In the Cities, There is Violence: Do Higher Levels of Police Militarization Correlate with Police Use of Lethal Force?

Brennan B. Sumner
Abstract

Police violence has become a pressing issue in the United States. The topic of police militarization, as a consequence, has entered the public consciousness, and its effects have become a topic of concern. This paper will examine whether there is a correlation between higher levels of police militarization and higher rates of police use of lethal force from multiple perspectives. This paper will utilize a mixed methods research approach, combining historical analysis, critical literature review, and data analysis from thirty American cities. This paper will also discuss the public policy implications of police militarization and offer critiques therein.
In the Cities, there is Violence: Do Higher Levels of Police Militarization Correlate with Police Use of Lethal Force?

by
Brennan B. Sumner

A Masters Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Montclair State University
In Partial Fulfillment of the requirements For the Degree of Master of Arts
May 2022
IN THE CITIES THERE IS VIOLENCE: DO HIGHER LEVELS OF POLICE MILITARIZATION CORRELATE WITH POLICE USE OF LETHAL FORCE?

A THESIS

Submitted In partial fulfillment of the requirements

For the Degree of Master of Arts

By

BRENNAN B. SUMNER

Montclair State University

Montclair, NJ

2022
Acknowledgments

The author would like to acknowledge and thank Dr. Zsolt Nyiri, the sponsor of this thesis and chair of this thesis committee, for his guidance and knowledge. Dr. Nyiri has been instrumental in completing this project, and the author could not be more grateful to him for his help. Next, the author thanks the other two committee members and our graduate program coordinator, Dr. Brigid Callahan Harrison, Dr. Ariel Alvarez, and Dr. Daniel Mengara. For their generous agreement to serve on this thesis committee and their help in completing this project.

Next, the author would like to thank the professors, teachers, friends, and peers who encouraged him during his education and generously offered their help and advice during this project. The author also thanks the scholars whose work he drew inspiration and from whom he came to understand this topic.

The author would also like to thank the creators and researchers behind the Fatal Encounters and Open the Books databases. Their diligent work and commitment to transparency have allowed this project to be completed.

The author would like to thank his family for their help and encouragement. He thanks his brothers Aidan, Colin, his Godmother Josephine, and Uncle Mark for encouraging him. Lastly, the author especially thanks his parents, Theresa and Ken, for their encouragement and advice. They never gave up on their son.
This thesis is dedicated to Valentina Orella Peralta and all victims of police violence.

Valentina Orella Peralta was 14 years old when her life was taken on December 23rd, 2021 (Vives 2022). On that day, she was shopping with her mother, Soledad, for a dress she would wear for her upcoming quinceanera. This unique cultural rite of passage would have marked her transition from a girl to a young woman. This, however, would not occur, and instead, she died in her mother’s arms. A police officer’s bullet ultimately struck her after passing through a wall of the dressing room she had taken refuge in with her mother while a person was outside attacking women with a bike lock (Vives 2022). The facts of this case have not been rendered in their entirety. However, what is clear from the video released by the LAPD, is that a police officer discharged a firearm at the attacker, though he was not at that moment engaged in violence (Belware & Beachum 2021). This is not to say that this suspect was innocent or not a threat. The video, available online, clearly shows this person engaging in a series of violent assaults that constituted a serious danger to the public. With that being said, there was no child shot before police arrived, and neither was anyone dead. The police themselves introduced a higher level of violence to a dangerous situation that ultimately took the life of an innocent child.

Unfortunately, this type of police manufactured violence is not atypical in the era of modern police militarization (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). This fact constitutes an immense problem today in the United States. Innocence has become a casualty of law enforcement. This remains true even though it is a near certainty that this police officer did not mean to shoot Valentina. He could not have seen her and could not have known with certainty there was anyone else in the path of his weapon. However, this situation could have been avoided had
police acted to stop this suspect with nonlethal methods. The culpability for incidents of this type is with the system of law enforcement in this nation, which provides few alternatives short of lethal force for dealing with volatile situations. The outcome is that innocent people pay for what is at its basest level, a shortsighted and reactionary public policy decision, which has been repeated for more than a century. Wanton police violence is a partial product of decades of police militarization in the United States. Therefore, this pattern of violence apparent in contemporary policing is a topic worthy of study.
Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapters</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THESIS SIGNATURE PAGE</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THESIS TITLE PAGE</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A CRITICAL REVIEW OF RELEVANT EXISTING LITERATURE</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Theoretical Perspectives on Police Militarization</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. The Foucauldian School of Thought</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1 Is Foucault Wrong About Punishment?</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. Modern Police Militarization, Community Policing and Ideology</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4. Police as Street Level Bureaucrats</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5. Existing Empirical Research</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6. SWAT Teams in Maryland</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7. Militarized Police and Visual Perception</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8. The Growth in Prevalence of SWAT teams</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9. Police Militarization and Use of Lethal Force, a National Problem</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10. Police Militarization and General Aggression</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A CONCISE HISTORY OF POLICE MILITARIZATION</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. The Beginnings of Police Militarization</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. The First Practitioners of Police Militarization</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3. The Dangerous Classes and Police Militarization</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4. The Colonization of the Metropoles</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5. Mid-20th Century Police Militarization and the Advent of the SWAT Team</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6. Modern Police Militarization</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7. The Terrorism Fallacy</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Public Opinion on Police</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. An Analysis of the Equipment Transfers in This Dataset</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1. Unusual Equipment Transfers</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2. Drones</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.1 Robotic Police Dogs</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3. Optical Equipment</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4. Other Equipment</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5. Armored Vehicles</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Quantitative Analysis: Correlation Between Police Militarization and Lethal Encounters</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1. Rationale for Sample Choice</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2. Procedures</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3. Results</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Conclusion</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Data Tables and Figures</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Bibliography</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1.

Introduction

Academic interest in the topic of police militarization has grown over the past several decades. Kraska and Kappeler (1997) were one of the first attempts to empirically assess the increasing use of and increased prevalence of SWAT teams and examine the attitudes amongst SWAT officers. Go (2020) established that a historical link between American imperialism and domestic police policy exists and is correlated with a rise in police militarization. Lawson (2019) found that a causal relationship exists between the presence of military equipment and the amount of police involved deaths on a national level. Still, others such as Walker (1977) and Lipsky (1971) have sought to understand the bureaucracy of professionalized police forces and open for discussion the societal effects of the professionalization of police departments.

Out of this debate have arisen questions on the efficacy and the exigency of police militarization. Recent police killings have opened this debate once more due to the militarized police response which occurred in reaction to protests over police killings. Concurrently more significant segments of the public have started questioning police behavior and have begun expressing concerns over police brutality and racism in law enforcement (Doherty 2020). This situation creates a need for discovery and exegesis. This paper will examine the effects of police militarization within thirty urban centers.

The author will draw upon existing data sets adjusted for this paper. The hypothesis of this paper is, that higher levels of police militarization correlates with more frequent use of lethal force by police. The IV is the level of militarization (LOM), and the DV is the amount of police
use of lethal force incidences. To assess whether this hypothesis is supported, the author will examine the LOM of thirty cities in the United States.

This paper will include several substantive chapters dealing with specific facets of police militarization and the existing research on this topic. Chapter two, a critical review of relevant existing literature, will detail theoretical perspectives of police militarization and existing empirical research. The Foucauldian school of thought concerning police militarization, which includes the idea of a social boomerang effect, panoptical surveillance, punishment, and discipline, will be discussed. Next, the neoliberal and neoconservative foundations of modern police militarization will be examined. Following this, the theory of police as street level bureaucrats and what that entails for police-public relations will be examined. Lastly, existing empirical research on police militarization will be discussed and analyzed to conclude the literature review. Chapter three, a concise history of police militarization, will detail the imperial origins of police militarization, the colonization of urban areas, an examination of essential inflection points, and the decisions which led up to the modern era of police militarization.

Next chapter four, public opinion on police, will discuss polling from the Pew Research Center and Gallup on police in the United States. This chapter will present the findings of these studies and discuss the problems police face in terms of legitimacy due to the high mistrust of police by minorities. Chapter five will comprise an analysis of the equipment transfers in this dataset. Individual items, and categories of items, will be discussed and analyzed. Chapter six, the methodology section, will discuss the data sources for this paper, the rationales for the sample choices, and the procedures used to examine whether a correlation exists between the included police departments’ LOM and the use of lethal force by those police departments. Chapter seven will detail the results of this study. Chapter eight will discuss the limitations of
this study. Chapter nine will include a discussion of the findings of this paper. Chapter ten will discuss potential solutions to the problems of police militarization. Chapter eleven will conclude this paper with a summary and conclusions to be made therein. Chapter twelve will include the data tables and figures cited throughout this text. Chapter thirteen will contain the bibliography of this paper.

The definition this paper will use for police militarization is borrowed from the work of Peter Kraska, who defines it as; the adoption and incorporation of the militarist model, tactics, equipment, and culture by police (Kraska 2007). This paper will take a mixed methods approach towards illustrating the topic of police militarization and the examination of this paper’s hypothesis. These methods will include analysis and discussion of theoretical perspectives which explain police militarization, as well as analysis of the historical record with a focus on understanding how police militarization began and progressed. Also included will be consultations on existing Empirical Research. Next, quantitative methods, including correlation analysis and regression analysis, will be used to determine whether there is a correlation between police use of military equipment and lethal force incidents in the cities covered in this dataset and if that correlation is significant.

CHAPTER 2.

A Critical Review of Relevant Existing Literature

The literature review of this paper will be constrained to theoretical perspectives that explain the presence and proliferation of police militarization and existing empirical research on the topic of police militarization. The theoretical perspectives discussed in this section include the Foucauldian perspective, the neoliberal and neoconservative relationship to police
militarization, and police as street level bureaucrats. The existing empirical research section will consist of a discussion and analysis of studies that focus on the creation and prevalence of SWAT teams, the use of SWAT teams against minorities, as well as the relationship between the police use of military equipment and incidents of use of lethal force by police.

2.1

Theoretical Perspectives on Police Militarization

Theory in the case of police militarization helps us to understand how police militarization began and the consequences of police militarization today and in the future. Theory underpins the entire investigative process of social science and provides a vehicle to conduct research. Philosophers and social scientists have long sought to understand state power, violence, and society. Today we confront these issues again with regard to police militarization, relying as ever on the sturdy ground theorists and philosophers have laid for us to walk on towards a higher truth and the ultimate goal of more perfect knowledge.

Police militarization, because of its intersection with the state, society, history, and governance, is at its core a theoretical concept. Despite this, we know from empirical evidence that militarization of police is occurring. First covered is the Foucauldian approach, which explains the presence of parallels between colonialism or imperialism and subsequent police practices with its theory of a boomerang effect. Next, we will observe neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies that show a level of consubstantiality between them when viewed through the lens of policing. Lastly, the theory of police as street level bureaucrats will be examined. We will observe how this theory explains the roots of some biases within policing and
provides a framework to consider the structures present in police departments and where conflict is created therein.

2.2

The Foucauldian School of Thought

This section discusses the ideas of Michele Foucault, who developed the concept of a social boomerang effect, as well as theories on discipline and punishment. Foucault observed that imperialism, colonialism, and militarism, in general, tend to reverberate back upon the nations they originated from (Foucault 1975). This view of boomeranging imperialist tactics back onto the homeland coalesced well with the Foucauldian viewpoint on discipline as the primary control method within the modern social order. Foucault observed that during the 18th and 19th centuries, different states in Europe and elsewhere turned away from public punishment, executions, torture, and spectacle (Foucault 1975). Instead, these states focused their efforts on prosecution and incarceration and moved what executions they continued to carry out into a far more private setting. Alongside this shift in state policy, a novel form of discipline emerged. Foucault observed that this type of discipline is deindividualized and automated; it resides in the social relations between individuals (Foucault 1975, Elmer 2012). When this type of discipline failed, is in Foucault’s view when the state utilized colonialist tactics to restore order. Foucault’s boomerang explains where the type of militarized domestic state power we observe today originated from and why it is used.

The Foucauldian boomerang is related to Michele Foucault’s conception of discipline enforced in society through the power of surveillance (Foucault 1975, Jensen 2016). This idea of a surveillance society intent on instilling discipline and creating as few options for subversive
behavior as possible is based in part on the work of Jeremy Bentham (1778), specifically his idea of a panopticon (Jensen 2016). The panopticon is essentially a design plan for a prison complex in which a central tower overlooks all inhabitants, and as a result, one would have no way of knowing if and when they are being watched (Bentham 1778). This idea taken at the societal level necessarily implies not physical but social structures ranging from government agencies to civil society to our social peers. All of whom engaged in systems of surveillance aimed at preventing subversion.

We see parallels today in the use of aerial surveillance technology by law enforcement and the “see something, say something” anti-terrorism slogan, which delineates, perhaps better and more simply than even Bentham could, the goals of the panopticon (Davis 1990, Poland 2016). These modern panoptical technologies and tactics act as a form of governance. Their purpose is to ferret out and suppress subversive behavior to maintain hegemony. Likewise, the nascent American empire of the late 19th and early 20th centuries required new tools of governance to maintain its hegemony over colonial subalterns (Go 2020). The word empire, in this case, refers to the United States, which despite its republican system of government, has and continues to act in furtherance of imperialism in a variety of ways. We must consider that the expansions of manifest destiny, or the expeditions which followed to various Asian and Latin American nations as imperialist actions, and these examples became important to the developments which would follow in the realm of policing (Go 2020). These expeditions led to a new role of policing and governance the military would have thrust upon it, and this necessitated both the standardization and professionalization of military forces to maintain colonial hegemony (Go 2020). This first stage of imperialism would see a reverberation onto the
homeland of militarist tactics and colonial methods of social control (Coyne and Blanco 2016, Go 2020).

The boomerang effect would progress via a method of creating, vindicating, and legitimizing techniques of repression through the process of foreign wars, be they colonial expeditions of the past or through the early 21st century war(s) on terror in the middle east (Foucault 1975, Dunlap 2014). These tactics and methods then reverberate in the techniques of social control used in the domestic settings of the intervening nation (Foucault 1975, Dunlap 2014). Specifically, the boomerang effect sees the adoption by governments of imperialist, colonialist, and militarist methods of violent social control for use in the domestic setting (Foucault 1975, Cesaire 2001, Coyne and Blanco 2016, Go 2020). This is in essence, a kind of governance style and requires the use of violence, or the threat of violence, to solve problems and institute social control (Kraska and Kappeler 1997, Go 2020).

The case of the United States has seen the colonization of cities by the use of police militarization, developed via the importation of military methods, in the manner that Foucault’s boomerang describes and is used to enforce a social order amongst urban populations (Graham 2012, Go 2020). New colonial/imperialist methods of controlling problem neighborhoods, developing new methods of punishment, incarceration, and control are tested on battlefields abroad and rebound onto the society their users originated from (Graham 2012, Go 2020). We observe in both Europe and the United States today the boomeranging of colonial methods and the adoption of militarism and technology to enforce social control (Graham 2012, Dunlap 2014). In general, these methods have boomeranged onto those without power, who more often than not are the poor and racialized minorities (Go 2020).
The Romani, often referred to with the pejorative *gypsy*, have in Italy faced state enforced biometric registration, having their DNA and photos taken by force since 2008 (Dunlap 2014). Only then to face state violence at the hands of police units (Graham 2012, Dunlap 2014). This is indicative of western states’ adoption of surveillance technologies which have grown in prevalence since 9/11 (Graham 2009). Biometric surveillance of what can be termed problem groups, in this case, the Romani, is a function of both the panoptical surveillance state and the Foucauldian boomerang (Graham 2009). This is, in essence, an attempt to utilize advanced biometric technology to surveil and control. The west has embraced the practice of internal colonization, which Go (2020) thoroughly documents as occurring in American metropoles from the early 20th century into the present.

Similarly, in the United States, the use of technology is central to the state’s ability to enforce social order (Graham 2012). In the United States, we see similar instances of the Foucauldian boomerang striking not those in power but those without power. One area of note which bears some resemblance to the case of the Romani is the creation of a militarized border using advanced technology to police the southern border of the United States (Graham 2009). In this case, Israel provided the expertise, with consortiums from that nation obtaining contracts to design new American border control technologies to track unlawful entries (Graham 2009). Israel has, in this field, exceeds much of the rest of the west, and has developed numerous techniques for policing its borders, and, in many cases, has created what amounts to urban prison camps within occupied Palestinian territories (Graham 2009).

In the United States, we have both external, in the case of our southern border, and internal examples of colonized and marginalized groups that the state seeks to subjugate. African chattel slavery has left a colonialist legacy of violent social control which has subjected African
Americans to the type of state repression, colonial subalterns faced in the recent past (Graham 2012). The continued racism by the American state has subjected African Americans to becoming the racialized “other” in and amongst us, leading to their repression by militarized police and their existence becoming one of the main targets for the modern boomerang effect (Graham 2012, Go 2020). We see clearly the boomerang effect at work in various broad examples of police enforcement involving African Americans whether it is SWAT raids, which Mummolo (2018) found disproportionately targets African Americans, or in more specific instances such as the government response to Hurricane Katrina (Dunlap 2014).

This saw military commanders’ term black neighborhoods in New Orleans, “little Somalia” and pledge to “take back” New Orleans, as well as the deputation of private military contractors to “patrol” that is invade black neighborhoods and engage in a campaign of harassment therein (Ridgeway 2009). Or further still when thousands of indigent minorities amongst others were arrested and subjected to what has been termed “Katrina Time” which was in essence a form of indefinite detention (Garret and Tetlow 2006, Ridgeway 2009). As many as 8000 persons were subjected to detention for upwards of a year in the aftermath of the storm (Garret and Tetlow 2006). Many of them were jailed in inhumane conditions, for petty offenses such as “public drunkenness”, and even one for “reading tarot cards without a permit”, these petty alleged offenders, were housed alongside convicted killers (Garret and Tetlow 2006). These incidents are little known, and dominant media narratives at the time suggested that violence was out of control in the aftermath of the storm (Garret and Tetlow 2006). In reality, the murder rates the week after the storm were on par with the normal rates in New Orleans, a city that at that point saw 200 murders per year. This reveals one of the many incongruities that often seem to accompany rationales given for militarist police tactics. A rationale in this case of
emergency and of crime was given, and draconian measures were instituted. It is only in hindsight that we come to realize that the rationale was unfounded and the measures taken were unnecessary.

The Foucauldian Boomerang can take a variety of forms. The adoption of surplus armored military vehicles by police agencies is a material example of the Foucauldian Boomerang at work (Burkhardt and Baker 2019). Another example can be found in tactics and in organization, for example, the SWAT team, a distinctly martial police unit, which were modeled on and originally recruited exclusively from military units and military veterans, respectively. (Coyne and Blanco 2016, Go 2020). This can be taken further as the use of both armored vehicles and SWAT teams is effectively a policy decision on operational activities. There are more archaic examples that can be cited as well, Go (2020) effectively demonstrates that police in the early 20th century often consciously adopted military professionalism, standardization, and tactics in response to not only crime but also social changes. This is to say that ultimately the use by governments of military equipment and tactics at home did not simply come from thin air. Rather operations and equipment use were effectively tested abroad and only then implemented at home to maintain hegemony. It can also be observed that the testing of social control methods abroad as opposed to at home lowers the audience cost for these managers and the state at large. Simply put, ill consequences from these methods abroad cost less than they do when the same things occur in the domestic setting. Whether we present the Foucauldian boomerang as the adoption of tactics, equipment, or attitudes amongst law enforcement, the fact remains that all of these examples originated in conflicts abroad and have reverberated onto the homeland producing substantive alterations in American communities.
Unfortunately, there is little public understanding of any influence foreign policy has on the domestic setting or the tendency for militarism to return home in the form of domestic policy. Due to the limitations of language and access to information, the foreign and domestic policy spheres are considered separate. In fact, they are not, foreign policy influences domestic policy far more often than is realized and there is ample evidence of this. Police militarization and the causes of its occurrence are misunderstood by both the public and the media. The topic is often reduced to a problem of equipment only, but this falls short of a full explanation of the phenomena. The process of militarization and subsequent public responses demonstrates the problem of understanding we observe is caused by the bifurcation that occurs in public debates on foreign and domestic policy.

2.2.1

Is Foucault Wrong about Punishment?

We should also consider how correct Foucault’s thesis concerning the states’ preference for private over public punishment really is. There is without a doubt a qualitative difference when we consider the punishments of the past with those of today. Gone are mutilations, regular public executions, and the types of brutally violent, organized spectacles of the past (Foucault 1975). Prison sentences and other nonlethal punishments predominate in most cases. Today however we do have a form of public execution, though it is not billed that way. Cases such as those of George Floyd, Eric Garner, Freddie Gray, and Philando Castile, all involved public or semi-public killings by agents of the state.

Foucault posits that formal judicially imposed corporal punishment is now a private affair, that the state is seemingly reluctant or ashamed to acknowledge (Foucault 1975). This
broadly seems to be the case in most western nations. Killings such as those listed above were not judicial impositions, rather one can argue they occurred extrajudicially but still at the hands of agents of the state. Is it correct for us to differentiate then between judicial corporal punishment and extrajudicial corporal punishment? From a critical perspective, it seems that the difference is somewhat opaque when we consider the similarity in outcomes between judicial and extrajudicial executions. In some cases, the victims such as George Floyd become vilified in the aftermath, in a way not dissimilar to what Foucault observes to often occur in modern trials (Foucault 1975). Trials are often sensationalized and the defendant is often made out to be a villain before punishment is handed down (Foucault 1975). In the case of George Floyd punishment was meted out and afterward every arrest, crime, and ill deed was presented by some as evidence that he either deserved death or was not worth mourning, which was specious. This was apparent in the number of tweets celebrating the anniversary of his murder, many of which cited his drug use and past convictions (Anti-Defamation League 2021). This however is seemingly a reversal of the model Foucault gives us for modern corporal punishment. Rather than beginning with vilification and following with punishment, punishment occurs first and vilification occurs second.

These incidents among others were not meant to be the organized public events present in the historical records of executions (Foucault 1975). However, they did send a visible and clear message to the public and to minorities in particular. This message was simple; it communicated that resistance or even inconsideration, however small to the power of the police, can be met with a violent and painful death. The qualitative difference between these tragedies and the executions of the past is not lost on the author. However, the after effects between the executions of the past and today seem remarkably similar. These after effects are simply put, the instillation
of fear. In the past, one who was subjected to state power had to fear gruesome torture and public death. Today that fear is seemingly still present, albeit changed, and carried out with less gruesome implements. There is no doubt that the state has moved towards imprisonment and the instillation of discipline over corporal punishment, as Foucault posits (Foucault 1975). However, at the same time, there are many people in the United States today, who fear a gruesome public death at the hands of police, which bears a resemblance to forms of state instilled fear present in the past.

2.3 Modern Police Militarization, Community Policing, and Ideology

This section discusses the ideologies which underpin both the prevalence and perpetuation of police militarization. We will observe that the divide between neoliberalism and neoconservatism on the subject of policing is a false one, and far more often than not, they share a consubstantial relationship in this area. This section also seeks to explain the connection between police militarization and community policing and observe critically where these policies fall short.

Ideology today looms large in and around debates on policing and the role police militarization plays in society. Today we observe in our society and within our state, ideological conflicts centered on a variety of issues such as the politics of gender, the politics of race, and electoral politics. Likewise, the realm of policing has entered the ideological-political arena squarely. On the one hand, we have the supporters of police who identify mostly as conservatives. We witness constant allusions to law and order as not only an end but also a means and even a rationale in and of itself from politicians and pundits on the right. Some, like
our former President, claimed to have a “pro-cop, anti-crime agenda” (Trump 2020). While from liberals, we hear of police reform, the use of body cameras, and the initiation of community policing arrangements to bridge the divide between police and communities. President Obama suggested, “we know there are specific evidence-based reforms that if we put in place today would build trust, save lives, would not show an increase in crime.” (Obama 2022). Of note, the often-repeated phrase “evidence based” is questionable as it seems that the only answer non-critical observers have for the problems of policing is some new form of policing. These positions are separated in the public discourse by what we critical observers might call a false divide.

From conservatives, we observe constant reactionary behavior to even the humblest criticism of the police, and from liberals, we observe the same tired platitudes about reuniting police and communities. However, the critical observer must realize that police and communities have never been united. Issues of race, class and the maintenance of the social order have consistently divided police from those they police, and the militarization of police departments has only served to increase this divide (Walker 1970, Go 2020). The rise of “warrior cops”, occupations by police of problem neighborhoods, and the often violent and intimidating use of SWAT teams have all but destroyed any remaining trust many communities had in law enforcement, and serve to demonstrate the escalation of police militarization (Kraska and Kappeler 1997, Burkhardt and Baker 2019).

These differing approaches to policing are themselves the results of different but not in this case contradictory ideologies. On one hand, we observe in community policing the neoliberal notions of individual responsibility and the absence of state responsibility for addressing social problems. This neoliberal approach to policing and governance has seen the
retreat of the state from public services and the implementation of punitive practices of governance and, ultimately, enforcement against the poor and racialized minorities (Lyman 2012). While on the other hand, we observe the iron fist of neoconservatism exercise its power against those with the least means to resist it (Koslicki and Willits 2017).

Turning first towards community policing, we can observe that it has often been hailed as a solution to the problems of police brutality and, thereby, the problems of police militarization (Rosenbaum 1994). Racial strife, broad communal distrust of law enforcement, and police violence are cited among the issue’s community policing can address (Rosenbaum 1994). There is a high degree of variability in what community policing entails and no accepted general definition for community policing. It often becomes a rhetorical device meant to, at times, dissemble the substantial problems policing has and obfuscate its relationship with police militarization (Skolnick and Bayley 1988, Greene and Mastrofski 1998, Coombs 1998, Go 2020). Community policing effectively becomes an ideological point police administrators, and politicians can grasp to signal that they are open to reform. One explanation for the rise of community policing we can consider is that the modern state has reached the limits of its power to control crime; realizing this, some scholars have observed a sort of state “ambivalence” on crime issues (Feeley and Simon 1992, Kraska and Paulsen 1997).

Ambivalence is, in this case, the recognition that crime control measures may not produce the sorts of desired outcomes that may have been possible in the past (Kraska and Paulsen 1997, Koslicki and Willits 2017). This is, in essence, a neoliberal form of thought and arises out of the particular sort of neoliberal disdain for government using its power to address social problems. This type of thought proposes that the state metaphorically wash its hands of dealing with social problems and instead opt for a response that involves the community in a
rhetorical, if not literal, sense. This apparent limit in state power has led to the elder military model of bureaucratic, standardized, and professional approach to policing, which focused mostly on criminal matters, becoming discredited (Kraska and Paulsen 1997). The elder model often chose not to interfere always in personal or social problems, would become discredited by this apparent limit of state power, though it would not fall out of use entirely (Demichele and Kraska 2001).

Thus, a shift towards focusing on observable community problems occurred and is embodied by the famous “Broken Windows Thesis” (Wilson and Kelling 1982, Kraska and Paulsen 1997). This idea suggested that maintaining orderly communities would “foster healthy” communities (Wilson and Kelling 1982). In a manner similar to how an illness can be alleviated with a specific treatment but general bodily health can be fostered (Wilson and Kelling 1982). This approach, when implemented, did not produce tangible effects on crime but was instead claimed to make communities feel safer (Wilson and Kelling 1982). This pseudo-democratization of policing, with the introduction of community policing, is perhaps a function of modern police militarization (Dansky 2016). This development, however, has not seen police militarization diminish but rather, to an extent, disguise itself, evolve, and increase.

This change has produced what to the public must seem like incoherence but may be, in reality, a far less simple matter (Kraska and Paulsen 1997, Koslicki and Willits 2017). Unable to exercise a totalitarian control of criminal behavior, the state, in keeping with neoliberal principles, devolved some of that responsibility to the community in a rhetorical if not literal sense (Kraska and Paulsen 1997, Koslicki and Willits 2017). This, however, was accompanied by a ramping up of police militarization in general and specifically enforcement measures by militarized units such as SWAT teams that more resemble a neo-conservative approach (Kraska
and Paulsen 1997, Koslicki and Willits 2017). These ideologies, rather than clashing, instead meshed and produced a system of governance not seen often in the history of the modern state. Two seemingly antagonistic ideologies and praxes, to an extent, complemented one another rather than clashing and produced a form of policing and governance that was at once both neoliberal and neoconservative. Police militarization seems, on the one hand, to be a sort of last-minute attempt by the state to reassert its authority using violence in the face of profound social change, while community policing appears to be a sort of acknowledgment that the state has finally reached the zenith of its power and cannot exercise further control (Koslicki and Willits 2017).

Broadly the question of why community policing became prevalent is difficult to ascertain. However, we may speculate that community policing provides a useful cover for the serious problems police militarization presents to the state and the communities that suffer its consequences (Koslicki and Willits 2017). Community policing may very well be the neoliberal “velvet glove” that covers the neoconservative “iron fist” that police militarization embodies (Kraska and Paulsen 1997, Koslicki and Willits 2017). In that sense, these developments are a product of ideology, in this case, neoliberalism, which provides cover to another ideology, neoconservatism. Importantly also is that community policing is, in effect, a branding tool or a rhetorical device that allows some unscrupulous police agencies to militarize themselves and, at the same time, project a community centered approach (Koslicki and Willits 2017). Furthermore, certain aspects of community policing, such as the embedding of specialized officers within often marginalized communities, is itself a tactic boomeranged from middle eastern battlefields of contemporary conflicts (Go 2020). Specially trained police officers or soldiers walking a beat in communities can be used as tools of infiltration meant to utilize the community to achieve
state security goals (Go 2020). This would suggest that far from being a solution to longstanding problems of policing that continue through the contemporary. Community policing is instead either a facade for police militarization or merely one of a host of material, cultural, and, importantly ideological facets that comprise police militarization.

From today’s perspective, however, we may observe that in the past, the implementation of neoliberal ideas has rarely occurred without neoconservative methods. Chile, for example, under Pinochet and with the help of the “Chicago boys” (a group of economists educated at the University of Chicago), implemented a neoliberal economic regime accompanied by what can be described as a fascist methodology (Kiely 2017). The significant overlap between neoconservative methods with neoliberal policy is unmistakable when we consider the Chilean example. We also observe a less extreme example in the United States that highlights this overlap and demonstrates the validity of this theory. New York City, under Mayors Koch and Giuliani, downsized the municipal government, cutting services in order to stimulate growth, while at the same time increasing the number of police officers by a figure of 6000 between 1990-2000 (Lyman 2012). The consubstantiation that exists between neoliberalism and neoconservatism is a function, therefore, of ideology. These ideologies are very much alive and seemingly very powerful when we consider that police militarization has been invested in heavily by the federal government, nearly forty million for the cities included in this papers dataset alone, and the prevalence of neoliberal public policy at all levels of government (ACLU 2017). Taking these factors alongside the realized rhetorical promises of law and order and community policing, we see that neoliberalism and neoconservatism being opposed is, in fact, a false dichotomy.
These ideologies, though conceived differently, share a consubstantial relationship. Their coalescence inside the state itself basically allows these two ideologies to achieve their ends. Neoliberalism achieves a smaller state that does not use its fiscal power to remedy social problems, while neoconservatism gets to dominate the spaces and bodies of the poor and minorities by using the state’s physical power. Therefore, we should understand police militarization and community policing as forms of praxis. These praxes, to a degree, have enmeshed themselves with one another and, in their undertakings, have contributed to the incoherence we observe in policing today, which is evinced by community policing efforts being tied up with violent and militarist police tactics.

2.4

Police as Street Level Bureaucrats

Next, we turn towards the theory that police are, in effect, street level bureaucrats. Conceiving of police as essentially a form of bureaucracy is perhaps one of the less glamorous or widely known methods for understanding police behavior. Nonetheless, it provides valuable insight into the internal workings of police organizations and what effect that has on their relations with the public, as well as implications for public policy. This idea, first developed by Michael Lipsky, argues that police are, at their core, street level bureaucrats, and in that sense, they themselves set public policy as they are the only method the state has to enforce it (Lipsky 1971). In the context of police militarization, this theory provides a framework for how we might choose to view the progressive militarization of police and the cause of certain excesses in police behavior.
The notion of police as being, in effect, a sort of bureaucrat is not how they are commonly conceived of by the public or media. In effect, they occupy a bureaucratic role in society and are the main point of contact between citizens and the state (Lipsky 1980). These street level bureaucrats operate with an enormous degree of discretion in the performance of their job duties (Lipsky 1980). Police are free to forgo the arrest of a suspect or refrain from issuing a ticket. There is also amongst this profession the sort of standardization common in militaries (Go 2020). Police have created standard operating procedures and routines; this allowed for simplification of their interactions with the public in order to cope with ever increasing workloads (Lipsky 1980).

This simplification has led, in many cases, to disparate treatment and the application of sanctions where they were not necessarily in the public interest (Lipsky 1980). There is also the problem of “elastic demand” wherein as services improve, demand for those services increases (Lipsky 1980, Moore 1987). An example of this could be perhaps the idea of the police patrol car. Go (2020) details how this innovation allowed police to control more territory with fewer personnel and crackdown on subversives more efficiently at the same time. The automobile provided quick transportation and therefore improved police response times and thus improved the service. Likewise, the idea that an individual in distress could, with a phone call, summon quickly a trained professional who can potentially interdict in a volatile situation is relatively novel. As communications improve, there will likely be more calls to the police for help (Moore 1987). This increase in demand often results in the degrading of the service itself (Moore 1987). Within these bureaucracies, there exists conflict between supervisors and the street level bureaucrats themselves (Lipsky 1980, Moore 1987).
This is not the sort of class conflict that might occur in other hierarchical organizations but rather a contest for powers of discretion and authority between hierarchical divisions within the police bureaucracy (Lipsky 1980, Moore 1987). Police on the street want greater discretion generally, while their managers want less and greater standardization in practice (Moore 1987). This competition results from the need for adaption when confronted by complex situations, flexibility when confronting the human and often emotional dimensions police encounter, and importantly “self-regard” or pride in the most literal sense police officers feel (Lipsky 1980, Moore 1987). This friction between managers and officers, combined with a heavy workload, creates a sense of alienation in the general sense and produces psychological stress (Lipsky 1980, Moore 1987).

Furthermore, the continuous need to resolve often ambiguous predicaments places an additional burden on officers’ mental faculties (Lipsky 1980). Lipsky (1980) posits that this leads to the adoption of stereotypes and prejudices by police to simplify their job duties (Moore 1987). These cognitive simplifications are a coping mechanism used to rationalize decisions and ration attention and energy on subjective bases with a high potential for racial bias (Lipsky 1980, Moore 1987). This creates a disconnect between street level bureaucrats and policymakers (Lipsky 1980). Lipsky (1980) suggests that, in effect, it is street level bureaucrats who make policy simply through their control of situations at the street level and the through broad discretion the state grants them.

The notion of being the one on the street consistently dealing with social problems has led to police officers calling for better equipment and more funding while maintaining that they are not biased and their procedures are effective (Lipsky 1971). This explains the escalation of police militarization and community policing as they individually elicit vast sums of money and
hordes of equipment from all levels of government. On the other hand, the notion of racism and its presence in street level bureaucracy stems from not only racist tropes as old as the American republic itself but also from the perceived danger police officers believe they face (Lipsky 1971). Police often do not hail from the neighborhoods they patrol, and they do not look like the people they serve, particularly in urban areas (Lipsky 1971). These urban landscapes are, for many street level bureaucrats, alien spaces that may elicit fear (Lipsky 1971). This is to say that considering individual perception as ever is essential in comprehending decisions police make in the course of conducting their duties (Lipsky 1971).

Police believe they are in danger, and their training fixates on these dangers despite homicides of police remaining very low (Lipsky 1971, Marenin 2016, Mummolo 2018). Thus, perception of danger is created in the minds of many police officers. This makes the possibility of police reacting to a challenge to their authority, even a nonviolent one, with latent hostility that occupational conditioning and unsupported beliefs have placed in their consciousnesses (Lipsky 1971). The inability to perfectly control a person or a situation is a threat in the minds of street level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1971). The refusal to answer questions, derogatory language, running away or body language cues can impress upon police the presence of ill intent during an interaction, despite the chance of corporeal harm coming to the officer being remote (Lipsky 1971). This is often compounded by the presence of bias, implicit or explicit.

There is no perfect solution to the problem of bias within the street level bureaucracy. This problem is not merely confined to policing. We know other sections of the bureaucracy, be they teachers, medical professionals, or social service workers, can and do act out of bias (Lipsky 1971). However, the results that occur in policing are particularly egregious because they are violent and sometimes deadly. Implicit bias training or sensitivity training has inherent limits.
Human beliefs are such that anti-bias training, however often repeated, will probably not change minds, or its lessons will be forgotten (Lipsky 1971). The attitudes of street level bureaucrats are the result of their backgrounds and socialization, particularly the socialization that occurs during indoctrination that is essential to their occupational training (Lipsky 1971). Therefore, these attitudes are basically set and not easily changed; thus, it has been postulated that changing outcomes is better than changing minds in the case of police-community interactions (Lipsky 1971). For example, if police were trained to de-escalate situations instead of responding with their own escalations, this might produce more positive outcomes from police interactions, whereas bias training has produced very little.

2.5

Existing Empirical Research

For this paper, the strongest influences in terms of methodology and focus come from Lawson (2019) and Delehanty, Mewhirter, Welch, and Wilks (2017). Both Lawson (2019) and Delehanty et al. (2017) use military transfers of equipment to police departments as their independent variables, which is meant to be a proxy variable for the level of militarization, and chose the level of police violence as their dependent variables. Lawson (2019) and Delehanty, et al. (2017) used “Fatal Encounters” as a source for reliable numbers on police killings. This was necessary because it is relatively uncommon for police departments or the governments that supervise them to compile and release lists of police killings. Mummolo (2018), and Kraska and Kappeler (1997), who will also be included in this, section, differ in both focus and scope but provide valuable quantitative and qualitative findings on PM. Mummolo (2018) suggests that police militarization harms public safety and police reputation, while results from Kraska and
Kappeler (1997) indicated that SWAT team deployments tend to increase exponentially as time passes, as does their prevalence in police departments in general.

2.6

SWAT Teams in Maryland

Mummolo (2018) analyzed data on SWAT raids in Maryland over a period of five years; this data includes reasons police gave for deployment and rationales for resulting outcomes (Mummolo 2018). This is a rare data set because police agencies and governments which control them rarely allow such data to be collected. Ultimately the provision in Maryland’s law, which mandated this data collection, was allowed to expire and was not renewed (Mummolo 2018). Next, Mummolo sought to determine whether the presence of SWAT teams mitigated criminal activity and improved public safety, and he used a sample of known SWAT teams across jurisdictions nationwide for this portion of the study (Mummolo 2018). Concerning this portion of the research, Mummolo controlled for race, specifically because areas with a high proportion of African Americans, according to existing data, are subjected to SWAT raids at higher rates than other races (Mummolo 2018). Lastly, Mummolo surveyed individuals to ascertain attitudes on militarized police units with a series of images that depicted different teams of police varying in equipment, uniforms, and weapons (Mummolo 2018). This ranged from heavily militarized (high-mil) to not very militarized (e.g., beat cops), (low-mil) (Mummolo 2018).

The results tabulated from Maryland SWAT raids are interesting in several ways. First, 91.06% of raids occurred to execute a search warrant; it is probable that these warrants mostly concerned narcotics (Mummolo 2018). Barricaded persons accounted for 4.92% of SWAT raids during this period (Mummolo 2018). Arrest warrants and exigent circumstances accounted for
less than a percent each, while a category defined as “other” accounted for 2.67% (Mummolo 2018). Mummolo (2018) discusses the methods used in these raids, including percussive grenades (flash-bangs) and the use of battering rams. Property damage occurred, as did the use of lethal force (Mummolo 2018). Property was taken in 84.38% of these raids; entry was forced in 68.36% of raids, 63.9% saw an arrest occur, 1.20% saw a shot fired, Injuries occurred in 1.15% (Mummolo 2018).

Upon analyzing this data, it was concluded that wanton violence from police, excluding what critics would characterize as their base level of wanton violence during raids, was not overly prevalent in this sample (Mummolo 2018). Further, even when controlling for violent crime rates, Mummolo found that African American communities were subjected to SWAT raids 10.56% more often than other racial groups (Mummolo 2018). This positive correlation endured even after controlling for education level, unemployment, and income levels (Mummolo 2018). This finding supports qualitative evidence that highlights the disparate treatments African Americans can experience from SWAT teams compared with other racial groups (Mummolo 2018).

Next, Mummolo (2018) examined the effects of SWAT presence on violent crime on a jurisdictional basis. This rendered interesting results in several ways. First, a sharp uptick in violent crime at an increase of 6.5% is recorded in jurisdictions that obtain a SWAT team (Mummolo 2018). This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that critics have cited when suggesting SWAT teams, police violence, and police militarization, in general, elicits a violent reaction from suspects and from within affected communities (Mummolo 2018). An example of this type of incident is the Breonna Taylor shooting. Taylor’s partner reacted violently to a police raid, ostensibly because he was startled by police forcing entry into their domicile late at night.
while the couple was asleep in bed (Lovelace 2021). For this study, the trend of increased rates of violence after obtaining a SWAT team shrinks significantly over time. This finding provides little evidence for claims that SWAT teams elicit violence from communities (Mummolo 2018). SWAT teams, in this study, seemed to have no detectable effect on crime rates in general, with there being no difference in rates of crime after the obtainment of a SWAT team (Mummolo 2018). Further, the rates of felonious killings of police were not affected by the presence of a SWAT team (Mummolo 2018). This is partially because felonious officer deaths are rare, and the addition of a SWAT team did not deflate the rates of officer deaths (Mummolo 2018). There is, however, some evidence that a SWAT team’s presence causes officers to be injured more often, with a 3.5% increase reported (Mummolo 2018). However, Mummolo cautions that this does not yield conclusive results on this question (Mummolo 2018). There are also other explanations, SWAT raids bring a level of danger for both police and civilians; this danger is natural to this kind of behavior and is created, oftentimes exclusively because the police themselves initiated these situations (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). This finding undermines an often-cited rationale for police militarization, it is often suggested that officer safety will be improved if police are militarized.

2.7

Militarized Police and Visual Perception

Mummolo (2018) also observed the effects of police militarization on individual perception of police, the results of which are fascinating and substantial. Across racial groups, high-mil photos showed a significant decrease in confidence, support for a decrease in police funding, and a perception that crime in the city which high-mil police patrolled was higher (Mummolo 2018). Notably, participants who were shown high-mil photos showed a 3.2% drop
from the baseline in wanting police patrols in their neighborhoods (Mummolo 2018). There is room to debate what mechanisms explain these responses, but Mummolo offers some theories. Caucasian respondents might view high-mil police as not in keeping with their values and beliefs on what police officers should be, look like, do, and behave (Mummolo 2018). For African Americans and other minorities, the case may be that they have either experienced or have knowledge of what treatment can be expected from high-mil police and thus make responses accordingly (Mummolo 2018). This portion of this study demonstrates that police militarization incurs reputational costs to police departments (Mummolo 2018). Furthermore, this study broadly supports the belief that police militarization is dangerous, unnecessary, racially biased, and counterproductive to crime control efforts.

2.8

The Growth in Prevalence of SWAT Teams

Kraska and Kappeler (1997) examined the creation, frequency of use, and application of SWAT teams that they term Police Paramilitary Units (PPU). This paper was constructed from data collected from a 40-question survey of SWAT team officers from departments across the United States (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). Of 548 written responses, 81 officers were selected to participate in a verbal questioning session focused on their perspectives, activities, and job duties relating to SWAT operations (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). Next of the 548 responding departments, 89.4% reported having a SWAT team in their department (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). The researchers found that reported formation years for SWAT teams increased steadily from 1960-1970 and then shot up to 48, reportedly formed in 1975 alone (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). A steady decrease followed in formations of novel SWAT teams, with intermittent increases occurring occasionally into the year 1995 (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). This finding
supports claims made that police militarization tends to escalate over time and that periodic increases in escalation are observable and statistically significant.

Next, the researchers looked towards tabulating a mean number of callouts (deployments) per year. This led to interesting findings, callouts on average increased steadily from 1985-1995 from 13-53 an increase of 407% (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). Similar to Mummolo (2018) these researchers looked toward finding out the reasons for callouts. Mainly warrant-work (executing a search warrant) accounted for callouts at 75.9% (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). The researchers’ term this a “proactive” use of SWAT teams by departments for interdicting against drug use, and cite the escalation of the war on drugs that occurred in this time period (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). Civil disturbances, barricaded persons, terrorism, and hostage situations accounted for 1.3%, 13.4%, .09%, and 3.6%, of call outs respectively (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). Broadly the officers interviewed reported that the majority of their job duties were focused on drug enforcement (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). Further, the serving of search warrants grew significantly over time with substantial increases from 1967-1995 (Kraska and Kappeler 1997).

Of note is how several survey respondents expressed conflict upon reflecting on their SWAT raids. These officers reported that these raids involved serious danger and risk to all involved (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). Dynamic entry (forced entry) the throwing of percussive grenades, and the brandishing of long rifles, all brought a level of danger to these situations that the officers themselves reported was not present before their involvement (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). In this paper, particularly in the survey responses, there is a notion that police departments use SWAT teams to essentially invade communities to manufacture low-level drug cases that can be prosecuted (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). The respondents, in general, reported minor amounts of drugs being recovered in most cases, leading to the exigency of these raids being questionable
Officers reported being horrified at occurrences such as automatic weapons being fired inadvertently at unoccupied baby cribs, neighboring domiciles, and so forth (Kraska and Kappeler, 1997). The officers surveyed reported further that they were instructed to focus on not only drugs and weapons but also cash and property for confiscation (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). This again calls the exigency of these raids into question and suggests that social control and potential gain are equally present in the motives for this kind of enforcement action, if not more important than interdictions against narcotics.

The researchers then determined that a large portion of departments (94 in total) used SWAT teams for proactive patrol work (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). That is to say that SWAT teams drove around in, or walked about on, the streets of high crime areas in full SWAT gear (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). Respondent officers reported occasionally dressing in plain clothes but retaining their long rifles while on patrol (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). Of interest is that these officers reported that they knew they were being used to saturate these areas in order to intimidate ostensible criminals but also the populations themselves (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). Further, the officers reported that this was a portion of their departments’ community policing strategy in which they would enter a community first to crush or intimidate potential resisters and would be followed by community relations police officers (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). Respondents further stressed the social importance of this kind of work and tellingly cited issues of normative bureaucratic policing and governance measures which they can circumvent via these tactics (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). This suggests as Lipsky (1971) does, that there is tension between police at the street level of bureaucracy and the command level of bureaucracy. This also, in addition to supporting the community policing-police militarization connection, further supports the role of police militarization as a tool of violent social control and supports
theoretical perspectives which cite the discreditation of earlier bureaucratic models of policing as being a factor in what we today would conceive of as community policing or police militarization (Demichele and Kraska 2001).

2.9

Police Militarization and Use of Lethal Force, a National Problem

Lawson (2019) sought to assess whether there exists a causal relationship between more militarization of police and a higher frequency of suspects killed by police. In this case like this project, the independent variable is the level of militarization and the dependent variable is the frequency of police killings of suspects. The methods used included Census data on state and local police agencies (Lawson 2019). As well as data on police killings from Fatal Encounters, which is a database that collects agency-specific, geographic-specific, and time-specific data on police killings (Lawson 2019). Mainly this data comes from newspapers and is subjected to fact checking from paid and volunteer researchers (Lawson 2019). The data Lawson accessed ran from 2000-2018, and as of right now it runs through the year 2021. Lawson acknowledged the novelty of this database but cites others such as Delehanty et al. (2017) and Jennings and Rubado (2017) as evidence that scholars with similar research focuses rely on fatal encounters for decent estimates of police killings.

Lawson (2019) gathered data on military transfers via the 1033 program with FOIA requests for a period of two years between 2014-2016. Likewise, Lawson restricted his scope for police killings to the period of 2014-2016. As control variables, Lawson included Population, Race, Poverty, and the rate of violent crime. The results of this study and in particular the control variables, present some interesting findings. Overall, Lawson finds that $3,750,000 as a dollar
value for military equipment transferred predicts one death to occur at the hands of police (Lawson 2019). Next, an expenditure of $5,000,000 is predicted to cause two deaths (Lawson 2019). Further, this model predicts four deaths with an expenditure of $7,500,000 (Lawson 2019). Importantly this data is aggregated from police departments across the nation. Most departments do not even come close to expenditures of this size (Lawson 2019).

In terms of the results for the control variables, Lawson (2019) offers some interesting results. His model finds a positive and significant relationship between population size and the use of lethal force (Lawson 2019). This makes sense potentially because a greater population may mean a greater number of police officers and might cause a greater number of police interactions (Lawson 2019). There are, however, exceptions. New York City has the highest population in the United States but compared to its less populous counterparts has comparatively few police involved killings (see Tables 1, 3). Further Lawson (2019) finds no significant association between poverty and police killings. This is interesting because longstanding tropes and common sense would suggest the opposite. Violence therefore may not be a primary method of social control for the contemporary poor (Lawson 2019). Further research on that finding is necessary. Likewise controls for race offer counterintuitive results. Lawson (2019) finds no significant association between the percent of a population that is Hispanic and police involved killings. Next, the percent of the population that is black has a slightly less insignificant association with deaths by police (Lawson 2019). This is not to say that police do not kill an inordinate amount of black people, they in fact do to such an extent that police killings are one of the leading causes of death for Black males in the United States (Edwards, Hedwig and Esposito 2019). Rather Lawson (2019) finds that a higher dollar figure in military transfers seems to have no detectable effect on rates of police killings of either Hispanics or Black people.
Police Militarization and General Aggression

We turn next to a paper from Delehanty et al. (2017). These researchers looked towards data from four states (Connecticut, Maine, Nevada, and New Hampshire), focusing on military transfers, amounts of police killings, and changes in police killings from year to year (Delehanty et al. 2017). The independent variable for this study was the dollar amount in military transfers under the 1033 program, and the dependent variables were the amount of police killings and changes to those amounts over time (Delehanty et al. 2017). The data on police killings were sourced from Fatal Encounters, while data on military transfers were obtained from a database administered by the Washington Post (Delehanty et al. 2017). Of note for this study is that the researchers used an alternative dependent variable to control for endogeneity by measuring the number of domesticated dogs killed by police in a given jurisdiction (Delehanty, et al. 2017). The rationale for that choice is that police might anticipate violence from civilians and thus consciously militarize for their own protection (Delehanty, et al. 2017). This notion of police needing protection would not apply to dogs. The data on dog killings was sourced from the “puppycide” database project, which seeks to catalog police killings of dogs on the basis of humanitarian concerns (Delehanty, et al. 2017).

This study covered county, and municipal jurisdictions across the four states and ultimately found a causal relationship between military transfers under the 1033 program and civilian killings by police (Delehanty et al. 2017). Police agencies with a max transfer level between $658,000-$858,643 killed civilians at a full order of magnitude more often than their less militarized peers (Delehanty et al. 2017). Further, those agencies that received no military equipment were recorded to have not killed any civilians. Despite controlling for race, income,
violent crime, drug use, and reported rates of mental illness, the results of this study held steady and military transfers were found to have a causal relationship with the amount of police killings of civilians. Likewise, those same agencies that received more transfers under the 1033 program killed domesticated dogs at higher rates than those which did not (Delehanty et al. 2017). This ultimately suggests that police militarization, specifically the transfer of military equipment, increases police violence in general. After all, dogs do not suffer from human frailties that can lead to interactions with police; rather, they, like their human counterparts, are subject to the wrath of heavily militarized police departments just the same.

Chapter 3

A Concise History of Police Militarization

The author L.P Hartley wrote in his novel “The Go-Between” that “the past is a foreign country, they do things differently there” (Hartley 2015). This is very much accurate. In considering the history of police militarization, especially its origins, we observe marked differences between the past and the present, but at the same time, many similarities to the contemporary. In that sense, we should view the progression of historical police militarization as both a history of conflict as well as of change and also of rationales. In this record, we find rationales cited for cruelty, racism, classism, and social control schemes disguised under the thin veil of police professionalization and standardization, which would ultimately become what we today would term police militarization.
3.1 The Beginnings of Police Militarization

Police militarization began in earnest towards the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century (Go 2020). During this time, the United States emerged on the world stage after completing its conquest of what is today the continental United States, which saw the United States fighting over 1,000 engagements with Native Americans between 1870 - 1890 (Williams 1981). Following the pacification of the Native Americans, the United States engaged in multiple imperialist wars (Go 2020). The Spanish-American War (1898) saw American soldiers for the first time depart from the North American continent (in large numbers) and engage in imperial expansion (Go 2020). This ultimately led to the American occupation of the Philippines and precipitated a protracted conflict within this new American colony (Go 2020).

Guerilla warfare predominated in the Philippines, which saw the American military become both a tool of governance and a police force in the Philippines (Go 2020). Other interventions abroad would follow, including invasions of Cuba (1898), Haiti (1915), Nicaragua (1912), and the Dominican Republic (1916) (Go 2020). In each of these conflicts, occupation and social control were the end goal (Go 2020). In turn, each of these interventions would strengthen the ethos of professionalism and standardization that would come to define the American military and now defines American police departments (Go 2020). With no colonial department, as seen in contemporaneous European empires, the nascent American empire assigned governance and police powers in its colonies to the military (Go 2020). This notion of governance here is important because, unlike other imperial powers of the 19th and 20th centuries, the United States had no official colonial department, which in other empires assumed
responsibility for colonial administration (Go 2020). Other powers had dedicated security forces, officials, and agencies to oversee colonial possessions that lay adjacent to the military (Go 2020). The United States, by contrast, had only an army, and that is why it became a tool of governance rather than solely security (Go 2020). This precedent would have far reaching implications.

3.2

The First Practitioners of Police Militarization

Moving forward, the initiation of police militarization in the early 20th century, brought about via the boomerang effect, also called “imperial feedback” began in cities undergoing what was later called the “police reform movement” (Foucault 1975, Go 2020). The father of the police reform movement was August Vollmer, Chief of the Berkeley police department and a veteran of the Spanish-American war (Go 2020). In 1909 Vollmer instituted what would become the first standardized and professional police department in the United States. The use of military ranks and standard uniforms was instituted within the Berkeley police department (Go 2020). In particular, the superficial aspects, i.e., the uniforms and associated insignias, would become some of the most visible aspects of early and even modern police militarization, highlighting the clear association between police and the military (Simon 2001). The nature of this new professionalization of police was purposefully militaristic (Walker 1977, Richardson 1980, Go 2020).

Berkeley, for all practical purposes, was the first example of true police militarization in the United States (Go 2020). This process involved breaking the power city based political parties had held over police departments until this point (Walker 1977, Richardson 1980). It must be noted that police departments operated up until this point as highly political/patronage-
oriented organizations. Once reform was initiated, elite bourgeois administrators, were able to take their place as the leaders of now professionalized police forces and institute in their jurisdictions a new type of policing which focused on maintaining a class and race based social order (Walker 1977, Richardson 1980). This nonpartisan, professionalized approach to policing would continue for a time (Richardson 1980) Ironically though it was this approach that would spur out of its professionalism and that association between individuals therein, modern police unions which have become hyper partisan organizations (Richardson, 1980). This partisanship which was born from nonpartisanship has come to in many ways color modern discussion of police and the problems inherent to that profession (Richardson 1980). It has also been argued that police unionism began because officers became conscious that choosing to or falling into the law enforcement profession, placed them at odds with fellow citizens and to an extent alienated them from their compatriots (Richardson 1980).

3.3

The Dangerous Classes and Police Militarization

This social separation of the police from the public took on a measure of classism in some respects. Prior to the professionalization of police departments in urban centers, a consensus had developed in those municipal governments that police jobs would best suit the sons of working-class urbanites, often termed the dangerous classes during this era (Fogelson 1977, Richardson 1980). This was essentially an organic conclusion amongst the government and denizens of these cities that argued for residents to police other residents (Richardson 1980). This provided these young men with stable employment, and the chance for group advancement (Fogelson 1977, Richardson 1980).
The issue of legitimacy for police officers which remains a serious issue to this day was addressed by this recruitment of locals who in many ways could identify with those whom they policed (Fogelson 1977). These officers having grown up in urban working-class conditions would know intimately the struggles and lifestyles of the members of the public they had interactions with. This would quite naturally breed empathy, while also gaining for the police the kind of legitimacy that can only come from familiarity. This familiarity coincided with the highly partisan and inefficient nature of machine politics’ control over urban police departments (Williams 2015). Police reformers of the early 20th century successfully managed to suborn each of these points of interest whether it was partisan interests, interests in terms of legitimacy, or working-class interests, in favor of professionalization and militarization (Fogelson 1977, Richardson 1980). To reformers, the culture of the urban proletariat was unacceptable, partisan control was illegitimate, and the legitimacy gained by police being the sons of the communities they patrolled was unimportant (Fogelson 1977).

From this point, not only, the suppression of crime, but also in some respects the maintenance of bourgeois morality became the focus of these now professionalized, career police officers (Fogelson 1977, Richardson 1980). This notion of morality is interesting because it provides a rationale for police militarization but also for violent methods of social control. This rationale for suppression of crime and maintenance of bourgeois morality through violent means raises a philosophical question pertaining to police legitimacy in the past and the present. This question is: does one owe responsibility to a community one fundamentally does not belong to? Rorty (1983) raises this same question about the responsibility of the proletariat and minorities in both the political and racial senses. However, this question applies here in equal measures. On one hand police, since the great reform movement, have become separated from the communities
they police, because they did not mature in, and do not live in those communities (Richardson 1980). On the opposite end, the proletariat and racialized minorities face state power in the form of police agencies that set a bourgeois and hegemonic standard of behavior totally alien on a fundamental cultural and social level to them. The absence of responsibility by police to the communities they patrol is often cited as a major issue in the host of problems associated with policing. Heavy handed enforcement, racially motivated police activity, and the casting of the public as enemies of the police and even the state, are all indicative of a dearth of police responsibility to the communities they patrol (Kraska and Kappeler 1997, Mummolo 2018, Burkhardt, Baker 2019 Go 2020). Less apparent is the responsibility those communities have to the broader regional or national communities. Do those alienated by public policy and the use of violent methods of social control, owe their allegiance or compliance to the state? There is not in every case a clear answer to this question, however, the raising of a question such as this, might in time promote a better dialectic on this issue and perhaps a modicum of understanding.

3.4

The Colonization of the Metropoles

Next, we observe the internal metropolitan colonization project undertaken by early advocates of the police reform movement (Go 2020). This movement pioneered by the aforementioned Chief of the Berkeley Police department, August Vollmer, would prove quite reactionary to social changes in these bourgeoning metropoles. This movement would lead to the adoption of novel equipment and technologies to exercise greater control of city streets while also creating the standard, militarized police departments that are common today. As previously mentioned, rationales, in this case, are of paramount importance for understanding why police militarized.
With Berkeley as the beginning of the phenomena of police militarization, this style of policing would germinate in other metropoles (Go 2020). Following the professionalization of policing along militarist lines and the exclusion of proletarians, a new pseudo colonial social order would begin in many American cities (Fogelson 1977, Richardson 1980, Go 2020). These cities were, at this time in the early 20th century, experiencing the Great Migration of African Americans from a terroristic and white supremacist hegemony in the south, as well as the immigration of southern and eastern Europeans (Go 2020). This created social conflict, and the newly militarized police departments of American cities suddenly had a rationale for using violent methods to solve novel social problems and instill a class and race based social order (Kraska and Kappeler 1997, Go 2020). Rationales for implementations and escalations of police militarization and its proliferation are important as they occur over time and change when the need arises.

The rationales that have driven police militarization and associated violence change over time to suit emergent narratives of danger and compensate for the dissolution of previous narratives. Prior to this time, city police departments operated either on the classical spoils model of political patronage/corruption or as disorganized, highly decentralized groups (Williams 2015). Breaking away from that model, the urban police forces of the early 20th century, under the auspices of reform, borrowed the methods of empire and deployed colonialist tactics within cities via the boomerang effect (Go 2020). These internal colonies saw new tactics and equipment used for various security purposes (Go 2020). Efficiency and standardization after a militarist fashion became the norm for urban American police departments of the early 20th century (Haden 2003, Go 2020).
Furthermore, the adoption of new equipment and technology, namely the automobile, higher caliber weapons, and rifles by police of that time parallels similar activity amongst police today (Haden 2003, Scott 2016, Poland 2016, Go 2020). Lastly, it must be noted that, like later instances of police militarization, the groups most affected were minorities. The rationalizations for much of police militarization were and are presently based on contrived dangers or risks of criminality (Poland 2016). One rationalization for this targeting of racialized minorities, of note for this period is the use of higher caliber “.38 revolvers” by some departments because of a contrived notion that African Americans who used cocaine were immune to less powerful weapons (Go 2020). The .38 was a favorite of the U.S army during this time period, and its adoption owing to explicit racism is yet further evidence of police militarization as a trend and the racism it often embodies (Go 2020).

3.5

Mid-20th Century Police Militarization and the Advent of the SWAT Team

The idea of the American SWAT team, a hard hitting, heroic group of police officers who everyday risk life and limb for the public good, is a popular idea in the American mythos. Less popular is discussing the rationales for the creation of SWAT teams and how as well as on whom they are ultimately used. The background for the creation of the first SWAT team was a period of immense turmoil in the United States in both the internal and external spheres (Erickson 2004, Coyne and Blanco 2016, Go 2020). This realization is important for our conception of SWAT teams and why they have become ubiquitous throughout the United States.

We observe from this period beginning in the 1960s the use of small teams of semi-elite police officers under the command of mid-level officers (Go 2020). This change occurred after
the military previously adopted similar tactics for flexibility and strategic effectiveness (Go 2020). This in particular, is quite interesting because, as we shall now see, a similar occurrence took place against the backdrop of the Vietnam war and during a period of serious social/racial civil unrest (Coyne and Blanco 2016, Go 2020). This occurrence of a sort of dual crisis has been observed by scholars to precipitate periods of fear and paranoia in government (Erickson 2004). This idea of dual crises has often been observed to be the driver of police militarization and militarism in general, both at home and abroad (Erickson 2004). Low intensity crisis cooccurring with prolonged low intensity conflict has in many cases, been a defining characteristic of the security situation in both the American domestic and foreign policy spheres (Erickson 2004, Kraska 2007). Los Angeles (LA) in 1964 was caught in the middle of one such crisis. Against the backdrop of civil rights and the escalation of the war in Vietnam, a rebellion broke out in LA.

African Americans in LA had been subjected to police violence and endemic poverty for some time by this point (King 1965). The neighborhood of Watts reacted violently to an arrest of an alleged drunk driver who was beaten along with his intervening relations (Bouligny 2021). Standard riot control tactics of that time, in what we might term an anachronistic fashion, called for a massing of police force and then a charge to disperse rioters (Coyne and Blanco 2016). This tactic was ineffectual, and the Watts Rebellion would last for several days (Bouligny 2021). A novel solution was needed; two veterans of Korea and Vietnam respectively joined forces to create a solution (Coyne and Blanco 2016). Inspector, and later on, Chief, Daryl Gate, and officer John Nelson of the LAPD created what we now know as the SWAT (special weapons and tactics) team in 1967 (Coyne and Blanco 2016, Go 2020).

Originally called “special weapons attack team” the name was changed for sounding to militaristic (Coyne and Blanco 2016). Despite the name change, the SWAT team remains the
single most recognizable facet of police militarization in contemporary times. This new militaristic and “elite” unit was modeled after “force-recon units” “imported” or boomeranged from the Vietnam war (Coyne and Blanco 2016, Dansky 2016, Go 2020). This type of unit has the purpose of eliminating enemy combatants with efficiency and speed by using military tactics and military equipment (Coyne and Blanco 2016). The organization of SWAT teams borrowed from the military was designed for maximized effectiveness and, ultimately, kill counts (Coyne and Blanco 2016). Like their military counterparts, SWAT teams have a mid-level officer as a team leader and were organized to minimize risk to team members and maximize risk for enemies (Coyne and Blanco 2016, Go 2020). The original SWAT team of LA was specifically recruited from amongst veterans of foreign conflicts already serving in the LAPD, which, taken with the organizational/Weapons aspects, demonstrates the occurrence of police militarization and its connection with foreign wars in multiple ways (Coyne and Blanco 2016, Poland 2016, Go 2020). New military tactics would be incorporated into the SWAT repertoire with time, and the purpose of SWAT teams would change as well, from one solely of enforcement to one of social control and intimidation as self-reported by SWAT team members (Kraska and Kappeler 1997, Coyne and Blanco 2016).

3.6 Modern Police Militarization

It can be argued that the end of the Cold War in 1991 brought about not an end to history but rather a need for a new rationalization and justification for the size of not only the largest military in the world but also the power that the American state amassed during the period of the Cold War (Kraska 2001). This need for a new justification produced an ethos amongst the military industrial complex, and its child, the criminal industrial complex, to make militarism
“socially useful” in the domestic context (Kraska 2001). Rationales for state activities and public policy become necessary when public perception may be at odds with the views of the state. This notion of rationales and public perception is important because it demonstrates a conscious desire to bring public perception in line with state perception and not the inverse. Mummolo (2018) demonstrates this phenomenon partially by examining individuals’ perceptions of heavily militarized police units.

Even with controls, it is a constant in his findings across demographics that people express dismay and skepticism about militarized police units (Mummolo 2018). Thus, a rationale is required, and there have been multiple iterations of state rationalization for police militarization as public policy across the twentieth century. The escalation of the war on drugs would provide a partial rationale for the idea that military equipment and, ultimately, military techniques could alleviate this problem and provide a social benefit to communities (Demichele and Kraska 2001, Balko 2013, Burkhardt and Baker 2019). Subsequently, the perceived threat of terrorism and the following war on terror would provide a far more durable rationale for not only the size of the military and the power of the state but also for an escalation of police militarization (Poland 2016). This escalation was done for reasons of social utility and rationalized by a somewhat incongruous view that society had become more dangerous and that the prevalence of crime was growing. We now know that the opposite was in fact, true during the 1990s, which succeeded the end of the cold war and preceded the war on terror; crime, in particular, dropped substantially from levels seen in the preceding decades (Blumstein and Farrington 2000). It is apparent that rationalizations used for escalations of police militarization in the twilight of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries are built on lies.
3.7

The Terrorism Fallacy

The fear that an active shooter situation or terrorism arouses is profound and evocative. The threat of terrorism is a powerful concern in contemporary American society (Poland 2016). Whether it is contrived or as serious as the state would have us countenance is difficult to say. What is interesting however is that excessive police militarization is often justified by the threat of terrorism (Poland 2016). The advent of a standard police “patrol” rifle, the increased prevalence and use of SWAT teams, as well as the proliferation of military equipment in police forces, all of which are facets of police militarization are often justified by the threat of terrorism (Scott 2016, Poland 2016). This justification however is broadly unfounded, to the contrary, empirical evidence tells a much less simple truth. Most such incidents involving an active shooter do not end because of police officers, and even less because SWAT teams stopped them (Blair and Schwieit 2014, Poland 2016). Between 2000-2013 56% of active shooter situations ended at the shooter’s initiative, this encompasses flight of the shooter, or alternatively suicides which occurred in a total of 21% of cases (Blair and Schwieit 2014). Further in 3% of cases, the shooter was shot by armed civilians, while in 13% of cases it was unarmed civilians who manually restrained the shooter until police could apprehend them (Blair and Schwieit 2014). In only 28% of cases did police exchange gunfire with a total of 66 active shooters killed by police according to Federal Bureau of Investigation records (Blair and Schowieit 2014).

This data would suggest that the terrorism rationale for police militarization is unfounded. It provides a palatable rationalization for modern police militarization by conditioning the public to view heavily armed police officers as necessary because worst case scenarios, involving terrorism or active shooters, are held up as not only possible but likely
(Poland 2016). The truth about terrorism is rarely told in popular media, and the “true” first responders in the persons of heroic civilians are not credited for their roles in stopping mass shooter incidents, or acts of terror (Poland 2016). Instead, the canard of heavily armed police officers “playing” at waging war is held up as a solution to the problem of terrorism, a problem whose own exigency is questionable (Kraska 2001). Furthermore, the issue inevitably becomes of how the assets of police militarization such as SWAT teams, heavy weapons, and vehicles are used when there is no terrorist threat. Broadly, existing research suggests that having these assets makes their use more likely on a regular basis for situations far below the threshold of terrorism (Delehanty et al. 2017, Mummolo 2018).

CHAPTER 4

Public Opinion on Police

The notion of public opinion on the issue of policing is important though it is far from straightforward. The American public has diverse and, at times, dissonant views on a variety of subjects, and the police are no different. Legitimacy for any institution in a democratic system is based on the belief that the institution is set up to perpetuate the public good and that we as citizens can then buy into that mission. Police behavior has never had either universal support or universal condemnation. As experts and civil society have increasingly begun to question the exigence of police militarization and the conflict between police and many communities, the public has also begun to reckon with the current state of affairs concerning American police.

Pew Research Center and Gallup conducted in the year 2020 extensive polling into Americans’ perception of police, the criminal justice system, and police-citizen interactions. The results yield valuable insight into the thoughts of the American public on these topics. Gallup
found that the share of Americans’ who expressed high confidence in police fell from 53% to 48%, a 5% drop between 2019 and 2020 (Jones 2020). High confidence in police amongst African Americans fell from 30% to 19%, while amongst Whites’ it dropped from 60% to 56% (Jones 2020). The gap between White Americans’ and African Americans’ perceptions of police has historically not been this wide (Jones 2020). This is not to suggest that police are more racist now or that African Americans’ tolerance for racism or abuse has decreased, but perhaps the advent of instant communication, recording devices, and the frequency of incidents such as the murder of George Floyd. Have galvanized African Americans’ and awakened a keener awareness of these issues. This drop to 19% of African Americans’ expressing high confidence in Police was an 11% drop from the figure of 30%, which held steady between 2014-2019 (Jones 2020).

Additionally, Pew Research Center found support for certain police reform measures across racial lines, but in other areas, little change. First, the issue of qualified immunity has entered the public debate in recent years, and Americans have begun to express doubts about its legitimacy. Qualified Immunity is a manufactured judicial doctrine established by the Supreme Court in its 1982 decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald (Sobel 2020). The court established that police were immune from lawsuits so long as they did not, in bad faith, violate a person’s constitutional rights (Sobel 2020). This established a “good faith” standard which essentially requires plaintiffs in civil suits against police to establish specificity in alleging violations by police of their constitutional rights and that police acting in bad faith knowingly broke the law (Sobel 2020). This is a difficult standard to meet for a civil suit because it raises the burden of proof to such an extent that many cases cannot meet. However, amongst the public, there is broad support for allowing citizens to sue police officers who use excessive force or engage in misconduct (Pew
Research Center 2020). Many of the survey respondents, 66% in total, expressed strong support for the allowance of lawsuits in cases of police use of excessive force or misconduct beyond what current judicial doctrine concerning qualified immunity would allow (Pew Research Center 2020).

Amongst several racial groups, there are sizeable majorities to that effect. 86% of African Americans, 75% of Hispanics, and 60% of Whites express support for this position (Pew Research Center 2020). Amongst Democrats and left leaning independents, the figure is 84% in support, while among Republicans and right leaning independents, the figure is 45% in support (Pew Research Center 2020). Next declinations in the belief that police use the right amount of force in a given situation, that racial groups are treated equally by police, and that officers are held accountable for misconduct declined amongst respondents, with 69% of African Americans, 65% of Hispanics, and 64% of Whites, expressing doubt at the veracity of all three of those statements respectively (Pew Research Center 2020). For each group, those figures showed a decrease of 10% or more between 2016 and 2020 (Pew Research Center). Next, respondents reported 92% in favor of police being required to be trained with nonviolent alternatives to deadly force, 90% in favor of the creation of a federal database to track police misconduct, 74% in favor of giving civilian review boards power to oversee and discipline police, 74% in favor of establishing mandatory residency requirements for police and 74% in favor of banning chokeholds or any form of manual strangulation by police (Pew Research Center 2020).

Chart 1. Support for Several Police Reform Policies
It is important to place these results into the context that hindsight has given us. These polls were conducted only a few weeks after the murder of George Floyd. There was, by that point, racial and civil unrest already occurring as a result of previous police involved killings. It is possible that, given subsequent events which occurred during the police response to protests and in political authorities’ reactions to the situation as a whole, public opinion may have shifted not long after these polls were conducted. However, we can surmise that public support for
common sense measures such as banning chokeholds and holding police accountable for misconduct is high (Jones 2020, Pew Research Center 2020).

It is also apparent that confidence in the police has fallen from previous levels particularly among African Americans (Jones 2020). These findings hold both positive and concerning results for us to consider. The growing awareness about police misconduct is a net positive, and it is necessary for a representative democracy to possess citizens who question the state, particularly those portions that are armed. Likewise, support for common sense police reforms has increased. It is concerning, however, that confidence in the police, especially among African Americans, has hit record lows. This is important because it suggests that more Americans have come to view the police, not without cause, as being excessively violent and illegitimate. Americans increasingly not supporting the police is likely to exacerbate existing police-community relations issues and potentially create more volatile situations in which police make the choice to engage in further violence. The lack of legitimacy police possess today is, unfortunately, the result of decades of public policy decisions to pursue war against omnipresent ideas such as drugs, and, unfortunately minority communities. However, it is also the rapid militarization of police in the material sense that has escalated during the past several decades, which has been demonstrated to alienate members of the public (Mummolo 2018).

CHAPTER 5

An Analysis of the Equipment Transfers In this Dataset

The equipment that comprises the DV, the LOM, totaled 14,600 separate pieces of equipment. It should be noted that certain cities availed themselves of military equipment at far higher rates than others. For example, Las Vegas and Columbus acquired out of the total value,
23%, and 18%, respectively (see Table 4). Little Rock, the next highest, had 8% of the total value (see Table 4). There could be two things occurring here. Either some departments see militarization in the material sense as a necessity for security reasons, and thus avail themselves of federal transfers freely, owing to the little oversight this process entails from the DOD (Withers 2013). Or there is a more distinctive martial culture amongst the higher transfer police forces, which engenders the desire for military equipment.

The total of the equipment in this dataset is valued at $39,845,145.45 and ranges from mundane items to heavy weapons and vehicles. Unsurprisingly the data in this sample produced a figure of $10,753,404.00 spent on armored vehicles, accounting for 26.98% of the total expenditures in this dataset (see Table 2). This was for a total of 20 vehicles which ranged from MRAPs (Mine Resistant Armored Personnel Carriers) to Combat assault vehicles, which are a specialized type of attack vehicle that can take a variety of shapes, as well as traditional Armored Trucks, which we might observe in use by a bank or a cash business. Normal cargo trucks, 21 in total, are recorded in this dataset at $1,341,629.00 or 3.36% of the total expenditure (see Table 2). Aquatic craft, in this case, underwater scooters, which divers can hold onto and pilot for rapid transport, 4 in total, accounted for $20,000.00 or 0.05% of the total expenditure (see Table 2). Unusually, protective gear ranging from goggles to ballistic vests, in total, 359 items accounted for a mere $70,547.00 or .17% of the total expenditure (see Table 2).

One would think this figure would be far higher. However, it is possible that protective items are commonly bought with municipal budgets as a normal practice as opposed to other items. Aircraft exactly 7 helicopters and 1 cargo airplane for a total of 8 items are valued at $3,867,989.00 or 9.7% of the total (see Table 2). Camera systems, 28 in total, accounted for $103,734.00 or 0.26% of the total (see Table 2). Interestingly 14 of these camera systems were
for reconnaissance, and these were valued from $17,254.00 to $5,147.45, suggesting that some of these were more powerful and or sophisticated than others. Night vision equipment, 122 items in total, accounted for $522,170.00 or 1.31% of the total expenditure (see Table 2). Next drones, all land based and ranging from reconnaissance to bomb disposal types, accounted for $1,539,983.00 or 3.86% of the total expenditure (see Table 2). Various weapons sights and viewers, lasers, ranging equipment, telescopic devices, and binoculars in total, 2,061 items equaled $2,349,109.00 or 5.89% of the total expenditure (see Table 2). Rifles, meanwhile in total, 3,611 items equaled $1,310,421.00 or 3.28% of the total expenditure (see Table 2). Lastly the author kept a record of items he considered unusual for military transfers to police departments which ranged from coffeemakers to landmine detectors and calculated these at $30,968.00 for a total of 104 items or 0.07% of the total expenditure (see Table 2). Other equipment totaling $19,200,612.00 or 45.06% was mainly maintenance items, spare parts, and equipment upkeep tools (see Table 2).

5.1

Unusual Equipment Transfers

Interestingly the unusual items provided some interesting examples of the incongruity associated with transfers of military equipment to police agencies. First, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police department (LVMPD) acquired in 2016 a land mine detection set valued at $2,450.00. It should be noted that the author could find no example of an active landmine being found by the LVMPD or any other police agency in the continental United States. Next, Las Vegas and San Antonio each received several infrared transmitters, 63 and 30, respectively. These devices can be used to identify friendly forces in a situation where visibility is low. The author took the liberty of contacting the manufacturer of these transmitters using the NSN
(NATO Stock Number) to identify its manufacturer in order to ascertain what use these transmitters could be to the police. The manufacturer Cejay Engineering LLC, after being informed of the research purpose of this query, kindly shared that these transmitters are generally used for “high risk missions”. The manufacturer wrote that while they could be useful to police, in theory, police would do just as well with a “less sophisticated/lower cost option”. This demonstrates a sort of incongruity between police militarization and reality. It is elucidating that the manufacturer of this item would question the exigency of police use of their own products.

5.2

Drones

Tellingly the prevalence of drones in this data sample is high and indicates the validity of the Foucauldian boomerang theory. These ranged from reconnaissance to bomb disposal types, accounting for $1,539,983.00 or 3.86% of the total expenditure (see Table 2). Drones are a relatively recent innovation in military technology and have in a small amount of time, apparently entered into a surprising number of police departments. Notably, in 2016 police in Dallas, Texas, for the first time, used a drone with an explosive device attached to kill a sniper who had shot and killed five police officers (Feeney 2016). This was entirely novel and presents implications for future use of such tactics, and possibly provides legitimization for future police drone kills. This is written not to justify the sniper’s actions in any way but instead to observe the simple fact that SWAT teams had been used previously for similar incidents only for their use spread to mundane tasks like patrolling or serving narcotics warrants (Kraska and Kappeler 1997, Coyne and Blanco 2016). What evidence would suggest that the use of police drones for less serious incidents would not become commonplace as SWAT team raids have? The answer is there is none. Evidence would suggest that such a scenario is actually quite possible when we
countenance that police have a tendency, as observed in this paper, to use military equipment and tactics more often and for less serious issues than they were originally created for. SWAT teams, for example, were originally reserved for the most dangerous situations but have now proliferated to the point where they are used in low level narcotics interdiction regularly (Kraska and Kappeler 1997, Coyne and Blanco 2016).

We must also consider whether drone use by police is, in effect, an effort to realize Bentham’s metaphorical panopticon. The majority of these drones exactly are meant for reconnaissance. This again evinces the validity of the Foucauldian Boomerang theory because these items, until recently, had been restricted to the military sphere only to then migrate to the hands of the police. This finding also suggests that at present or sometime in the future, a great many metropolitan police departments will have the capability to spy on citizens remotely in ways that had been impossible only a short time ago. It is not improbable that police may also take to aerial drones in the near future, and this should be of concern as to whether police will then weaponize these. Furthermore, it should be noted that these ground reconnaissance drones have the potential to be and, in some cases, by the military, have been fitted with firearms (Gage 1995). This notion of any level of government, much less urban police forces having the ability to, with drones’ spy on and possibly kill citizens is, on its face, a major development of police militarization and indicative of panoptical surveillance capabilities that now lay in the hands of militarized police departments.
5.2.1

Robotic Police Dogs

The incident in Dallas involving the killing of a sniper with an explosive drone was a more extreme example of police drone use (Feeney 2016). Several similar drones to that used in Dallas are present in this dataset. However, recent examples provide more banal incidents of police drone use. The NYPD, in the year 2020, tested the use of a police robotic dog called “Spock” (Zaveri 2021). Spock was marketed by the NYPD as a lifesaving tool that would protect both police and the public (Zaveri 2021). Public displeasure with this new iteration of police militarization occurred when Spock was deployed to a public housing building to search for an armed person thought to be hiding there (Zaveri 2021). The juxtaposition between a $75,000 police drone and people living in poverty was not lost on observers of this case and highlights not only the disconnect between police and communities but also the unmoored rationales used to promote police militarization. Militarization of police is often rationalized as being an answer to social problems, though it has yet to alleviate social problems associated with poverty and may, as Mummolo (2018) suggests, cause upticks in crime or have no effect at all.

A further concern, in this case, is that Spock was stated by police to have some form of AI (Artificial Intelligence) within its programming (Zaveri 2021). Observers were quick to point out that should Spock or similar devices advance to the point of being autonomous and making their own decisions, there was no guarantee they would not act with bias (Zaveri 2021). As police, many times appear to do. In this case, it should be noted that the manufacturer of Spock, the corporation Boston Dynamics, disputes police statements that their creation uses AI (Zaveri 2021). Whether Spock is smart or not, the necessity of this tool is highly questionable. Spock is, in essence, the next logical step after decades of police adoption of military technology for
purposes that are never proven exigent. Police could not, in this case, when asked, explain how Spock would improve officer safety or that of the public (Zaveri 2021). The more likely purpose of police militarization in general and specifically the adoption of drones and other military technology is for social control. Spock is just the latest panoptical innovation; it embodies the Foucault’s boomerang (Foucault 1975).

5.3

Optical Equipment

We next observe the prevalence of optical equipment in this data. The total value for this equipment ranging from night vision goggles to rifle sights is $2,871,273.00. In the author’s view, this is one of the more basic aspects of police militarization. As police have militarized, their weapons have become more sophisticated, accessories for these weapons have become standard and are used with increasing prevalence. The use of weapons sights, in essence, is an attempt to increase police lethality. Magnification sights, reflex sights, and night vision scopes are all present in this sample, as are laser “bore” sights. It is possible that the police use of rifles is standard by this point that there is little need for police to seek out rifles from federal stockpiles as they have just bought them already with municipal budgets (Phillips 2016). Instead, they seek out expensive and, to an extent over, the top accessories for their existing rifles.

5.4

Other Equipment

When reviewing this data, it became apparent that much of the equipment transferred here was relatively mundane. This equipment totaled $19,200,612.00 or 45.06%, including items such as engine lubricant, spare rotors for helicopters, repair kits, and replacement parts were
highly prevalent (see Table 2). Skeptics might argue that this demonstrates that equipment transfers from the DOD are benign and that militarization of police is overemphasized by critical observers. The author of this paper would caution against this kind of oversimplification. Instead, this kind of transfer activity can be viewed as federal subsidization of municipal police militarization. The expense associated with maintaining this many of these higher value items, such as aircraft and vehicles, is enormous, and it seems apparent that these departments sometimes use federal transfers to save money on parts. We can then view these types of military transfers as a reinforcement of police militarization and subsidization of exorbitant police budgets. Essentially, federal transfers to these municipal police departments do not merely militarize them; they also subsidize their continued militarization by transferring spare parts, maintenance kits, and other items. This lends credence to claims of centralization of security agencies in the United States, amongst a traditionally federalist system in which power has normally been dispersed (Poland 2016).

### 5.5 Armored Vehicles

Unsurprisingly, armored vehicles made up a large portion of dollars spent within this data dataset. Totaling at $10,753,404.00, or 26.98%, these vehicles represent the largest expenditure by category within this dataset (see Table 2). Armored vehicles such as the MRAP have become ubiquitous symbols of police militarization. Their prominence in police departments came to wide public attention first during the Ferguson Missouri protests which began in August 2014 (Burkhardt, Baker 2019). Images of police with rifles astride, on what, by a common definition, are tanks, was a visceral display of what police militarization is meant to do (Burkhardt and Baker 2019). Police militarization and these vehicles, in particular, are meant to intimidate and
coerce. Those are the only purposes that such vehicles serve when confronting unarmed persons. These vehicles likely also contribute to the martial police culture better than virtually any other item simply because their character is distinctly militaristic.

CHAPTER 6

Quantitative Analysis: Correlation Between Police Militarization and Lethal Encounters

This paper will compare and analyze data on lethal force incidents and military transfers in thirty major American cities (see Table 1). The hypothesis of this paper is that a higher level of militarization correlates with a higher rate of lethal force incidents. If there exists a correlation, then it stands to reason that those more highly militarized municipal police departments should have lethal force incidents occur at higher rates than less militarized municipal police departments. This dataset accounts for the municipal police forces of thirty cities and covers approximately 8% of the population of the United States of America.

The author views urban areas as the birthplace of the first militarized police forces in the United States. Therefore, the study of these cradles of police militarization quantitatively is a novel contribution to this research area. This dataset is substantial, and it is necessary to consider the sheer weight of these numbers. A total of $398451456 was spent on militarizing these police departments. These same police departments killed 2611 Americans. A total of 14611 items were transferred to these police departments from the federal government. The effects of these items in and of themselves, depending on their nature, are debatable. The author takes, in this case, a holistic view that the item in and of itself is less important than its nature. Suppose the item itself is a military item, for example, a bivouac (type of temporary shelter, common in
military operations). In that case, it cannot be used to kill, but it heightens the martial culture and thus contributes to the LOM of these departments.

The IV is the level of militarization (LOM), and the DV is the number of police uses of lethal force. Both are interval level variables. This paper will use secondary data openly available for research in online databases sourced from Freedom of Information Act Requests (FOIA) and newspaper reporting on police killings. The IV data is sourced from an online database called “Open the Books”. This dataset contains information on the type of equipment, the dollar amount for each piece of equipment, and the quantity of equipment. This data is organized on an agency basis and, for this paper, will be used to determine how much the municipal police department for each of the cities covered has received in military transfers from the Department of Defense (DOD) whereby this will be used to constitute the IV or LOM. This database was created by a fiscal watchdog group called “Open the Books”, which utilizes FOIA requests to measure a number of government expenditures, including transfers of military equipment from the Department of Defense (DOD) to various police agencies. The Open the Books organization focuses on government spending in various areas, including equipment transfers. In order to measure military transfers, this paper will use a dollar figure for the total amount of military transfers to municipal police departments as a measure of the IV.

The DV data is sourced from a separate online database called “Fatal Encounters”. This data will be comprised of lethal force incidents in which the included municipal police departments were involved. The Fatal Encounters database tracks the number of people killed by police by examining accounts of police killings sourced from newspapers and police public statements from across the country. Fatal Encounters is managed by paid researchers and volunteers (Lawson 2018). Fatal Encounters is, at this point in time, amongst the best sources for
comprehensive estimates of the number of police involved deaths (Lawson 2018). Fatal Encounters was created in order to provide a measure of transparency in the realm of police use of lethal force that is not currently provided by governments. The use of newspaper articles in tallying police use of lethal force provides an easy system of fact checking the validity of each incident (Lawson 2018). Several peer reviewed papers, including two cited in this paper, Lawson (2019) and Delehanty et al. (2017), have utilized fatal encounters to conduct their own research in this area. Additionally, the author reviewed manually the data accessed from Fatal Encounters and did not observe any major issues with it.

6.1

Rationale for Sample Choice

The cities chosen for this paper were included because they each had data available on both the LOM and police use of lethal force incidents. Each of these cities has a population exceeding 50,000 persons. The exception to this was the inclusion of Atlantic City, New Jersey, whose population falls below 50,000. However, Atlantic City is widely known as a destination for gambling and other activities, so its population on a given day likely increases substantially and thus warrants inclusion. The data for incidents in which lethal force was used concerns exclusively municipal police departments for the listed cities. Likewise, the LOM data covers only those military transfers to the same municipal police departments. For example, data on lethal force incidents and data on the LOM for New York City covers only the NYPD, not the state police of New York, and not any federal or port security agencies. The decision to focus on cities as opposed to counties or states stems from the view of the author and scholarly sources that militarization of police began in urban centers and germinated outwards (Go 2020). Furthermore, urban centers have been a hotbed of questionable police behavior and have seen
serious civil unrest in response. These views are supported by contemporary social science as well as the historical record. Go (2020) found that militarization of police in urban centers coincided with population shifts, namely immigration from southern/eastern Europe and the Great Migration of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Likewise, Fogelson (1977) observed that professionalization in a militarist fashion occurred in cities across the United States during this same time period in response to proletarian unrest, amongst other causes. Since that time, analysis of more contemporary events has described a state of “low intensity conflict” that exists in American cities, between militarized police departments and communities therein (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). These facets of police militarization make focusing on cities a rational approach to studying this topic.

6.3 Procedures

To test this hypothesis whether there is a correlation between the variables, the author used data from the Fatal Encounters database, as well as the Open the Books Database for this papers DV and IV, respectively. The periods of time this data covers are for the IV 1999-2019 and for the DV 2000-2021. This data covers thirty major American cities, which comprise 8% of the total population of the United States (see Table 1). This data was then standardized per 100,000 inhabitants for each city. This created two new variables for each city (see table 1). These two new variables were used as the multipliers to test for a correlation between them. The author will perform correlation analysis to determine whether there is a relationship between the IV and the DV. Lastly, the author will perform regression analysis to determine if the IV has a reliable impact on the DV.
6.3

Results

While the results of the statistical test (Pearson’s r) did not reach statistical significance at p<.05, the results did show a moderate positive correlation between the variables, with an r value of .34 a p .064 (See Figure 2). This means that within this dataset, as the IV increases, the DV also increases, though this increase occurs in an unreliable manner (see Figure 1B). Since a p value of .064 was recorded, this suggests that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (see Figure 2). Despite not reaching significance, the results for p are in the direction one would expect for these variables in that the IV does seem to affect the DV but does not meet the threshold for significance. These scores suggest that the hypothesis for this paper cannot be supported and that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

These results likely occurred for several reasons. First, the data sample for this paper was likely not large enough to establish a strong correlation between these variables. The author had supposed that gathering data for jurisdictions that encompass 8% of the population of the United States would provide a viable dataset for establishing a correlation between the variables. This would suggest that a larger population size on its own does not necessarily provide enough data to establish a strong correlation between the variables. Further, it is possible that the IV is not important for predicting the DV within this dataset. This would suggest that a higher LOM does not necessarily predict strongly more frequent police use of lethal force within this dataset.

Next there are certain issues present within this dataset that suggest both the DV and IV are lower in this dataset than in reality. For the IV, it is possible that police agencies have bought more military equipment from defense contractors not covered in these datasets (Rahall 2014).
There exists what Rahall (2014) terms a “green to blue” pipeline wherein lobbyists for police agencies and the defense industry pursue the further acquisition of military equipment by police departments. The police agencies therein do this because they want this equipment; it conforms to their worldview, which is full of imagined dangers, while at the same time meshes well with the martial culture they have erected (Burkhardt and Baker 2019). The records of military equipment purchases are not always available to the public or researchers. Police agencies are, after all, semi-clandestine paramilitary organizations; by and large, they do not willingly at all times divulge their equipment acquisitions to interested parties (Kraska 2001). Therefore, the LOM used for the IV is probably deflated in this dataset and is possibly higher in reality.

Next, it is possible, if not probable, that the datasets the author accessed were not complete for the DV. Fatal Encounters admits this, and despite their herculean efforts to catalog incidents of police use of lethal force, it is possible they missed certain incidents or mislabeled others. Despite this, Fatal Encounters is among the best public databases for estimating police killings in the United States. While accessing data for the DV, the author noted that in certain instances, a police agency was mislabeled, or the labeling was inconsistent. For example, “metropolitan” as in metropolitan police department was entered as “metro” for several entries but not for dozens of others. The author attempted to counter this by entering several variations of a named department into the database when he thought it possible that this error might occur and checking the entries against zip codes and geographical locations. It is also possible that police agencies in this dataset have failed to report all of their uses of lethal force.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion
The results of this paper suggest that a moderate positive correlation exists between a higher LOM and more frequent police use of lethal force for the municipal police departments covered in this dataset. Despite falling below, the threshold for significance, this would suggest that the urban police departments used in this study, which are more militarized, kill at higher rates than their less militarized peers. Another factor to consider is the population sizes of these cities. It is notable in this sample that New York City, despite its high population of 8,804,190, had a relatively small number of police uses of lethal force at 72 exactly. Other far less populated cities, such as Tulsa, with a population size of 413,066 persons, had 99 recorded police uses of lethal force (see Table 3). This would suggest that by and large population, at least in these urban areas, does not necessarily predict, on its own, a higher number of police uses of lethal force.

While not finding a statistically significant correlation between the variables, this paper’s qualitative portions offer evidence that police militarization has been growing in America for more than a century and tends to increase police violence and lethal force incidents. From this paper’s critical literature review, as well as from its historical analysis, we can make conclusions about police militarization. We have observed how militarism and imperialism invariably reverberate onto the nations they originated from and alter their police practices (Foucault 1975, Go 2020). The lessons learned during the early imperial expansions of the United States informed the great police reform movement of the early 20th century, and they created what today have become militarized police forces (Go 2020). From their beginning, militarized police forces clashed with the urban proletariat and racial minorities (Fogelson 1977, Richardson 1980, Go 2020). We then observed that the militarization of police has grown and evolved to incorporate new military tactics and equipment as they were developed on foreign battlefields.
(Coyne and Blanco 2016, Go 2020). The advent of the SWAT team and the proliferation of police use of drones evinces this (Kraska and Kappeler 1997, Coyne and Blanco 2016, Go 2020).

Furthermore, we have come to understand innovations in police militarization and police policy more broadly as being, in essence, a form of ideological praxis. This praxis of policing is brought about in a variety of ways. Police militarization embodies the neoconservative praxis, which stresses the maintenance of hierarchical social order and achieves this goal with violence (Kraska and Paulsen 1997, Koslicki and Willits 2018). In comparison, community policing embodies the neoliberal praxis, which devolves onto the community the responsibility to maintain order while at the same time allowing the state to metaphorically wash its hands of dealing with social problems constructively (Kraska and Paulsen 1997, Koslicki and Willits 2018). These ideological praxes have coalesced and share a consubstantial relationship in modern American policing. Together these praxes have served to disguise police militarization and, at the same time, accelerate the militarization of police.

Furthermore, we have gained insight from examining the equipment inventories contained in this data set. These inventories suggest that police militarization in terms of equipment is incongruous with actual police needs. It may also be argued that the presence of nonlethal military maintenance equipment is, in essence, a subsidy used to offset bloated, militarized police force budgets (see Table 2). In some cases, police departments in this data set have been shown to possess equipment whose utility is highly suspect. Arguably, police departments have to a degree, over militarized themselves and, in doing so, have acquired military equipment to meet contingencies that they are unlikely to face.

From this paper, we can observe that police militarization does have a deleterious effect and does cause police to kill more often. The martial culture of police combined with police
adoption of military equipment and tactics has had a harmful effect on those subject to police power in the United States of America for more than a century. Whether it was because of proletarian agitation, racial minorities, or civil unrest, a rationale has always been found for police to militarize and deploy military equipment and tactics on those who could least defend themselves. The literature review, the data analysis, and the historical analysis of this paper tend to point in the same direction. Police in the United States have militarized and kill more often because of it. These developments displayed and examined in the findings of this paper should give pause to any serious observer of police policy today in the United States.

Observers must also realize that the problems of police militarization need not continue and grow worse. For more than a century, police militarization has grown, and police violence, along with it, to become today not the means to an ordered society but instead a disordered society. The events of the past several years should teach us, if nothing else, that police violence and police militarization inspire fear and hate among Americans subjected to them. Excessive police violence has been the catalyst for destruction and broad distrust of police. We critical observers must no longer live in denial of the myriad problems’ observable in militarized policing today. We can have a demilitarized system of policing in the United States. We need only first be honest with ourselves and realize that the era of police militarization has not created a peaceful society but rather one that is violent.
CHAPTER 8

Figures and Data Tables

Figures. 1A, 1B. Results of Correlation analysis and Variables displayed Visually on a Scatter Plot

Source: Open the Books Database, and the Fatal Encounters Database, for the IV and DV respectively

A. Results of Correlation Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>x</th>
<th>y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>y</td>
<td>0.342377</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Variables displayed Visually on a Scatter Plot
Figure 2. Regression Analysis Results

Data Source: Open the Books Database, and Fatal Encounters Database, for the IV and DV respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlations</th>
<th>Dollar Amount Transfers</th>
<th>Lethal Force Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dollar Amount Transfers</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Force Incidents</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. Chart of Data for both Variables, Populations, and Multipliers for Each City

Source: Data for the IV and DV was sourced from Open the Books, and Fatal Encounters respectively. Population data was accessed from the U.S Census Bureau.

The multipliers for the variables were calculated by the author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Dollar Amount in Transfers, IV</th>
<th>Lethal Force Incidents, DV</th>
<th>Multiplier Population</th>
<th>Multiplier IV</th>
<th>Multiplier DV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York City (NY)</td>
<td>8804190</td>
<td>1523000</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>88.0419</td>
<td>15.23</td>
<td>0.00072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles (CA)</td>
<td>3967000</td>
<td>2229458.61</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>27.46388</td>
<td>22.45641</td>
<td>0.00319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago (IL)</td>
<td>2746388</td>
<td>2245641</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>8.73965</td>
<td>5.89512</td>
<td>0.00086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisville (KY)</td>
<td>633104</td>
<td>847064</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>6.33104</td>
<td>8.47064</td>
<td>0.00072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulsa (OK)</td>
<td>413066</td>
<td>733333</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>4.13066</td>
<td>7.33333</td>
<td>0.00099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco (CA)</td>
<td>873965</td>
<td>589512</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>8.73965</td>
<td>5.89512</td>
<td>0.00086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jose (CA)</td>
<td>1013240</td>
<td>939353.3</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>10.1324</td>
<td>9.393533</td>
<td>0.00072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia (PA)</td>
<td>1603797</td>
<td>111141</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>16.03797</td>
<td>1.11141</td>
<td>0.00224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce City (CO)</td>
<td>56488</td>
<td>495000</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.56488</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>0.00011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado Springs (CO)</td>
<td>464871</td>
<td>88655</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4.64871</td>
<td>0.88655</td>
<td>0.00064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert (AZ)</td>
<td>243254</td>
<td>131893.66</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.43254</td>
<td>1.3189366</td>
<td>0.00006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Vegas (NV)</td>
<td>634773</td>
<td>8995930.05</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>6.34773</td>
<td>89.95930</td>
<td>0.00203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escondido (CA)</td>
<td>151300</td>
<td>112486</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.513</td>
<td>1.12486</td>
<td>0.00029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moore (OK)</td>
<td>60943</td>
<td>735334</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.60943</td>
<td>7.35334</td>
<td>0.00012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark (NJ)</td>
<td>281054</td>
<td>102827.3</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2.81054</td>
<td>1.028273</td>
<td>0.00055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus (OH)</td>
<td>878553</td>
<td>7059601</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>8.78553</td>
<td>70.59601</td>
<td>0.00096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampa (FL)</td>
<td>387916</td>
<td>404728</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3.87916</td>
<td>4.04728</td>
<td>0.00045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Total Sales</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>Onset</td>
<td>Average Sales</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Rock (AK)</td>
<td>197958</td>
<td>2989068.45</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1.97958</td>
<td>29.890684</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis (TN)</td>
<td>1361192</td>
<td>651932</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>6.51932</td>
<td>13.61192</td>
<td>0.00095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt Lake City UT)</td>
<td>697920</td>
<td>197756</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1.97756</td>
<td>6.9792</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sioux City (IA)</td>
<td>733000</td>
<td>82531</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.82531</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo (OH)</td>
<td>142874</td>
<td>359535.4</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.76614</td>
<td>3.595354</td>
<td>0.00041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syracuse (NY)</td>
<td>672737.9</td>
<td>142874</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.42874</td>
<td>6.727379</td>
<td>0.00017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento (CA)</td>
<td>738551.8</td>
<td>500930</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>5.0093</td>
<td>7.385518</td>
<td>0.00066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta (GA)</td>
<td>1153934.51</td>
<td>488800</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>4.888</td>
<td>11.539345</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providence (RI)</td>
<td>71886</td>
<td>179494</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.79494</td>
<td>0.71886</td>
<td>0.00009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic City (NJ)</td>
<td>862283.77</td>
<td>37999</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.37999</td>
<td>8.6228377</td>
<td>0.00008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Bay (WI)</td>
<td>1149733</td>
<td>104777</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.04777</td>
<td>11.49733</td>
<td>0.00011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio (TX)</td>
<td>826885.7</td>
<td>1508000</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>15.08</td>
<td>8.268857</td>
<td>0.00206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knoxville (TN)</td>
<td>883459</td>
<td>186173</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1.86173</td>
<td>8.83459</td>
<td>0.00037</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Equipment by Percentage of Total Value

The data shown here is comprised of an aggregation for all 30 cities in this dataset, which were sourced from Open the Books, and calculated by the author.
Table 3. Lethal Force Incidents by City

Source: Fatal Encounters Database, tabulated by the author.
Table 4. Percent of Total Transfer Value per City

Source: Open the Books Database, calculated by the author.
CHAPTER 9

Bibliography

ACLU 2014. Federal Militarization of Law enforcement Must End


Carroll Doherty, Director, Political Research


President Obama, Town Hall on Police reform, 2022

President Trump, Remarks to PBA members, Bedminster NJ, 2020


Skolnick, Jerome H.; Bayley, David H. (1988). "Theme and Variation in Community Policing".


