Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2001
Journal / Book Title
Journal of applied philosophy
Abstract
Critics who allege that deception in psychology experiments is unjustified frequently cite Stanley Milgram’s ‘obedience experiments’ as evidence. These critics say that arguments for justification tend to downplay the risks involved and overstate the benefits from such research. Milgram, they add, committed both sins. Critics are right to point out that research oversight is often susceptible to self-serving abuse. But stating a priori how beneficial a given experiment will be is a tall order for psychologists, or anyone else. At the same time, critics themselves have difficulty in showing what is wrong with deception, and how subjects in these experiments suffer. Hence, it becomes unclear what the psychologists, including Milgram, are prone to downplay. There is also room to wonder how the Milgram studies can illuminate the debate over deception. Although Milgram probably exaggerated the scientific significance of his own work, critics who exaggerate its moral and historical significance do little to clarify the status of deception.
DOI
10.1111/1468-5930.00192
MSU Digital Commons Citation
Herrera, Chris, "Ethics, Deception, and ‘Those Milgram Experiments’" (2001). Department of Philosophy Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works. 5.
https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/philosophy-facpubs/5
Published Citation
Herrera, C. D. (2001). Ethics, deception, and'those Milgram experiments'. Journal of applied philosophy, 245-256.