalyptic vision of the Islamic State421. A changed state system, brought about by separatist conflict, sounds grandiose until one considers what happened after the Arab Spring in places like Syria, Libya, Lebanon and Yemen. Given Western intervention across the world, and a desire for people displaced by war to move to developed countries, a future of interethnic conflict between hosts and migrants is all-too easy to imagine. This is especially so in light of the rise of populist leaders in the West422.

Walls could prevent future conflict as well as future migration423. But walling people off subjects them to human rights abuses and leaves desperate people little choice but to risk deadly sea- and desert-crossings424. Lockdowns also harm host-countries as they wall themselves off from economic opportunities.

Inter-state conflict could be caused by strict anti-immigration policies in destination-states. As seen in recent conflicts in Syria and Yemen, in an interconnected world, civil conflicts easily shift into inter-state ones. Proxy forces garner air support from rich countries while inter-ethnic skirmishes spill over borders.

Increased internal conflict in host countries is distinctly possible in a world where climate, rural decline and economic inequality conspire to push people to move to new lands. South Africa received more asylum applications than any other in the world between 2006 and 2011425. The crumbling of neighboring Zimbabwe, conflicts in Somalia and DR-Congo, and South Africa’s relative wealth compared to neighbors led to a crush of migrants and refugees looking to make it their home in the twenty-first century. South Africans, looking to find their feet post-apartheid, have reacted with anti-migrant attacks and xenophobic sentiments426. Without integration, such outcomes are likely in many migrant destinations.

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425 Polakow-Suransky, *Go Back to Where You Came From*, pg. 231.
Conclusion

Predicting the future is difficult. The pandemic was unimaginable to most people, and even those who drew up a scenario like it did not know the timing or how the process would play out. Who would have thought that America, the country ostensibly most prepared for a pandemic, would suffer the most deaths of any country in the world?

The future contains many possibilities, but those possibilities are controlled by policies. Martin Ruhs writes that high-income countries focus more on the potential negatives of migration (such as crime and social fragmentation) and “clearly continue to play a paramount role in influencing the scale and type of labor migration, conditions under which it occurs, and the rights of migrants after admission.” Despite great global inequality, migrants made up only 3 percent of the world population in 2010427.

That said, the vast majority of countries protect the human right to leave one’s country of residence and return428. Further, even if migration is slowed considerably after the covid-19 pandemic recedes, there are already millions of newcomers in host-countries that need to be integrated. Providing a road to permanent residency and legal status is not only morally right but would also lead to future stability429.

Policies will determine whether future migration leads to illiberalism, integration or radicalization. It is in this spirit that we turn to the final chapter where proposals for improving world migration and reducing radicalization will be considered.

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Chapter Five: Flattening the Radicalization Curve: How to Reduce Host and Migrant Radicalization

Abstract

This chapter proposes policy solutions to the current issues of migration and radicalization. These solutions include integration, a migrant and refugee clearinghouse, sharing the burden, reducing global inequality, resolving conflicts and improving human rights. While nothing will ever stop some people from becoming radicals, it is important to note that radicals make up a tiny minority of migrants and that there is a lot more that countries and the world can do to prevent radicalization.

Key Words: Covid-19, Immigration, Policy, Radicalization, Refugees.

Millions of people have migrated in recent years fleeing their homes in developing countries due to economic inequality, war, deprivation, and increasingly climate change. These newcomers are too often being greeted with xenophobia and nationalist populism as the world swings back to tribalism.

This swing affects both hosts and migrants. Migrants are stuck, many times literally, in their statuses and spaces. After World War II, refugee status was created to help correct a situation wherein millions of people had left their home countries in pursuit of protection430.

Today refugee status and asylum are being eroded. Refugees rarely repatriate and are rarely accepted by third-party countries. Instead they fester in camps or live in liminal spaces outside of main cities, living shadow-lives with sometimes-shaky statuses431. The mistreatment of migrants is well-chronicled: cages in America, camps outside Australia, children living on streets in Europe432.

But what’s happened to the hosts is no less tragic. Hungary, Serbia, Brazil, Israel, India, America and other countries have embraced nationalist populism in response to migrant arrivals. The fear of hordes of migrants undoing cultural heritages, contorting national histories, upending job markets and changing landscapes galvanized host populations. Many sought out leaders who were all too eager to exploit rules that weaken democracy to stay in power433. Seeking to stem migration, these leaders rode a wave of xenophobia to pass policies that do just that. The covid-19 pandemic has seemingly worked in their favor.

The world stands at an impasse. The reasons to accept newcomers rub against the reasons to reject them. Of course, the values we seek to uphold in liberal societies speak

to reasons to accept migrants. Migrants have been shown to augment the economies of host societies, and of course they augment the social offerings in those societies too434. A tolerant and pluralist society should want to accept others. Understandably, societies also want membership to mean something and want some control over the character and composition of their communities.

From the migrants’ perspective, it is only fair to accept someone into a new space given the great inequalities in the world. The rich-world benefits many times over at the expense of the poorer-world. Resource and labor exploitation abound in developing countries, many times due to the influence of rich governments or MNCs. A birthright-lottery vision of migration, which views life as a lottery and birth in a rich country as winning the lottery, maintains that the rich-world owes the lottery “also-rans” some recompense435. Freedom of movement certainly could be part of that—money transfers may also make sense, but they may not directly benefit people seeking better lives.

Those who defend host societies’ rights to keep migrants out point to overpopulation and overcrowding, a limited ability to help newcomers especially if they arrive rapidly and in large numbers, the right to self-determination, the concomitant right of communities to form around self-selected visions, and the potential negatives that come with migrants ranging from crime to the spread of illness.

Natural forces will continue to make more lands less habitable. Meanwhile, human factors will continue to exacerbate the inequality that makes people want to move. These are the physics behind the migration crisis.

Another physics is already taking place inside many countries where newcomers are already changing things linguistically, culturally and socially. These newcomers are many times under- or un-represented in democratic governments, undereducated by public school systems and underappreciated by their host societies.

These newcomers sometimes reject their host societies and even turn to violence when their opportunities for advancement are shunted. In response, prejudiced nationalists have also turned to violence in reaction to migration. As Farhad Khosrokhavar emphasizes, radicals of all stripes represent “a tiny minority”436. In the West, jihadist radicals provoke a “public anxiety” that far-right radicals, such as those that oppose immigrants, do not437.

Radicalization is a process, it does not happen all at once438. The influence of “the imagined community to which jihadists belong” is critical. Attachment to a “new Ummah” resolves the anomie of the individual lost and disconnected in prison or in a new land439. Khosrokhavar finds that people radicalize when they feel that they have

437 Khosrokhavar, Radicalization, pg. 5.
438 Khosrokhavar, Radicalization, pg. 8.
439 Khosrokhavar, Radicalization, pg. 16.
been humiliated, victimized and that their people are “under assault.” Khosrokhavar says, “These three dimensions belong to the context of globalization and radicals have internalized them perfectly”\(^{440}\). Radicals feel “a profound sense of injustice” that cannot be remedied without drastic action\(^{441}\).

Common sense dictates that welcoming migrants will prevent them from rejecting their new societies and prevent host societies from fanning the flames of exclusivist nationalism. The less sanguine flip side would be to simply close off all migration. While logical, integration is not a simple process and isolation is both difficult to achieve and comes with attendant negatives. This chapter makes policy proposals for improving world migration and, along the way, reducing radicalization.

**Domestic Policy Proposals**

_Tolerance:_ Tolerance and acceptance of new populations through immigrant-friendly policies could reduce radicalization. Broadly conceived, such a strategy would likely be coupled with a regime that liberally accepts the entrance of migrants. A state-driven tolerant approach to migrants would likely subvert migrant radicalization but could yield xenophobic radicalization. Anti-immigrant rejectionists could subvert this strategy as could continual, rapid flows of migrants which would make it difficult to absorb people properly.

General tolerance toward migrants has worked for America—as it has for other countries—but it normally comes with caveats. Not all migrants are welcome, and certainly not all at once. Restrictions need to be placed on migration at least for the maintenance of order, a point with which even open borders theorists concur\(^{442}\). That said, tolerance to new migrants would ring hollow if coupled with heavy immigration restrictions.

In “The Emerging Migration State,” James Hollifield traces how “the settlement of large foreign populations” in Western Europe in the post-War period ignited anti-immigrant public opinion “giving rise to new social movements and political parties.” Governments and citizens worried about how to integrate the newcomers and feared “that disposed and disillusioned youth of the second generation would turn to radical Islam, rather than following the conventional, secular, and republican path to assimilation”\(^{443}\).

Hollifield writes that even in the face of pressures to limit migration, liberal democratic rights, such as protections for minorities and non-citizens, served to “blunt the impact of nativist and xenophobic movements.” Courts rejected or watered down repressive laws such as “the 1986 and 1995 Pasqua Laws in France, Proposition 187 in California, or the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act in the United States”\(^{444}\).

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\(^{440}\) Khosrokhavar, _Radicalization_, pgs. 18-9.

\(^{441}\) Khosrokhavar, _Radicalization_, pg. 19.


\(^{443}\) Hollifield, James F., “The Emerging Migration State,” _International Migration Review_ 38: 3 (Fall 2004), pg. 896.

\(^{444}\) Hollifield, “The Emerging Migration State,” pg. 897.
A welcoming, tolerant approach is not a panacea. Tolerance presumably leads to the adoption of more modest forms of religiosity and ideology, but it may not help with the rise of illiberal democracy. Promoting moderate Islam was widely proposed after 9/11\(^445\), and while moderation reduces radicalization it won’t stop democratic backsliding all on its own\(^446\).

Tolerant elite messages go hand-in-glove with tolerant policies. Even welcoming policies, can get upended by the rhetoric of xenophobic leaders such as Donald Trump. Poland’s ruling PiS Party’s pro-immigration policies coupled with anti-immigrant rhetoric merge to create an intolerant environment for newcomers\(^447\). The Russian case is instructive here. Policy changes and elite statements countering nationalist radicalization quelled xenophobic attacks on migrants over time. Further, a reduction in the broader conflicts between Russians and Chechens reduced inter-communal tensions.

Welcoming strategies may help rich countries at the cost of poorer ones. These policies will likely lead developing countries to suffer from brain and human capital drains. Their best and brightest will be helping already-rich countries prosper\(^448\). While there are downsides, policies that welcome newcomers coupled with more open migration regimes work together to limit radicalization of hosts and migrants. A goal of such policies: integration, is taken up in the next section.

Integration to Reduce Radicalization: In Strangers No More, Richard Alba and Nancy Foner write that one of the key issues with twenty-first century immigration remains “how to integrate immigrants and their children so that they become full members of the societies where they now live”\(^449\). Alba and Foner emphasize that integration is “complicated by the widespread resistance to immigrants and their children” that is professed by journalists and politicians and measured in opinion polls\(^450\). Immigration alters societies, but mostly for the better; this is why integration is a two-way street: immigrants and hosts act in concert to forge new social identities\(^451\).

The goal of integration is for immigrants to truly become part of their new societies. Integrated immigrants participate in elections and lead, work and manage, and live in integrated spaces. Segregated immigration communities stifle integration leaving immigrants behind in their new societies\(^452\). As Alba and Foner write while immigration segregation “is most severe in the United States, where large enclaves have developed in


\(^{448}\) Collier, Exodus.


\(^{450}\) Alba and Foner, Strangers No More, pg. 2.

\(^{451}\) Alba and Foner, Strangers No More, pg. 6.

\(^{452}\) Alba and Foner, Strangers No More, pg. 95.
which immigrants and other poor minorities live,” Western Europe has a harder time with integrating Muslims. These problems with integration lead to radicalization as migrants who are alienated from their new communities may adopt extremist ideologies. Alba and Foner find that in Western Europe, “Islam has become an oppositional identity for some Muslims..., or a way of marking their rejection of the European mainstream, which they perceive as condemning them to positions of inferiority”.

Unfortunately, Adida, Laitin and Valfort discover, through a series of game theoretic experiments, that Muslims and “rooted French” are locked in an equilibrium of discrimination in France. Extremist Muslims reinforce the Islamophobia of rooted French through their behaviors and rooted French people’s discrimination against Muslims in the labor market and in wider society pushes Muslims away from mainstream society. This leads Muslims to retrench themselves in ethnic enclaves. Breaking this equilibrium will take both new French policies and perhaps a renewed desire on the part of Muslims to assimilate—the authors suggest that French Muslim parents consider giving their children less “Muslim-sounding” names to guard against resume discrimination. Along the same lines, Khosrokhavar calls for France to be more flexible to the “theological and psychological” needs of religious minorities, to adopt policies more like the integrationist ones espoused by the United States and Great Britain.

As Christian Joppke clarifies, “The very fact that Islam is an issue in Europe but not in the United States casts doubt on the often-made argument that there is something inherent in Islam that makes it incompatible with western ways.” Joppke instead points to, “persistent socioeconomic marginalization of the children and grandchildren of Muslim immigrants” in Europe. This, he argues, is more an issue of integration issue than one of religious conflict, but “it has often found a religious expression in that global Islam provides an idiom of protest and identity for excluded Muslim ethnics.” Ultimately, Europeans have failed to make Muslim newcomers into prosperous members of their societies as seen in France’s banlieues and “in the decrepit industrial towns of northern England.”

Paul Collier observes that, “left to the decentralized decisions of potential migrants, migration accelerates until low-income countries are substantially depopulated.” For this reason, Collier holds that “Migration cannot be left to the decisions of individual migrants; it must be managed by governments.” He believes that a “fit-for-purpose”

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453 Alba and Foner, Strangers No More, pgs. 244-5.
454 Alba and Foner, Strangers No More, pg. 123.
456 Khosrokhavar, Radicalization, pg. 147.
458 Joppke, “Successes and Failures of Muslim Integration in France and Germany,” pg. 128.
459 Joppke, “Successes and Failures of Muslim Integration in France and Germany,” pg. 117.
460 Collier, Exodus, pg. 251.
461 Collier, Exodus, pg. 255.
migration system would work hard at integrating migrants into their host societies. Under such a system, governments would strictly enforce laws against discrimination and racism, require migrants to disperse geographically as Canada does, work hard to integrate schools (as America did in the 1970s), and require migrants to adopt some aspects of host-country identity\textsuperscript{462}. While progressives seek to combine multiculturalism with rapid migration and generous social welfare, Collier believes that such combinations are likely unsustainable\textsuperscript{463}.

Daniel Rauhut theorizes that how hosts and migrants view nationality affects whether migrants successfully integrate. He builds a theory of immigrant integration supported by findings that integration of newcomers is a two-way street and that informal institutions (such as religions and cultures) play a large role in integration. Rauhut conceives of a process whereby immigrants are more likely to integrate into societies where hosts and migrants view nationality similarly. The best scenario is when migrants and hosts both see nationality as being based on socialization and language, the worst is where both see ethnicity, religion or history as the basis for nationality. If nationality is viewed inflexibility, as something you either have or you don’t and that can’t be changed, then integration of newcomers into the national society is not possible\textsuperscript{464}.

There is hope. Leo Lucassen finds that the “problematic migrants” of Western Europe are actually integrating faster than did groups that came to Europe in previous decades\textsuperscript{465}. Further, the idea that a second-generation of disaffected Muslims are not culturally destined to radicalize in Europe. “As the situation of the second generation of Algerians in France shows, their worrisome prospects are not so much explained by their Islamic culture, which most of them denounce,” Lucassen reports, “but by their exclusion and isolation from mainstream French society”\textsuperscript{466}. All the more reason to focus on the benefits of integration. Additionally, Michael Minkenberg finds that Europe’s radical right has had little effect on integration policies, which have actually expanded in Australia, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands (but contracted in Belgium and France)\textsuperscript{467}.

Doug Saunders counsels that segregation is not always a bad thing. In a defense of arrival cities, Saunders highlights that these places are not the dens of extremism that others make them out to be. He states that, “there is no correlation between ethnic concentration and terrorism—that is, it is just as likely to arise, if not more so, in places other than arrival cities.” Moreover, he cites anecdotally that “there are strong

\textsuperscript{462} Collier, Exodus, pg. 264.  
\textsuperscript{463} Collier, Exodus, pgs. 264-5.  
\textsuperscript{465} Lucassen, Leo, The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press 2005), pg. 201.  
\textsuperscript{466} Lucassen, The Immigrant Threat, pg. 213.  
suggestions that the tight-knit networks of arrival-city culture deter the worst forms of extremism”468.

This view does not contradict a proposal calling for more integration. Immigrant enclaves can be empowering platforms for social mobility or ghettoized traps. By integrating migrant populations, places of arrival will look more like the former than the latter. Ultimately, as Tim Marshall puts it, “we need to find a way for newcomers to join the host community, not seek to undermine its values”469.

Enforce Human Rights: A recommitment to enforcing human rights will reinforce democracy, integration and liberalism, which could help both hosts and migrants. Human rights, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, conceive of human beings that are free, treated equally and worthy of dignity. Pride in one’s nation need not contradict a commitment to such rights. For instance, the treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang is a grave violation of human rights that the Chinese government justifies on nationalistic grounds470. Such a justification rings hollow when viewed from the outside, just like justifications for child separation in America for reasons of immigrant deterrence rang hollow to many observers471. Committing to a world where human rights are taken more seriously, benefits citizens and migrants alike; the post-War world has been one of great economic growth and movement due to the rise of liberal democracies and the enshrinement of human rights. The rights of current citizens need not be uprooted by migrants under such a scheme. Countries can still have discretion to control migration, but would do so within a human rights framework.

Shaping Migration as a Win-Win: Migration is too often problematized today; but governments and publics can once again view it as a mutually beneficial process. Migrants, as seen in America, Russia, Japan and elsewhere, take on jobs that hosts don’t want to work in. High-skilled migrants add to the economy. Migrants bring new foods and cultures to their adopted communities. Previous chapters discussed tensions between natives and migrants (Ch. 3) and between human rights and security (Ch. 1). Integrating and tolerating migrants can be a win for both migrants and their hosts. Balancing migration with membership rights is key. As Song proposes, a system of “closed borders and open doors” could provide the optimal balance between practicality and universalism472.

International Policy Proposals

Coordinated Burden-Sharing: Europe’s reaction to migration is instructive. The Schengen Agreement of 1985 set a new migration regime: countries dropped border checks “in exchange for common visa requirements to control the movement of third-

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468 Saunders, Doug, Arrival City: How the Largest Migration in History is Reshaping Our World (New York: Pantheon Books 2010), pg. 320.
country nationals.” The Dublin Convention of 1990 required asylum-seekers to apply in the first “safe country” they set foot in, which reduced the likelihood of people “asylum shopping”473. Angela Merkel suspended these rules in Germany to allow for the entry of more refugees. The purpose of the Dublin system was to share the burden of migrant acceptance across the Continent. Merkel’s welcoming of refugees has undone an arrangement that had already been fraying474.

Khaled Koser emphasizes the importance of burden-sharing in reforming the current refugee system475. He observes that, “control measures such as border fences, biometric testing and visas are, in isolation, unlikely to reduce irregular migration in the long-term. They probably need to be combined with more proactive measures that address the causes of irregular migration, including achieving development targets to increase security and improve livelihoods in origin countries, as well as expanding opportunities to move legally”476.

The current system is clearly too ad hoc. All countries want to accept highly-skilled, rich migrants, but few want lower-skilled, poorer ones who could be migrating in great numbers in the near-future. A more coherent system wherein rich countries share the burden of accepting migrants is necessary. Indeed, as climate change makes more of the earth uninhabitable, countries will have to build capacities to help migrants and internally displaced residents. Island and coastal nations may yield huge migrant outflows and nearby countries may have to take in millions of newcomers. Without a coherent system of acceptance, great upheaval and human misery could take place similar to other great movements of people such as the Cultural Revolution in China and the Partition of India and Pakistan.

Rather than ad hoc acceptance of migrants to Europe and other places, a centralized organization that balances the needs of migrants with the ability of destination countries to provide is needed. Even the European Union, supposedly a supranational, cosmopolitan body, has found it difficult to justify accommodating the new mass of migrants. Were it not for Angela Merkel’s leadership on this issue, migrants might interminably be boxed in by border fences—and, in many cases, they are still stuck in refugee limbo. Coordinated burden-sharing is absolutely critical for absorbing migrants effectively into new societies, the next proposal offers one method for equitably distributing migrants.

A Refugee Clearinghouse: The world needs to create a refugee clearinghouse organization that coordinates where political and economic refugees are placed throughout the world. Canada, for instance, has plenty of land, a tolerant population and some desire for new immigrants while geographically smaller, more nationalistic European countries have struggled mightily with who to accept and how many. A

refugee clearinghouse would place more people in states that seek migrants and level the burden of refugee acceptance.

Under the current system, countries like Germany and Turkey have willingly taken on much greater refugee numbers than others. These countries will have to deal with the consequences of potentially overburdened government services and labor markets which could lead to radicalization and terrorism. Distributing refugees more evenly in countries throughout the world—including in those countries that seek to sidestep asylum seekers—would reduce the likelihood of terrorism and make for a more equitable world community.

A refugee clearinghouse, established by an international treaty and run by the United Nations, could solve a few issues. First, it would create a more coherent system for the acceptance of refugees. Second, it could match refugees with countries that either need their skills or that already have Diaspora communities for those refugees to join. Finally, it would lighten the load on arrival nations that feel strained by migration by sharing the burden of refugee acceptance worldwide.

Expanding on this proposal, James Hollifield calls for a truly international migration regime, controlled by the United Nations, to better manage world movements. However, he feels that differences between developed and developing countries would likely prevent such a regime being agreed-upon. Peter Schuck writes that a solution to the issue of mass refugee movements involves formalized burden-sharing through a vehicle like the refugee clearinghouse proposed here. Like Hollifield, Schuck does not have high hopes for the adoption of his proposal in a world controlled by states. Still, he believes that “a quota system that distributes refugee burdens among the wealthier states with a market option that can redistribute protection resources to other states that can more effectively use them to harbor more refugees” makes for a better system than the current one.

Leaving labor, education and family reunification-motivated migration to states, while better coordinating refugee distribution sets the right balance. Refugees’ rights are derived through international treaties, while states have plentiful laws about other forms of migrants. A refugee clearinghouse, established by an international treaty, could be an achievable strong step toward a more egalitarian and sustainable migration system and I believe powerful, refugee-accepting countries would be in favor of such a plan. A refugee clearinghouse would provide a good framework for a more extensive, coordinated migrant burden-sharing scheme.

Reducing Inequality to Stem Radicalization and Rapid Migration: So far we have focused on supply-side proposals, but solving the demand-side of the equation is equally important. Global inequality drives large migration patterns, which in some cases yield radicalization. Reducing inequality worldwide, then, is a critical step toward solving the issues outlined in this book.

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478 Schuck, Citizens, Strangers and In-betweens, pg. 325.
As Collier underlines, “Mass international migration is a response to extreme global inequality”\textsuperscript{479}. Collier predicts that migration will diminish as low-income countries catch up to high-income countries\textsuperscript{480}. But, Collier warns that this will only happen if migration policies effectively set ceilings for migrant numbers and selection criteria. Without such policies, “migration will continue to accelerate” and “high-income countries could become postnational, multicultural societies.” Multiculturalism is certainly a positive in many contexts, but it has stretched the social fabric to a breaking point in some states. Further, accelerated migration could cause “an exodus” of talented people with means from the poorest countries, which will leave them in worse shape than before\textsuperscript{481}.

Khosrokhavar observes that, “Globalization has gone hand in hand with a profound feeling of oppression and frustration, which is no longer kept in check by ideologies, as it was during the Cold War. If citizenship is defined as social and economic integration into a society, then the affliction of some while others prosper in a globalized world devoid of true global citizenship will continue to haunt all citizens in the form of radicalized terrorism”\textsuperscript{482}. As Michael Marmot relates in \textit{The Health Gap}, “Poverty and inequality are deeply disempowering. People with little control over their lives do not feel able to make healthy choices”\textsuperscript{483}. People living in segregated and unequal spaces also may not be able to shake off calls to extremism or crime. Reducing inequality, which continues to rise during the pandemic\textsuperscript{484}, is critical to establishing social justice\textsuperscript{485}. Social justice will quell grievances and reduce radicalization.

Ayelet Shachar argues that birthright citizenship is the true impediment to solving global inequality. Citizenship in rich countries bestows enormous benefits on those with the good fortune of being born in them or of having the right parents. Shachar proposes a \textit{jus nexi}, or proximity-based, method of attaining citizenship. Such a method would grant greater rights to long-time residents (who might not have papers) and fewer rights to those who collect passports or who don’t have genuine connections to the countries that grant them citizenship\textsuperscript{486}. This model provides the basis for a more inclusive form of citizenship that could reduce radicalization.

In sum, reducing global inequality is extremely important in the quest for a world where migrants and hosts live together more peacefully. Additionally, reducing inequality will reduce the need for migration, which will help stabilize all countries. The next proposal relatedly seeks to help poor countries.

\textit{Failed State Stabilization and Liberalization:} A common response to those who seek to help migrants is to flip the issue and ask why we don’t just stabilize the countries they came from. Stabilizing countries such as Syria, Libya and Somalia is surely more

\begin{footnotes}
\item[479] Collier, \textit{Exodus}, pg. 271.
\item[480] Collier, \textit{Exodus}, pg. 273.
\item[481] Collier, \textit{Exodus}, pg. 272.
\item[486] Shachar, \textit{The Birthright Lottery}, chapter 6.
\end{footnotes}
difficult than accommodating the migrants who come from them. World powers have spent a lot of blood and treasure in trying to stabilize failing states. That said, the effort to improve conditions in failing states and to liberalize autocracies is surely a critical component in stifling radicalization and moderating migrant movements. Both types of states are potential incubators for terrorism and both types of states push out large numbers of their own people. Working toward bettering conditions in authoritarian and fragile states, while no easy feat, would limit the supply of migrants and terrorists. Additionally, stable countries like Saudi Arabia that export and create disproportionate numbers of terrorists need to be pressured to better their human rights records, liberalize politically wherever possible and tone down extremist rhetoric.

Resolution of Middle East vs. West conflicts: Critical criminologists explain the forms radicalization takes by examining the wider world the radicals live in. In this case, migrants and hosts live in a world where Western countries have repeatedly engaged militarily in the Middle East, North Africa and Africa in recent years. The list includes interventions and drone strikes in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Gaza, Yemen, Mali and Pakistan. While isolationism and internationalism require a balance, these conflicts clearly lend fuel to the fires of radicalization and explain why so many host-migrant conflicts have centered on Islam. The Abraham Accords as well as reductions in American troop numbers in the Middle East could improve relations between Muslim and Christian countries in the future. That said, root conditions in the Middle East need reform including liberalizing authoritarian governments, opening economies, improving education systems, fighting for gender equality and resolving the status of Palestinians and Kurds. An avenue to improve the conditions of people in all states is explored in the next section.

Global Citizenship Rights: The concept of universal, egalitarian human rights needs to be entrenched into a world system where citizenship rights create gross inequalities. Reece Jones calls for an opening of borders combined with “a global minimum wage, global standards for working conditions, global safety nets for the poor, and global environmental standards.” Shachar’s jus nexi rights to citizenship and Jacqueline Stevens’ concept of a world where people freely traverse de-nationalized state units, could be part of this notion of global citizenship. Of course, such a system, though morally attractive is not likely to take hold in the near- or medium-term.

Nations and nationalism, and their concomitant justifications for ownership and exclusion, are the great barriers to a more just land distribution and system of human migration. Global citizenship rights, based on cosmopolitanism: an ideology that views humans as part of one family, would alleviate the pressures that many who lost the birthright lottery feel. Partitioning lands may make sense from the view of elites or religious groups but unified, federated, and confederated lands are needed to take humanity from a world of “others” to one where we are one family united in the goals of helping one another and preserving the land we have. Global or regional citizenship

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would be part of this scheme. This goal is certainly Utopian and long-term but it serves as a template to judge policies against and as a metric for measuring progress.

Reforming International Organizations: The United Nations delivers a good platform for international discussion and provides aid to hundreds of millions of people\(^{490}\), but it is politicized and does not accurately represent humanity\(^{491}\). More objective international bodies that better represent the world’s people by representing people not states would create for a fairer world system. Truly representative international bodies could work towards resolving land disputes, reforming the United Nations and establishing coordinated migrant-sharing schemes. Together, these goals would reduce radicalization.

Conclusion

Fareed Zakaria avers that despite the pandemic, globalization is not going anywhere any time soon. Trade, movement and international communication have continued even during the covid-19 crisis\(^{492}\). In a globalized world, migration and the radicalization that sometimes comes with it needs to be dealt with.

International solutions abound; including some that propose new state systems. Reece Jones concludes that, “the thousands of deaths at borders and the callous and inhumane treatment of migrants create an opening to question the underlying logic of the state system that is predicated on violent exclusion at borders”\(^{493}\). While “breaking borders” has been attached to the actions of the Islamic State\(^{494}\), Jones writes that the fight against colonialism and discrimination has for generations been a fight against “artificial boundar[ies]” meant to hem people in\(^{495}\). Ben Barber calls for a Global Parliament of Mayors that would connect the world’s cities and usher in a world order centered on metropolises\(^{496}\).

Solutions involving land rights-changes, such as inheritance or ownership reforms could also reduce conflict and radicalization by shifting the spoils. Jones proposes that, “There certainly needs to be a rethinking of the right of property owners to exploit the resources on their property without limits.” This could mean that property eventually goes back to the commons\(^{497}\). Jacqueline Stevens’ arguments against inheritance follow the same line of thought\(^{498}\). Of course, changes in how land is viewed or in how the world state system is organized will take generations to take hold.

\(^{490}\) United Nations, “70 Ways the UN Makes a Difference,”
\(^{492}\) Zakaria, Fareed, Ten Lessons for a Post-Pandemic World (New York: WW Norton & Co.).
\(^{493}\) Jones, Violent Borders, pg. 180.
\(^{494}\) Ahram, Break All the Borders.
\(^{495}\) Jones, Violent Borders, pg. 178.
\(^{496}\) Barber, Benjamin, If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2013).
\(^{497}\) Jones, Violent Borders, pg. 177.
\(^{498}\) Stevens, States without Nations.
As De Conink, et al. summarize, “there are no simple solutions [to issues of migration and refugees] because the refugee situation is a complex matter, perceptions of it are fraught with emotions, and it cannot be met with coldly ‘rational’ decisions, while involving both national and international rules. The actors in this complex interplay are not only the people on the move, governments, and NGOs, but also often ruthless refugee smugglers”\(^{499}\). James Hollifield similarly frames the issues discussed here as complicated and hard to control; he asks, “Will this increase in migration be a virtuous or a vicious cycle? Will it be destabilizing, leading the international system into greater anarchy, disorder and war, or will it lead to greater openness, wealth and human development?” Hollifield answers that, “Much will depend on how migration is managed by the more powerful liberal states, because they will set the trend for the rest of the globe. To avoid a domestic political backlash against immigration, the rights of migrants must be respected and states must cooperate in building an international migration regime”\(^{500}\).

To conclude, the issues of migration and radicalization are not necessarily connected—in the sense that migration does not strictly lead to terrorism or the reverse—but they do affect one another. Migration can lead to nativist terrorism and migrants can become terrorists for various reasons.

In an age where common ground needs to be reached, the resurgence of nationalism recently observed in the West that has accompanied an almost unprecedented migration is disquieting. Solutions from the left and right have become troublingly similar, as Micklethwait and Wooldridge iterate: “nationalist arguments for self-sufficiency and socialist ones for a big state have begun to blend”\(^{501}\). Solving the world’s big geopolitical problems, which have been increasingly ignored, will break any perceived link between migrants and terrorists; restricting migration with no international plan for accommodation, as has occurred during the covid-19 pandemic, will only make matters worse. Yuval Harari observes that nationalism has no answers for the great problems of our future: technological disruption, climate change and nuclear war. “To have effective policies,” Harari argues, “we must deglobalize the ecology, the economy, and the march of science or we must globalize our politics”\(^{502}\).

Radicalization, rather than ready-made terrorists moving for the express purpose of committing attacks, should be the concern of nations accepting new migrants. This phenomenon has been studied in the context of Western and non-Western societies as well as in their prisons. Still, of course, only a tiny proportion of migrants to any Western country (even in the oft-bandied case of Moroccans in Belgium’s Molenbeek) turn to extremist beliefs and only a small portion of extremists go the extra step of carrying out violence. As deradicalization programs have shown in Saudi Arabia and

\(^{499}\) De Conink, David, Christine Ogan and Leen d’Haenens, “Can ‘the Other’ Ever Become ‘One of Us’?: Comparing Turkish and European Attitudes toward Refugees: A five-year exploratory study,” The International Communication Gazette 0 (0), pg. 17.

\(^{500}\) Hollifield, “The Emerging Migration State,” pg. 905.


elsewhere, radicals can be “reprogrammed” given proper education and vocational training503.

In 21 Lessons for the 21st Century, Yuval Harari writes that, “the debate about immigration should not be conducted as an uncompromising struggle over some nonnegotiable moral imperative. Rather, it must be a discussion between two legitimate political positions, with the ultimate choice decided through standard democratic procedures.” Harari does not know how to solve the age-old issue of hosts seeking to maintain their cultures while immigrants bring new ones, but he does warn that radicalization should not be a reason for unwinding democracy. “It would be extremely unfortunate if the European experiment in freedom and tolerance unraveled due to an overblown fear of terrorists,” Harari counsels504. After a time of pandemic when we have lost so much, it would be a tragedy to lose our values over the unfounded fears of radical migrants.

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Index Terms
Arrival city
Australia
Citizen, citizenship
Civil death
Covid-19, see pandemic
Daesh, see ISIS/Islamic State
Domestic terrorism
Europe, European Union
Far-Right
France
Hispanic
Host
Human rights
Indigenous rights
ISIS, Islamic State
Israel
Jihad, jihadist
Muslim, Islam
Land Ownership
Land Rights
Latin
Mexico
Migrant Rights
Native
Native Rights
Binyamin Netanyahu
Victor Orban
Palestine, Palestinians
Pandemic
Populist, populism
Prison radicalization
Radicalization
Refugee
Russia
South Africa
Syria
Terrorism
Donald Trump
Undocumented/illegal migration
United Kingdom, Britain, British
United States, America
United Nations
Visa
Xenophobia
Zimbabwe