Journal / Book Title
Public Administration Review
This article explores the political influence of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Using Congress's overhaul of the regulatory infrastructure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a case study, the article presents two principal findings: (1) The characteristics that distinguish government-sponsored enterprises from traditional government agencies and private companies endow Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with unique political resources; and (2) the alignment of interest groups around Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is subject to strategic manipulation by the GSEs. A triangular model of this alignment is proposed and employed to analyze the legislative outcome. The case has implications for students of organizational theory as well as policy makers considering the use of GSEs or other hybrid organizations.
MSU Digital Commons Citation
Koppell, Jonathan G.S., "Hybrid Organizations and the Alignment of Interests: The Case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac" (2001). Publications from President Jonathan G.S. Koppell. 2.
Koppell, Jonathan GS. "Hybrid organizations and the alignment of interests: The case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac." Public Administration Review 61, no. 4 (2001): 468-482. Harvard
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